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This dissertation addresses the challenge of liberal democracies to deal with fundamental 
conflicts in society about, for example, political representation and natural resources, and the 
subsequent transfer of such conflicts into the criminal justice arena when actors fail to deal 
with competing demands in the political arena. In an exploration of tensions between law and 
justice, and the competing conceptions of “crime” and “harm,” this work analyzes 
criminalization processes in three contentious episodes: the Chilean-Mapuche territorial 
conflict, the Spanish-Basque separatist conflict, and the eco-conflict in the United 
States. Although prosecutors invariably asserted their independence and the democratic 
mandate to “simply” enforce the law, this dissertation describes the gradual politicization of 
criminal proceedings as opposing actors implicated in the political struggle move into the 
criminal justice arena and make it subject to and the space of claim-making. This study not only 
challenges the belief that criminal law can be applied in an independent and neutral manner. 
Taking a constructivist perspective on the prosecutorial narrative and analyzing how 
mobilization and discursive action of “victims” and “prisoner supporters” aim to push or 
challenge criminal prosecutions, it describes in detail the ways in which such conflictive and 














* SI APLIKAN LEY WINKA HABRÁ JUSTICIA MAPUCHE1    
 
                                                      
1
 If they apply huinca [pejorative word for Chilean] law, there will be Mapuche justice. This phrase is used 
frequently by radical Mapuche activists (see, for example, Presxs a la Kalle 2009).  
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“[Judge] Learned Hand2 […] feared a lawsuit more than death or taxes. Criminal cases are the 
most frightening of all, and they are also the most fascinating for the public” (Dworkin 1986:1).  
 
October 1997, United States: six raids in the Midwest just before the pelting season: between 
8,000 and 12,000 minks released, two fur farms out of business. Opposing interpretations 
either emphasize the tragedy of enormous economic losses for these farming families or joy 
that many animals escaped death for profit.   
 
October 1999, Chile: a forestry plantation is set on fire in the south of Chile. The plantation 
belongs to a large forestry company that currently owns 391,000 ha of plantations, while an 
adjacent indigenous Mapuche community claims historical rights to the land. Opposing 
interpretations either indicate anger about the economic loss for the forestry company or 
happiness to see the invasion of imported water-consuming trees turned into ashes.  
 
March 1992, Spain: three Molotov cocktails set the offices of the national train company in 
Bilbao on fire. Opposing interpretations either claim this was terrorism and related to the 
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armed organization ETA or view it as the angry expression of youths because of police violence 
during a demonstration earlier that day.  
 
Each of these incidents formed the material for “frightening” and “fascinating” criminal 
prosecutions. Peter Young, who released the minks, spent two years in jail. José Nain, who 
always denied responsibility for the arson at the plantation, was convicted to five years and one 
day in prison. At the same time, the Mapuche community where he was living ultimately 
received the disputed land. Julen Larrinaga, member of a left-nationalist Basque youth group, 
was convicted under terrorism laws to ten years in prison. Each of these events was the subject 
of a struggle of interpretation, and the criminal proceedings were as much a site for this 
struggle as a significant contributor to it. The story that the prosecutor chooses to tell in the 
courtroom reinforces one version of the truth about the political contention and 
institutionalizes this truth in the form of legal documents if the judges ratify that interpretation. 
Further, the story chosen by the prosecutor blames some as “perpetrators,” whereas others are 
labeled “victims,” thus enabling the punishment and incarceration of some individuals and not 
of others.  
 
Each of the events took place in the context of “streams of contention,” a concept that I borrow 
from Tilly (2007:211) which refers to “connected moments of collective claim making that 
observers single out for explanation.” Within these streams of contention, I am concerned with 







terminology coined by Charles Tilly (in collaboration with Sid Tarrow and Doug McAdam) that is 
visible in concepts like contentious politics, contentious episodes and contentious 
performances. Other scholars have adopted and made variations on this theme, such as Auyero 
in his book Contentious Lives (2003). While Tilly and his colleagues have not explicitly entered 
the terrain of criminal justice and the specific processes and mechanisms pertaining to it, I draw 
upon some of their concepts and insights to examine this arena.  
 
I have selected three “streams of contention” as the context for my inquiry about processes of 
criminalization. In the US, eco-activists are challenging the current use of animals and the Earth 
for human purposes and therefore demand the closure of animal testing companies, the end of 
experimentation with animals, defense of the earth against infrastructural projects, and 
restrictions on logging companies. In Chile, Mapuche activists are reclaiming the lands that they 
lost when they were relocated to reservations in 1881. In Spain, Basque left-nationalists are 
fighting for an independent and socialist Basque Country. For analytical purposes, these 
streams of contention can be broken down into separate contentious episodes (Tilly 2007:213). 
Thus, whereas the Chilean-Mapuche territorial conflict is a “stream of contention” that has 
been running ever since the Chilean army fought against Mapuche communities and 
subsequently moved them to reservations, I have chosen to limit my inquiry to the 
“contentious episode” that began in 1990 when a democratic government was installed after 







incidents have occurred that came to the attention of the government with a claim to criminal 
investigation and prosecution.  
 
In this study, I am concerned with the challenges and difficulties the criminal justice system 
faces in dealing with these conflicts and any harm they cause. The general inadequacy of 
criminal justice systems to solve conflicts has been pointed out by many scholars, who point 
out, for example, the one-sided focus on perpetrators and the frequent exclusion of victims 
from criminal justice proceedings. Further, crimes often have their origin in social problems like 
unemployment or psychological disorders. Locking up perpetrators does not address these 
underlying factors. Some critics go so far as to abolish the notion of punishment (e.g., Hulsman 
1986). Without disputing the need to punish or deal coercively with those that use “violence”3 
to achieve some moral cause, I want to explore how this fundamental problem of western 
democracies and their criminal justice systems plays out in the setting of actual conflicts.  
 
                                                      
3
 The concept “violence” is itself wrought with interpretation and the attribution of malicious intent. The dentist 
that hurts you with the intention to cure you is not generally thought of as violent. Indeed, it is one of my 
objectives in this book to trace the different definitions of protest activity and the development in which these 
contentious and often disruptive actions become increasingly defined as illegitimate and violent. Indeed, the very 
meaning of “violence” is contested, not only in its application but also in theory, as some advocate the position 
that violence can only be inflicted on human beings (or animals), whereas others include the destruction of 
property in definitions of violence (I refer interested readers to a discussion on this topic by Morreall, 2002). 
Violence is often defined as intentionally causing harm to life or property. This presupposes that the definition of 
“harm” is unproblematic, which however, as we will see in the various cases, is equally contested. In my writing it 
would be good to use quotation marks every time that I use the concept “violence” to indicate that its use 
inevitably refers to the labeling as violence by particular actors. I have, however, chosen not to do so, and remain 







Criticisms of the rule of law 
There is a need for new thinking about the nature of criminal prosecutions in relation to 
political struggles. Political protest can range from harmless social movement activity to deadly 
attacks. The distinctions between actions on this continuum between these two poles are not 
only inevitably blurred, but also heavily contested, as is illustrated in the brief examples above. 
The translation of such actions into “crimes” is thus inherently contentious. The framework of 
the rule of law claims to be unaffected by this contestation as it sticks to the parameters of due 
process and the strict application of the letter of the law.4 A de-contextualized criminal justice 
approach simply emphasizes obedience to the law and relegates political claims to the political 
arena.  
 
The rule of law framework is, however, subject to challenges from different sides. Two distinct 
criticisms of the rule of law were dominant in my country studies and are a reflection of voices 
from all over the world. A first criticism emphasizes that the rule of law obliges the state to 
protect victims. This is a demand for security. The 9/11 attacks in New York have led people to 
question the suitability of criminal prosecutions to deal with such threats. Many countries have 
enabled stronger incursions on the rights of suspects, leading to longer periods of preventive 
                                                      
4
 In this book, I will use the terms “rule of law” and “rechtsstaat” interchangeably. While they largely refer to the 
same concept, they originate in different legal traditions. This has been discussed, for example, by Anne Marie Bos, 
Geregeld recht. Een rechtspositivistische analyse van de rechtsstaat, Diss. UvA, Nijmegen 2001, pp. 27–28 (cited in: 
Veraart 2005:22, footnote 59).  
I use rechtsstaat as the German concept without translation, just like the translator of Habermas chose to do in 
Between facts and norms (1998:xxxv).   
Veraart points out that any conception of the rechtsstaat always comes as not just a description, but also a set of 
requirements vis-à-vis the government (2005:22, footnote 60). Similarly, Abel asserts that “[l]aw is intrinsically 
normative; its prescriptions embody societal ideals” (2010:19). In chapter 1 I return more fully to my 







detention and broader investigative authorities for police and intelligence agencies. While this 
perspective addresses the fact that the rule of law is not capable of creating a harm-free 
society, it ignores the rights of defendants or criticizes such rights as an “obstacle” in the fight 
against terrorism. Advocates of harsher treatment of terrorist suspects often seem to take for 
granted that the suspects are factually guilty. The lamentable death of the Brazilian Jean 
Charles de Menezes in 2005 in the London subway after the police decided to shoot to kill is 
only one extreme example of the tragedies that can arise when rule of law guarantees are 
loosened. Further, the focus on preventing supposed terrorist attacks can overshadow or 
thwart efforts to address and solve underlying societal problems.   
 
A second criticism claims that social protest is “criminalized,” which points to the numerous 
incidents in which states use the rule of law to repress political opponents (e.g., CIDSE 2009; 
OCMAL 2009).5 Mugabe’s labeling of humanitarian food assistance as “terrorism” is just one 
example of the potential abuses of anti-terrorism laws (Cortright 2008:9). Social and political 
activists are indeed hampered in their work when they are the target of various prosecutions 
and investigations, especially when they face long preventive detentions and disproportional 
charges. Compliance with due process requirements and eventual acquittals may be hailed as 
“justice” within the logic of the rule of law, but they do not take away this burden on social 
movements. People accusing the government of “perverse” criminalization, however, often fail 
                                                      
5
 There is even a Facebook page devoted to the issue of criminalization of social protest: 
http://www.facebook.com/pages/NO-A-LA-CRIMINALIZACION-DE-LA-PROTESTA-SOCIAL/204679125172 [Accessed 







to address or recognize the existence or threat of actual harm due to law breaking.6 In later 
chapters, we will observe that protesters sometimes ignore or dismiss the grievances of victims 
of sabotage, vandalism or even murder, which is felt to be especially disparaging when those 
victims are unrelated to the political demands.  
 
While these criticisms thus do address some of the fundamental flaws or downsides of the rule 
of law framework of criminal prosecutions, they are problematic in that they tend to simplify 
what is at stake and fail to take important concerns or complexities into account.  
 
In this research I deal exclusively with episodes where criminal prosecutions are the chosen 
framework. It is important to note, however, that approaches that dismiss prosecution and opt, 
for example, for amnesty do not escape the blurring and defining of crime and politics. An 
example of this is the frustration of South Africans who were robbed or whose relatives were 
killed, while the Truth and Reconciliation Commission gave the perpetrators amnesty because 
the crimes were considered part of a political struggle.  
 
Despite these challenges, prosecutors stick to the rule of law framework when they assert their 
independence and the mandate to “simply” enforce the law. In this dissertation I will focus on 
these challenges to the rule of law as I describe the gradual politicization of the criminal justice 
arena that takes place when opposing actors implicated in the political struggle move into the 
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criminal justice arena and make it subject to and a space for claim-making. I understand 
“politicization” as bringing issues into the arena of “the political” and making it subject to 
contestation (Mouffe 1993). Thus, the political is opposed to the “pre-political,” which is 
assumed and taken for granted. As we will see, the prosecutorial narrative is not immune to 
contesting claims and discourses, and over time engages with them, for example explicitly 
rejecting one discourse and adopting (parts of) another discourse, sometimes leading to a 
radical discursive shift. The fact that I view the choices and representation of the prosecutor as 
a narrative does not mean that it is not the truth. The point is that one can represent any event 
in multiple truthful ways by selecting certain elements and ignoring others.7 Specifically, the 
prosecutor can be observed to depart from a de-contextualized and de-politicized 
representation in favor of a re-contextualization of the events subject to criminalization. While 
the re-contextualization serves to expand criminal liability and thus to respond to victim 
demands for justice and order, it also propels a new basis for continued contestation.  
 
I have reached this conclusion on the basis of in-depth research into the processes of 
criminalization in the Chilean-Mapuche territorial conflict, the Spanish-Basque separatist 
conflict, and the conflict about the use of animals and the earth in the U.S. (henceforth eco-
conflict). Each of these episodes represents a liberal democracy afflicted by political struggle 
where political and legal collective actions are accompanied by illegal and underground activity 
ostensibly aiming to achieve political demands by extra-legal means. Each of the conflicts 
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represents a threat to the government that is not existential, but also not insignificant. The 
cases tell us how prosecutors respond to that challenge.  
 
The question 
What do criminal prosecutions in streams of contention look like? Such contention can become 
a problem of national proportions and concern, such as the Basque conflict in Spain or the 
Mapuche conflict in Chile. Newspapers frequently or even daily report on events related to the 
conflict, and descriptions of the occurrence and the impact of violent or illegal events regularly 
fill the pages. While prosecutors prepare the cases against the suspected perpetrators of those 
crimes, they are aware of the context within which the crime and the trial take place. As a 
Chilean prosecutor put it, he knows that a Mapuche activist burning down a plantation is not 
the same as a random pyromaniac. He claims, however, that this does not in any way affect his 
job (Interview C-12). Of course, prosecutors are not supposed to get involved in politics. 
According to the logic of liberal legalism they are not responsible for solving political conflicts.8 
Their task is just to execute the law and prosecute the crimes as they are defined in the criminal 
law. The setting or context of those crimes should not affect their work.  
 
However, setting and context do matter. In three country studies we will learn whether, when, 
and how prosecutors take the context of a crime into account as they are investigating and 
prosecuting crimes. The results of my research clearly show that context is deemed important 
                                                      
8
 “Liberal legalism” is the ideology which places criminal proceedings firmly within the tradition of the rule of law 
and cherishes liberal notions such as individual responsibility and formal equality. In chapter 1 I will come back to 







and is not always ignored and excluded from prosecutorial narratives. We will see, moreover, 
how the interpretation of the context affects the definition of the crime and the identification 
and prosecution of perpetrators.   
 
These difficulties are not the exclusive terrain of criminal prosecutions in contentious episodes. 
One can think of other relevant areas, such as the prosecution of gang violence or the 
prosecution of politically prominent persons. One could even argue that every criminal case 
might display some of the dynamics that I outline here. Often prosecutors mentioned in their 
interviews that the “conflict” cases were not so different from ordinary cases. Indeed, I do not 
claim that the processes described here are particularly unique. I do argue that they may be 
more visible and sustained over a longer period of time, creating feedback loops that should be 
taken into account when trying to understand both the conflict dynamic and the nature of the 
criminal prosecutions.  
 
This question (How are criminal prosecutions conducted in a situation of conflict?) can be 
situated in the longstanding academic debate about the relation between law and politics. Put 
simply, some have argued that law is separate from politics, whereas others have asserted that 
there is no separation at all, i.e., that law is just another way of doing politics and securing the 
interests of the powerful. Many academics have tried to reconcile these opposing positions by 
formulating ways in which law and politics are separate but interdependent (Abel and Marsh 







views law as a socially embedded phenomenon and “is premised on the understanding that the 
conventional division of law from society creates false dichotomies in thinking.”9 The separation 
between law and politics, however, is more than just one academic theory among many; it is 
the foundational fiction and normative ideal upon which lawyers work and have constructed 
the legal system (this is described, for example, by Nonet and Selznick 1978). The rule of law in 
this sense is and has to be opposed to the rule by men.  
 
Liberalism advocates a specific way of dealing with conflicts. Western criminal justice systems 
are based in a liberal ideology. It asserts formal equality of autonomous individuals and a 
separation between fair proceedings and substantive justice. Political issues are excluded from 
criminal justice questions as political goals are to be dealt with by dialogue and political 
lobbying. This system separates ends and means, leaving ends entirely free while prosecuting 
all illegal means. Thus, a US prosecutor insisted in the courtroom that “this [case] is not about 
animal rights.” Indeed, he even acknowledged privately that the defendants’ allegations of 
animal abuse in the animal testing company may be true. “But then they have to go to 
Congress,” he noted, confirming his commitment to the formal proceedings (Interview US-13). 
In each of the episodes, we can observe the prosecutors sticking to this formal rhetoric. This 
separates the defendants on trial from the larger group that may share their ideology and 
material grievances. “Real Mapuches are peaceful,” argued the Chilean prosecutor (Interview C-
10). “Peaceful animal rights activists have nothing to fear for,” asserted the US prosecutor 
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 From the “Law and Society” publication series of British Columbia University Press, 







(Interview US-13). Of course, the separation between defendants and the rest of the movement 
is a slightly bigger challenge once there are 62 defendants, such as in one of the macro-trials in 
Spain, or when entire organizations in which many Basque volunteers are active are judged to 
be terrorist organizations.  
 
Prosecutors cannot all be lumped in one category. It is not my concern here, however, to focus 
on the dynamics within prosecutorial offices or engage with the personal considerations of 
individual prosecutors. Rather than placing attention on the person of prosecutors, I have 
studied the act of criminal prosecutions and the decisions and arguments voiced by prosecutors 
as representatives of the state and the rule of law. The state is not a monolithic enterprise 
either. Prosecutors may act in contradiction to other state actors, such as judges or politicians. 
Migdal suggests conceptualizing the state as a “field of power marked by the use and threat of 
violence” and shaped by a combination of (1) an image of a “coherent, controlling organization 
in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory,” and (2) the 
“actual practices of its multiple parts” (2001:16). I study the practices of prosecutors as state 
actors that draw upon, defend or reproduce the image of the state. 
 
Here it is important that while there are personal differences between individual prosecutors 
and while approaches in prosecutions have changed over time, all prosecutors have publicly 
maintained their commitment to the basic tenets of the rule of law. This does not mean that 







motives are involved. On the contrary, all prosecutors were fully aware that politics played a 
role. This is precisely why it is noteworthy that they remained committed to their task to 
extract the “criminal” from the “political” and engage in this act of boundary drawing. It is this 
boundary drawing and the multiple and changing ways in which it is done, interpreted, and 
contested that is the object of this study.  
 
Criminal law is understood to be conceived ideologically for a society in consensus, with shared 
crime definitions and a clear-cut public interest.10 In addition, the criminal law assumes an 
abstract individual as the agent of equal rights and responsibilities. Under those circumstances, 
the formal rationality of criminal law (separating fair proceedings from substantive justice) 
would be the fair and legitimate way to deal with “crimes” regardless of the substantive nature 
of problems. These assumptions of consensus and abstract individualism are challenged during 
contentious episodes in which a society becomes polarized and actors engage in collective 
action to contest the status quo.  
 
This dissertation is about the fine line that prosecutors tread as they stay away from politics but 
take into account the context in which crimes occur. This balancing act will be studied in an 
analysis of the “battle of interpretation” that is part of any criminal trial, but in situations of 
conflict the battle of interpretation or “meta-conflict” has a significance and participating voices 
that go beyond the particular trial at hand. The meta-conflict – the interpretive battle about the 
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 This does not mean that in any of the countries the criminal codes or the justice system were devised in a society 
in consensus. It refers to the Enlightenment ideology which inspired the current principles of criminal law. I will 







conflict, its nature and causes and the narrative of the unfolding of its events (Horowitz 1991:2) 
– can be viewed as an ongoing debate in which different frameworks and definitions of the 
situation compete for dominance.  
 
One of the central issues in this debate, for example, has to do with the relevant identities of 
groups and subjects. Prosecutors can choose to emphasize or ignore certain identities or 
impose others. One US prosecutor effectively ignored the environmentalist credentials and 
motives of a defendant, while emphasizing his anarchist affiliations, thus setting the criminal 
case clearly in the center of a dangerous tradition of anarchist extremism and distancing it from 
mainstream environmentalism. In Chile, Mapuche activists adhering to a nationalist ideology 
conceive of the conflict in terms of the Chilean state, which rejects the Mapuche people as a 
nation, instead imposing upon them the forced status of “Chilean” citizen or at best 
“indigenous” people. “They want us to be their indigenous people,” said a young Mapuche 
leader, a position which he regards as subordinate instead of equal (Interview C-68). When a 
Chilean prosecutor announced at the start of the trial that he was prosecuting the defendants 
“as Chileans” and accused the defendants of “abusing the Mapuche identity,” he was 
participating in the meta-conflict, responding to certain arguments and definitions while 
proposing his own (Case Lonkos of Traiguén). Prosecutors are not outside of the meta-conflict. 
Their interpretations are constructed in the context of this battle, and in turn they contribute to 










I present the results of my research into the process of contentious criminalization in three 
highly distinct contexts of political struggle. Contentious criminalization is the process in which 
criminal prosecutions in a contentious episode transform into a site of contestation. This 
contestation may lead to significant discursive shifts in the prosecutorial narrative, with real 
penal consequences. Despite the differences between the conflicts, their actors, and the 
political issues at stake, there are striking commonalities that come into view once we focus our 
attention on the criminal justice system and the contested way it has processed events related 
to the political struggle while law enforcers claim continued commitment to democracy and the 
rule of law. In each country study one can observe the following features and mechanisms:  
 
1. Political opponents all perceive the criminal justice system to be unjust or failing in 
some respect. Critics on both sides argue that the system is failing to provide sufficient 
protection, is motivated by political considerations, is meting out disproportionally high 
sentences or sentences that are considered to be too low, or is failing to prosecute 
crimes.11  
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 One can be forgiven for assuming that when both sides of a conflict are dissatisfied with the performance of the 
criminal justice system and its proceedings, the system is actually doing quite alright. I would argue that the 
opposite is true. It is failing both sides, which is not the same as seeking a correct middle ground. Demands and 
images of justice on both sides regarding criminal justice are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, 
heightened protection of potential victims is not necessarily a trade off with correct due process for a defendant. 







2. Different actors mobilize support to make claims regarding general criminal policy and 
specific prosecutions, employing the identifications relevant to the criminal justice logic: 
“victim” mobilization and “prisoner” support mobilization. 
3. Throughout the contentious episode, the prosecutorial narrative moves from a de-
contextualized representation of the events towards a re-contextualized representation 
of those events and the implicated actors.  
4. The re-contextualized representation generally serves to expand criminal liability, either 
by criminalizing more kinds of conduct or by increasing the severity of and thus the 
sentence for already criminalized conduct.  
5. The re-contextualized representation becomes a new basis for continued contestation 
and mobilization.  
 
These loops of contestation and mobilization may even lead to violent escalation, but that is 
not necessarily so.12 Further inquiry into the relation between these phenomena, however, falls 
outside the scope of my research, as I am focusing on the events within the criminal justice 
arena.  
 
I conducted in-depth case studies of a process that I have called contentious criminalization. 
This occurs within the context of contentious episodes when the prosecutorial narrative is 
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 Indeed, my observation of the Chilean case had led me to speculate that this was a probable outcome. However, 
the Basque case, for example, shows that violent escalation is not necessarily the consequence of contentious 
criminalization. While there are multiple connections between these two phenomena, it is impossible to draw any 







highly contested. In three distinct episodes, I explored the alternative contesting narratives and 
traced the development of the prosecutorial narrative. In the analysis of the prosecutorial 
narrative I asked questions like the following: Which charge has been chosen? Are the 
defendants prosecuted individually or as a group? What is chosen as the defining element of 
the group? What motive, if any, is discussed? How is the defendant depicted? How is the 
criminal act framed? Which legal terminology is chosen to frame the criminal act? Which 
available interpretations in society does the prosecutor draw on to construct this reality? Which 
interpretations are ignored? I have documented “discursive shifts” in the development of 
criminal prosecutions. A discursive shift constitutes and is constituted by legal decisions, for 
example by changing the affected legal interest from the protection of “property” to the 
protection of the “democracy.” I draw upon some of the insights developed in the field of 
discourse analysis and semiotics to study the construction of meaning in the prosecutorial 
narrative.  
 
In everyday language, criminalization often has a meaning that is almost interchangeable with 
“demonization” or “stigmatization,” thus referring to a broad process in which actors or actions 
are labeled and treated as “criminal” in political speech, the media, in confrontations with the 
police, and in general communication in public places, including the courtroom. In this analysis I 
take a more technical approach to the process of criminalization, which I view as the legal steps 
taken by the state to define actions as criminal and prosecute specific actions as crimes. In this 







This juridical process can of course have demonizing or stigmatizing effects or, as we will see at 
various points in the country studies, be preceded by conscious efforts to “criminally 
stigmatize” specific groups, individuals or actions.13 This process of boundary-drawing can be 
fundamentally contested. For analytical purposes, I find it important to distinguish between 
these very different kinds of criminalization and instead to reserve the term “criminalization” 
for the judicial trajectory. Indeed, I think that part of the problem in many of the current 
analyses of “criminalization” is the conflation of various elements of the use of state force, the 
application of criminal law, and public speech. While these elements are indeed often related, it 
is unhelpful to lump them together in one term as this impedes our ability to question the exact 
relations between them and distinguish between the different actors involved at different 
stages.  
 
I describe three ethnographies of contentious criminalization. I say “ethnographies” as I will 
emphasize the on-the-ground perspectives of the different actors as they participate in the 
process of labeling actions, defining crimes, and mobilizing support in favor of or against the 
government response. My description of the criminalization process is often based on detailed 
material on specific criminal cases that were in progress at the time of my fieldwork, where I 
had the opportunity to observe and sit in the courtroom as well as interview each of the people 
involved in the case from their own position and vantage-point. My research is a “multi-sited 
ethnography” not only because of my three country studies, but also because of my interest in 
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various actors and the temporal development over several decades. However, it is based less 
on participant observation than on “polymorphous engagement,” which Gusterson describes as 
“interacting with informants across a number of dispersed sites, not just in local communities, 
and sometimes in virtual form, […] collecting data eclectically from a disparate array of sources 
in many different ways” (1997:116). The fieldwork I conducted in Chile, the US, and Spain has 
consisted of participant observation during various criminal trials, protest actions, and political 
meetings; more than a hundred interviews with activists, victims on different sides, 
prosecutors, lawyers, and defendants14; the collection of trial transcripts in numerous criminal 
cases, such as indictments, opening statements, jury instructions, verdicts, prosecutorial 
conclusions, trial minutes, motions, documentary evidence, and dossiers from investigative 
judges; and the collection of written documents, such as public declarations, press releases, 
legal statutes, websites, and other documents from various political actors, activists, 
supporters, victim organizations, and government institutions.  
 
I am trained both as a lawyer and an anthropologist and as a consequence have never fully 
identified myself as one or the other. While I did learn how to do the necessary operations on 
legal provisions to “solve” cases, I suspect, however, that I failed to properly internalize the 
legal training to “Think Like A Lawyer” (Mertz 2007). There is a common joke about economists 
in which a physicist, a chemist, and an economist are on an island in the Pacific with just one 
can of beans. While the physicist and the chemist attempt to leverage their backgrounds in 
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 I have chosen not to interview any judges as I have limited my inquiry to the process of prosecutorial 
qualification. It is evident, though, that the prosecutorial narrative is influenced by the subsequent rejections or 







order to open the can calculating the heat needed to explode it and the distance at which the 
individual beans would fall, all the economist can say is: “let’s assume we have a can opener…” I 
have often felt that lawyers reason in a similar way: “Let’s assume we have a liberal 
democracy…” While this does not mean that they assume the rule of law always works 
perfectly, they do assume that the rule of law can work and that by making it work, it can solve 
everything.  
 
In questioning the very things that lawyers often take for granted, this research is far more 
anthropological than it is legal. It does, however, engage closely with the very criminal law 
doctrine and legal documents that are often shunned by anthropologists for being allegedly too 
impenetrable for outsiders. I have attempted to write in a style that is accessible to all, in order 
to circumvent that convenient myth that law should be left to the lawyers. Further, I have 
chosen to study a problem that specifically qualifies as “western,” and my concern with the 
prosecutorial production of reality reflects an interest in describing powerful elites as much as 
marginalized “others.” At the same time, the anthropological approach should not make it less 
relevant to lawyers, legal scholars and particularly prosecutors. I believe that the findings in this 










The idea for this research emerged when I attended a trial against three Mapuche activists in 
Chile in April 2003 (Case Lonkos of Traiguén). In his opening statement, the prosecutor did not 
focus narrowly on the three defendants and the criminal actions that were imputed to them. 
Instead, he went back to the end of the 19th century to recall the war after which Mapuche 
indigenous people were put in reservations. His account of the relations between the Chilean 
state and the Mapuche people was complemented by an analysis of the way in which the 
defendants allegedly “abused” their Mapuche identity. His emphasis on context surprised me. 
In Chapter 5, I will discuss that trial in more detail. This trial and the centrality of criminal 
justice proceedings within the dynamics of the “Mapuche conflict” sparked my interest in 
processes of criminalization in conflict situations. Many people, however, dismissed the 
relevance of my observations as they held Chile to be a third-world country where it would be 
obvious that criminal proceedings are just an instrument in the hands of the elite. This 
viewpoint, however, both underestimates the Chilean criminal justice system and 
overestimates the criminal justice systems in developed western countries. Indeed, far from 
dismissing contentious criminalization and discursive shifts in the prosecutorial narrative as a 
Chilean or third-world phenomenon, my assumption was that my observations were related to 
the inherent dilemmas that a liberal democracy faces when it is challenged by large-scale 
disruptive mobilizations and political demands. The problem is then understood not as a 
malfunctioning of the rule of law due to human error or corruption, but as inherent to the rule 







response to discursive mobilization in the criminal justice arena tempted me to go beyond the 
in-depth study of one case.  
 
Choice of country studies 
Multiple case studies do not necessarily make a comparative study. The choice of contentious 
episodes may seem an odd constellation for comparative research. Whereas their differences 
are glaring, the similarities may not be so obvious. I argue that it is useful to look at these three 
highly different cases through the same analytical lens. I am not comparing the three conflicts, 
which admittedly have highly distinct features. Instead, I am comparing the criminalization 
processes in three liberal democracies that are challenged by major contention. The rule of law 
in democracies is generally imagined to have universal features. “It is our job to just apply the 
law,” is what all the prosecutors have told me. This made me decide to look at this “applying 
the law” in liberal democracies that all strive to solve their political disagreements within the 
boundaries, framework and promises of the rule of law.  
 
“Research design is always a matter of informed compromise” (Bechhofer and Paterson 2000 
in: Ritchie and Lewis 2003:47). The choice of my country studies similarly reflects such 
compromise, balancing the need for in-depth qualitative research with the aim to portray a 
process found in many different forms and contexts. On purpose, I have chosen hard cases, as I 
studied the often unpopular and “violent” marginal parts of social movements in liberal 







areas like Guantánamo Bay or Zimbabwe. To explore the mechanisms of criminal proceedings 
in liberal democracies afflicted by conflict, I limited my population of cases to those countries 
that receive the highest ratings in political science measures such as Freedom House and Polity 
IV, which narrows down the possibilities to Western Europe, the US, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Chile.15 In addition, I limited my choice to countries where I would be able to 
speak the language. Further, whereas the challenge posed by the conflict did not have to be 
existential, it did have to involve a significant amount of physical or material harm or the fear 
of violent escalation.  
 
There are thus many cases that I could have included in this research, such as the Corsican 
nationalist struggle in France, the Northern Ireland troubles, “homegrown” Muslim and 
immigration contention in Britain or the Netherlands, animal rights activism in Britain, neo-Nazi 
mobilization in Belgium, or indigenous activism in Canada. Given my choice for in-depth 
ethnographic research, I decided to limit myself to three in-depth case studies. This research is 
a qualitative study focusing on in-depth analysis of a small set of cases to generate deep case 
studies.  
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 In many different judgments the three states that are chosen (US, Spain, Chile) were during the relevant 
research period considered to be well established democracies. See, for example, 
http://www.worldaudit.org/democracy.htm [Accessed 1 June 2007] (I only accepted division 1); Polity IV Project, 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/ [Accessed 30 June 2007] (I only accepted level 9/10); 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAllScores.xls [Accessed 4 November 2009] (I only accepted level 
1/2). Various other contentious episodes were excluded, such as autonomous struggles in Bolivia and Mexico, as 
the states did not fall in the required category of high-capacity democracies. For a critical discussion of such ratings 







The nature of this research has been exploratory and focuses on theory building by “looking for 
similarities in unexpected places” (Ragin 1994:85). I was therefore interested in choosing cases 
that would enable me to study the processes of criminalization to the fullest. I followed 
Becker’s advice to look “for cases that may upset your thinking” (1998:87). I have opted for a 
“far-out” comparison that aims to explore three highly different instances of the same 
phenomenon. I was more interested in “finding the full range of cases” (ibid. 1998:87, 112) 
than zooming in on assumed similarities among cases that are usually pre-conceived as 
categories, such as the oft-compared cases of the conflicts in the Basque Country and Northern 
Ireland (a comparison that because of its premise of comparability turns out to be strongly 
resented by some actors in Spain while favored by others. No comparison is thus politically 
neutral).  
 
Because of my first observations in Chile and my in-depth knowledge of the “Mapuche 
conflict,” I decided to keep that case and complement it with useful comparative cases. This led 
me to include a deadly conflict (the Spanish-Basque conflict), where I expected the process of 
criminalization to be more visible, severe, or further developed. Indeed, the open defiance of 
the state monopoly of force turned out to be more present in the Basque country than in Chile, 
where the use of violence is hardly accepted in public discourse, even among activists. Also, I 
suspected that the pressure on the government to stop killings in a lethal conflict might be 
much higher than the pressure that was leveled in the Chilean episode. In addition, the length 







prosecutorial approach in criminal prosecutions. It turned out to be a fruitful choice, as indeed 
there have been significant changes in the prosecutorial approach throughout the years.  
 
In addition to the Spanish-Basque case, I chose to include a conflict that was not truncated by a 
military dictatorship, enabling me to more accurately trace the beginning of the contention and 
the subsequent criminalization. This led me to include the U.S. eco-conflict. This case provides 
an additional interesting possibility to study an episode where the activists are not an ethnic 
minority, and where the political issue is not related to nationalism.16  
 
I wrote that I have chosen conflicts that constitute a significant challenge to the state. Without 
a doubt the “Basque conflict” has been a major challenge for more than three decades, and the 
“Mapuche conflict” can also easily be called a huge domestic concern. People may wonder 
about the challenge that mobilization in the US episode poses to the government. Here I rely 
on the assessment of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) itself, which in 2005 publicly 
called the animal rights movement and “eco-terrorism” the number one domestic terrorism 
threat (Frieden 2005)17 and which continues to list a fugitive animal rights activist on its list of 
the “most wanted terrorists” (FBI 2011).18  
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 Christenson (1999) asserts that trials involving nationalists are different from trials involving dissenters because 
of the different challenge to the state, and also Beetham (1991) describes how rebels attacking the constitution of 
the state attack the legitimacy of the state in a much more fundamental way than one-issue rebels do.  
17
 This claim was and is contested, also within the government (Department of Homeland Security 2008). This, 
however, does not take away the fact that the public image of a highly dangerous group was projected in the 
media. For more information on the various definitions of the situation, see Chapter 6.  
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 Daniel Andreas San Diego is listed here at number three (FBI 2011). He is wanted for the bombing of two 







I have thus looked at the following contentious episodes: (1) the Chilean-Mapuche land conflict 
from 1990 to 2010; (2) the Spanish-Basque separatist conflict from 1978 to 2010; and (3) 
extremist environmental protests in the US from 1980 to 2010.19 In this study I explore the 
existence of a pattern, similar mechanisms, comparable processes, or variations on the same 
process in the course of criminal prosecutions in conflict situations. As such, the goal of my 
comparison most closely resembles what Tilly calls “process generalization,” in which analysts 
concentrate on the process itself, “asking in general how it arises and what effects it produces 
under different conditions” (2007:208).  
 
My emphasis on mechanisms and processes shows that I am indebted to Tilly in this view on 
social science and specifically theory building in social science (2007). I have been inspired by 
what Tilly calls the “mechanism-process approach to explaining contentious politics” 
(2007:206). Tilly defines mechanisms as “events that produce the same immediate effects over 
a wide range of circumstances.” On a higher level of observation, “processes assemble 
mechanisms into combinations and sequences that produce larger-scale effects than any 
particular mechanism causes by itself” (2007:214). As Tilly points out, within mechanisms it will 
always be possible to identify micro-mechanisms again. Thus, whether we call a specific chain 
of events a “mechanism” or a “process” depends on our level of observation. While I am 
committed to understanding events in their particular historical and spatial context, my effort 
supersedes the single case method in the search for patterns that may give us clues for shared 
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 The time frames in the Basque case and the Chilean case were chosen according to the return to democracy in 
both countries. The starting point of my U.S. research was chosen according to the first documented attack in the 







processes and mechanisms, thus contributing to the development of a theory that can be 
applicable to similar situations in other liberal democracies. Thus, while my description of the 
process of contentious criminalization is informed by the three episodes that I have chosen, 
and while the outcome and specific characteristics of this process will be different in every 
liberal democracy, I do propose that the broad outline of the process, challenges, dilemmas, 
and characteristics of contentious criminalization as described here can be found in all liberal 
democracies afflicted by major contention.  
 
In each of the chosen contentious episodes the challengers of the status quo strongly oppose 
the economic system. Mapuche activists challenge transnational corporations, infrastructural 
projects, and the neoliberal conception of “progress.” Basque left-nationalists specifically claim 
that they are struggling for a free and socialist Basque Country, thus proposing a different 
economic system. Environmentalists in the United States oppose the profit-driven logic of 
capitalism that perceives animals and the earth as instrumental to satisfying human needs. 
Discontent with the economy can indeed lead to a strong challenge to the legitimacy of the 
government (Beetham 1991:163).20 Whereas the challenge to capitalism has not been one of 
the variables on which I selected the episodes,21 still, that shared feature may not be 
coincidental. Various scholars have indicated that formal rationality is specific to capitalist 
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 According to Beetham, often changes or problems in the economy are beyond the control of particular 
governments. Therefore, discontent with the economy will lead to discontent with the political system, not only 
discontent with a particular government. He therefore argues that a challenge to the economic system is 
simultaneously a strong challenge to the political legitimacy of the government  
21








democracies, or even to neoliberal democracies (Weber 1978; Balbus 1973; Mansell et al. 
2004; Wacquant 2009). Mansell et al., for example, argue that the rule of law is essential to 
liberal capitalism, as its focus on individual, formal equality and freedom in the political sense 
opens the possibility for widespread economic inequality (2004:15). This might mean that the 
challenges and dilemmas faced by prosecutors who attempt to reconcile contentious 
prosecutions with the rule of law framework may be specific to these cases where the capitalist 
model is at stake. While this is a possibility, such speculations fall outside of the scope of my 
project and my research design is not suitable for answering such questions.   
 
There are of course many differences between the conflicts, contexts and legal systems of my 
cases, but this is a study about their similarities. The presence of striking features in one 
episode has opened my eyes to a similar presence or absence of those features in the other 
cases. I have maximized the possibilities for this feedback-loop by visiting my fieldwork sites 
twice, enabling the chance to return with renewed questions and concepts based on my 
observations in the other countries. For example, to explore the phenomenon of prisoner 
support mobilization in each of the three episodes, I used the differences and similarities 
between the cases to understand better what prisoner support looks like in each of these 
countries. Ultimately, the three different expressions of prisoner support enhanced my 
understanding of what prisoner support mobilization is about and how it relates to the larger 
process of contentious criminalization.22  
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 The goal and design of the research was not to explain why prisoner support mobilization is expressed 








The three cases thus exemplify the same phenomenon of contentious criminalization in 
different forms. Of course, as I mentioned before, these processes are set in highly different 
institutional and cultural contexts. I will point out some of the most important differences. 
First, the political issue is different in each of the episodes, and they therefore involve different 
actors (such as politicians, companies, scientists, or landowners), regions, political arguments, 
and relevant circumstances. For example, while poverty and socioeconomic inequality is one of 
the (important) factors in the Chilean episode, it is not an issue in either the Basque case or the 
U.S. case. Indeed, the Basque Country area is richer than the rest of Spain. Second, the role of 
the state differs significantly in the different episodes. The Basque struggle is explicitly against 
the Spanish state as a direct opponent, whereas in the Mapuche conflict and in the U.S. eco-
struggle, the state often plays the role of third actor. Third, the levels of violence vary greatly: 
the Spanish-Basque conflict has seen more than 800 deaths, the Chilean-Mapuche conflict 
three killings, and in the U.S. eco-conflict no deaths have been recorded.23 Fourth, whereas the 
legal systems of Spain and Chile are highly similar as both are based on German criminal law, 
the U.S. has a common law system instead of continental law. Other analysts of comparative 
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 The Spanish-Basque case clearly involves the highest levels of direct violence. In the beginning of the 1980s ETA 
killed about 100 persons a year. Since 1992 there have consistently been less than twentyfive deaths per year by 
ETA. In the past few years this number has been less than ten per year. State violence led to a Dirty War in the 
1980s involving about 30 deaths and some high-profile cases of torture. The Mapuche struggle escalated in terms 
of methods and demands throughout the nineties, and the general perception was that things could get severely 
worse, with politicians fearing a Chilean Chiapas. Actions in the Chilean-Mapuche territorial conflict consist mainly 
of theft, land takeovers, threats, harassment, and arson. So far there have been three deaths of young Mapuche 
activists after confrontations with the police. Actions in the animal rights-environmentalist contention in the U.S. 
consist of harassment, vandalism, threats, and several bombings. Perceptions in the U.S. of eco-violence have been 
that it easily can become worse, with prosecutors fearing actual deaths as a (intended or unintended) 







criminal law, however, have emphasized similarities more than differences between common 
law and continental law (Fletcher 2007; Vercher 1991:14). Although I do not deny the existence 
of many differences between the legal systems, what is relevant for my conception of 
contentious criminalization is the shared basis of Enlightenment values and the philosophy of 
liberal legalism that underlies these criminal justice systems (cf. Vercher 1991:278). For the 
specific choices I have made in order to deal with these legal differences in terms of data 
collection and analysis, I refer the reader to the methodological appendix.  
 
Data collection 
My research question was straightforward: Will a shift in the prosecutorial narrative occur, and 
if so, when (as a result of which processes and factors?), how (what changes in criminal 
doctrinal devices constitute that change?), and which narrative does the prosecutor then 
choose? The focus therefore is on the courtroom as research setting. I have combined 
ethnographic methods with discourse analysis. As data, I have collected meanings defined as 
“the linguistic categories that make up the participants’ view of reality and with which they 
define their own and others’ actions” (Lofland and Lofland 1984:71). Of course, studying three 
episodes over an extended period of time necessarily means that much could not be covered 
and that I have had to make many choices about what to select. My country studies do not aim 
to tell a complete or exhaustive story of either the conflicts or the criminal proceedings. 
Further, rather than focusing upon what is somehow representative, my interest has mostly 







called upon, defended, interpreted, and imagined, and how the prosecutorial narrative is 
adapted accordingly. In short, I selected the examples that best show that there is a whole 
process of interpretive battle that goes into “just applying the law” – and what that process 
looks like in practice.  
 
On the one hand, I have compiled data to construct the prosecutorial narrative as it has 
developed during the contentious episode in various criminal proceedings. Therefore, I have 
collected trial transcripts (indictments, press releases, opening statements, closing arguments, 
and verdicts), information from government websites and official statements, and I have 
interviewed prosecutors.  
 
On the other hand, I have collected data in order to construct the competing discourses that 
constitute the meta-conflict and the battle for interpretation in the criminal justice arena. To 
construe and analyze these competing discourses I have taken both a macro- and a micro-
approach. For the macro-approach, I have collected data in order to describe the broad 
oppositions, competing logics and arguments of the actors challenging and defending the 
status quo. Therefore, I have attended meetings and events and interviewed various actors 
from diverse positions (reformist and radical) on the side of both the challengers and the 
defenders of the status quo. In addition, I have collected books, websites, political declarations 
and various other materials that express the vision, values and classificatory schemes of the 








For the micro-approach, I have made a detailed analysis of several criminal cases and the 
competing narratives about the background of the specific events that led to the criminal case, 
the allegations, indictment, argumentation, and the identities of the involved actors. Therefore, 
I have selected several criminal cases (a maximum of fifteen per country study) and 
interviewed the defendants and affected parties, complainants and prosecutors, collected the 
relevant trial transcripts, and (in one or two criminal cases) observed the trial proceedings. The 
combination of interviews, participant observation, and extensive document analysis has 
ensured data and method triangulation. Due to the particularities of each country, in each 
country I have made different decisions regarding the exact data that I have used, the criminal 
cases that were selected and the people that were interviewed. For a more detailed 
description of my choices regarding data collection and data analysis in each of the country 
studies, I refer the reader to the methodology appendix.  
 
I want to mention briefly the special challenges of doing research in these highly sensitive 
conflict areas. Sociologist Howard Becker has written an article entitled “Whose side are we 
on?,” in which he argues that neutral positions are not possible for sociologists (1967). He 
describes that when scholars understand, defend, or explain the position of the underdog, they 
are less likely to be perceived as credible by the community of scholars and the larger public. 
This point applies heavily in situations of conflict where both challengers of the status quo and 







relations. In my research I have attempted to faithfully collect the information that reveals the 
points of view of the different actors in conflicts. I have attempted to be critical towards all 
sides, making sure to question the information that each shared. This can be personally 
challenging. How do you balance the feelings of empathy with a person claiming victimhood 
and on the other hand maintain healthy criticism as you probe into the story they are telling 
you?  
 
Also, activists and their targets everywhere have a tendency to be paranoid about their security 
and the identity of people they interact with. This paranoia can be contagious and twice I was 
sure I had identified an overeager new activist as an undercover FBI informant, though I will 
never know whether that was indeed the case. Urban Mapuche activists often warned me 
about militarization in the rural communities. They argued that the state would follow me and 
that I risked being expelled from the country.  
 
Trials are nerve-racking happenings. The presence of opposing parties, the potential impact of a 
sentence that can land someone in jail for many years, the lack of certainty about the truth…it 
all comes together to make a criminal trial as a whole a tense event. The moment in which the 
verdict is made is the heaviest of all. As I attended these politically charged trials, often I had no 
neutral place to sit, as the benches on the left were the province of prisoner supporters and 
those on the right were occupied by victim supporters. The visual orchestration of the 







broader contention enacted in the mutually exclusive roles of victim and defendant. 
Maintaining a distance while at the same time approaching people for interviews put me in a 
constantly difficult position.  
 
More difficult than doing the research, however, was writing everything down. Given the 
contentious nature of the topic, I am certain that much of what I have written not satisfy 
everyone. More likely, it may upset one side or the other, or both. I hope people will recognize 
my work for what it is: less an attempt to describe in depth the different conflicts and their 
criminal prosecutions than to tease out a common process of social, political, and sometimes 
violent challenges to the legal system and the way in which criminal law gets interpreted, used, 
challenged, twisted, and defended. To do so, I have attempted to do justice to the existing 
different viewpoints. My writing has developed in a continuous internal dialogue with all of my 
informants, who shared their point of view with me and kept me sharp while developing my 
sentences. I am aware, however, that my choices of representation and the inevitable selection 
that I had to make will not do justice to the injustices experienced by the various actors 
involved.  
 
What is to come  
 
Conflicts tend to be hard to sort out, especially if they are protracted, involving many actors, 







becomes hidden behind additional claims about past injustices, broken promises, and violence. 
During my interview in 2003 with Ms. Vidal, the regional prosecutor in the south of Chile, she 
emphasized that her job was just to “apply the democratic mandate of the law” (Interview C-
10). Her references to the law as the basis and final arbiter of her job supposedly closed the 
discussion about the choices she made and the way she conducted the criminal proceedings. 
“Just applying the law” can be more complicated than it sounds. This analysis focuses on what 
that complicated process looks like in situations of conflict and how it contributes to making 
those conflicts so hard to sort out. This dissertation is a lengthy response to Ms. Vidal arguing 
that “just applying the law” is where the discussion is just beginning.  
 
I am by no means the first to observe that the rule of law ideology makes promises that it does 
not always fulfill in practice. It is not my aim to rehearse any of these critical observations, 
which are by now commonly accepted. My particular objective is to describe how this ideology 
and its framework of rules and institutions work at the moment in which they are challenged by 
the discursive action and disruptive mobilization that characterize contentious episodes. In that 
sense, it goes beyond merely pointing out a “gap” between ideal and practice to show how the 
ideal itself is interpreted in competing ways or even contested as such. In other words, the gap 
is not incidental, due to a mistake, open to be repaired in the future. On the contrary, the 








This dissertation presents an in-depth study set in and around the courtrooms of liberal 
democracies. It is about legitimacy and legitimization, the construction of crimes, and 
categorization in the criminal law framework. It is about how the state and different non-state 
actors continue to build and challenge the edifice of liberal democracy and its institutions. We 
will observe actors as they talk about the rule of law, claim the rule of law, defend the rule of 
law, and challenge the rule of law. There have been many books that have taken the law and 
the courtroom as a discursive arena and I am building upon that approach (Silbey and Ewick 
1998; Foucault 2001). Discourse analysis is about unpacking all the assumptions that go into 
criminal justice categories and their application. Specifically, this analysis looks at how these 
categories are explicitly challenged in the course of contentious episodes. It thus analyzes the 
drawing of lines between good and bad, which I show to be continuously negotiated products. I 
explore the consequences of language and show that discursive shifts from de-
contextualization to re-contextualization that can be identified in the country-studies have real 
penal consequences (i.e., who gets in jail for how long). Law is a system of signification, and I 
am studying the meta-conflict in that process of signification, focusing specifically on the voice 
of the prosecutor. Law, supposedly authoritative in categorizing, becomes just one of many 
speakers on the subject and is not regarded anymore as necessarily authoritative by all 
speakers and listeners.  
 
I thus describe the common process of contentious criminalization in which the political conflict 







prisoner supporters challenge the state’s definitions and authority. I will point out the 
commonalities in the dilemmas and challenges that prosecutors face and the solutions they 
form as they work within the linguistic and logical framework of liberal legalism and try to fit in 
the criminal cases while they juggle the challenges of competing discourses that question and 
attack the prosecutorial actions, decisions, definitions and arguments. I will describe the 
similarities in the ways in which criminal cases become re-contextualized as they are classified, 
for example as “Mapuche-conflict” cases, and I will explore the ways in which this shift is 
discursively constituted and reinforced in doctrinal moves.  
 
I make two specific claims about the prosecutorial narrative in these country studies that 
should be falsifiable: 
1. The prosecutor changes the modality of the charging narrative without claiming a 
change in the facts of the events “on the ground,” that is, it is a purely interpretive turn. 
For example, the Spanish prosecutorial narrative about Basque street violence has 
changed without claiming that there is a change in the actual events of “street 
violence.”  
2. The change in the prosecutorial narrative has consequences outside of the courtroom, 
that is, of course there are penal consequences, such as who gets charged for what, but 









In the next chapter I set out my analytical framework, where I discuss more in depth the 
contestation of the prosecutorial narrative and the nature of potential discursive shifts and 
their expression in legal choices. Then I present the country studies, each divided into a chapter 
in which I outline the competing discourses in the meta-conflict and a chapter with an analysis 
of the development and discursive shifts in the prosecutorial narrative. I conclude the 
dissertation with a short comparison of the different episodes and a conclusion in which I 
discuss the value of the concepts of contentious criminalization, the discursive shift and the 
distinction between de-contextualization and re-contextualization.  
 
I will hardly address the policy question of what prosecutors should do, i.e., when and how they 
should take the context of events into account. While obviously an important issue, it is outside 
the scope of this research. I will only say two things about it: First, when one departs from strict 
liberal legalist prescription, addressing context is not necessarily “bad” and should not be 
categorically rejected. For example, the literature on hate crime has abundantly addressed the 
reasons why context should sometimes be taken into account as well as the specific pitfalls 
when that is done. Second, as this study attempts to show, “the” context can itself be subject to 
contestation, making general prescriptions particularly difficult and probably not desirable.  
 
While the meta-conflict transfers into the criminal justice arena in a highly comparable process 
in each of these episodes, the development of the prosecutorial narrative, the discursive shifts, 







conflict, I have found that the prosecutorial narrative makes a strong discursive shift 
throughout the 1990s as it develops the concept of the “ETA network” and starts macro-trials 
as a logical consequence of that interpretation of ETA. Similar discursive shifts in relation to 
street violence and speech and expressions result in an expansion of the people and actions 
that come under the purview of the criminalization. The criminal justice arena is expanding its 
reach to cover many of the activities that were previously deemed to belong in the political 
arena.  
 
In the case of the Chilean-Mapuche territorial conflict, I will argue how the prosecutorial 
narrative reflects the ambivalence of the state, as it recognizes the political conflict on the one 
hand, while using anti-terrorism legislation and attempting to criminalize Mapuche 
organizations on the other hand. The ambivalence is visible in the constant re-drawing of the 
lines about what exactly belongs in the criminal justice arena and what belongs in the political 
arena. The prosecutorial narrative creates the contested image of the “true” Mapuche, which is 
the subject in the political arena, and the image of the “radical activist that abuses the 
Mapuche identity” as the target of criminal prosecutions.  
 
In the case of the U.S. eco-conflict, we see how the concept of “eco-terrorism” is developed and 
increasingly applied to a select number of high-profile activists, resulting in severe sentences. 
The prosecutorial narrative shifts from reacting to past harm to anticipating future crime. The 







an increased attention to aboveground activists allegedly inciting or coordinating underground 
crimes.  
 
The description of the different kinds of criminalization as expansive, ambivalent, or 
marginalizing refers to the way in which the prosecutorial narrative proceeds to mark the 
boundary between the political arena and the criminal justice arena. The expansive discourse in 
Spain has enabled a criminalization of activities that previously were treated according to the 
logic of the political arena, thus expanding the criminal justice arena while encroaching upon 
the political arena. The ambivalent discourse in Chile shows a constant back-and-forth in which 
that which was considered criminal ten years ago is now firmly treated as political, whereas 
that which was merely criminal yesterday suddenly turns out to be terrorism today and is 
subjected to political negotiation tomorrow. The marginalizing discourse in the United States 
creates a specific pocket of what is considered to be criminal or more specifically “eco-
terrorism.” Once you are perceived to have crossed that line you fall deep into the tentacles of 
criminal justice proceedings. You are turned into a legitimate target of harsh prosecution and it 
will be difficult to crawl back towards the identity of a subject in the political arena.  
 
Throughout this work I will refer to many different criminal cases, the defendants, and the 
events that led to the criminal investigation. This can be confusing for the reader. At the end of 







relevance throughout the analysis. I hope this solution is more practical than repeating the 
details of every case throughout the text.  
 
My conclusion is that these three country cases represent instances of the tragedy of liberal 
legalism, where the state is unable to deliver (substantive) justice and the rule of law becomes 
the target and sometimes the victim of continued contestation. The goal of this analysis is not 
to point out the particular shortcomings of liberal legalism and its constitutive fictions about 
society. Many scholars have done that before me. I build upon their insights to describe and 
understand how criminal proceedings that take place within the framework of this system play 
out in the challenging context of major conflicts. This dissertation thus contributes to the 
current literature as it provides new insight into both protracted conflicts that have moved into 
the criminal justice arena and the rule of law as it is exposed by the challenges of these 
conflicts. Because crime is not a fixed category and because liberal legalism is not necessarily 
able to provide substantive justice, the criminal proceedings create conflict dynamics (collective 
claim-making, polarization, and escalation) or become the arena in which they are transferred, 
sparking a potentially infinite re-framing of events and “innovating” of criminal vocabulary. In 
three in depth case-studies, this dissertation describes what that process and the concomitant 









II. Law, Politics, and Legitimacy in Liberal 
Democracies 
 
“We wanted justice and we gained the rule of law.” 
Artist Bärbel Bohley on the reunification of Germany (Economist 2010:91)  
 
The rule of law is a wonderful construction that has protected citizens against arbitrary state 
power and formulated a framework within which disputes can be resolved through fair 
proceedings. Still, the rule of law is not always capable of delivering justice. Sometimes people 
are satisfied with having had their chance in court according to proceedings that are recognized 
as fair and equally accessible for all. At times, however, the rule of law is not enough, or even 
perceived as part of the problem, leading to protests and challenges to the status quo. If that is 
the case, it is possible to observe what I have labeled contentious criminalization: criminal 
prosecutions in a contentious episode transform into a site of contestation. This contestation 
may lead to significant discursive shifts in the prosecutorial narrative, with real penal 
consequences. Rather than assuming that the criminal justice system and its performance are 
fixed and natural, I have approached this institution from the perspective that it may be 
challenged and can subsequently change its performance (Garland 1990:4). If so, the question 








In this chapter, I present the analytical framework that I have used to analyze this process of 
contentious criminalization and the prosecutorial discursive shifts that I observed in three 
distinct case studies: the Spanish-Basque separatist conflict, the Chilean-Mapuche territorial 
conflict, and the eco-conflict in the United States. First, I elaborate on the way in which 
challengers to the status quo put prosecutors in a difficult position, facing competing needs for 
order and legitimacy. Then I discuss what it means to conceive of criminal prosecutions as social 
constructions of reality. Third, I provide the analytical concepts regarding contestation in the 
criminal justice arena dominated by victim mobilization and prisoner support mobilization, and 
finally I present a way to operationalize the discursive shifts that can be observed in the 
prosecutorial narrative in terms of legal choices and representations.    
 
1. Challenge to liberal democracy 
 
Liberal legalism assumes a social contract, in which citizens give up their right to private 
violence in exchange for state protection. If the government in turn does not abuse this 
position to repress the population, the pacification will support the legitimacy of the 
government (van Reenen 1979:22–23; Tilly 1997:181). The fiction that the social contract 
benefits the citizens can only be upheld and lead to continuing obedience as long as the 
government continues to fulfill the obligation to provide security. Facing this obligation to 







seriously challenged by events that take place in contentious episodes. Challengers24 of the 
status quo can engage in disruptive protests that take place outside of the designated legal and 
political avenues for change. Those negatively affected by these protests often clamor for state 
protection. A lack of effective state protection can lead targets of protests to engage in 
proactive self-protection. The state then faces the following dilemma: how to create order (and 
satisfy the demands of those that claim victimhood) without further stirring up discontent and 
alienation among protesters and their constituency.   
 
Balancing the competing interests of “order” and “legitimacy” is particularly relevant to liberal 
democracies, which base their power on popular sovereignty and an ideology of individual 
liberty. It is within this quandary that I situate the criminal prosecutions that are the subject of 
this study. The dilemma addresses the complex relationship between law and politics, which I 
understand to be distinct but interdependent. In this section I briefly discuss the dynamics of 
how political contestation transfers into the criminal justice arena, where the issues, demands, 
and actors are co-determined by the logic and language of criminal prosecutions. After having 
addressed this challenge to liberal democracies, in the next section I analyze the construction of 
the prosecutorial narrative.  
 
Challengers of the status quo can engage in a wide variety of activities. Most notorious are acts 
of violence (perceived as intentionally causing harm to life or property), which tend to draw 
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public attention. In this dissertation, however, we will observe many other kinds of activities 
that have been subjected to criminal prosecution: offering a place to sleep to fugitives, writing 
press communiqués, organizing honoring ceremonies, making Basque ID cards, spray-painting 
shops or houses, entering private premises, and shouting offensive texts. In order to justify 
their collective actions, challengers of the status quo claim the urgency and legitimacy of their 
grievances and actions, challenge the state’s jurisdiction, dispute the validity of current laws, or 
point out the deficiencies of political avenues. They often actively construct their own “laws” 
and rules for engagement, sometimes explicitly defending the use of violence to achieve their 
goals. Open justifications of private violence, such as the propagation of armed struggle or 
legitimate self-defense, break the taboo on private violence and strongly challenge the state 
monopoly on force. Generally, challengers argue that their daily experience with imposed 
violence does not make their own resort to violent methods so special.  
 
People who feel threatened by these challengers of the status quo often call upon the state for 
effective protection and the punishment of perpetrators. For example, in the Chilean-Mapuche 
territorial conflict, a senator made this demand for state intervention explicit:  
 
Facing these types of conflicts, State intervention  is logical and demandable, as the State has 
the legitimate use of force at its disposal and is the guarantor of the rule of law. The absence of 
the State in the solution of this conflict […] justifies self-protection, which is the basis of 








The lack of successful criminal prosecutions can lead to complaints about “impunity.” When 
victims feel truly unprotected, they may recur to radical means to pressure the state or simply 
ensure their own protection. Thus, not only challengers but also defenders of the status quo 
can mobilize and engage in a variety of disruptive actions, including violence. For example, in 
Spain, in the 1980s, “uncontrolled” right-wing commandos such as the Basque-Spanish Batallón 
Vasco Español or Triple A engaged in targeted killings of presumed ETA militants. In Chile, a 
retaliation commando was founded in order to protect private landowners against harassment 
by Mapuche activists, while private landowner Augustín Figueroa called the south a “Far West” 
and mentioned his right to take justice into his own hands if the state would not do it. These 
reprisal actions, in turn, can elicit claims for protection and criminal prosecutions or set off a 
cycle of violence.  
 
These actions of spray-painting or violence, while practical, can simultaneously be analyzed as 
statements that challenge, redefine, or defend the meaning of those acts, the law, and the 
status quo. That is why Cover argued, regarding the struggle against slavery in the United 
States, that “[r]escuing fugitives, and aiding and abetting them or their rescuers, were at once 
practical acts and symbolic ones” (Cover 1983:35). In these situations, state control is 
weakened, alternative rules or authorities are followed, and the legitimacy of the state 
monopoly on force is not recognized by all anymore. Of course, it matters whether the 








If you are opposed by a minority, it is easy to neutralize them, and your actions need not cause 
much resentment; but if you are opposed by the vast majority, then you are never going to be safe, 
and the more blood you shed, the weaker your hold on power becomes. So the best policy you can 
pursue is to try to win the allegiance of the populace. (Machiavelli 1994:122) 
 
Criminal prosecutions in these situations, therefore, can be highly sensitive. Governments face 
the prosecution of an accused who possibly represents a larger group within society voicing its 
grievances. The stakes in these cases are high. An actual risk of criminal prosecutions might be 
that it does indeed stop violence in the short run but radicalizes the defendant’s supporters in 
the long run. The lack of intervention, however, can similarly lead to escalation (as victims feel 
unprotected). This dilemma has been framed as the competition between the “immediate 
interest in order” and the “long-run interest in maximizing legitimacy” (Balbus 1973:3). The 
capacity of criminal trials to have a counterproductive effect has been recognized by other 
scholars, such as Christenson: “A just trial may bring the revenge cycle to a halt, but an unjust 
trial will encourage the wronged faction to ‘get even’ and ‘right the balance,’ next time in their 
favor” (Christenson 1999:4). The government runs the risk that groups will identify prosecutors 
and judges only with particular political interests and no longer see them as representing 
legitimate authority in upholding law and order (cf. Miall 2001:88). To maintain control, a 
democratic government therefore has to address different audiences, sending the right 







The government thus has to decide which groups can be ignored25 or excluded at no risk, and 
which groups cannot be “barred from the magic circle” (Nieburg 1968:19).26 Criminal 
prosecutions then have a double agenda: they are not only supposed to achieve order but also 
to recover the legitimacy of the criminal justice system and potentially the government behind 
it.  
 
The transfer to the criminal justice arena 
In liberal democratic regimes, the assumption is that ample political and legal avenues exist to 
solve political contention. Despite democratic structures, however, it is possible that political 
negotiation in round tables, constitutional amendments, or legal adjudication in civil lawsuits 
will fail to deliver a solution that fits everyone’s perceived needs and interests. Adjudication in 
civil lawsuits only makes sense, for example, if both parties are willing to lose on the issue if the 
judge decides against their interest. If the stakes are considered too high, or if one simply does 
not have anything to lose in a further battle (a feeling pervasive among Mapuche activists), 
there is no incentive to stick with the outcome of civil lawsuits. In each of the case studies in 
this dissertation, we can observe a shift from the claims that are involved in the political dispute 
towards questions surrounding the process of criminalization that effectively sideline the 
political issue. The transfer to the criminal justice arena can take place for a variety of reasons, 
one of which is the criminal justice response to the use of illegal means, notably violence, by 
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 “[A]ll state systems must integrate into their power structure at least the groups which are self-conscious, 








people who feel disenfranchised from the political or legal avenues or who simply reject the 
state. The exact reasons for the initiation of criminal prosecutions tend to be highly contested 
themselves, as challengers often claim that it is not their recourse to illegal methods that 
prompts state repression but their effective challenge to the status quo.  
 
The transfer to the criminal justice arena implies that a problem or dispute that arose in 
another arena somehow ended up in this “garbage bag” of last resort. In a way, that is exactly 
what the criminal justice system is designed for. Criminal law has a crucial function in relation 
to all other areas of the law, as was expressed already in 1843 by the Criminal Law 
Commissioners in the UK: “The high and paramount importance of the Criminal Law consists in 
this consideration, that upon its due operation the enforcement of every other branch of the 
law … depends” (in: Norrie, 1993:17). The criminal law is ultimately seen as the guardian of the 
entire legal system. Therefore, the transfer to the criminal justice arena is often explicitly 
defended as a means of protecting these other legal and political arenas. The US prosecutor in 
the case against activists from the campaign Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC), for 
example, pointed out that Huntingdon Life Sciences is engaged in “lawful practices,” and that 
animal testing is “mandated by the Food and Drug Administration.” In Chile, similarly, to justify 
a penal response to attacks on their lands, landowners consistently point out that they have all 
the legal land titles and that all lands have been acquired legally for decades already. Those 
laws from the other arenas are thus presented as the set-in-stone referent to be relied upon 








The switch to the criminal justice arena is in itself generative of issues, actors, and courses of 
action that are not present in the other arenas (see also Escobar in: della Porta and Reiter 
1998:28). The transfer process can be conceptualized as a concrete switch between relevant 
government buildings including a change in the actors that occupy this arena (Fletcher 2007:4) 
and a transition in the nature of the logic and language of interaction between actors, such as a 
shift from persuasion to coercion. Finally, there is a shift in attention from the validity of 
political claims and interests to the legitimacy of the methods used to pursue the political goal. 
The transfer can be difficult to reverse when criminal prosecutions lead to the stigmatization of 
perpetrators and statements like “we don’t negotiate with terrorists,” which subsequently 
make a shift back to the negotiation table harder to sell (della Porta and Reiter 1998:28; Zulaika 
& Douglass 1996:x).  
 
As I trace the way in which actions are pushed into the criminal justice arena or defended as 
belonging in the political arena, it is important to emphasize that actions that are thought to 
belong in the political arena are not necessary deemed appropriate, good, or legitimate. 
Indeed, they can and often are labeled as offensive, unpopular, and unwise. The division 
between these arenas is not a matter of “good” versus “bad.” The difference between the 
arenas is that they are guided by different rules, understandings, and criteria, and that the 
actors populating the arena are constituted by different identities. Indeed, what they are doing 







defense is saying that in effect the behavior was justified or even “good” while staying within 
the realm of criminal justice. An argument of “self-defense” does not bring events into the 
political arena. Similarly, the argument that a public speech was offensive and should not have 
been given is a political judgment which condemns the speech and can call upon the speaker to 
be more politically responsible in the future without pushing the event into the criminal justice 
arena.  
 
The courtroom is a mechanism of the state for creating order while maintaining legitimacy. 
According to Fletcher, the central question of criminal law “is justifying the use of the state’s 
coercive power against free and autonomous persons” (Fletcher 2000 [1978]:xix). Law and its 
social imaginary as being “just” and “neutral” are essential to achieve this legitimization, which 
is why the criminal process is portrayed as politically neutral, as it “generates ‘objective’ 
determinations of fact and law” (McBarnet in: Lacey and Wells 1998:16). This imaginary, 
however, can be contested. Sketching the different viewpoints regarding law and legal 
repression in a liberal state, Balbus distinguishes between the liberals and the radicals. On the 
one hand there are the “liberals,” who have a fundamental confidence in the state, 
emphasizing the crucial role of legality, civil liberties, and due process. Time and again they 
seem very surprised and upset when they are confronted with arbitrary and violent repression 
and the violation of these norms. On the other hand there are the “radicals,” who think of the 
state as a fascist conspiracy characterized only by evil self-interest. They advocate strategies 







response is far more benign than they had anticipated (Balbus 1973:1). These caricatures are 
useful ideal types of the contest that has been going on inside and outside academia regarding 
the nature of law, its relation to politics, and its capacity to regulate the state’s use of force.  
 
As Balbus suggests, both the liberal view and the radical view are too simplistic to account for 
the actual relation between law and power and are therefore criticized by various scholars (e.g., 
EP Thompson 1975; Wiener 1990). The findings of my research similarly reject this dichotomy. 
On the one hand, the process of criminalization is not adequately viewed as a simple 
reproduction of the interests of a powerful elite. If that were the case, criminal proceedings in 
each of the cases would occur more often, lead to more convictions, and yield higher 
sentences. Criminalization, however, is also not explained by a simple reference to the law and 
the straightforward application of its provisions. Were that so, profound changes in the 
interpretation and application of the rules would not be explicable. To analyze the process of 
criminalization more satisfactorily, I build upon the notion that law and politics should be seen 
as “distinct but interdependent” (Abel and Marsh 1994). Research in this spirit typically 
interprets the paradoxical workings of the law as both constraining and legitimizing (EP 
Thompson 1975; Ron 1997). This tradition can be traced back to the legal realists, who were 
followed by the law and society movement and critical legal theorists, all of whom focused on 
the relation between processes and (power) relations in society on the one hand and law on 








Placing my research within this approach, I understand the courtroom as an institution that is 
continuously socially constructed and reified in interactions between people (cf. Berger and 
Luckmann 1969). This legitimating mechanism and the claims it makes need to be believed as 
“true.” Liberal juridical institutions exist only because people give them legitimacy and play the 
roles that they require. These institutions can also be challenged when people refuse to interact 
according to the scripts that run them. In the next section, I present prosecutorial narratives as 
social constructions of reality and discuss how I have analyzed these narratives and the way in 
which their claims are presented as “natural.” The social mobilization to push for a change in 
penal action or withdraw compliance with juridical institutions is the topic of the subsequent 
section.  
 
2. Criminal prosecutions as social constructions of reality  
 
The prosecutor receiving a criminal complaint will have to define the situation to decide 
whether, how, and against whom to build a criminal case. What information is deemed relevant 
to define the nature of the event? What information is excluded from consideration? What 
kinds of questions are asked to determine what happened? In this section, I will discuss how I 
have approached this process of “building a case.” I propose to study criminal prosecutions as 
operations of translation from everyday reality into the specific reality of criminal law (cf. 







the criminal justice arena as groups and individuals draw upon the logic and terminology of 
criminal law to engage with the prosecutorial narrative.  
 
Existing approaches to the study of criminalization 
In this section I compare my approach with several existing approaches to the study of 
processes of criminalization. Some scholars have taken a “case flow approach” of several 
measurable stages: arrest, prosecution, conviction, imprisonment (see, for example, Balbus 
1973:241). These studies are often based on statistical data. Whenever it was easily available, I 
have not shied away from collecting quantitative data in order to complement my 
interpretation of the criminalization process and put qualitative data in context. Of course, it 
does make a difference whether 700 (in Spain, 2009) or 38 people (in Chile, 2010) claim to be 
political prisoners. However, instead of attempting to come to “reliable” numbers, I used them 
as the starting point for conversations in order to explore how these numbers themselves are 
subject to political contestation.  
 
A second common approach to the analysis of criminal cases is a legal analysis or rights-based 
analysis. Legal analyses, for example, evaluate or compare selected legislation and judicial 
verdicts, providing a factual and informative inquiry or comparison about what the legal limits 
and possibilities are as laid down in existing laws and jurisprudence. Though I have studied 
legislation and verdicts, my analysis emphasizes contextualization and is not limited to specific 







given situation. This makes it possible to observe that in a given situation, the prosecutor 
changes the kinds of laws that he or she uses for indictments.  
 
A rights-based analysis argues in favor of or against certain measures using, for example, 
human rights principles and the democratic rule of law as a benchmark. Instead of engaging in 
these debates (such as whether or not a given terrorism provision infringes on the freedom of 
expression or whether the illegalization of the Basque political party Batasuna is within the 
boundaries of a constitutional state), I have taken such expressions and positions by scholars 
and other actors as the data for my analysis of how the rule of law is demanded, rejected, 
interpreted, negotiated, and ultimately constructed. It is for this very reason that I will not 
make any assessment as to whether the prosecutions that I have studied were done according 
to “the” rule of law or the principles of “due process.” The concept of due process is itself a 
product of liberal legalism. Violations of due process take place within that framework and as 
such can only violate the rights of the individual being prosecuted. That very understanding is 
incommensurable with the grievances of those observing a “criminalization of a social 
movement.” Such claims of harmful effects of criminal prosecutions go beyond the violations of 
the rights of individuals. “Rule-of-law thinking” that posits a supposedly external standard 
against which we can measure criminal proceedings is typical for lawyers. Without disputing the 
worth of such work, my research aims to investigate this lawyerly discourse and the imagined 
rule of law as one of the available discourses in society: constructed in context, subject to 








A third type of research has been conducted by sociologists of law, either in micro-analyses of 
trial proceedings and arguments in the courtroom (e.g., Danelski 1971; Christenson 1999; 
Becker 1971) or macro-analyses of trajectories of “legal repression” (e.g., Ron 2000; Balbus 
1973; Gusfield 1984) or a combination of both (e.g., Barkan 1985; Hajjar 2005). These analyses 
approach legal institutions as social processes. I build upon this approach, although I pay more 
attention to legislation, criminal doctrine, legal concepts, and legal reasoning than most 
sociological studies, thus combining an internal analysis with an external analysis of the law.  
 
A final approach has studied criminal prosecutions as instances of social constructions of reality 
(e.g., Kelman 1981; Lacey and Wells 1998; McConville, Sanders, and Leng 1991; Bennett and 
Feldman 1981; Mansell, Meteyard, and Thomson 2004; Ewick and Silbey 1995). Judicial verdicts 
in this approach are not only decisions that can send someone to prison, they are also 
discursive products, which is deemed important because of the power of courts to 
institutionalize these “truths” and “marginalize other ways of looking at the world” (Lacey and 
Wells 1998:10). Many scholars have emphasized this truth-producing character of criminal 
proceedings (Abel and Marsh 1994:38; Bennet and Feldman 1981; Brass 1996).  
 
My research draws upon both the third and the fourth strand of research and is based on the 
idea that crime is a socially constructed category and that the response to crime is “shaped by 







event or threat is always about what the event or threat represents. Events are placed in an 
interpretive framework in order to determine the appropriate response (Hulsman 1986). Traffic 
accidents, for example, are generally perceived as a different threat than that posed by a group 
of aggressive street-corner youths, a rapist, or an armed organization like Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (ETA). These categorizations can be subject to contestation. For example, some 
scholars push for a re-conceptualization of the devastation of hurricane Katrina from a mere 
“natural disaster” to a “state crime,” criticizing the notion “that such disasters are unforeseen, 
and that humans can do nothing to mitigate the effects of these disasters” (Faust & Carlson 
2011:34).  
 
Just two weeks after former councilman Isaías Carrasco was killed by ETA, it was Semana Santa 
in Spain (the Eastern week during which many people go on holiday), which causes famously big 
traffic jams with an unfortunately infamous amount of deaths every year. In that year, 2008, 
the death toll was 63 in the week of Semana Santa, roughly the same number of deaths caused 
by ETA in the previous ten years. For many reasons, we categorize differently the threat posed 
by these yearly traffic jams from that posed by the continuing existence of ETA.   
 
Scholars have referred to these different representations as “images” or “definitions of the 
situation” (Hall 1979; Sudnow 1965). In this study, I trace the development of criminal 
prosecutions as embedded in specific and changing images and definitions of the situation 







and constitutive of criminal prosecutions. In addition, I describe the contestation of these 
images as a fundamental part of the conflict dynamics.  
 
Law as a system of signification 
The social construction of reality in the criminal justice arena is constituted and constrained by 
the logic and language of criminal law. I thus understand criminal law as a system of 
signification, as suggested by James Boyd White (1990), who wrote that “[t]he law, of which 
legal punishment is a part, is a system of meaning; it is a language and should be evaluated as 
such” (in: Wiener 1990:9, footnote 26). This system creates classifying concepts and categories 
of crimes as well as principles and rules, such as the presumption of innocence and rules about 
proper evidence (cf. De Roos 1987:4).27 Similarly, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz wrote that 
law is “not a bounded set of norms, rules, principles, values, or whatever from which jural 
responses to distilled events can be drawn, but part of a distinctive manner of imagining the 
real” (1983:173, see also p.215 and p.232). 
 
The prosecutorial narrative 
In my analysis of criminal cases, I “read” the sequence of criminal prosecutions as a story, a 
narrative, told by these classifying concepts. The “language” of the prosecutor in the 
indictments and trial transcripts consists not only of explicit verbal arguments but also of the 
decisions that he or she makes regarding who gets prosecuted and for what. Every choice a 
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prosecutor makes expresses and reproduces a certain “definition of the situation.” This is a 
concept from symbolic interactionism developed by W.I. Thomas, indicating the process in 
which people collectively interact in situations, defining what is going on and acting upon those 
definitions, thus constructing the situation according to the definition and its expectations. This 
includes adopting roles and identities that fit the definition, which the counterpart can then 
accept or reject by treating the other as being a certain person.  
 
I understand definitions of a situation to originate and make sense in discourses that provide us 
with the logic and terminology to interpret our worlds. The prosecutorial narrative can draw 
upon discourses in society, reproduce these discourses, institutionalize them, or provide them 
with new input. Its status as a narration of “facts” has important implications, as can be seen in 
the following example. An individual mugging story, including an incidental reference to the 
nonwhite race of the assailant, seems to be simply stating “facts.” It may, however, 
communicate a message of the inferiority or danger of a certain group, which as a general claim 
probably would be subjected to empirical evidence. Ewick and Silbey warn that “[t]he causal 
significance or relevance of the assailant's race is, in such a tale, strongly implied but not 
subject to challenge or falsifiability” (1995:214). As I focus on the prosecutorial narrative, I thus 
study criminal law and the criminal justice system as a system of talk, labeling, categorization, 








To understand the important role of the prosecutor in this system of signification, I distinguish 
between primary criminalization and secondary criminalization (de Roos 1987:4). Primary 
criminalization is the creation of laws by the lawmaker proscribing abstract behavior. Secondary 
criminalization is the application of these general laws to concrete instances, thus targeting 
concrete behavior. The prosecutor is an “agent of secondary criminalization” (Zaffaroni 
2006:166). To initiate a criminal case and decide upon the appropriate charge, the prosecutor 
has to decide whether or not a specific conduct falls within the boundaries of the generally 
indicated category described by the lawmaker. This means that there has to be a translation 
from the general to the specific, reducing a complex situation to a specific selection of legally 
relevant facts which can be more or less contested. Mansell et al. refer to this process as the 
transformation of “primary reality” into the “secondary reality of the law” (2004:161). These 
translations have a real impact. Only successful translations can, for example, enable the state 
to use investigative authorities, limit citizen’s rights, or even use force.  
 
The prosecutorial narrative is thus important for two reasons. First, it creates criminal liability 
and can thus secure a conviction and land someone in jail. Second, it is a powerful voice in the 
meta-conflict, in which different parties of the conflict try to impose their version of the truth 








For my conceptualization of criminal prosecutions as a process of translation and 
communication I rely on scholars who have emphasized this quality of meaning and 
signification, such as Garland:  
[Penality] communicates meaning not just about crime and punishment but also about power, 
authority, legitimacy, normality, morality, personhood, social relations, and a host of other 
tangential matters. Penal signs and symbols are one part of an authoritative, institutional 
discourse which seeks to organize our moral and political understanding and to educate our 
sentiments and sensibilities. They provide a continuous, repetitive set of instructions as to how 
we should think about good and evil, normal and pathological, legitimate and illegitimate, order 
and disorder. Through their judgments, condemnations and classifications, they teach us (and 
persuade us) how to judge, what to condemn, and how to classify, and they supply a set of 
languages, idioms, and vocabularies with which to do so. (Garland 1990:252–253)   
 
Discourse analysis and semiotics 
I will briefly introduce some of the key concepts of discourse theory and semiotics and describe 
the way in which I approached my data with these analytical tools. Whereas other forms of 
qualitative analysis tend to accept social reality as a given and explore how actors give meaning 
to that reality, discourse analysis is a methodology that aims to research this construction, 
production, and reproduction of social reality (Philips & Hardy 2002:83). It is a good way to 
study different underlying perceptions of and claims to legitimacy (Brass 1997:59). Discourse 
analysis, therefore, is an excellent approach for studying criminal prosecutions as 
representations of reality. Discourse theory is based on anti-foundationalism and anti-
essentialism (Sayyid & Zac 1998). Anti-foundationalism holds that we cannot access the truth, 
but only have access to our descriptions of the truth and our experiences, which are molded by 
our interpretations. As the Inuit have multiple words for “snow,” they not only expand their 







essentialism is the belief that concepts do not have a meaning prior to the political and social 
process within which they play a role (Sayyid & Zac 1998:251).  
 
Our descriptions of the world determine how we deal with it. And our descriptions can change. 
An illustration can show the concrete social impact of these definitions. On its website about 
police violence, Amnesty International remarked that the beating of suspects in many countries 
is so normal that even the victims do not recognize it as a form of torture. Calling the treatment 
torture then does not only describe reality: it can also reveal or construct reality. Words can 
therefore have very real consequences, which is most evident in law and legal procedures, 
where rituals constituted by words and references to texts can have material consequences, 
like imprisonment and the death penalty.  
 
Discourses are constructed and shared in discourse communities in real or virtual interactions 
in newspapers, rituals, and meetings. On the one hand, individuals are free to construct and 
influence discourses. On the other hand, in the construction of discourses, individuals are 
necessarily constrained by the words and meanings that are available in society and shared in 
communities (Jabri 1996:129; Barthes 1964:14). I focus on the ways in which different discourse 
communities define and legitimate or condemn social action, specifically in relation to 
criminalization. For example, our perspective on rape has changed considerably throughout the 
past century, and it took deliberate mobilization to have non-consensual sex within marriage 







prosecutions, Frailing and Harper Jr. (2010) have shown how midwives in New Orleans in the 
1940s became defined as an “abortion racket” in the media and by various (medical) interest 
groups, which led to their criminal prosecution.  
 
Discourse analysis can identify what causes the institution of courts and the law to be taken for 
granted. The discourse that is dominant in society is called the “hegemonic discourse,” which 
can be contested by “counter-discourses.” Struggle about language is therefore a power 
struggle (Hajer 2000), as those with power are able to produce discourses and have definitional 
power, and because the knowledge and truths that a discourse entails also produce power. In 
his perspective on governmentality, Foucault does not propose to view language and discourses 
as creating realities and identities. Instead, “language and other signifying systems were […] 
regarded as one element among many for rendering reality governable” (Rose et al. 2006:89).  
 
Discourses are hegemonic when they are taken for granted (Silbey 1998).28 Hegemony exists 
when the proposed logic and rules as well as the boundaries of collectives are viewed as 
“natural,” particular interests are successfully represented as universal interests, and 
underlying contradictions are negated. Alternative possibilities to the status quo are forgotten, 
and the fact that the status quo is the product of history and that change is thus possible is 
denied (Jabri 1996:96; Sayyid & Zac 1998:262; Silbey 1998). “If the minds of the dominated can 
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be influenced in such a way that they accept dominance, and act in the interest of the powerful 
out of their own free will, we use the term hegemony” (Van Dijk 1993:255).  
 
I analyzed criminal cases as sites of contestation and as a product of that contestation, beyond 
the adjudication of the specific alleged crimes and defendants on trial, examining what 
prosecutors communicate in criminal proceedings (materialized in trial transcripts, indictments, 
and prosecutorial decisions and arguments). Communication involves two sides, and even more 
than that if one takes into account “bystanders” and other casual listeners (Goffman 1981). 
Given that communication is about all of these actors, in my analyses of texts I have paid 
attention not only to what prosecutors said or wrote but also to what several audiences heard 
and understood. I have thus analyzed indictments as “performative utterances” (Bourdieu 
2010:8) and announcements, where the intended and actual audience of the prosecutorial 
message can vary. Paul Brass emphasizes the importance of the analysis of interpretation by 
focusing his book on “the struggle to interpret violence, the attempts to govern society or a 
country through gaining not a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence but to gain control 
over the interpretation of violence” (1996:45).  
 
I studied the content of the discourses in the meta-conflict at the micro-level by examining 
what examples are chosen to support arguments, whether the passive or active voice is used, 
how jokes are made, or what kind of metaphors are used, just as, for example, Van Dijk 







victim,” “apparent sympathy” (it is for their own good), or “apparent democracy” (the people 
do not want more immigration) (Van Dijk 1993:267, see for a larger overview of possible 
analytical questions: Van Dijk 1993; Fairclough 2003; Gee 2006). In this dissertation, I will 
descibe, for example, how landowners argue that Mapuche activists “take advantage of” their 
identity.  
 
Apart from analyzing the content of discourses, I also paid attention to the production, 
distribution, and reception of discourses (Philips and Hardy 2002:86) as well as to which 
persons have the most influence on a discourse, who has access to specific discourses or gets 
excluded, and the relation between dominant and non-dominant discourses (Fairclough 
2002:128). Access to discourses can depend on access to specific locations (e.g., a business 
meeting), roles (e.g., a member of parliament), or the differential value that is attached to kinds 
of information (e.g., statistical or scientific data). These “meta-discursive practices” (Briggs 
1996:19) decide who can talk, about what, and for how long. For example, in a courtroom, the 
discourse of liberal legalism is privileged over other discourses, giving clear cues regarding who 
can talk, who decides, and what is the allowed subject.  
 
The impact of such meta-discursive practices on the construction of and interaction between 
discourses was visible, for example, when defendant Cayupe in Chile testified on trial how he 
had cared for his mother, who suffered from Parkinson’s disease, and was tied to her bed 







four months in jail awaiting his trial. During his testimony on trial, Cayupe expanded on these 
obligations towards his mother, when the interrogating prosecutor interrupted and pushed him 
to come to the point in relation to the crime with which he had been charged. This push to 
“come to the point” is related to a broader notion of “legally relevant facts.” A defendant who 
interprets the prosecutor’s intervention according to ordinary conversational practices would 
certainly consider the interruption as rude. On-trial conversations between the prosecutor and 
the defendant take place within the specific meta-discursive practices of the courtroom and the 
playing field offered by liberal rules. The defendant is allowed to be silent, according to the 
principle of self-incrimination. The prosecutor can ask questions but is held in check by the 
defense lawyer, who scrutinizes questions and objects when the questions are leading, 
repetitive, or unrelated to the charges. It is within this strictly orchestrated setting that 
evidence is presented, a narrative is built, images are evoked or contested, and judges decide 
about the guilt of the defendants. 
 
Semiotics is the science of signs and the field that studies the creation of meaning. The creation 
of meaning is called “signification,” which Barthes defines as the act which binds the signifier 
(e.g., the word ox) and the signified (the mental image of an ox – not the actual ox), an act 
whose product is the sign (1977:48).29 I will give a concrete illustration of this process of 
signification in relation to criminalization. The meaning of terrorism, for example, is not only 
provided by a certain prior (legal) definition of the term, but also by the kinds of cases that 
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prosecutors choose to charge as terrorism. Changes in the meaning of words (the linkage 
between signifier and signified) in a language can never be an individualistic enterprise. Even 
though a specific individual can initiate a change in his or her speech, the real effectuation of a 
changed meaning depends on its communication and reception and response by others, as well 
as its use (speech) by others, independent of this first individual.30 The creation of meaning is 
also dependent on comparison with related signs (Barthes calls this “value”). Thus, to analyze 
the meaning given to the word terrorism one needs to analyze the process in which the signifier 
(the word terrorism) is linked to a certain mental image of terrorism. In addition, this mental 
image has to be compared to and differentiated from the mental image of related concepts, 
such as “public disorder.” Thus, terrorism obtains a certain value in comparison to public 
disorder. For example, in the creation of the prosecutorial meaning of “terrorism” in the 
Spanish-Basque case, this means that by prosecuting street violence31 as terrorism the 
prosecutor actively influences the meaning of both street violence and of terrorism, as well as 
the meaning of non-terrorism, such as public disorder.32    
 
The construction of a case 
Using the analytical tools described above, I analyzed the construction of a case in the 
prosecutorial narrative as the translation of events of everyday reality into the appropriate 
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 That is, when the meaning of a word is not “arbitrary” as discussed by Barthes (1977:51). That means that the 
link between the signifier and the signified is “contractual” and thus dependent on another’s consent.  
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 Street violence in the Basque Country is generally referred to as Kale Borroka, Basque for street struggle, and 
was previously prosecuted as public disorder. For more on this shift to prosecuting such actions as terrorism, see 
chapter 4.  
32
 This is what Barthes means with the “production of meaning” where it is not merely the act of linking one 
concept (signifier) to something else (signified), but by identifying one sign, the opposite (A versus A’) is articulated 







terminology of criminal law in order to create criminal liability for a defendant. The elements of 
the story have to be framed, classified, and ordered in such a way that it becomes a convincing 
criminal case. Criminal liability subsequently forms the justification for the application of a 
coercive measure against the defendant.33 The interpretation of the prosecutor is guided, that is 
both constituted and restrained, by criminal law logic and concepts: for example, the 
prosecutor has to choose a defendant. In the construction of criminal liability, the narrative can 
make patterns, create organizations, determine leaders, define speech acts, manage identities, 
de-politicize contentious issues, and redefine political struggles. Other scholars have recognized 
this tendency of the criminal law framework to guide (and thus influence) the construction of 
events. McConville et al. (1991) describe how detectives, police officers, and prosecutors create 
reality in accordance to – often dichotomous – legal categories, like: guilty/not guilty; 
sane/insane; intentional/not intentional; reckless/not reckless; voluntary/involuntary.  
 
McConville et al. describe the process in which a case is constructed from the moment the 
suspect becomes an object of police suspicion:  
It must be emphasized that at each point of the criminal justice process “what happened” is the 
subject of interpretation, addition, subtraction, selection and reformulation. This process is a 
continuous process, so that the meaning and status of “a case” are to be understood in terms of 
the particular time and context in which it is viewed, a meaning and status it may not have 
possessed earlier or continue to possess thereafter. […] Case construction implicates the actors 
in a discourse with legal rules and guidelines and involves them in using rules, manipulating 
rules and interpreting rules. It involves not simply the selection and interpretation of evidence 
but its creation. Understanding the selections made and the decisions taken requires, therefore, 
analysis of the motivations of the actors, their value systems and ideologies. (McConville, 
Sanders, and Leng 1991:12)  
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Let me briefly tease out what it means to construct a case, examining the selections and 
interpretations pointed out by McConville et al. Below I illustrate some of the questions that I 
have posed to my material in order to study this process. For example, it is important to 
analyze how prosecutors have used their discretion to initiate and drop cases. Further, whom 
does the prosecutor claim to represent, and what are the competing claims? An important 
element of my data analysis has been the construction of the identity of the relevant actors and 
the definition, description, and label given to actors in the indictment and legal arguments. 
Subjects always have multiple identities, however, and depending on the discourse they can 
emphasize one or more identities and roles and construct hierarchical relations between them 
(Sayyid & Zac 1998:263). Subjects identify themselves and are identified in the terms, norms, 
symbols, and power structures provided by discourses (Jabri 1996:131). In the courtroom, for 
example, the prosecutor addresses Mapuche activists as “Chilean citizens,” asserting their 
equality before the law and at the same time negating their claims, which are based on their 
Mapuche identity. Identification occurs in relation to self-images and enemy images which also 
play a role in the legitimization of inequality or the use of violence. We will observe how these 
images and their meanings are contested in the interpretive struggle in the criminal justice 
arena. For example, as Mapuche activists are prosecuted under anti-terrorism laws, they claim 
that the state is the “real terrorist.” This is an example of an “inversionary discourse” (Kapferer 
1997), in which people strategically adopt images from the opposing discourse and give it new 







identity images, thus playing a role in processes of identification and polarization. An important 
feature of identities is that categories such as “Mapuche” and “Chilean” can become 
interpreted as binary and exclusive, precluding the possibility to be both.  
 
The first important definition and categorization in the construction of a case regards the 
identity of the defendants as well as their possible representation for a larger group. Given the 
multiple available labels for the defendant’s identity, which identity does the prosecutor 
choose or construct? Is the defendant named with others as a group or as an isolated 
individual? Is the defendant addressed as a leader or as a self-interested agent? When multiple 
possible perpetrators are involved, it also becomes an issue of who is (not) chosen as a 
defendant and why. If an organization is involved, then the relation of the defendant to the 
organization becomes relevant. Of course, the description of the organization can become an 
item as well, as can the relations between multiple accused, like images of leaders and 
followers or ideologues and manipulated youth. The collective names that claim-making actors 
give themselves or that other people give them are what Tilly calls “political identities” 
(2007:9). These political identities (other examples are “workers,” “citizens,” or “women”) are 
subject to intense debate, which is reflected in the interpretive struggle in the criminal justice 
arena. Who do defendants represent? Who do they claim to represent, what does the 
prosecutor argue about their representativeness? And the same questions can be asked about 
the victims. Is the victim mentioned, or is it considered a so-called “victimless” crime? Is the 







intricately related in the form of an image. The image is relevant as it may influence the 
perception of whether the criminal conduct is seen as something inherent in and essential to 
this person, as something inevitable because of a certain ideology, or simply as an incidental 
mistake, easy to leave behind. This image is thus related to the assessment of dangerousness. 
These questions lead to potentially contentious choices about identity, membership, 
representation, and collective guilt.  
 
A second category of inquiry is the legal interest. How is the victim related to the legal interest 
that is argued to be at stake, threatened or damaged? Was it a specific legal interest such as a 
specific piece of property or a more abstract interest such as the constitution, the democracy, 
public peace, or economic stability? If the act allegedly “disturbed public order,” how does the 
prosecutor define and represent public order? Similar questions can be asked regarding a legal 
interest like “citizen security” – whose security, whose order?  
 
The conduct that has been identified as criminal conduct is another main element of the 
construction of the case. Which facts are chosen as the relevant facts? Which facts are 
excluded? Does the conduct constitute a completed crime or have the prosecuters chosen to 
criminalize preparatory activities or an unsuccessful attempt? What kinds of actions have been 
identified as criminal offenses? Speech acts, direct physical harm, preparatory activities, 
recruitment, or financing of terrorism? Agirre has argued that the key to constructing a series 







elements in common among individual offences to consider them as a whole like a single and 
greater entity. The common denominators that show the existence of a pattern may refer to 
the victims, the geographical area of commission, the chronology, or the purpose and modus 
operandi of the perpetrators (Agirre 2004:18). “The problem is that the ‘pattern’ is a 
procedural construct, a concept shaped by the process, often of fuzzy boundaries. The 
prosecution will tend to highlight the most dramatic, the gravest aspects of a purported overall 
picture, even if they are not central to the pattern” (Agirre 2004:19). What was the time frame 
that was chosen? Is it a narrow time frame or a broad time frame? This is relevant, for 
example, because a broad time frame tends to provide more room for excuses (Kelman 1981). 
It may occur that more than one incident is part of the “criminal conduct.” This opens up the 
issue of the choice of and interpretation of the relation between specific incidents. One can 
analyze the justifications for the sampling of incidents and the arguments that establish a 
pattern between them. Of course, causation is another important part of a charge. All western 
criminal law systems make a distinction between human causes and natural events. When we 
attribute damage to a natural event, we are not likely to define it as a crime or punish anyone 
(Hulsman 1986). Further, it is important to see how actors achieve this construction of facts in 
a credible way. How are the witnesses, judge, and other participants as well as evidence given 
credibility? What, for example, is the role of “experts”?  
 
These are some of the questions that I have asked in my analysis of the materials to gauge the 







the meta-conflict in which the images in the prosecutorial narrative are contested. In the last 
section, I present a typology that enables a systematic analysis of shifts in the prosecutorial 
narrative as a consequence of this continued contestation and the presentation of alternative 
narratives.  
 
3. Mobilization and discursive action in the criminal justice arena 
 
Having discussed the role of the state, represented by the prosecutor as the initiator of and 
spokesperson in criminal prosecutions, I now turn to describing how non-state actors mobilize 
and bring discursive action into the criminal justice arena. I specifically discuss victim 
mobilization and prisoner support mobilization as two distinct forms of action competing for 
dominance, as they are engaged in definition work regarding criminal prosecutions. In this 
meta-conflict we encounter actors imagining the liberal order, attacking that order, making 
claims on that order, and defending that order. Criminal law offers a socially validated syntax 
for condemnation (of perpetrators) and solicitude (for victims). The deployment of such legal 
vocabulary is a bid for that social validation, or (from the mobilization perspective) at least a 
rallying cry. In the next section, I discuss the typical logic of criminal prosecutions within the 
framework of liberal legalism. There, I discuss the features of “liberal legalist” criminalization 
and also how this liberal legalism can come under pressure in the specific context of a 
contentious episode, where society is divided and multiple notions of law, violence, politics, 








Whereas the exact nature and form of victim and prisoner support mobilizations differed across 
the cases, their main features had striking similarities. While I am not the first to pay attention 
to these processes, I developed an original, systematic, and coherent framework to analyze 
them. Analyzing my material, I asked questions like: How does a prisoner support group or 
victim lobby group come into existence? Who are the active members (e.g., family, friends, 
companies, individuals, political sympathizers)? How do they define the event which is the 
subject of the prosecution? How do they define the state response? How do they relate to the 
actors of the political dispute and define the political dispute? What is their power base? What 
kind of political and legal actions do they undertake? What does their work mean for the 
lawyers and prosecutors involved in the case? Who decides who is a “political prisoner” or a 
“victim” and who is not? How are internal disagreements regarding these labels decided?  
 
Identification split 
Criminal prosecutions can be analyzed as acts of inclusion and exclusion. Defendants are 
excluded from society and a message is sent to people who risk crossing the line as well. 
Criminal proceedings can exacerbate or solidify an existing tendency towards polarization when 
actors identify either with the defendant or with the victim (the “identification split”) and 
identities are framed as mutually exclusive (“you are with us or against us”). Identification – 
“the process of identifying with others” (Woodward 1997:14) – is a dual process: actors identify 







identification can be reproduced and institutionalized in criminal proceedings. These 
identifications can have real consequences. For example, if people identify with the victim in a 
criminal case, they might fear that they will be the next person to be victimized. Broad societal 
identification with victims is usually sought and established by emphasizing their innocence. For 
example, as we will see in Chapter 7, the prosecutor in the SHAC case explicitly argued that the 
victims had “nothing to do with Huntingdon Life Sciences.” If, however, people identify with the 
defendant, they might fear that they will be the next in line to suffer (legal) repression. This 
identification can also be actively sought by prisoner supporters. Given these dynamics, 
prosecutors can strategically choose to emphasize or ignore certain identities or impose others.  
 
Collective identities give meaning to events. The death of Mapuche activist Alex Lemún, for 
example, was for the activists in the Mapuche movement not (only) the tragic death of one 
arbitrary individual. They identified with him as Mapuche, and his death was viewed as the 
exemplary outcome of the collectivized experience of systematic and continuous police 
violence against all Mapuches. Identification can thus lead to acts of solidarity (defined as 
support for someone who suffers on the basis of political identification) intended to share in or 
alleviate the suffering of other people with whom one identifies. In relation to criminal 
proceedings, two types of solidarity can be identified: solidarity with the defendant of the 
criminal prosecution and solidarity with the victim of the criminal offense. The type of solidarity 
can also determine whether people will cooperate with the criminal justice system or resist it. 







state resources to protect and vindicate the victim. Solidarity with the defendant is a challenge 
to the state and a dissent from the process of criminalization. Other scholars have observed 
such solidarity as well. For example, DeNardo (1985:191) notes that “[w]hen demonstrators 
become the victims of brutal repression, their movement often gains sympathy and even 
material support from people who have not suffered directly from the government's excesses” 
(in: Opp and Roehl 1990). To garner broad support, it is thus essential for prisoner supporters to 
portray repression against them as brutal and unjust.  
 
The processes of “prisoner support mobilization” and “victim mobilization” are not confined to 
specific actors. Mobilization for defendants can be in support of challengers of the status quo as 
well as defenders of the status quo, depending on the prosecutorial charges. Similarly, both 
challengers and defenders of the status quo can mobilize as “victims” and claim victimhood. 
However, in each of the country studies, some actors tend to be more successful in their claims 
and will be able to appropriate the “victim” label more often than others. In other words, their 
appropriation of the label is more often “honored” (Scott and Lyman 1968) in the form of 
criminal cases in which they figure as the officially recognized “victim.” Indeed, while the 
apparently “equal” presentation of these two processes should not mask the structural 
asymmetry that often exists between groups, this asymmetry can be reproduced in the criminal 
justice system. It should thus be clear that in referring to actors as “victims,” I do not mean to 







effectively) in the public space and act upon that shared identification and the characteristics 
that are associated with it.  
 
In the description of the country studies I will describe how victims of ETA in Spain, landowners 
in Chile, and animal enterprises in the United States manage to unite and mobilize as victims in 
the criminal justice arena. Basque left-nationalists, Mapuche activists, and eco-activists, on the 
other hand, mobilize in support of “their” prisoners. In this section, I briefly describe the broad 
features of how these groups claim and appropriate roles within criminal justice proceedings or 
how they reject roles that are imposed on them. As groups mobilize, they appeal to or de-
legitimize the criminal justice system and its claim to punitive power as they, for example, 
contribute payments to police investigations or refuse to testify. The different groups employ 
competing discourses and try to access the criminal justice arena and have their concepts and 
images accepted as the “truth” and ultimately even taken for granted. In the analysis of the 
claims the groups are making, it can be useful to distinguish between competing truth claims 
and competing moral claims (Rehg in: Habermas 1998:xv). Sometimes the course of events as 
such is disputed (“truth” claims). Competing truth claims may exist when Mapuche activists 
deny responsibility for or even the existence of a case of arson, whereas a landowner attributes 
responsibility to them. Often, however, there is no disagreement about “what happened,” but 
rather the moral valuation of what happened differs. Thus, for example, both eco-activists and 
fur farmers can agree upon the basic facts of the case that 2,000 mink were released, but they 








Polarization can be observed as an increasing separation and growing inflexibility of discourse 
communities. Strong mobilization and a strict identification split can then make the criminal 
justice system incapable of generating a universally shared truth. For example, landowners in 
Chile interpret the high acquittal rate of defendants as an indication that legal guarantees make 
it too difficult to provide evidence to convict the guilty. Mapuche activists, on the other hand, 
read acquittals as a confirmation of the innocence of defendants and the unjust “persecution” 
by the prosecutors.  
 
In describing victim mobilization and prisoner support mobilization as distinct processes that 
can be ascribed largely to some major groups and individuals, I attempt to identify the way in 
which discourses and their key concepts come to play a role in the criminal justice arena. I am 
not suggesting that these discourses are the sole invention of these groups or that these 
discourses can be found only within these groups. On the contrary, these groups are connected 
to the broader society in many ways and it is exactly the resonance with the larger public that 
can give these groups and their discourses the strength that they may have, which is, for 
example, shown explicitly when many people show up for the public demonstrations that these 
specific groups organize.  
 
Of course, the complex conflicts and the relevant multiple actors in society can never be so 







that I am making. As actors move into the criminal justice arena, the logic, the available roles, 
and the very criminal proceedings have this polarizing and dichotomizing effect, simplifying 
what is often highly blurred and multifaceted. Further, while in some criminal cases the ongoing 
trials are front-page news and a topic of daily conversation, in many of the other criminal cases 
only a select number of people care about the trials. My focus on the specific groups that 
mobilize in the criminal justice arena should not make us forget that often the vast majority of 
society just carry on with their lives. While absent from active mobilizations, this “silent” 
majority is often the subject of them as different actors, including the prosecutor, try to reach 
out to, make claims about, or speak in the name of “society” and the “public.”  
 
Victim mobilization – appealing to state protection  
Mobilization in the criminal justice arena is just one of many ways in which people who feel 
victimized can become engaged. In the country cases, they often engaged in multiple responses 
at the same time and sometimes did not do anything at all. Frequently, victimized actors 
attempted to make up for the state’s failure to protect their goods or lives by hiring private 
security companies or bodyguards or by starting civil lawsuits to ask for protective injunctions 
or gain restitution or compensation for damages. Whereas victimized actors can recur to 
extralegal retaliation, and indeed have done so, powerful defenders of the status quo are 
particularly likely to appeal to the rule of law for their protection (Beetham 1991:67).34  
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Victim mobilization is collective action calling for criminal justice action in the interest of those 
that claim the status of “victim.” Many scholars mention in their accounts of the dynamics in 
and around the criminal justice system the relevance of “interest” groups, “pressure” groups, or 
“moral entrepreneurs” (De Roos 1987; Quinney 1964; Vold 1998; Chambliss & Seidman 1982; 
Becker in: van Swaaningen 1999:204). Not many, however, have examined how exactly this 
pressure group activity works. Waddington provides a useful account, suggesting that police 
officials change their routine behavior when potential victims are “important people” like 
ambassadors or royalty who can cause significant “in-the-job trouble.” Waddington defines 
effective “troublemakers” as those who occupy institutionalized positions of power 
(Waddington 1998:127). In the subsequent case chapters, I will analyze how groups have 
claimed the victim label and taken steps towards creating these institutionalized positions of 
power in order not to be ignored. In this process of victim mobilization we can identify several 
(not necessarily chronological) steps: 
 
1. Self-identification as victim and the forging of alliances 
2. Declaration of a common problem 
3. Demanding protection from the state 
4. Defining actions as criminal: employing criminal law  
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
made to appear not only as the necessary, but as the sufficient, condition of legitimacy: its ultimate, rather than 







The declaration “I am a victim” is a reference to the logic of criminal law and the institution of a 
criminal trial in which the victim has a specific place, role, and significance. Whereas the 
political arena is constituted by political opponents, the criminal justice arena is constituted by 
perpetrators and victims.35 It is to this criminal justice “victimhood” that victim mobilization 
refers. Collective action is then based upon the mutual identification as victims and a shared 
victimhood, due to a common “perpetrator.” At the same time, “victims” can claim their 
innocence by denying the political conflict or their role or responsibility in it. Whereas a conflict 
is always more complicated than a simplistic division into victims and perpetrators can convey, 
guilt and innocence (“Was it a crime?” and “Did s/he do it?”) are supposed to be clear-cut in 
criminal justice (Hulsman 1986). Victim mobilization can obtain formal legal effect when the 
prosecutor or judge is warranted to weigh in the effects of “social alarm,” as, for example, is the 
case in Spain when a judge decides about preventive detention.36  
 
Once unified as a group, “victims” declare their common problem: a lack of protection and 
continuing impunity. The victims address the state and demand it perform its fundamental 
duty: to protect citizens adequately from incursions into their rights and freedoms and punish 
the perpetrators that do. Victims and their advocates generally request “legal security” and a 
strict obedience to positive law, thus claiming the general tenets of liberal legalism (Nonet & 
Selznick 2005:54). They point to the state obligations as understood in the social contract and 
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the relation between citizens and the state. In this appeal to the law, victims claim the rule of 
law as a guarantor against crime and the source of their right to protection. At the same time, 
the law and the rechtsstaat can be viewed as a serious obstacle in the struggle against crime or 
terrorism, as it is perceived as providing too many guarantees to defendants, making effective 
police and prosecution work very difficult. Whereas traditional constitutionalist interpretations 
see the concept of the rechtsstaat as a protection for citizens against arbitrary state repression, 
in these country studies we see that victims refer to it as if it were a toolkit the state is 
supposed to use to protect them against other actors. Further, victims often argue along the 
same lines as Jakobs and Cancio Meliá (2006) in their view of rights as a zero-sum game: if the 
state grants the defendant certain rights, this means the negation of the rights of victims.  
 
It is useful to think about criminalization from the point of view proposed by Hulsman, who 
contends that the world is full of potentially “criminalizable events” (1986). Whether or not 
concrete specific events get criminalized depends on social action, not on a certain innate or 
essential criminal quality of the event. Human beings can choose to attribute a criminal quality 
to specific conduct and thus bring it to the attention of the relevant authorities to initiate 
secondary criminalization. Potentially “punishable facts” happen all the time, but only a certain 
part of them are translated into the criminal justice system. “Victims” set this process of 
criminalization in motion when they actively translate their narrative into the criminal law 







regarded as criminal, or to change the qualification of actions that were not taken seriously 
enough.  
 
Why is it important to analyze how different actors present and use the “victim” label? The 
identification of victims plays an essential role in the assessment of harm and the 
determination of the legal interest at stake. No crime without harm is an important principle in 
criminal law (de Roos 1987:34). As victims unite and recognize each other as victims of a similar 
phenomenon with shared experiences of harm, threat, and fear, they often construct a 
narrative in which distinct incidents become connected in a pattern. Their narrative can then 
construe and blame a unified actor, organization, or identity group and hold it responsible for 
this harm. This narrative can become the basis for a re-contextualized prosecution, which will 
be discussed in more depth below.  
 
On the basis of their narrative, victims can lobby for the adoption or application of specific laws 
and engage in debates about the affected legal interests. They draw upon the criminal law 
language and terminology as they identify harm, define actions as crimes, provide accounts for 
criminal liability, and demand higher sentences. Victims thus contribute to the criminal 
qualification of events. Victims traditionally played a small role in classical criminal justice. 
During the last decades, however, much effort has been made to give the victim a stronger 
place within the criminal justice system. Once actors have successfully claimed the status of 







Victims can become participants in criminal investigations and trials as private accusers 
(“private prosecution”) or witnesses, they can file complaints, and they can provide assistance 
in investigative tasks (offer evidence).  
 
As “victims” mobilize and become one united actor, they can thus become effective 
“troublemakers,” propose an alternative narrative, and transform the way the prosecutor 
constructs a criminal case.  
 
Prisoner support mobilization – condemning the state response 
Balbus points out in his study “Black rebels before American Courts” that one of the reasons 
the courts were able to process the criminal cases after the riots in Detroit, Chicago, and Los 
Angeles so smoothly was the lack of a consistent challenge to “the very logic of the court 
authority effort – their very definition of the situation” (Balbus 1973:258–259). In the country 
studies in this research, we do encounter such organized efforts to provide alternative 
definitions and challenge those put forward by the state. The process of prisoner support 
mobilization37 can be divided into four steps or elements.  
 
1. Creation of a prisoner support group: a call for solidarity  
2. Criticisms within the framework of liberal legalism: de-legitimization of the state 
3. Bringing the “political” back in: identification as a political prisoner 
                                                      
37
 Whereas in all cases people mobilize under the header of “prisoner” support, it more correctly is “defendant” 







4. Persuading the public of the political definition: changing the impact of criminal 
prosecutions  
 
Prisoner support mobilization provides a counter-narrative to the account proposed by the 
prosecution. The practical aspects of this process – the need for material support – are 
interwoven with the communicative aspects – the desire to confirm this counter-narrative for 
internal and external consumption.  
 
As a result of criminal prosecutions, defendants and their supporters switch part of their time 
and money from their political activities to issues of criminal justice. A clear incentive for the 
support group to be created is the emergence of practical issues that a criminal prosecution 
involves, such as the necessary money for the defense lawyer and the practical needs of a 
prisoner. In the cases that I studied, the prisoner support group also functioned as a 
coordinator of all the actions that occurred regarding the prosecution. As a case drags on, and 
of course also during the time of imprisonment, there are infinite moments for outcries and 
rallies. Prisoner support groups distributed information about the trial dates and the treatment 
of the prisoner. There were demonstrations in front of prisons, honoringceremonies for 
prisoners, and hunger strikes for better prison conditions. This work requires for activists to 
identify with “fellow activists” who are viewed as sharing the same cause. Activists engaged in 
prisoner support invariably emphasize that they are acting in solidarity. “Their repression is our 







“a social movement activity in its own right” (Zwerman and Steinhoff 2005:96) and can involve 
more moderate groups when the state is perceived to be “overreacting” (della Porta and Reiter 
1998:18).38 Criminal justice issues can even come to replace, overshadow, or complement the 
original political claims (Starr et al. 2008:265).39 Some challengers of the status quo claimed 
that this diversion is exactly the aim of those prosecutions.  
 
Not all prisoner support is politically motivated. Prisoner support can be categorized according 
to its relation to the political claim of the defendants. Family and friends often engage in 
offering “personal support” intended to alleviate the suffering of the imprisoned person. This is 
the kind of support that is provided regardless of the definition of the criminal facts, and 
regardless of the political cause. The prisoner is simply recognized as a human being worthy of 
humane treatment.  
 
Another form of prisoner support, which I call “liberal” support, is generally provided by human 
rights organizations and moderate groups which agitate against human rights violations, such 
as torture, long preventive detention, disproportionate sentences, or the lack of due process. 
Human rights groups take liberal legalism seriously and maintain the difference between 
“formal” support (for the legal case) and “substantive” support (for the political cause). Also, 
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 “When the police are perceived as ‘overreacting,’ a process of ‘solidarization’ is set in motion between those 
who are the direct target of repression and larger – often more moderate – forces” (della Porta and Reiter 
1998:18).  
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Flam (1998), organizations under surveillance tend to shift their agenda from projects to self-defense. Interviewees 







even prisoner supporters who are motivated by reasons that cannot be understood in terms of 
liberal legalism per se often frame their support as “liberal” support for strategic reasons.  
 
Finally, prisoner support mobilization can step outside of the framework of liberal legalism and 
criticize the state definition of the criminalized conduct more fundamentally by pushing it back 
into the political arena. Prisoners can successfully claim and establish their identity as 
“political” prisoners when they receive support and recognition from a prisoner support group 
and a broader movement. “Political” prisoners contrast themselves to common prisoners, or 
what Basque activists call “social” prisoners. Of course, the definition of what counts as a 
“political” prisoner is fundamentally contested. “Political” prisoners and their political 
supporters generally defy the state’s legitimacy to condemn their actions. Balbus emphasizes 
that in challenging the logic of the court, protesters have to sacrifice their short-term interest 
in the name of the consciousness of a broader, longer-term interest. This requires strong 
identification with a larger collective and is both a condition for and a goal of prisoner support. 
Self-identification as a political prisoner may advance the political cause but jeopardize the 
criminal case, as activists then commit themselves to a “political” solution in the political cause 
in contrast to “individual” justice in the criminal case. Challengers of the status quo have to 
decide what kind of defense to give during their trial or whether to reject state jurisdiction 
entirely, dropping any defense. Defense lawyers can play an important role in supporting a 







prisoner support is often given by people who are politically active for the same or a similar 
cause.  
 
Of course, these different kinds of personal, human rights, and political support often overlap. 
Specifically, supporters tend to switch between a human rights framework and a political 
challenge depending on the audience to whom they are speaking. For example, political 
supporters frequently employ the liberal legalist framework in order to de-legitimize the state 
by pointing out that it “does not apply its own rules.” Prisoner support groups frequently keep 
detailed track of legal irregularities and publish lists with the number of “political” prisoners to 
denounce state repression. Political prisoners and their supporters can strategically decide not 
to step outside of the liberal legalist framework in order to maintain popular support from 
moderate forces. Regularly, the message is framed such that the larger public is encouraged to 
identify with the prisoners, claiming that illegitimate repression may also victimize them at 
some point. Effective de-legitimization of the courts’ decisions and the validity of evidence can 
lead people to doubt charges and the prosecutorial narrative. This disrupts the belief prevalent 
in liberal democracies that everyone in prison has a good reason to be there.  
 
In my analysis of the country cases, I will pay quite some attention to the dynamics within the 
different social movements between moderate and extremist activists. The drawing of 
boundaries, inclusion and exclusion, and the labeling of groups as extremists, sympathizers, 







Criminal prosecutions tend to reinforce a distinction between ends and means, as prosecutors 
claim to focus exclusively on the illegality of means. Whereas “moderates” tend to accept this 
distinction, “extremists” often reject the very distinction and argue that movements must not 
be divided over the means of struggle but rather should accept a “diversity of means” 
(Gelderloos 2007). This division process can lead to a situation in which extremists support 
extreme protest activity and claim their prisoners are “political” prisoners, whereas moderate 
activists ignore or condemn them. Criminal prosecutions can thus work as a watershed in 
activist communities as they can create or strengthen distinctions between the “moderates” 
and the “extremists.” Moderates often have to decide whether or not they support or even 
cooperate with the state’s prosecution. We can observe mainstream groups officially and 
explicitly distancing themselves from more extreme organizations and rejecting illegal means 
as illegitimate (see also Balbus 1973:259). The Sierra Club in the United States, for example, 
refers to actions in name of the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) as “extremist.” This active rejection 
can also be required by the government.  
 
Prisoner support groups are dedicated to promoting their political cause and persuading the 
public of the political definition of the phenomenon. Successful prisoner solidarity makes 
prisoners themselves turn into a political issue. Sometimes, political supporters respond to 
charges by openly disputing the illegitimate tag the state gives the criminalized conduct, 
claiming responsibility for their actions and widely publicizing, explaining, justifying, and 







irrelevant, arguing that the accusation and prosecution are politically motivated because 
activist tactics were effective in threatening political interests. They then claim that the state is 
criminalizing their legitimate goal, their legitimate protest, their movement, or their people.  
 
The work of solidarity aims to change the effects that criminal prosecutions are supposed to 
have: incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, retaliation. Sharp argues that repression can 
only be effective when the persons against whom repressive measures are taken support the 
norms that are supposed to be protected by the sanction (1973:14, cf. Mahmood 1996:21).40 
True or not, we can observe that supporters actively resist the criminal prosecutions and their 
effects. In each of the country cases, defendants often decided to evade proceedings and 
become fugitive. Supporters can then defy law enforcement and offer assistance to fugitives, 
decline to offer testimony in grand juries, or otherwise refuse to cooperate with law 
enforcement. Many prisoner support activities challenge the stigmatizing function of criminal 
proceedings and the distance that is created between the “ordinary citizen” and those 
imprisoned, a process which led Garfinkel to argue that a criminal procedure can be seen as a 
“status degradation ceremony” (Vold et al. 2002:213; Van Swaaningen 1999:204). As a 
consequence of prisoner support, many political prisoners get transformed into heroes, which 
can turn the cost of repression into a benefit (Opp and Roehl 1990). This is not always the case, 
however. As a consequence of internal disagreements among “political” prisoners and their 
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solidarity groups (about the means of struggle or negotiation with the government), prisoners 
can cut ties with the movement as a whole or with their specific support group. Sometimes 
they are thrown out.  
 
Contested truths – the problem with evidence 
The interpretation of evidence is one of the stages in criminal proceedings where the impact of 
the different discourses and belief systems is particularly notable. In the criminal justice system 
as it is envisioned in the ideology of liberal legalism, the presentation of evidence is the key to 
truth-finding. Convincing evidence upon which judges can make their verdict “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” can clear away any assumptions or prejudices that people may have. 
Evidence is then supposed to give an objective and universal message. In each of the country 
studies, we can observe that the credibility and meaning of evidence is fundamentally 
disputed, impeding evidence to provide the basis for a shared truth.  
 
Having discussed the meta-conflict in which “victims” and “prisoner supporters” present 
alternative images and narratives contesting the discourse of the prosecutor, I will now turn to 
the discursive shifts that we can observe in the prosecutorial narrative.  
 








In the previous sections, I have conceptualized the prosecutorial narrative as a construction of 
reality that is constituted by courtroom arguments and decisions regarding who is prosecuted 
on which charges. In the process of contentious criminalization, the prosecutorial narrative is 
constantly contested in the criminal justice arena. Victim mobilization and prisoner support 
mobilization challenge the prosecutorial narrative and propose alternative narratives regarding 
punishable events and the proper state response. In interaction with these challenges, the 
prosecutorial narrative can change. This change can be described as a shift from an ostensibly 
de-contextualized narrative to a re-contextualized narrative. These are modes of the 
prosecutorial narrative that are constituted in different applications of criminal doctrine. In 
contrast to a de-contextualized approach that aims to isolate the facts of a case from the 
context in which they occurred, the re-contextualized approach situates criminal facts within a 
particular context while claiming that the context is relevant to understand and label the facts. I 
have drawn upon the work of various other scholars to identify these potential shifts, which will 
be discussed in more detail below.  
 
Criminal law as the practical application of liberalism 
Criminal law can be viewed as the practical application of a liberal political philosophy based on 
the following values: rationality, legality, formality, and individual justice (Norrie 1993:12–14). 
This ideology originated in the Enlightenment period when it became the basis for liberal 
democracies and the rule of law as a means against arbitrary government repression. I follow 







understood as a system that evolved because a more simplistic “repressive law” was not good 
at establishing legitimacy.41 As chief characteristics to legitimize legal outcomes, Nonet and 
Selznick emphasize the separation between law and politics, the importance of rules and 
procedure, and strict obedience to positive law (2005:54). If you do not agree with a law, it is 
allowed to protest through all legal means, but you have to obey the law. Administrators can be 
held accountable, but citizens have to comply. This is part of the historical bargain according to 
Nonet and Selznick: “legal institutions purchase procedural autonomy at the price of 
substantive subordination” (2005:58). Weber similarly stresses this distinction between formal 
procedures and substantive justice (“formal rationality”) as an important feature, which has 
been recognized as the best approach for the state to maintain both order and legitimacy 
(Balbus 1973:13).  
 
Differentiation in society (a distinction between persons and roles) is another important 
component of the professionalized criminal justice system (Elias 1982; Weber 1972:124–128). 
Police and judges wear uniforms denying their individuality and are supposed to perform their 
tasks based on their role and not out of personal motives. These roles are no longer the 
“property” of a person but are (often temporarily) assigned (Weber 1972: 124–128). Formally, 
police and prosecutors represent the nation and the public interest. In every prosecutor’s 
office, courtroom, and prison this is symbolized by the national flag and pictures of the head of 
state, reflecting the unity of these organs and their role as representatives of the state. 
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Prosecutors are important “characters” (Fairclough 2003:213) in charge of executing the liberal 
legalist paradigm in criminal proceedings. 
  
This framework is built, however, on assumptions regarding society and human beings that do 
not always correspond to reality: “Enlightenment thought was populated with a world of 
rational individuals living in a society based upon imagined consensus” (Norrie 1993:57). The 
existence of social and political conflicts was ignored from the beginning in the ideology of 
liberal legalism, and “[c]rime was the result of individual calculations” (ibid. 1993:58). Liberal 
legalism produces a framework within which the state is the guarantor of the social peace and 
abstract legal individuals are assumed to be free and equal. However, this does not correspond 
to the realities of social life. Critical legal theorists have explored these contradictions between 
the assumptions underlying liberal legalism and the actual application of law in the real world. 
In doing so, they have, for example, criticized the notion that law determines legal decisions 
(Norrie 1993:30–31; McBarnet in: Lacey and Wells 1998:16). Another contradiction is that the 
prosecutor has to act in the public interest, which is believed to be shared in a society by 
common consensus, founded in the metaphorical social contract. The public interest is, 
however, always a contested concept in a divided society. Over the past decades various 
researchers have developed competing perspectives in which they portray the criminal justice 
system as an institution that develops its own interests, is linked to interests in the larger 







(Packer 1964; Conley and O'Barr 1990, 2005; Ewick and Silbey 1998; Feeley 1979; Lazarus-Black 
and Hirsch 1994). 
 
In this research, I build upon this insight that there is a discrepancy between the assumptions 
underlying criminal law and characteristics pertaining to actual events in social reality. In this 
section, I describe the ideal type of de-contextualization as the standard way in which criminal 
prosecutions are conducted according to liberal legalism. The fact that it is an ideal type means 
that it is an analytical device, not a description of factual reality. In contrast to de-
contextualization, I describe re-contextualization as an alternative (ideal typical) mode of 
operation. In this way, I conceptualize the discursive shifts that we can observe in the 
prosecutorial narrative in response to contestation in the criminal justice arena.  
 
De-contextualization 
The first ideal type that I describe is based on general descriptions of what criminal proceedings 
should look like, based on the core values of liberal legalism. Prosecutorial narratives are 
generally expected to be “de-politicizing” (Nonet and Selznick 2005:58; Balbus 1973; Melossi 
2008). De-politicization is a way to legitimate judicial proceedings. It also denies politically 
motivated defendants exactly what they seek most: political legitimacy (Shapiro 2007:10–15).  
 
How is de-politicization generally achieved? Mertz has analyzed the process by which lawyers 







emphasizes that lawyers “operate in a world where social context and identity have become 
invisible” (2008:110).42 While this approach purports to select legally relevant facts and 
otherwise exclude the social context, critics have noted that there is no such thing as “no 
context.” Indeed, the chosen context is a very particular one which is claimed to be politically 
neutral. De-politicization means that courts move away from the substantive issue at hand and 
instead focus on formal (understood as neutral) rules, making a strict distinction between ends 
and means. Instead of dealing with the dispute of political claims, the focus of a criminal 
prosecution is on the appropriateness and legality of means used by defendants to pursue their 
ends, make their claims, or defend themselves. Debates about the legitimacy of the underlying 
political claims are invariably deliberately and silently or explicitly excluded from the trial.  
 
Procedural fairness is a core value. Substantive justice is the “hoped-for-by-product of 
impeccable method” (Nonet and Selznick 2005:67). Balbus similarly observes sharply that 
“[f]ormal legal rationality circumscribes the conflict between the state and the accused into a 
conflict over facts; to have committed a “crime” or to be a “criminal” means only to have been 
proven to have committed such-and-such act” (Balbus 1973:8). Formal equality before the law 
is one of the devices that make a criminal prosecution seemingly impartial and unrelated to 
structural differences in society. Hence the famous quip by Anatole France about “the majestic 
equality of the French law, which forbids both rich and poor alike from sleeping under the 
bridges of the Seine” (Balbus 1973:5). De-politicization is further achieved by creating generally 
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formulated legal definitions that make a seemingly objective and de-politicized division in 
behavior, categorizing some as deviant or wrongful (Lacey and Wells 1998:12). Beetham makes 
the same point as he writes:  
 
[T]here are features inherent in most legal systems that serve not only to encourage respect for 
the law in general, but to put the particular content of existing law beyond question, and make 
it difficult to challenge. […] What are these features? Most deeply embedded are those terms 
used in everyday language which serve to distinguish the lawful from the unlawful in the 
achievement and exercise of power, and which demarcate, for example, theft, violence and 
murder from legally permitted forms of acquisition, compulsion and deprivation of life or 









A de-contextualized narrative is typical in situations that resemble reality according to the 
assumptions upon which the criminal law was built: a society in consensus, disrupted by a few 
criminals who are motivated by self-interest, such as financial gain or an adolescent need for 
Criminalization and de-politicization in the spirit of liberal legalism follows the 
following steps:  
1. De-contextualization 
2. Individualization 
3. Choice legally relevant facts, i.e. selection 







adventure. This brings us back to the importance of the “definition of the situation.” Liberal 
legalism is a message from the state to the effect that criminalized activity is fully 
comprehended within the state. It takes something and treats it as an ordinary part of society. 
A de-contextualized and de-politicized narrative constitutes a claim by the state that the stakes 
are not that high. For years, the Chilean government chose to view the Mapuche conflict as 
isolated cases of private dispute between particular communities on the one hand and specific 
land owners on the other hand. Criminal incidents were framed within the context of these 
private disputes. Thus, the political significance of the conflict was downplayed. It is typical that 
government officials maintained that criminal prosecutions were not only appropriate and 
necessary but also sufficient to deal with the crimes and disorder related to this private dispute. 
In 2003, the mayor of Collipulli, a village in the middle of the area that was the center of 
struggle and “violent” action, commented that with the incarceration of one of the main 
Mapuche leaders of the zone, “everything was quiet now” (Interview C-19). Thus, he confirmed 
the image that the problem was caused by a few people and that repressing these individuals 
was an effective way to maintain or retrieve order and stop the violence. In Chapter 4 I will 
return to the various other available narratives and the subsequent discursive shifts made by 
Chilean prosecutors. The de-contextualizing and de-politicizing narrative fits the government 
that claims to be in control.  
 
While the chosen (non-)“context” in this modality of the prosecutorial narrative is claimed to be 







in which the prosecutorial narrative in its de-contextualized modality becomes contested. It is 
important to realize that the doctrinal tools on which the narrative built up (i.e., the choice of a 
narrow time frame, the focus on individual perpetrators, exclusion of the political motive) co-
create the content of this narrative that isolates individuals from their communities and places 
priority on individualistic motives of actions (see also the table below). The images that are thus 
produced are specifically typical of this modality. Criticism of these images from actors that feel 
misrepresented or from actors that call prosecutorial action ineffective thus has a bearing on 
the form of the narrative as much as on the content. For example, the criticism in the United 
States that acts of animal-rights-motivated vandalism are organized and coordinated not only 




The second ideal-type modality of prosecutorial narratives is based on my observations in the 
country studies and available literature regarding different types of criminal proceedings.  
 
As described earlier in this chapter, contestation in the criminal justice arena can challenge the 
de-contextualized prosecutorial narrative. Both victim mobilization and prisoner support 
mobilization can push the prosecutor to take the context into account. “Victims” can perceive 
the de-contextualized narrative to be highly problematic in fulfilling the promises of the 







criminal acts from happening again. When disruptive action becomes repetitive and involves 
many people, incarceration of a few is not likely to stop these protests. As we have seen earlier 
in this chapter, victims can mobilize and complain that many offenses go unpunished as 
individual material perpetrators do not get caught. In the absence of convincing evidence or a 
lack of witnesses who are prepared to testify, criminal prosecutions can lead to acquittals. In 
some other instances, isolated actions of vandalism are not deemed severe enough for serious 
sentences. As a result, victims can propose a new definition of the situation. In the country 
studies, I will describe how the state, and in particular prosecutors, can adopt this alternative 
“definition of the situation,” leading to a discursive shift.   
 
In the new narrative, instead of excluding the context of, for example, the “Mapuche conflict,” 
this context comes to the foreground. The Mapuche organizations, the Mapuche identity, the 
political motive, a larger collective of victims, a broad legal interest such as “national security,” 
the connection between different protest actions, events, and protest targets: all of these 
elements become necessary parts of the narrative to indict perceived troublemakers, instead of 
excluding them as they are in the de-contextualized narrative. With this shift, the specific image 
of perpetrators can vary and change over time while including those that were excluded from 
decontextualized prosecutions. Prosecutorial attention can focus on powerful leaders, financial 
supporters, or on outside sympathizers who give support to fugitives. Victims can also construe 
new images of the perceived perpetrators. Re-contextualizing the prosecutorial narrative in this 







leaders who were not materially involved in the execution of crimes, or prosecute preparatory 
activities or activities of logistical support.  
 
Defendants and their supporters also can perceive the de-contextualized narrative as 
problematic, because their political grievances and claims are not taken into account. They tend 
to challenge the strict distinction between means and ends, which enables prosecutors to 
condemn the use of illegal protest tactics and refer activists to the parliamentary route for legal 
change while leaving structural inequalities unaddressed. In the country studies, we will 
encounter, for example, Mapuche activists who ask in response to allegations of arson in 
plantations: “What about the trees, which suck up all the water, making it impossible for the 
Mapuche residents on the adjacent lands to get water from their wells?” (Interview C-46). They 
perceive such induced erosion to be more “violent” than any of their protest actions which get 
prosecuted. Re-contextualizing the prosecutorial narrative in the “context” as Mapuche 
activists perceive it would then serve to de-criminalize protest actions that actually enjoy 
widespread legitimacy among the population and are, according to the prisoner supporters, 
more aptly understood as signals of communication or legitimate self-defense than as “crimes.”  
 
I have pointed out that the doctrinal tools of this modality are an important factor in the 
production of images. The shift in modality is therefore simultaneously a shift in both the 
doctrinal instruments and in the content of the images. Indeed, a shift in a doctrinal device 







The prosecutor choosing a doctrinal device for opportunistic purposes (for example drawing on 
provisions against “criminal organizations” to have more investigative tools and flexibility) can 
suddenly become immersed in the context of specific criminal acts as the charge forces the 
prosecutor to produce a credible image of the alleged criminal organization.  
 
As a prosecutor re-contextualizes the narrative in a criminal case, he or she re-draws the 
boundary between the criminal justice arena and the political arena. Just like the de-
contextualized narrative, the new re-contextualized narrative can also have the intention of de-
politicizing an event; however, it follows a different path to do so. While the previous de-
contextualized narrative ostensibly excluded the context in order to distinguish between the 
“political” and the “criminal,” the re-contextualized narrative explicitly engages with the 
context and frames the context in such a way that it affirms the criminal definition of the 
events.  
 
The discursive shift from de-contextualization to re-contextualization 
When the de-contextualized narrative is contested, prosecutors may put criminalized events in 
a different context. This occurs, for example, when prosecutors classify a case as a “Mapuche 
conflict case” and thus place a criminal case within a network of assumptions and images that 
govern the “Mapuche conflict.” I have called this step the “first classification” as this basic 
categorization is what the further specific re-contextualization of the facts of the case relies on. 







“ETA terrorism” versus the “Basque conflict.” Beyond the contestation common to criminal 
cases (“Did s/he do it? “Is there enough evidence?”), the network of assumptions and images 
that govern the chosen “context” becomes the new basis for continued contestation.  
 
In analyzing the variety of forms of criminal justice proceedings, I step into the footsteps of 
other scholars who have theorized this issue. Herbert Packer (1964) famously devised two 
models of criminal process (crime control and due process), and Günther Jakobs (2006) 
distinguished between Feindstrafrecht (enemy penology) and ordinary citizen penology. Instead 
of adopting any of these models wholesale, I have drawn from these and other analyses to 
distinguish between different forms of criminal proceedings. In the appendix is a table in which 
I have juxtaposed the different ways in which criminal doctrine is interpreted and applied 
within a de-contextualized narrative and a re-contextualized narrative. For the elaboration of 
this table I have drawn upon insights and analyses from a wide variety of scholars and studies, 
including Agirre Aranburu (2004); Agamben (2005); Weber (1978); Packer (1964); Norrie (1993); 
Kelman (1981); Simpson (2006); Christenson (1999); Barkan (1985); Nonet and Selznick (2005); 
Damphouse & Shields (2007:71); Jakobs (2006); Smith and Orvis (1993); del Valle (2001); and 
Turk (1982).  
 
The goal of the table is to provide a descriptive typology for the analysis of data. It does not 
necessarily have normative implications, even though we can subsequently evaluate its use and 







cases but can be used as an analytical tool in discerning broader patterns and changes. I use the 
typology as “a purposive, planned selection, abstraction, combination, and (sometimes) 
accentuation of a set of criteria with empirical referents that serves as a basis for comparison of 
empirical cases” (McKinney 1966:3 in: Jacques & Wright 2008:222). Its goal is not to explain a 
phenomenon, but to provide a useful description of it.43 Indeed, instead of trying to find these 
ideal types as such in the country studies, I am more interested in an empirical description of 
the in-between and what that actually looks like at any given moment. There is no grand shift in 
which de-contextualization and liberal legalism are entirely abandoned. Rather, we can observe 
a “back-and-forth” consisting of partial shifts including some elements of re-contextualization. 
My focus will thus be less on the dichotomy and more on the process in which prosecutors shift 
between these ideal types and how these shifts are constituted by and reinforce new images of 
the criminalized phenomenon. In this way, the prosecutor gets a voice in the meta-conflict and 
communicates about what is going on, who the relevant actors are, and how the state relates 
to the situation.  
 
To make the table easier to digest, I have sorted the many different doctrinal choices into three 
broader shifts that can occur as part of a re-contextualization: (1) a shift from narrowing 
towards broadening the legal interest; (2) a shift from narrowing towards broadening criminal 
liability; and (3) a shift from emphasizing towards loosening the separation between law and 
politics.  
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For the subjects of criminalization, prosecutions in the re-contextualized modus are not 
necessarily better or worse than those in the de-contextualized modus. The impact on 
individuals or a movement is not only dependent on the kind of context that is chosen and the 
way this context is portrayed and translated into legal decisions. More importantly, de-
contextualized criminalization can be as damaging to a social movement or individual as any 
other kind of criminalization. Indeed, without resorting to any context references, governments 
can easily imprison inconvenient protesters on bogus or pretext charges such as traffic or 
administrative offenses. While re-contextualized prosecutions may be particularly prone to 
violations of the liberal legalist rulebook, de-contextualized prosecutions can also lead to the 
imprisonment of innocent men or women, introduce illegal evidence, or otherwise violate a 
due process requirement.  
 
The point of this identification of different modalities of prosecution is to understand the 
interaction between the contextualized images chosen to represent a criminal event and the 
doctrinal decisions that follow from and at the same time reproduce these images. To speak in 
plain English: for most people it does not really matter how they get locked up. In liberal 
democracies, however, the use of the force of criminal law against free individuals needs a 
justification. This justification is provided in laws and our understanding of the adequate 
application of these laws. Images of law-breaking can be translated into the corresponding 







the images with which prosecutors describe a phenomenon can lead to a shift in the doctrinal 
tools that are applied, which reproduces and reinforces the discursive shift. The modality shift 
can even lead to a caricature of the images, as the social construction of reality in the criminal 
justice arena is constituted and constrained by the logic and language of the criminal law. Thus, 
prosecutors can be led to portray a loose network as an “organization” simply because the law 
on criminal organizations requires that the existence of an organization is proven.  
 
The doctrinal shifts described in the table constitute a discursive shift in the narrative of the 
prosecutor. In each of the three country studies, I analyze the prosecutorial narrative and 
identify discursive shifts that constitute departures from de-contextualization towards re-
contextualization. De-contextualization is one way in which criminal proceedings claim 
legitimacy. When that claim appears to fail, a new basis for legitimacy can be sought in a 
particular re-contextualization. The expectation was that de-contextualization is the standard 
approach which can largely be found in situations of stability where there are no specific 
pressures on the government or the criminal justice system. Re-contextualization can occur in 
the face of emergency and escalating violence, but also as a result of victim mobilization or 
other pressures. My country studies show that when the penal vocabulary is perceived to be 
unable or inadequate to do what it promises (define, punish and deter crimes), prosecutors will 








In the country studies, we will often observe the following dynamic: Prosecutors enter the 
stage in an attempt to extract “criminal behavior” from a blurry and complicated range of 
events. Committed to the ideology of liberal legalism, they tend to work in a de-contextualizing 
manner, selecting specific events and individual perpetrators, charging them with narrowly 
framed offenses. They often prosecute challengers who have started to assert their rights in 
extralegal ways. These challengers may criticize the prosecutions and attempt to redefine their 
protest activity and push it back into the political arena, thus resisting criminalization. As the 
conflict continues, those who feel victimized by the protest activity may perceive the 
prosecutor’s response as insufficient. Their victim mobilization can include calls for re-
contextualization of the events, while proposing a “context” that competes with the narrative 
from the prisoner supporters. Thus, the meta-conflict occupies the criminal justice arena as 
competing accounts of the relevant context and the appropriate definition of the events are 
translated into criminal law vocabulary. Prosecutors often present their narratives as a natural 
and inevitable representation of criminal events, while in truth there is not one determinate 
narrative. Both a de-contextualized prosecutorial narrative and re-contextualization within an 
alternative context are always an option.  
 
Facing an incriminating re-contextualized narrative, defendants have three options. They can 
propose a different context and argue for a different definition of the crime (for example, 
choosing a context that enables the framing of the crima as self-defense or a context in which 







emphasize liberal legalist values, and call for a de-contextualized manner of prosecution. 
Finally, they can choose to resist criminalization altogether and keep pushing back the 
boundaries of the criminal justice arena and emphasizing that the proper arena to deal with the 
criminalized event and its underlying dispute is the political. Often, their response is a mixture 
of these three options. In this meta-conflict, the prosecutor can – and in the three cases that I 
studied tends to – adopt the re-contextualized narratives proposed by the victims. While re-
contextualization inevitably means that political elements are brought into the criminal 
proceedings, this does not mean that events are placed and dealt with in the political arena. Re-
contextualization still is a form of criminalization, even though there are differences with a de-
contextualized approach to criminal prosecution.  
 
At the same time, defendants often also attempt to have their accounts as “victims” honored 
within the criminal justice arena, presenting a definition of the situation in which their 
grievances are actually criminal harms. In the cases in my research, these efforts to turn the 




Liberal legalism brings with it a framework that both enables and constrains the state 
regarding, for example, how it can prove elements of an offense or the kind of conduct it can 







within a decontextualized approach, prosecuters may shift their framing. A discursive shift may 
bring investigative and charging flexibility, as it enables the prosecuter to punish more severely 
and to prosecute people and actions together that otherwise would be processed separately. 
Calling something terrorism, for example, can move incidents up on the list of priorities. At the 
same time, these constructions can also lead to a loss of the benefits of liberal legalism. While 
liberal legalism can be a powerful framework for taking complicated events and processing 
them in a non-contentious manner, re-contextualized prosecutions can turn the prosecutor into 
a political actor and change the way people think about what is going on in the courtroom. The 
case studies show that at times prosecutors have decided to switch strategies and have with 
varying force, depending on time and place, flirted with or moved towards prosecutorial 
strategies that are not the common ones of liberal legalism. This shift constitutes a recognition 
that the criminalized events are not ordinary crimes, thus validating to some extent the 
difference between the defendants and ordinary criminals.  
 
In this chapter, I have sketched the analytical framework that I have used to analyze the 
different cases. Each country study will be presented in one chapter that sets out the context of 
the conflict, its actors, competing claims, and the mobilization in the criminal justice arena. A 
second entire chapter will then be devoted to the analysis of the criminal prosecutions that 
have occurred, their main themes, and the way in which the prosecutorial narrative, the images 








II. Basque Separatists Challenge the 
Spanish State 
 
“Somos españoles, aquí también!” [We are Spanish, also here!], shouted the people who had 
gathered at Plaza Moyúa in Bilbao. After the 2008 European Soccer Championship, youth in 
Bilbao celebrated the Spanish victory in the finals. Their celebratory shouts indicated a political 
message as well (Field notes, June 2008). The tensions surrounding the Basque claim for 
independence are present throughout daily life, also in soccer. Increasingly, the criminal justice 
arena has been transformed into one of the primary sites where these tensions are played out. 
Mobilization by and on behalf of victims of ETA dissatisfied with continued neglect and 
impunity has pushed the government to pay attention to the victims and, more importantly, to 
adopt new legislation and a different narrative about ETA and its sympathizers that has enabled 
an expansion of criminal prosecutions. This has drawn a variety of actors into the criminal 
justice arena, where they engage in a battle of interpretation as they condemn, justify, or 
redefine the conduct that is charged and place or reject blame. In its struggle to end terrorism 
and destroy ETA, the prosecutorial narrative has increasingly re-contextualized events within 
the context of ETA terrorism, defining as criminal what previously had not received that label. 
As a consequence, the narrative has expanded its reach and brought into the criminal justice 







prosecution. In this and the next chapter I trace this development in this first case of 
contentious criminalization as I analyze how the Spanish governments and its law enforcement 
agents have negotiated a short-term interest in order and a long-term interest in legitimacy in 
the face of challenges to its claims to democratic decision-making and an adherence to “the” 
rule of law.   
 
1. Introduction  
 
In June 2008, I met Carlos in the restaurant next to the courthouse in Madrid.44 As promised, he 
had brought Iñaki with him, a businessman who had been forced to pay the so-called 
“revolutionary tax” to Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) for years now. Carlos introduced me, 
mentioning that I was a student doing research about the criminal justice system and the 
struggle against terrorism. He added that I was talking to “everyone” and had also talked with 
people from the terrorist organization ETA. I wanted to protest and say that I had not 
interviewed any ETA militants. But before I could say anything, Carlos added that I had 
attended the trial against Gestoras pro Amnistía and also talked with the defendants. I held 
back my protest as I realized that Carlos was employing the broader definition of ETA as a 
network (Field notes, June 2008).  
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The simple question “What is ETA?” proved to be far more complicated than I could imagine 
before embarking on my fieldwork. Not only is it disputed whether ETA is a terrorist 
organization or an armed organization. It is also deeply contested who belongs to ETA and who 
does not. Indeed, even the prosecutor got confused during one of the trials. He charged the 
defendants with membership in ETA. During his arguments, however, he talked about the 
relation between one of the defendants and ETA, as if ETA were actually external to the 
defendants. He corrected himself quickly (Field notes, June 2008, Trial Gestoras, Audiencia 
Nacional).  
 
A final example can illustrate the discrepancy in understandings about what ETA is. In the trial 
on the illegalization of a Basque political party, the defense lawyer interrogated one of the 
police experts. The police expert claimed that in a public speech a mayor of that particular party 
had openly called for support for two ETA members who were being detained and had allegedly 
been tortured. Defense lawyer: “Did she use the word ‘ETA’?” Expert: “She said ‘Basque 
political prisoners,’ which everyone understands as ETA prisoners” (Field notes, June 2008, 
illegalization ANV/PCTV, Tribunal Supremo). 
 
In this chapter I will analyze and question this assertion that “everyone” views Basque political 
prisoners as the equivalent of ETA militants. It turns out that different groups imagine ETA in 







about the representation of ETA has entered the criminal justice arena and changed the choices 
made in the criminal prosecutions by the Spanish state in its “struggle against terrorism.” 
 
My fieldwork in Spain took place between January and June 2008, and I briefly went back in 
January 2010. During that time I conducted participant observation at various political events 
and criminal trials, and I conducted more than thirty interviews with actors from the different 
political sides as well as those in the criminal justice arena: prosecutors, victims, lawyers, and 
defendants. In addition, I collected numerous books and articles, surveys, legal transcripts, 
legislation, public declarations, internal documents from ETA, and government reports. For my 
analysis of the development of the prosecutorial narrative I have further relied on the yearly 
publication of the Memoria Anual (MA) by the general attorney’s office. For detailed 
information regarding my data I refer the reader to the methodological appendix.  
 
 
2. Challenge to the liberal democracy  
 
Basque nationalists demand independence from Spain.45 While this conflict goes back a while – 
at least to ideologue Sabino Arana at the end of the 19th century – the time frame of my 
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usage, only refers to the Basque Autonomous Community), “Euskadi” (associated with the moderate Basque 
Nationalist Party, PNV), or “Euskal Herria” (associated with the left nationalists and ETA). Euskal Herria does not 







research starts after the death of Franco in 1975. I thus analyze the contentious episode in 
which the Spanish state transformed into a democratic state and built a rule of law, while at the 
same time these very processes and the basis upon which they were built continued to be 
fundamentally contested. More than in the other two country studies, the conflict here directly 
implicates the state, as the Spanish state and its constitutional requirement for unity are at 
stake. The state has thus from the start been one of the main actors in this episode. Indeed, 
agents of the state were deeply involved in the Dirty War during the 1980s and have been 
among the main targets of ETA. Any brief introduction to the conflict, the actors, their 
perceived incompatible goals, failed negotiations, and the use of violent methods is bound to 
be incomplete. It will therefore merely serve as a basis for the reader to show how the actors, 
demands, and events in this episode challenge the Spanish liberal democracy. Inevitably, the 
issues and events presented in this introduction form the material for contestation in the 
criminal justice arena.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
claim to constitute the desired independent entity, including Navarra and the three provinces on the French side. 

















The contention: Basque separatism versus Spanish unity  
At the core of the contention are the incompatible goals of Basque separatism and Spanish 
unity. After the death of Franco, the Spanish liberal democratic institutions were built while 
specific sectors in the Basque Country demanded its independence from Spain, including ETA, 
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which continued the armed struggle it had started under Franco. During the Franco dictatorship 
(1939–1975) ETA emerged in 1959 as a student group aiming for more radical resistance than 
its members found in the moderate Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). Its goal was a free and 
socialist Basque Country. In 1975 Franco died and the transition started. Prime Minister Adolfo 
Suárez was the architect of this transition. In 1978, the new Constitution was presented for a 
referendum, where it was accepted, although in the Basque Country only 35% voted in favor of 
it (O’Brien 2003:111). This lack of legitimacy is still often cited by nationalist activists. Basque 
left-nationalist activists dispute that there has been a transition to democracy. Spanish 
constitutionalists, however, view the subsequently adopted “Statute of Gernika,” which 
outlines Basque autonomous competencies, as a retro-active legitimization of the Constitution. 
53% of the Basque people voted in favor of this agreement, and it is a point of dispute whether 
this means that through this vote the Constitution also got accepted or not (O’Brien 2003:112). 
41% abstained in this vote (Espiau 2006:4).  
 
Left-nationalists spoke out for their demands through party politics until 2003, when the 
political party Batasuna was banned. ETA’s response was defiant: “Banned? A foreign legal 
system that we don’t accept is trying to claim that we are banned, but we don’t feel banned! 
[…] We Basques don’t need to find a place within Spanish legality” (interview with a 
spokesperson of ETA in the newspaper Gara, 8 April 2007). In 2011, a new left-nationalist 
Basque political party (Bildu) participated in the regional elections, receiving 26% of the votes in 








Demands of Basque nationalists challenge the status quo 
Basque nationalists challenge the status quo with their demand for independence of the 
Basque Country. Self-determination is incompatible with the Spanish Constitution, which claims 
Spain as united and undivided (Article 2). “No one is allowed to violate the Constitution,” said 
one of my Spanish right-wing interviewees as he talked about the Basque claim to 
independence (Interview S-13). Even the proposal for a referendum to decide on the matter is 
perceived as a strong challenge to Spanish unity, as it would imply that the Basque people 
alone could decide the matter. Constitutionalists claim that the proper deciding body for such a 
referendum would be all Spanish citizens. The Constitutional Court ruled in 2008 that a 
referendum planned by the president of the Basque Autonomous Community was 
unconstitutional and thus illegal. One left-nationalist activist commented upon this decision: “It 
is about the equality of political projects. The Constitutionalists have it all, whereas the 
Independentists have nothing. That is inequality. We don’t even have the right to lose.” He thus 
redefined the “right to decide” (the right to a referendum) as the right to lose while basing his 
demand on the liberal value of formal equality. “They say that we will lose. OK, we’d like to see 
that. Democracy means that everyone can try to persuade the people” (Field notes, June 2008). 
In the eyes of nationalist Spanish people, however, equality between the different autonomous 









Whereas many “moderate” nationalists currently accept a certain degree of autonomy instead 
of total independence, left-nationalist activists generally regard the Spanish state and its claim 
to govern the Basque Country as entirely illegitimate. Indeed, refusing to participate in the 
collective imagination of the nation state when they talk about the state, they never say 
“Spain” but always “the Spanish state.”  
 
Some tactics and justifications challenge the law 
Unlike the other country studies, in the Spanish-Basque contentious episode the use of violence 
(including violence against people) has been openly justified, as some nationalist activists have 
not only rejected the state, but also accepted the use of violence to put pressure behind their 
demands. Their justifications are often based on fundamental criticisms of the democracy and 
the rule of law. Indeed, the democracy and the rule of law are perceived as part of the problem. 
This in turn poses a strong challenge to the state’s claim to a legitimate monopoly on force.  
 
Many left-nationalists maintained a “state-of-exception” discourse to justify the use of violence, 
reasoning that as long as there is neither democracy nor a constitutional state, the armed 
struggle is justified as a defense against oppression. For example, after the illegalization of the 
political party Batasuna, they argued that all political means to fight for their political project 
had been taken away. Comments justifying the use of violence were expressed openly, as, for 
example, when a 28-year-old activist claimed that his generation had not lived one year without 








They are educating us in violence. If they don’t give the youth the necessary instruments, then 
our reaction will be the only method they leave us, which is violence. It is a reaction to what we 
receive, and we respond in kind. The state imposes this on us. It is our right to confront the 
violence. What we do is politics, and our goal is to overcome the violence. (Interview S-24)  
 
Criticism of the state and its claims to democracy and the rule of law are widespread among 
left-nationalists. Basque left-nationalist groups such as the prisoner support group Gestoras pro 
Amnistía and the internationally oriented organization Askapena actively criticize the Spanish 
state for its perceived injustices and repression.  
   
ETA’s armed attacks profoundly challenged the state’s monopoly on force, especially as ETA 
claimed the right to defend the Basque people using all available means in the struggle for their 
political project. During the 1980s, ETA maintained the so-called action-reaction-action 
doctrine, engaging in actions that would provoke a reaction by the state and then reignite 
action by angry citizens. ETA waged its most deadly campaign in the early 1980s. At its height in 
1980, ETA killed 92 people in one year.48 While since 1992 the number of battle-related deaths 
has not surpassed twenty-five per year, during the 1990s ETA made several important 
qualitative leaps in its choice of targets (Alonso & Reinares 2005:266). During the 1980s, Civil 
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Guards were targeted most frequently.49 During the 1990s there were fewer deaths, but killings 
were often more spectacular, costing the lives of high-level politicians, journalists, and judges. 
These assassinations in combination with actual threats by ETA led many people to hire 
bodyguards. I display a short table with the mortal victims of ETA from 1975–2010, but only 
with the emphasis that this numerical overview is necessarily incomplete as it does not 
adequately indicate the harm caused by ETA. The table does not cover the complexity of the 
activities that make up ETA’s existence, as it omits the many actions in which people were 
injured or actions with only material damage.  
  
Table 1 Mortal victims of ETA, adapted from data Spanish Ministry of Internal Affairs 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
16 17 10 66 76 92 30 37 32 32 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
37 43 52 21 19 25 46 26 14 12 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
15 5 13 6 -- 23 15 5 3 -- 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
-- 2 2 4 3 1 
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Defending the status quo 
Given the violent challenge to its governance, the Spanish state faced the dilemma of 
maintaining order without further stirring up discontent and alienation among left-nationalists. 
For decades, it did a poor job as the attempts to maintain “order” were perceived as unjust 
repression and a continuing violation of the desired autonomy of the Basque people, while at 
the same time ETA continued its violent campaign. To complicate matters, the challenge to the 
democratic state did not only come from those demanding independence. During the first 
decade after the transition, right-wing elements have also threatened the Spanish government 
and its claim to the monopoly on force. In 1981 general Antonio Tejero Molina attempted a 
military coup and almost succeeded, providing a strong incentive for the government in those 
years to appease the right wing and their concern for the unity of Spain. During those years 
several extremist right-wing groups were active, such as the Batallon Vasco Espanol and Triple 
A, which engaged in the killing of suspected ETA members. The Spanish government habitually 
labeled these groups “uncontrollable” (see, for example, MA 1978:70). From 1979 until 1987, 
an estimated eighty persons were killed by extremist right-wing groups (Calleja & Sanchez-
Cuenca 2006:97). 
 
Criminal prosecutions during the 1990s revealed that the Spanish socialist (PSOE) government 
was deeply involved in the so-called “Dirty War” between 1983 and 1987. In this period, the 
paramilitary group “GAL” (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación or Anti-Terrorist Groups of 







revealed that government officials had hired mercenaries in order to kill ETA militants who had 
sought refuge in France. The paramilitary attacks were not only intended to eliminate ETA 
militants but also to force France to change its position vis-à-vis ETA and cooperate with the 
Spanish state instead of offering ETA members safe sanctuary (Woodworth 2002:82). While the 
lack of effective criminal prosecutions was a major impetus to found GAL and use extra-legal 
methods to fight ETA, the episode fueled anti-state sentiments in the Basque Country. GAL 
mistakenly killed several people who were not ETA militants at all as well as the popular leader 
of the left-nationalist political party Herri Batasuna. The Dirty War thus illustrates the 
continuing dilemma between the state’s interests in short-term order and long-term legitimacy 
as well as the balancing of competing demands of different audiences.  
  
Popular support: Extremism, supporters, and polarization 
Support for calls for independence should be distinguished from the support for ETA and its 
armed struggle. Surveys among the Basque public, since 1988, show that between 21 and 28% 
of the population has been in favor of independence, whereas 24–33% has been against it, and 
27–37% would decide depending on the circumstances (Euskal Soziometroa/Sociómetro Vasco 
2008:41–42). ETA has claimed it would accept the results of a referendum. The Basque 
challenge to the Spanish state has to be understood in the light of similar calls for 
independence in other regions, most notably Catalunya. This was, for example, visible when 







was able to send a representative to the European Parliament. Throughout Spain, especially 
also in Catalunya and Andalucía, people voted for Herri Batasuna.  
  
The dilemma that the challengers of the status quo pose to the Spanish state can further only 
be understood in light of the high level of popular support for ETA (especially during the 1970s 
and 1980s), the threat from right-wing paramilitary groups, and the growing mobilization of 
anti-ETA groups. Support for the ETA’s armed struggle during the 1970s and 1980s was 
significant, especially given that many people might not have supported it but also did not 
necessarily oppose it. Research has shown a constant ten percent of support for ETA 
(Euskobarómetro 2007; Sánchez-Cuenca 2007:302, Figure 2: Popular support for ETA in the 
Basque Country). This ten percent is often referred to as the “nucleo duro” or “hard core” of 
ETA supporters, principally located in small villages in the province of Gipuzkoa in the Basque 
Country, consequent voters for Herri Batasuna and the political parties that replaced it. On the 
other hand, right-wing paramilitary activity also received overt support. For example, one 
member of the Basque business community openly said that if the state would not act against 
ETA, private individuals would (Woodworth 2002:7). As we will see in subsequent sections, 
these factors have a direct impact on the practices of criminal justice agents. Popular support, 
for example, influences the level of citizen cooperation with criminal investigations.  
 
For decades, terrorism has been one of the major topics in every Spanish election, illustrating 







exclusionary identities. Such explicit polarization undermines the fiction of a shared public 
interest. Victim mobilizers and prisoner supporters have engaged in major mobilizations, 
demonstrations, counter-demonstrations, and public debate, regularly addressing the violence 
of ETA and the repressive reaction by the state. In the Basque Country, weekly demonstrations 
called attention to the suffering of “political” prisoners and deaths attributed to the state. 
Regular demonstrations also took place in honor of victims of ETA. During the 1990s, people 
participating in these different demonstrations would even come face to face in the streets 
when public demonstrations were held in favor of the liberation of the hostages held by ETA. 
Left-nationalist activists (also called members of the MLNV, Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional 
Vasco) organized “counter-demonstrations”:  
 
The participants in the anti-ETA demonstrations and people wearing blue ribbons often became 
victims of intimidation (with slogans like “the murderers wear blue ribbons” or “ETA kill them”) 
and harassment by MLNV members who saw them as enemies of their cause. According to 
many political comments in those days, the so-called “Basque conflict” had gradually turned into 
a “conflict among Basques.” (Van den Broek 2004:719)  
 
This is only one expression of the continuous process of identification in which people are 
categorized as “us” or “them.” Another example of such boundary drawing occurred after the 
terrorist attack on 11 March 2004 in Madrid (“11-M”). It later turned out that the attack was 
perpetrated by a group affiliated with Al Qaeda. During the first days after the incident, 







attack. As a result, female ETA prisoners in Spanish prisons were attacked by other (common) 
prisoners and had to be protected by the prison guards (testimony of a former prisoner in: 
Vecin@s de Donibane y Eguzki Bideoak 2007).  
 
The Attorney General wrote in 1990 that “the Spanish society” did not understand why the 
prison sentences for acts of terrorism were not higher (MA 1990:205). His label of “the” 
Spanish society excluded the many people in the Basque Country who would disagree. 
Especially during the early years of its existence, ETA received substantial support for its armed 
struggle, even though now that support has almost evaporated. For example, when, in 1973, 
members of ETA killed General Carrero Blanco, the supposed successor of Franco, this action 
drew quite a bit of popular support for ETA (Douglass & Zulaika 1990). Alonso and Reinares 
claim that the repressive violence Franco used against ETA led to a loss of state legitimacy and 
increased public opinion in favor of ETA (2005:267). In 1978 almost half of the Basque citizens 
viewed ETA members as idealists or patriots; just seven percent called them plain criminals 
(ibid. 2005:267).  
 
For a long time the common saying among ETA supporters “algo habrá hecho” [s/he must have 
done something] conveyed the extent of trust people had that ETA would have good reasons 
for its use of force and choice of targets.50 The common assumption behind this phrase was that 
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 Calleja & Sanchez-Cuenca (2006) mention how common this attitude was at least in the 80s; I heard this phrase 
myself after the murder of Isaías Carrasco by a young man from a little village in the Basque Country. Many rumors 
among left-nationalist youth after the murder of Isaías Carrasco provided these reasons. I was told, for example, 







ETA victims were “guilty” of something or somehow “deserved” to die. To that extent, the 
allegiance to ETA took on features of the allegiance to a sovereign. By 2008, left-nationalist 
interviewees still generally refused to see ETA as a terrorist organization, even if many had 
come to the conclusion that it should stop killing. Indeed, among a small but significant part of 
the population, ETA militants were still viewed as heroes. Such support translated into concrete 
support for ETA militants in the form of offering transportation and lodging, not only in the 
Basque Country, but also in places like Catalunya and Madrid. A survey conducted annually in 
the Basque country postulated that “today in Euskadi one can defend all ideas without the 
necessity to recur to violence” and shows the answers from 1989–2007. A clear majority in 
agreement with the statement fluctuated at around the 80% mark. Still, a significant and 
constant minority in disagreement fluctuated at around 10%, sometimes reaching 20% 
(Euskobarómetro 2007). Of course, it is doubtful how accurate such questions can have been 
answered. One of my informants told that he had been called for a telephone survey (not 
necessarily for the Euskobarómetro though) in which one of the questions was whether he 
supported the armed struggle. He laughed when he told this and said: “they might as well have 
asked me to come down directly with my hands on my back to be taken to prison” (Interview S-
19). 
 
During a large part of the 1980s people who opposed ETA did not dare to speak out. For a long 
time, moderate nationalists also viewed ETA members as the prodigal lost sons. In a more 







widespread support for ETA, there was a lack of public outrage and opposition. In 1986, the 
organization Gesto por la Paz was formed as one of the first public platforms opposing the 
violence of ETA. Throughout the 1990s, the demonstrations against ETA’s abductions and 
assassinations of civilians enabled people in the Basque villages and cities to speak more 
liberally about their ideas, even though the majority would still choose not to touch the subject 
instead of explicitly opposing ETA. Later, the citizen organizations Basta Ya and the Forum of 
Ermua were also formed and explicitly opposed the violence of ETA.   
  
Prosecutors followed the public support for these developments closely. In 1993, the Attorney 
General reported that it was “hopeful” that day by day the Basque society was taking a firmer 
position against the “terrorist phenomenon” (MA 1993:147). He reported a survey by the 
Basque government that had found that seventy percent of the Gipuzkoans rejected terrorism 
as a vehicle for the expression of any idea, repudiating it as unjustifiable. At that time, the 
prosecutor wrote that “only” 7.3 percent were reported to justify ETA’s violence. Further, 16% 
were reported to believe that the sentences for terrorist crimes should be harsher, and 3.8 % 
were in favor of the death penalty (1993:148).  
 
Popular support for ETA decreased significantly after the murder of the councilman Miguel 
Angel Blanco in 1997. A former ETA supporter expressed in early 2010 that he only hoped that 
ETA would quit with dignity before becoming “some sort of GRAPO,” as he put it (Interview S-







our country is in, we consider that the reasons for carrying out armed struggle are still 
applicable, and as long as that is the case we will continue” (interview in: Gara, 8 April 2007). 
On 15 June 2009, however, a significant turn was set in motion when the political party 
Batasuna asked ETA to leave their arms and look for dialogue. In this plea, Batasuna had the 
support of a part of the ETA prisoners (Diario Clarin, 15 June 2009). Indeed, on 5 September 
2010, ETA announced an indefinite cease-fire.  
 
Thus, the Spanish state has faced a persistent challenge to its sovereignty as popular support 
for independence has been significant and constant. At the same time, during the 1980s few 
people openly criticized ETA’s armed struggle and paramilitary violence also received some 
public support. Since the 1990s, however, support for the armed struggle has decreased, and 
those opposing ETA have increasingly found ways to unite and voice their condemnation.  
 
The Spanish criminal justice system 
In this dissertation, the analysis focuses on the part of the interactions in the contentious 
episode that take place in the criminal justice arena. I specifically explore the way in which 
actors draw upon the particular logic of that arena to translate complex and contested events 
into legal facts that are amenable to criminal proceedings. It is necessary, therefore, to provide 
a brief introduction to the Spanish criminal justice system, some of the relevant laws and penal 







edifice of the rule of law. In the subsequent sections I analyze when and how this logic and 
these actors are mobilized and drawn upon.  
 
The chief prosecutor at the Audiencia Nacional emphasized that it is his “role” within the 
“system” to apply the law, indicating his adherence to the differentiation of roles in the delivery 
and production of criminal justice (Interview S-21). What exactly does this system look like in 
Spain? The Spanish state is a parliamentary monarchy. The king currently is Juan Carlos I de 
Borbón. He has several competencies that are relevant in relation to the criminal justice 
system, such as the ability to grant a pardon to convicts. He is also the official commander of 
the armed forces. In the relation between the Basque Country and the Spanish State, the 
Statute of Gernika specifies the autonomous competencies, such as the Basque autonomous 
police, the Ertzaintza. Local Spanish courts (juzgados de instruccion) deal with crimes in the first 
instance. Appeals are lodged at the Audiencias Provinciales. The last instance is the Tribunal 
Supremo. Spain also has a Constitutional Court dedicated exclusively to issues regarding the 
Constitution. Autonomous provinces such as the Basque Country have a Tribunal Superior de la 
Justicia, competent in specific instances, such as cases against high government officials as well 
as adjudication regarding autonomous competencies. The Consejo General del Poder Judicial 
(CGPJ) is the responsible organ for various high-placed appointments and exercises control over 
the functioning of the courts. At the highest level, the European Court for Human Rights (ECHR) 
is the last instance that can adjudicate legal issues, as it has done, for example, in the case of 








The Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI) is the Spanish intelligence agency. Spanish policing is 
distributed to different agencies. The Policía Nacional is the police force present in all of Spain 
except the autonomous regions (the Basque Country and Catalunya), with specific 
competencies in the Basque Country, such as on the borders with France. The Guardia Civil is 
coordinated by the Defense Department and has specific competencies, such as the security in 
airports and border areas. Spread over the Basque Country are various quarters for the Guardia 
Civil, which is still a contentious issue. The Ertzaintza is the Basque autonomous police, at first 
considered a victory for Basque nationalists, now highly criticized by left-nationalists due to 
perceived repression. Each of these organs plays a role in the process of contentious 
criminalization. 
 
As the country has a continental legal system, Spanish prosecutors work in cooperation with 
investigative judges. Especially in Spain, investigative judges occupy an important role in 
criminal proceedings. As they prepare a case and make crucial decisions regarding who is 
charged with what, investigative judges play an important role in the creation of what I have 
called “the prosecutorial narrative.” Only when the investigative phase is closed and the case 
goes to trial does the prosecutor take over. Therefore, in my research in Spain I have focused as 
much on investigative judges as on prosecutors. For example, the well-known judge Baltasar 
Garzón is an investigative judge. He has played a major role in investigations and prosecutions 







major players in the prosecutions against state officials involved in the Dirty War. The Attorney 
General of Spain, currently Cándido Conde-Pumpido, supervises the prosecutors and publishes 
a yearly report (Memoria Anual) indicating the ongoing and terminated criminal proceedings as 
well as identifying developments in crime rates and the criminal policy.  
  
Until the reform of 1978, terrorism crimes were under the jurisdiction of the military courts. 
Then, special terrorism laws made terrorist offenses the province of a new court: the Audiencia 
Nacional. The criminal prosecutions related to the Basque conflict can be divided into the 
prosecutions that are conducted by the Audiencia Nacional (AN) and those that are done by 
local prosecutors in the Basque Country. The Audiencia Nacional was founded in 1977 (Decreto 
Ley 1/1977 of 4 January 1977). Critics point out that it neatly replaced the Tribunal of Public 
Order (TOP), which was a heavily criticized instrument used by Franco to detain political 
opponents. The Audiencia Nacional was founded by an executive decision, leading critics to 
claim that this adds to the illegitimacy of the tribunal (Lorenzo 2005). After years of legal 
proceedings about the legitimacy of the Audiencia Nacional, the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal 
ruled in 1987 that the European Commission of Human Rights had declared the Audiencia 
Nacional to be a normal court. That decision effectively wiped the issue off the table, at least 
legally. Still, criticism exists, also outside of the left-nationalist movement and outside of the 
Basque Country. For example, the Spanish lawyer Lorenzo disputes the interpretation of the 








What does the Audiencia Nacional do? The jurisdiction of the Audiencia Nacional is restricted to 
certain areas, one of which is terrorism. Proponents of the Audiencia Nacional argue, for 
example, that the distance from the Basque Country is needed to guarantee the safety and 
neutrality of judges. In the words of one of its instruction judges, it is not a special court, but a 
specialized court (Interview S-22). It specializes in terrorism, but also in money laundering, tax 
fraud, corruption, and drug trade. Most people, including those who view the Audiencia 
Nacional as a special court against separatists, are not aware that these other areas also belong 
to the domain of the Audiencia Nacional. In 2003, a law was adopted that created an appeals 
chamber in the Audiencia Nacional. Previously, appeals were only possible in a limited review at 
the Supreme Court. In 2001, the UN Human Rights Committee ruled that this was not sufficient 
(HRW 2005:17). In 2010, the appeals chamber was still not operational, making the Tribunal 
Supremo the instance for appeal and last domestic resort.  
  
The period from 1975 and 1985 was characterized by many legal reforms and attempts to bring 
the judicial institutions into an adequate position to deal effectively with the threat of 
continuing terrorist attacks. In 1995 a new Penal Code was written and the special terrorism 
laws were integrated into the penal code as separate offenses. The Spanish penal code has 
been reformed again several times, most recently on 26 December 2010. The terrorism 
provisions authorize, for example, the incommunicado detention, which limits or suspends 
some constitutional rights according to Article 55(2) of the Constitution, which prescribes that 







of communications “as regards specific persons in connection with investigations of the 
activities of armed bands of terrorist groups.” Membership in a terrorist organization is 
criminalized in Article 516 with 515 sub 2 of the Penal Code. Apart from “collaboration,” the 
Spanish law recognizes a form of authorship called “necessary cooperation” which, for 
example, is used to prosecute someone who collected information for ETA that is necessary for 
executing an assassination. In 2000, a law was enacted to deal with the social problem called 
“Kale Borroka” [street struggle], enabling the prosecution of street violence as a terrorist 
offense, also when suspects are not a member of a terrorist organization (Law 7/2000). The 
same law (7/2000) also created a new terrorist offense: the glorification of terrorism or the 
humiliation of victims of terrorism. In the next chapter, the process towards and the application 
of these new laws will be discussed in more detail.  
 
After the transition to an electoral democracy, state agents explicitly voiced their desire to build 
up a liberal democratic criminal justice system. In 1978, the Attorney General described the role 
of the prosecutor as the “defense of the juridical order and the prevention and punishment of 
crime,” emphasizing “objectivity,” “impartiality,” and responsibility for the “criminal policy” 
(Memoria Anual (MA) 1978:87–88). The ideals of liberal legalism are often stressed in the 
Memoria Anual. For example, in 1993, the Attorney General reflected on the quality of the 
Spanish rechtsstaat, which according to him should be based not only on a separation of 
powers but also on the separation between morality and the law. He called the Public Ministry 







mentioned “the dogmas of legality and impartiality” as well as “the professional, scientific, and 
specialized activity of the Judicial Police” (1993:27).  
  
With regard to the struggle against terrorism, however, in the early years of the transition the 
tension between respect for human rights and the normal functioning of the criminal justice 
system was openly acknowledged. In 1979, the Attorney General noted that it should not be 
the case that while the democratic society was fighting terrorism it “confuses respecting human 
rights with abandoning the most fundamental of these rights” (MA 1979:65), thus voicing a 
concern that can still be heard. Indeed, he viewed the terrorist phenomenon as the most 
horrifying challenge for democratic governments (MA 1979:67). He wrote: “let’s be honest: in 
the face of the terrorist phenomenon, the normal operation of judging, applying a penalty and 
taking care of its execution is [like] writing in the sea” (MA 1979:66). Doubts about this tension 
have vanished over the years, and in 2007 the Attorney General asserted that the judicial 
activity against terrorism was in “good health” and that the work that had been done was “firm, 
resounding, and according to strict fulfillment of the principle of legality” (MA 2007:161).  
 
Defining the situation: From war to criminal justice 
It is clear that the contentious episode has posed a significant challenge to the Spanish state.  
For decades, engagement in the political arena could not satisfy the demands of the challengers 
to the status quo. Negotiations failed, and left-nationalists criticized the slow process of 







violence and the armed struggle of ETA in combination with the use of violence by paramilitary 
groups as well as torture by state agents turned this episode into a severe challenge for the 
young Spanish democracy and its legal institutions. The Spanish state was not passive in the 
face of the challenge to its sovereignty and the established order. In this section I trace the 
definition of the situation that characterized the state’s priorities in terms of the framework, 
set of laws, and state agencies that were put forward to deal with the dispute and the 
challenges to the rule of law. Of course, the very definition of the situation is part of the 
contention. 
 
From the beginning, state agents have sought for and struggled with the appropriate 
framework and means to deal with this challenge. Broadly speaking, while during the 1970s and 
1980s the challenge was framed mainly in military terms, throughout the 1990s and 2000s a 
criminal justice perspective has gained dominance. It is important to recognize, though, that at 
all times the state has employed multiple measures and frameworks. Throughout the years, the 
Spanish government has responded with military measures, administrative measures such as 
the illegalization of organizations and events, police work, political dialogue, and international 
cooperation such as the EU terrorism list.  
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, terrorism was viewed as a severe threat to the democracy (Alonso and 
Reinares 2005:265). The foundation for the anti-terrorism policy was the so-called Plan ZEN 







thinking dominated the Spanish approach to ETA (Iruin 2001), and the state viewed ETA as an 
opponent in a war (MA 1979:65). Illustrative of this war perspective were the confessions by 
former President Felipe González, who told a reporter from El País that once in 1989 or 1990 he 
had had the possibility to have the entire leadership of ETA killed at a meeting in France. At the 
time, he rejected the option, but in 2010 he was still wondering whether that had been the 
right decision (Millás 2010). During the 1990s and 2000s the definition of the situation changed 
dramatically and prosecutors emphasized the loss of social support for ETA. By 2008, the 
government claimed it was about to destroy ETA and prided itself on its capacity to deal 
effectively with terrorism through criminal prosecutions according to liberal standards and due 
process.  
 
1970s/1980s: Fear of escalation and obstacles for effective crime-fighting 
In the 1970s, the Spanish state struggled with a transition to democracy and the reform of 
many of the institutions of the old regime. Prosecutors faced dilemmas related to this 
transition. Several times the Attorney General complained in his Memoria Anual about a lack of 
funding and good infrastructure to perform well, as well as about an overwhelming number of 
larger and smaller groups from both the left and right wing that were employing violence and 
putting pressure on the young emergent democracy. Importantly, in 1979 the “terrorist 
phenomenon” was discussed without any specific mention of ETA, whereas in later years even 
the title of the section on “terrorism” converts to “terrorism of ETA.” At the end of the 1970s 







Commandos (CCAA, perceived as a more radical split-off from ETA), Terra Lliure (for 
independence of Catalunya), GRAPO (anti-fascists), MPAIAC (for independence of the Canary 
Islands), Triple A (right wing), BEV (right wing), and some smaller groups.  
 
The Memoria Anual of 1979 makes it clear that criminal prosecutions were not viewed as a 
significant mode to deal with the terrorism threat. In the face of this threat the Attorney 
General viewed the administration of criminal justice as marginally useful at best. He 
contrasted terrorists to ordinary criminals and demanded that specific attention be paid to the 
specific characteristics of the terrorists. In sharp words, he declared that otherwise the work of 
the judicial authorities would be in vain.  
 
Any pretension to apply analogous norms to the ordinary delinquent and the terrorist is 
aberrant. It is not that we would declare him at the margin of the law, but if there is no specific 
substantive and procedural normative framework to deal with his/her criminal and psychic 
characteristics, and his/her fanatics and pathological desperation, then the work of the 
administration of justice will be impossible and will be shipwrecked between disillusion and 
indifference. (MA 1979:74)   
   
Whether acts of terrorism are different from ordinary crimes and, if so, how that should 
influence the state response, is a constant theme in the meta-conflict and still debated three 
decades later (e.g., Unzalu 2008:14). In 1979, the Attorney General viewed the existing terrorist 







connections, their technical expertise, and their enormous financial possessions (MA 1979:69). 
He called the “enemy” (note this war reference) “cruel, difficult, and sophisticated” (MA 
1979:70) and claimed that the terrorist activity constituted a grave threat to the state and the 
security of the citizens. What is more, the prosecutor perceived an escalation of the violence as 
well as the threat of further escalation. The overview with the number of terrorist attacks in the 
last decade showed a clear rise, leading the prosecutor to fear for continuing escalation. We 
will see in the cases of Chile and the United States that prosecutors there similarly perceived 
mounting escalation. The Attorney General wrote that “we find ourselves before a declared war 
against the civilization” (1979:65). ETA as an opponent in a war is the image that guided the 
Spanish state in its policy throughout the 1980s.  
 
At that time, prosecutors were struggling with an ineffective criminal justice system. As 
obstacles in the effective prosecution of terrorism, the Attorney General listed the lack of 
international solidarity, the lack of cooperation by the “terrorized citizens,” and the scarce 
means for the police as obstacles in an effective struggle against terrorism. The Attorney 
General also berated the media for giving exposure to terrorists. “Terrorism needs publicity for 
its ends. The terrorist sees his injustice crowned and completed as his name appears on the first 
page” (MA 1979:72).  
 
Significantly, during the first years after the transition, the category “political crime” was still 







were 8,909 people incarcerated for ordinary crimes and 59 individuals incarcerated for political 
crimes (MA 1978:114). In those years, prosecutors fought to distinguish terrorism from 
“political crime,” for example when they called upon other countries to extradite those 
suspected of terrorist crimes. The Attorney General criticized other countries for the lack of real 
help and the tendency to interpret terrorist actions as “political crime,” which would lead to 
their exclusion from extradition (MA 1979:71).  
 
The Attorney General also reported as one of the obstacles in the struggle against terrorism 
that the fear of the citizens led them to decline cooperation with the administration of justice.  
 
They don’t file complaints, report or communicate crimes or suspicions, they flee away from 
giving testimony, they hesitate in acts of recognition and identification of aggressors, and, in 
general, they procure to avoid their intervention, fearing to seek complications. (MA 1979:73)  
 
Therefore, the Attorney General pleaded for a campaign to persuade the population to reject 
terrorism and cooperate to isolate the terrorists. Also, in 1980 the Attorney General devoted an 
entire page to this problem of obtaining evidence, noting that in the case of crimes committed 
by armed groups it was absolutely impossible to find people who would testify at trials, not 
even the victim. This fear to testify at a trial was reiterated by the Attorney General in the 
Memoria Anual of 1989, where he stated that witnesses are especially hesitant to recognize 
perpetrators (1989:214). In Chapter 4, I will explain that this issue is also particularly relevant 








1990s/2000s: De-escalation, blows to ETA’s capacity, and loss of popular support 
While finding witnesses might still have been a problem, by 1989 the definition of the situation 
and the estimated threat posed by ETA had changed dramatically. Prosecutors observed a 
downward trend in the number of attacks (MA 1989:122) and a change in attitude among the 
population and were optimistic about the future trend. Significantly, the criminal justice 
response was now considered the dominant mode against a phenomenon that had become 
firmly labeled as “criminal.” In 1989, the prosecutor of San Sebastián explicitly noted that the 
majority of the Basque people increasingly openly rejected the violence and opted for pacific 
and democratic solutions to any problem. He observed that the “democratic idea” in which 
everyone can voice his or her ideas, even extremist ideas, was taking root. He speculated that in 
the short term the image of a Basque Country tainted by barbaric acts could be nothing more 
than “a sad and forgotten past” (1989:123) and stated that to achieve this, the goal was to 
“isolate the terrorist phenomenon and recuperate and re-socialize those that in a recent past 
took pleasure in or even participated in these criminal activities” (1989:123). What is more, the 
prosecutor also observed a decline in the activities of public disorder, harm to vehicles and 
property, and glorification of terrorism. He connected this to the fact that the majority of the 
people had taken a negative attitude towards the violence.  
 
After the experiences with the GAL and the Dirty War, the discourse changed to a strong 







other legal instruments, such as the Law on the Political Parties that led to the illegalization of 
Batasuna. In 2005, Attorney General Cándido Conde-Pumpido announced that “the counter 
terrorism fight at the international level is at the same stage as the fight against ETA twenty 
years ago: illegal detentions [and] torture,” claiming that such phenomena no longer existed in 
Spain as the struggle against terrorism was “based on respect for the rule of law” (HRW 
2005:16). Also, the Chief Attorney at the Audiencia Nacional argued that after forty years of 
experience, Spain now knew that the rule of law and criminal prosecutions were “sufficient to 
respond effectively to terrorism” (Interview S-21). He advocated fighting the struggle with “all 
the arms of the law, but also only the arms of the law.” Still, despite such liberal legalist 
affirmations, the categorization between Us and Them had not disappeared and continued to 
affect thinking about the proper application of laws. For example, in relation to protests that 
the closure of the Basque newspaper Egunkaria infringed upon the freedom of expression, 
former Prime Minister Aznar was reported to have said that the only ones that can seriously 
talk about being violated in their freedom of expression, up to losing their lives, are the victims 
of ETA (El Mundo, 26 February 2008).  
 
A crucial step in this commitment to criminal prosecutions as the way to deal with ETA has been 
the French turn from providing a safe haven to ETA refugees to its cooperation with the Spanish 
state, arresting and extraditing ETA militants. This safe haven had hampered criminal 
prosecutions (Garzón 2005). To achieve French cooperation, the necessary shift was to 







state could be qualified as a democratic rechtsstaat. When this succeeded, the French 
cooperation proved significant in the actuation against ETA, as France could not provide refuge 
to ETA activists anymore (MA 1993:144). 
 
By 1994, the Catalan terrorist group Terra Lliure had been dismantled and other terrorist 
groups also disappeared, apart from some minor actions by the terrorist organization GRAPO. 
This left ETA as the only terrorist organization active in Spain. This contrasts starkly with the 
situation only ten years earlier, when various groups were still active on this stage. From the 
early 1990s onwards, ETA lost operational capacity and popular support. By 2008, it was 
possible for Naty Rodríguez, a family member of ETA victims, to affirm that “ETA is defeated, for 
how much suffering they still will be able to cause” (Bake hitzak 2008:55).   
 
Thus, during the 1970s and 1980s, ETA and other terrorist organizations were described as 
“enemies” in a “war” and the criminal justice arena was not viewed as the primary arena to 
deal with it. To this end, the differences between “terrorism” and “ordinary criminals” were 
highlighted. Prosecutors expressed their hesitation to take on this challenge in criminal 
prosecutions alone and feared escalation. This can be contrasted to later decades, in which the 
“rule of law” was hailed for its effectiveness in dealing with ETA and its terrorist activity, which 
came to be viewed as just a particular mode of criminality. With the decrease of support for 
ETA violence and the increased dominance of criminal prosecutions as the site to deal with ETA, 







translating events and demands into the language of criminal law and setting off the process 
that I call contentious criminalization.  
 
The transfer: From the political arena to the criminal justice arena 
Much of the interaction in the Spanish-Basque contentious episode has increasingly taken place 
in the criminal justice arena, an arena that is collectively imagined when events are defined as 
“crime.” This process, which I have labeled the “transfer,” affects the relevant issues, significant 
actors, and the logic of interaction. This section discusses some of the moments and activities in 
which that transfer is visible.  
 
After the death of Franco, many of those who had been prosecuted and convicted during his 
regime were considered “political” prisoners. In 1977, the Spanish government accepted a 
broad amnesty law (Law 46/1977) providing amnesty for all political prisoners who had been 
detained under the Franco regime, referring to the “promotion of pacification of spirits, 
reconciliation and national concordance” (MA 1978:114). ETA prisoners (and others, including, 
for example, GRAPO prisoners) were recognized as “political” prisoners and released from 
prison. The amnesty law exemplifies the re-contextualization of criminal events as it conceded 
amnesty to those who had committed their actions with a political intention. With some 
crimes, this political intention was assumed, such as with the crimes against the external or 
internal state security. Amnesty was explicitly conceded to those who had acted in order to re-







order to judge this specific intention, the law dictated that it was important to look at the 
background and even the personality of the subject. Such an intention was, for example, 
assumed to exist when the person was a member of a political association that after the 
transition was legally recognized and was active for the defense of the specific political or social 
claims (Law 46/1977 sub 2).  
 
This amnesty thus made a reversal from the criminal justice arena to the political arena (a 
“transfer” in the opposite direction). It did not take long, however, before ETA and its activities 
were relegated back to the criminal justice arena. “The day after the amnesty the prisons were 
filled again with political prisoners,” said a Basque lawyer and left-nationalist human rights 
activist (Interview S-1). He said it as a matter of fact, apparently not feeling the need to address 
what exactly had prompted their detention. Thus, we can observe a typical difference of 
interpretation: whereas the Spanish government attributed the increase of the penal 
population to the fact that released prisoners had returned to criminal activity (MA 1978:114), 
Basque left-nationalists justified ETA’s continuing presence as a logical response to undue legal 
repression and militarization.  
  
In the criminal justice arena, the roles, logic, and tools of criminal procedure shape the 
interactions and the way in which issues are framed. Thus, in interactions in the criminal justice 
arena, the political dispute is excluded as irrelevant. Basque nationalists consistently have 







violation of their rights and justifying ETA’s actions from that perspective. Their opponents, 
however, refuse to enter this debate in the criminal justice arena and argue that the demand 
for self-determination is not relevant for determining the crimes of ETA. Constitutionalists thus 
emphasize the liberal legalist distinction between ends and means and argue that it is not a 
crime to advocate for independence (the end). Having insisted on the strict boundary between 
the political and the criminal justice arena, they move on to discuss ETA’s actions (the means) in 
criminal law terms. As evidence that it is really possible to advocate for independence within 
the political arena, they often point out that the new political party Aralar (founded in 2000, 
explicitly rejecting ETA’s violence) does not face illegalization. The exclusion of “conflict talk” 
from criminal proceedings fits neatly with the position of the Association of Victims of 
Terrorism (AVT), which refuses to label the situation in the Basque Country as a “conflict.” They 
refuse to speak about it in any other terminology than that of the criminal justice system: there 
are guilty perpetrators and innocent victims. Talking about a conflict would introduce the 
notion of some other party to the conflict, whereas they see only one party, which is ETA, and 
they view themselves as innocent bystanders.  
 
In 1988, an alliance forged by a treaty known as the “Ajuria Enea Pact” reinforced the shift to 
the criminal justice arena. Emphasizing the logic of legal liberalism, the Ajuria Enea Pact 
replaced the common framing of the dispute as “Basque nationalists versus Spanish parties” 
with the alliance of “democrats versus terrorists.” It is this alliance of democrats versus 







to condemn the violence of ETA. Later negotiations in 1998 (Lizarra Pact) revealed that Herri 
Batasuna had negotiated with other nationalist parties such as the PNV and EA in order to 
retrieve the previous alliance. It is a typical liberal move to focus on the “means” of a struggle 
instead of the ends. It aims to isolate extremists from moderates. We will observe similar 
maneuvering to isolate the extremists in the United States. Again in this spirit of creating a front 
against the use of terrorist means, in 2000 the political parties PP and PSOE signed an anti-
terrorism pact in which they reaffirmed their collaboration in the struggle against terrorism (8 
December 2000).  
 
Contrary to this separation of means and ends is the belief held by some right-wing actors that 
Basque nationalism is directly responsible for the terrorist violence. Sociologist Javier Elzo 
(himself threatened by ETA) criticized this perspective (in: Medem 2003:175). These right-wing 
groups put means and ends on the same level again, when, as Elzo writes, they blame the 
Basque nationalist ideology for terrorist attacks and thus believe that ending that nationalism 
will also stop terrorism.  
  
In the criminal justice arena, the logic of criminal prosecutions and their focus on the charge is 
dominant. Judges are careful to police the boundaries of acceptable legal arguments. This was 
illustrated, for example, when the judge of the Audiencia Nacional told a lawyer to refrain from 








Ms. Attorney, […] you can’t say that there are convictions without evidence. […] You cannot be 
gratuitous. For the development of the trial, you can’t offend… […] I don’t like to intervene in 
your remarks. Here we are not trying the Audiencia Nacional as a tribunal. That is not the trial. 
(Field notes, Trial Gestoras, June 2008) 
 
The attorney had to speak on the topic of the trial, and the judge defined the boundaries of 
what belonged to that discussion and what did not. At a later point the judge warned: “Don’t 
talk about torture again; that is not what we are judging here.” 
 
As the contentious episode was transferred into the criminal justice arena and different actors 
mobilized in this arena, the Spanish state risked a situation in which groups would identify 
prosecutors and judges only with particular political interests and no longer see them as 
representing a legitimate authority in upholding law and order (cf. Miall 2001:88). Indeed, this 
is exactly what has happened. In many of my interviews, people from very different sectors in 
society expressed their discontent with the Spanish criminal justice system, believing it was 
deeply politicized and not neutral (Interviews S-1/2/3/5/13/14/16/28/31). It is therefore 
instructive to be attentive to the ways in which the state addressed different audiences in its 
prosecutorial narratives, sending messages in order to defend the rule of law without (further) 
alienating important sectors in society.  
 
Just as we will see in the case of Chile in Chapter 4, the transfer to the criminal justice arena is 







not only political parties but also ETA participated in negotiations. Scholars have recognized 
that “all state systems must integrate into their power structure at least the groups which are 
self-conscious, organized, interested, and able to exercise private power in the streets if barred 
from the magic circle” (Nieburg 1968:19). While the government defined its actions as 
terrorism and prosecuted ETA militants, the social support for ETA was high enough and the 
capacity of ETA to create havoc significant enough that there were three formal attempts to 
negotiate. In 1989 representatives of the socialist government (PSOE, 1982–1996) negotiated 
with ETA in Algeria. These negotiations did not succeed. In 1998 there was a second failed 
attempt to negotiate by the Aznar government (right-wing Popular Party (PP), 1996–2004), 
followed by failed negotiations in 2006 under the Zapatero government (PSOE, 2004–present).  
 
3. Mobilization and discursive action in the criminal justice arena  
 
It is in this context of incompatible goals, the use of violence, and competing views of 
democracy and the rule of law that we can observe what I have labeled contentious 
criminalization: criminal prosecutions in a contentious episode transform into a site of 
contestation. As events unfold and are labeled as “criminal,” and as the state puts its criminal 
justice system into motion, groups and individuals in society engage with the state in what I 
have called the “criminal justice arena.” In this arena, the liberal legal framework, logic, and 
language shape the interactions, demands, and experiences. In my interview with the chief 







interest (Interview S-21). Contrary to this notion of one unified society with one voice, in this 
section I discuss the different interest groups that have mobilized to challenge the state’s 
definition of and response to criminal events.  
   
I specifically analyze two dominant modes of mobilization: victim mobilization by victims of ETA 
and prisoner support mobilization of the Basque left-nationalist movement. These forms of 
mobilization draw upon and reproduce an identification split within the Spanish and Basque 
societies in which people are drawn towards polarized identifications, either with the victim or 
with the defendant compounding polarized identifications in the political arena.  
 
While I have chosen to focus on the repertoire of victim mobilization by victims of ETA, other 
groups have mobilized as well in order to claim recognition as “victims.” Basque left-nationalists 
have frequently tried to turn the tables by adopting the criminal justice vocabulary as they 
point to the many instances in which they are victims. They emphasize extrajudicial killings, 
torture, and indiscriminate detentions. Instead of gaining recognition for their victimhood, 
these claims led some critics to accuse left-nationalists of “victimization.” Sometimes, however, 
recognition of their victimhood was given. For example, on 24 June 2008, the Human Rights 
Commission of the Basque government issued a report as the result of concerted effort and 
mobilization. This report gives explicit recognition to that claim to victimhood, as it focuses on 
the victims of state violence and paramilitary or radical right-wing groups, explicitly excluding 







level of recognition (2008:9). While left-nationalists thus have engaged in victim mobilization, 
they often refuse to replicate the criminal justice logic of victims and perpetrators, emphasizing 
their perspective of a two-party conflict in which there are no exclusive victims but opposing 
political projects and a long history of violence on all sides.   
 
I have further chosen to focus on the prisoner support mobilization by left-nationalist activists. 
Whereas most prisoners are indeed from left-nationalist or nationalist circles, there also have 
been prosecutions against police and right-wing violators of the law. Accordingly, people have 
engaged in prisoner support for them, either explicitly defending their actions or supporting 
their claim to innocence. As an illustration, I will give one significant example of such prisoner 
support for the former police official Galindo, who in 2000 was convicted to 75 years 
imprisonment for the illegal detention and murder of two Basque youth supposed to be 
involved in ETA. In addition, Galindo lost his military status. In 2006, journalist Jesús María 
Zuloaga wrote the prologue for the memoirs of Enrique Rodríguez Galindo, My life against ETA: 
The antiterrorism struggle from the Inchaurrondo quarters. Zuloaga defined Galindo as a “first 
line servant of Spain” (p. II). He also described the criminal proceedings against Galindo as a 
“mediatic process with clear political goals” (p. II), and he believed that time would show that 
Galindo is indeed innocent, something he has never doubted (p. III). During Galindo’s stay in 
prison, his family presented a petition for a pardon with 100,000 signatures. Indeed, former 








These examples should demonstrate that victim mobilization and prisoner support mobilization 
are thus forms of action that different groups employ depending upon the specific situation. In 
this section, however, I focus selectively on victim mobilization by victims of ETA and on 
prisoner support mobilization by left-nationalist activists.  
 
Victim mobilization: “Todos somos Isaías” 
One day during my fieldwork, I had a coffee with Angela, who was working with the 
organization Dignidad y Justicia. This organization advocates for a stringent application of the 
criminal justice system. She has been involved in some of the big court cases against groups in 
the left-nationalist movement. Due to this activity she was threatened by ETA and had to go 
everywhere with bodyguards. On that particularly day she had escaped her bodyguards for a 
second, so we were alone. As we sat down, she asked me to change places. She explained that 
she was not allowed to sit with her back to the door (Interview S-17). It was one of those small 
reminders of constant vigilance, which was a constant concern for those people I interviewed 
who were opposing ETA or criticizing the demand for Basque independence. They had 
bodyguards, parked their cars in unexpected places, and checked their car for bombs before 
they started driving. These are real examples that I observed during my interviews. More in-
depth testimonies are, for example, collected in the Pelota Vasca (Medem 2003). ETA’s threats 
and use of violence had a daily impact on their lives. More than 1,000 people had daily 







In this section, I analyze the mobilization by victims of ETA and the way in which they have 
adopted the framework of criminal law to make their claims on the government. I describe how 
individual victims formed alliances in order to make stronger claims towards the state and how 
they actively construed a discourse that would increase criminal responsibility. In doing so, the 
victims effectively established a claim of impunity as well as the continuing danger for 
everyone. The adoption of that discourse in prosecutorial narrative was visible, for example, 
when investigative Judge Garzón from the Audiencia Nacional wrote that “the Spanish society 
took conscience that we were all victims of terror and the social or professional adscription was 
not important to feel the attack as an attack on you” (2005:163). The notion that “everyone” or 
“Spanish society” is a victim is a necessary corollary of offenses in which the “security of 
citizens” or the “public peace” is considered to be under attack. These concepts have proven 
important in the development of anti-terrorism laws throughout the past decades. For 
example, in 2000 the Penal Code introduced “enaltecimiento” (glorification) as one of the 
terrorist offenses. The harm here is the “discrediting or the humiliation of the victim or its 
family members” (Art. 578 CP). The centrality of the persons of the victims and their personal 
feelings cannot be found in earlier legislation. The mobilization of victims and their effort to 
give meaning to the notions of victims, victimization, and the identification of the legal interest 
played an important role in this development.  
  
I analyze the victim mobilization as one of the voices in the criminal justice arena, specifically in 







voice heard coincides with the decision by instruction judge Garzón that “victims had to form 
part of the antiterrorist actions” (2005:161). It is important to connect the institutional rise of 
victim organizations with the fact that an important figure such as judge Garzón at the 
Audiencia Nacional emphasized the victim as the reason for judicial investigations. The fact that 
the AVT criticized Garzón for not doing enough for victims or compromising the victims in times 
of truces is only a signal of the divisive nature of the subject. I believe that Garzón’s emphasis 
on victims has been an important factor in the leverage victims have today. I argue that the 
course of criminal prosecutions in Spain cannot be understood without analyzing the dynamics 
and the growth of these victim organizations and the discursive emphasis on the victim as an 
important subject for the state. I describe the dynamics of Spanish victim mobilization using the 
four aspects described in Chapter 1.  
 
1. Self-identification as victim and creation of alliances 
2. Declaration of a common problem 
3. Demanding protection from the state: claiming the rechtsstaat 
4. Definining actions as criminal – employing criminal law 
 
1. Self-identification as victim and creation of alliances 
Victims of ETA in Spain went from individual cases left to their own devices to the notion that 
everyone is a potential victim of ETA. This could be observed, for example, in 2008, when a 







village in the Basque Country. The subsequent issue of the magazine of one of the victim 
organizations was titled: “Todos Somos Isaías” [We Are All Isaías]. In great contrast to the early 
1980s, when victims were ignored, by 2008 “everyone” expressly identified with the victim. 
Judge Garzón (2005:163) also observed this change. This creates the interesting paradox that 
whereas in numbers ETA killings had decreased enormously, the fear of becoming an ETA victim 
rose. Why was this? One reason is that ETA had made several so-called “qualitative leaps” in its 
targets. An editorial of the newspaper Correo listed this expansion of acceptable targets looking 
at ETA’s latest attacks. The newspaper concluded that now murders in France had also 
occurred. Urban attacks previously restricted to areas outside of the Basque Country now had 
also occurred inside the Basque Country. After making the leap of starting to kill politicians, 
now ETA had also killed politicians after they had left their position. And after the expansion to 
politicians, now the press had also been under attack. And finally, whereas the previous modus 
operandi of ETA was that they always announced their attacks on civilian buildings, now there 
had been an attack on a newspaper building without previous notification (9 June 2008, p. 30). 
The conclusion is clear, as Correo announced: “[N]ow everyone can be a victim of ETA” (ibid.)  
 
Until the 1990s the victims of ETA were severely neglected by the Spanish society, the Spanish 
government, and the Basque government. They were viewed as “collateral damage” and 
forgotten. Judge Garzón wrote: “the victims were a mere statistical fact when it came down to 
terrorist acts” (2005:160–161). In 1981 the first victim association was founded, the Asociación 







Guardia Civil, they expanded in the 1990s. The creation of more victim organizations 
constituted a new player in the contentious episode. Important events such as the murder of 
Miguel Angel Blanco have bolstered the efforts of these organizations to create visibility and 
support. Today, many individuals, organizations, and state agents act in solidarity with victims 
in honoring ceremonies and demonstrations. For example, the organization Gesto por la Paz 
explicitly communicated to the family of a recent victim that the majority of society was with 
them and that there was solidarity: “We want the family of Uria Mendizábal to know that the 
majority of this society is with them, shares their pain and rejects the ones who today have 
swept them into the tragedy” (Press Declaration Gesto por la Paz, 3 December 2008).  
 
Collective action in the name of and by victims thus creates the notion of a shared identity and 
shared interests, despite possible differences on other counts. This shared identity is 
maintained and furthered in various honoring ceremonies for the victims of terrorism. Victim 
organizations have successfully created the notion of “the” victims. Individual cases and 
individual stories are merged into a single story of “the victims.” All of this mobilizing and 
organizing has resulted in the victims becoming a significant force in electoral politics. As 
expressed by the son of an assassinated Civil Guard: “first we didn’t have a vote, now we can 
influence the vote.” He rejected this extreme politicization of victims (Díaz Lombardo 2007:37). 
 
The AVT currently is one of the best known victim associations, but there are many other 







for court action in terrorism-related cases. Other important organizations are Manos Limpias, 
España y Libertad, Dignidad y Justicia, Gesto por la Paz, Fundación Fernando Buesa, Foro de 
Ermua, Covite, Basta Ya, Fundación de Víctimas de Terrorismo, and Fundación de Miguel Angel 
Blanco. Not only is there a variety of different kinds of organizations, it is important to keep in 
mind the difference between individual victims and victim organizations. Several victims have 
indicated their distance to these organizations, speaking “on their behalf.” It is outside the 
scope of this chapter to deal with all their differences and opposing political affiliations. It is 
important to note, however, that victims and victim organizations are quite heterogeneous in 
their political opinions and backgrounds. Many victims, for example, do not wish to be 
associated with the highly politicized AVT (perceived to be associated with right-wing Spanish 
politics). To describe the process of victim mobilization and its relevance for criminal justice 
proceedings, I have spoken with spokespersons of the AVT, Fundación Fernando Buesa, Manos 
Limpias, and Dignidad y Justicia (D&J). They are by no means representative of the range of 
victims of ETA and their victim organizations. I have chosen the AVT and D&J not as 
representatives of all victims, but because they are main players in the criminal justice arena. I 
added the Fundación Fernando Buesa in order to compare their views. Manos Limpias (as well 
as España y Libertad) is not a victim organization but is actively involved with the criminal 








2. Declaration of a common problem 
From the beginning, the AVT advocated for a better treatment of victims, as its members felt 
“abandoned and marginalized by the state and many sectors of the Spanish society” (AVT 
2008). One complaint was, for example, that they were not even notified when the trial of a 
defendant in their case took place. “Many people don’t know who killed their family member,” 
a spokesperson of the AVT told me (Interview S-16). Knowing the truth is one of their demands. 
Another important issue was financial compensation for family members. The first official 
recognition came in 1988 in a law in which the Spanish government arranged for compensation 
for victims of terrorist crimes (Real Decreto 1311/1988, MA 1989:214). A major effort by the 
AVT is to create what they call the “civic rebellion,” which refers to awareness in Spanish 
society. The success of this rebellion was claimed, for example, with reference to huge turn-
outs at demonstrations in Madrid (Alcaraz 2008). Being a victim now brings certain rights, 
especially now that the Basque government has recognized the victims in specific legislation for 
victims, thus also acknowledging a duty on the part of the government to engage with them.  
  
This recognition of victimhood and related questions, such as who is entitled to financial 
benefits and who is not, creates the necessity to delineate who is a victim and who is not.51 This 
necessity to create a clear-cut category can cause contention. This contention was visible, for 
example, during a conversation between the former president of the AVT, the mother of a 
victim of ETA, and a high government official during the 2006 truce with ETA. In reference to 
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the “process of pacification,” the government official mentioned the possibility of releasing ETA 
prisoners who were not convicted of “blood-felonies.” The mother then asked the government 
official whether her child, who was not killed, but lost two legs, would be counted as a “blood-
felony” or not (Alcaraz 2008:107). This example draws attention to the contested nature of 
categories of victimhood. Many victim counts focus on the number of deaths, although the 
number of attacks by ETA is much higher.52 Victims of ETA, however, emphasize the harm that 
ETA has done apart from the number of deaths it has caused. Families and friends are 
victimized, for example, by the harm caused by ETA’s illegal abductions and threats. They also 
emphasize the harm caused by actions of street violence and the payment of the revolutionary 
tax. These different ways to count, label, categorize, and assign attacks are highly contested.  
  
3. Demanding protection from the state: Claiming the rechtsstaat 
Victims do not feel protected. Nor do they feel that justice is done. They complain of impunity 
and a lack of the rule of law. “There is no criminal justice system here,” said Pablo when I told 
him the subject of my research (Interview S-31). He has been forced to pay ETA’s “revolutionary 
tax” for years. “We are the losers, we are the poor bastards” (los pringados). His plain verdict 
corresponds to the complaints by the spokesperson of the AVT who listed the victims’ 
grievances, ranging from the fact that hardly any people are being prosecuted to the way in 
which victims are treated when they attend the trials.  
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The grievance of impunity is one of the elements which I see as a recurring complaint in each of 
the country studies. Judge Garzón argues that forgetting is a basic aspect of impunity and that 
impunity therefore has perpetrators. Garzón is explicit when he attributes the blame for the 
impunity to the “indifferent ones” and their “silence” and “passivity,” which enables the 
continuing aggression and the continuing impunity (2005:170). “The history of impunity in all 
nations is the history of cowardice,” he wrote (2005:172). This call on the citizens to speak out 
is shared by many of the victim organizations. Many victims and victim organizations opposed 
the last round of negotiations with ETA in 2006 for this reason. Victims in this view are 
sacrificed in exchange for a flawed peace. 
 
Victims call on the rule of law to claim their right to protection. They mobilize a “toolkit” 
perspective on the rechtsstaat, interpreting it as the duty of the state to protect its citizens. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, impunity or the belief in impunity is a problem for a state. Impunity 
means that the state does not fulfill its part of the social contract as it fails to protect those 
citizens that have given up their own means of defending themselves to the state. After a 
period of low law enforcement, confidence has to be re-established in the criminal justice 
system that the police and the judicial system work for the citizens and are capable of punishing 
criminals. Apparently recognizing this danger of discourses of impunity, in 2007 the Spanish 








The permanent criticism on the actuation of the judicial organs and the prosecutor’s office in 
the struggle against terrorism, with unfounded accusations of giving up (césion), passivity and/ 
or inactivity, have contributed to creating a climate of social tension and a lack of confidence in 
the normal functioning of the institutions. (2007:161)  
  
4. Defining actions as criminal – employing criminal law 
Criminal justice logic divides people into perpetrators and victims. The AVT in Spain employs 
this language successfully. There are multiple examples in which victim organizations have 
influenced the focus and discourse in the criminal justice arena, affecting laws and judicial 
decisions.  
 
The AVT denies the existence of a conflict and emphasizes the criminal justice terminology as 
the only right framework. They firmly maintain the absolute innocence of the victims, 
countering the notion that “algo habrá hecho” – [the victim of ETA] must have done something. 
The belief that victims of ETA somehow could be held responsible for something clashes 
strongly with the notion upheld by the AVT that there is no conflict. The assessment of 
innocence plays a role in the competing ways in which different actors define ETA’s violence. 
Innocence is an important ingredient for the indiscriminate attacks of terrorism (Zulaika and 
Douglas 1990; Armborst 2010). In his Memoria Anual, the Attorney General explicitly talked 
about “innocent” victims (1979:67). A young member of the left-nationalist youth organization 







perpetrate indiscriminate attacks. In his worldview, ETA attacks specific responsible (state) 
agents (Interview S-24).  
 
Resisting the notion that victims are not innocent, victim organizations explicitly reject possible 
justifications for ETA’s actions. An illustration of such rejection was visible, for example, when 
the organization Gesto por la Paz expressed its opposition to the violence employed by ETA in a 
press declaration after the assassination of a businessman dedicated to the construction of the 
high speed train (TAV). They placed all the responsibility for the killing squarely on the 
shoulders of ETA. They rejected explicitly any context or circumstances that ETA or left-
nationalists might have wanted to include in the considerations.  
Desde Gesto por la Paz insistimos e insistiremos cuantas veces haga falta, que no hay ninguna 
razón, ninguna justificación, ni existe la más endeble argumentación que pueda explicar el 
asesinato de un ser humano. La responsabilidad está exclusivamente en quienes han decidido y 
han ejecutado cobardemente a Ignacio Uria. No hay contexto que ampare ese horror. No sirven 
discursos baratos ni de defensa de un pueblo o de una nación, ni de proyectos ecologístas que 
beneficiarían a la mayoría, ni de nada. 
 
From Gesto por la Paz we insist, and will continue to insist whenever necessary, that there is no 
reason, no justification, and that there does not exist an argument that can explain the 
assassination of a human being. The responsibility is exclusively with the ones that have decided 
and have cowardly executed Ignacio Uria. There is no context that covers this horror. Cheap 
discourses don’t serve; not about the defense of a people or a nation, not about ecological 
projects that benefit the majority, nothing. (Declaration for the Press by Gesto por la Paz, 3 
December 2008) 
  
Victim organizations have successfully lobbied the criminal justice system with concrete 
demands. For example, until a recent verdict, in Spain sentences were capped at a maximum of 
thirty years. In addition to this cap, prisoners could be released after they had fulfilled two-







after eighteen years in prison, even if their formal sentence could run up to 1,000 years for all 
the crimes they had committed. For victim organizations this was unacceptable. They therefore 
advocated a “full completion” of the sentence. Concretely, they wanted the two-third rule to be 
applied not to the thirty year cap but to the entire sentence. They succeeded in court, and the 
new interpretation is called the “doctrina Parot.” This court decision is highly controversial 
among left-nationalists, who speak of “hidden life sentences.”  
 
Victim organizations have also lobbied around specific cases of specific individuals. A well-
known example is the case of ETA militant Iñaki de Juana. He was a member of the Madrid 
commando and in that capacity responsible for some of the most deadly attacks by ETA. 
Representatives of victim organizations call him a serial killer (Interview S-16). He was about to 
be released after eighteen years of imprisonment, and victim organizations brought all of their 
weight into the fight to keep him in prison. Their mobilization ranged from demonstrations, 
petitions, and press releases to personal conversations with prosecutors. A spokesperson of the 
AVT claimed that he is confident that it was due to their effective action that Iñaki de Juana was 
tried for new charges and sentenced again to a prison sentence (Interview S-16).53  
 
Victims have further been active in the creation of the new penal offense prohibiting the 
humiliation of victims of terrorism as a terrorist crime in the Penal Code. Activities brought to 
the attention of the court under this offense include ceremonies honoring prisoners and the 
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naming of streets after (alleged) ETA members. In order to interpret these offenses, it obviously 
has to be clear who the victims of terrorism are, how big this class is allowed to be, what counts 
as humiliation, and whether humiliation is determined objectively or subjectively. These 
questions have not yet been answered. It is to be expected that victim organizations will be at 
the forefront of the struggle for their desired interpretation. In the section in the next chapter 
on the criminalization of speech and expressions, some of the prosecutions that took place 
under this statute and the meta-conflict about these contested concepts will be discussed in 
more detail.  
  
Victim mobilization also has drawn more attention to the victims in court sentences. In one 
case in a small village in the Basque Country, after he came out of prison an ETA member came 
to live next door to the widow whose husband he had killed. This situation and many other 
instances where victims or family members had to encounter the perpetrator time and again in 
their own villages led to new legislation in 1999. In a verdict from 26 December 2005 the 
Audiencia Nacional for the first time imposed the additional sentence that the defendant 
cannot reside in the place where the crime was committed or where the victims live or 
communicate with the victims or their family members (MA 2006:286).  
 
As victims emphasize the fact that crimes of ETA should be seen as common crimes, they reject 
any notion that there could be negotiation about the punishment of these crimes. It has been 







requirements in the negotiations of 2006 (San Sebastián 2007). As Fungairiño eventually was 
removed, the spokespersons of the AVT claimed that this was in response to ETA’s demand. 
Victims portray such negotiations with and concessions to ETA as a breach of the rule of law 
and democracy and reject all negotiation efforts that the Spanish government has engaged in. 
For them ETA has no credibility, and they refer to the truce of 2006 as the tregua trampa [truce 
trap]. Victim organizations are thus vigilant concerning any departures from the logic of the 
criminal justice arena.  
 
Other initiatives on behalf of victims include the lobby to think about new statutes and new 
offenses to use against ETA. For a short while victims talked about “ethnic cleansing,” and judge 
Garzón made one attempt to get this charge against Batasuna accepted by the court. However, 
he did not succeed. A new attempt aims to qualify terrorism as “crimes against humanity.”54 
Simultaneously, victims advocate for the inclusion of “terrorism” as one of the crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. These activities are the 
subject of international organizing in which Spanish victims of terrorism reach out and make 
alliances with victims of terrorism in other countries, such as FARC victims at an annual 
conference for victims of terrorism in Madrid.  
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The main form in which victim organizations have influenced the criminal proceedings related 
to the Basque Conflict has come through their use of the Popular Accusation. Victims have two 
formal ways in which they can represent themselves as a prosecuting force in a criminal trial. 
They can choose to follow the way of “private accusation” or the way of “popular accusation.” 
A victim can be a private accuser when he or she is the specific victim in the case. The popular 
accusation can only be used when the organization represents the class of victims that is 
relevant in the case at hand. The popular accusation is the only form of victim involvement in 
those trials in which there are no specific victims. This is the case, for example, in the so-called 
macro-trials, where defendants are accused of membership in ETA without alleging any specific 
crime against individual victims. These trials are analyzed in more depth in the next chapter. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the AVT has employed the Popular Accusation in order to 
promote the interests of the victims. At first, a spokesperson told me, this was merely a way to 
ensure that the victim would be notified of the date of the trial. Now the AVT and D&J routinely 
participate in criminal trials as the Popular Accusation. In one trial the surreal situation 
emerged that the state prosecutor retreated from prosecution after examining the evidence, 
whereas the victim organization D&J continued alone as the Popular Accusation in this 
prosecution against a Basque newspaper.55 
 
Victim mobilization in the criminal justice arena has initiated many new concepts and forced 
prosecutors to take victims into account. Victim organizations such as the AVT have consistently 
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pushed for taking a criminal justice perspective on ETA and its activities. By uniting in 
organizations, pushing for a meaning of rechtsstaat that focuses on the protection of citizens 
and the problem of impunity, while at the same time employing the vocabulary of criminal law, 
victims of ETA have been able to turn themselves into effective “troublemakers” that cannot be 
overlooked by state agents. As the victim organizations entered this dialogue, the prosecutorial 
narrative has adopted as well as responded to many of the concepts and ideas introduced by 
these victim organizations. In the next chapter, I will analyze a more specific discursive 
development in which victim organizations have been important voices: the redefinition of ETA 
as gunmen to ETA as a network. This discursive shift subsequently led to the macro-trials, which 
significantly expanded the reach of criminal prosecutions.  
 
Prisoner support mobilization by left-nationalists 
There are specific organizations in the Basque Country and also, for example, in Madrid that 
were founded to care for what they call “Basque political prisoners.” These groups resist the 
criminalizing effort of the state. While most of these “political” prisoners come from the left-
nationalist movement, there are also many criminal cases where defendants can be situated 
more in a moderate nationalist part of the spectrum. Such cases also lead to efforts and 
moments of prisoner support, often engaging a larger spectrum of sympathizers. For example, 
former Basque president Atutxa was prosecuted for disobedience of a judicial decision. His 
conviction led to a massive demonstration in Bilbao in January 2008 (Personal observation 







institutionalized prisoner support activities organized by left-nationalist activists. Prisoner 
supporters specifically reject the images and logic enshrined in the prosecutorial narrative. They 
propose an alternative reading of criminalized events and make an effort to get their narrative 
publicly accepted as the truth. I will describe the focus and activities of these groups using the 
four aspects described in Chapter 1. 
  
1. Creation of a prisoner support group: a call for solidarity  
2. Criticisms within the framework of liberal legalism: de-legitimization of the state 
3. Bringing the “political” back in: identification as a political prisoner 
4. Persuading the public of the political definition: changing the impact of criminal 
prosecutions  
  
1. Creation of a prisoner support group: A call for solidarity 
Various groups are actively trying to bring the suffering of prisoners to the attention of the 
general public, and specifically also to visitors from abroad. Within the Basque Country, 
Gestoras pro Amnistía, Senideak, and Gurasoak are the most important organizations that 
actively mobilize to support prisoners. Gestoras pro Amnistia (now Askatasuna) was founded in 
1977 as a form of solidarity with the political prisoners of the Franco regime (Interview S-1). As 
the name implies, they mainly advocated for an amnesty. Once the amnesty was granted but 
people were imprisoned again, Gestoras continued to exist in solidarity with what it calls 







about repression. Senideak (previously Exterat) is the organization of family members of 
prisoners and coordinates, for example, visits to far-away prisons. Gurasoak is a more recent 
organization founded by family members of prisoners of Kale Borroka (Interview S-26). Other 
organizations relevant to prisoner support are TAT and Behatokia, human rights organizations 
engaged in the monitoring of human rights violations. TAT focuses specifically on the 
monitoring of torture and publishes yearly reports with testimonies. There are websites for 
“political” prisoners and issues of torture, how to react in case of arrest, and information about 
ongoing trials. In addition, there is a lawyer’s collective for lawyers that defend ETA militants 
and other Basque “political” prisoners. Askapena, an organization focusing on solidarity with 
other conflict areas such as Palestine, organizes events for foreign students to make them 
familiar with the typical Basque culture as well as the injustices they experience. These students 
are encouraged to become “friends” of the Basque Country.56 The cohesion among these 
groups is enormous, as they are all part of the left-nationalist movement. To learn more about 
prisoner support mobilization and these groups’ interpretation of events, I interviewed 
members from Gestoras, Behatokia, Askapena, Gurasoak, and the lawyer’s collective.  
 
Prisoners and trials play an enormous role in the daily lives of left-nationalist activists. I was 
able to observe this frequently during my fieldwork. One evening, for example, I had a 
conversation with JL from Gestoras pro Amnistía after he had given a talk in Amurrio, a small 
Basque village, about his own ongoing trial. Photos of prisoners (and a silhouette symbolizing 
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refugees) were hanging in the bar in which we were having a drink with some of the people 
who had also attended the talk. By coincidence, that same day in Madrid, the mayor of 
Amurrio, his assistant, and two other people were on trial for their activities and responsibility 
during an honorary ceremony for an ETA prisoner from Amurrio. When the television in the bar 
showed images of that trial, the bartender turned on the volume. The mayor could be heard to 
say that the trial was a “witch hunt.” At the same time a boy entered the bar with a large 
backpack. He had just returned from Madrid, where he had attended the trial against his 
mayor. He apologized for not having been able to attend the talk by JL and shared a little bit 
about what had happened in the trial that day. When we continued our conversation, JL said 
that not only had he and his older brother been convicted for terrorism; his younger brother 
was also convicted for having spray-painted “Gora ETA” in the street. The continued experience 
of repression against their children had turned his parents from voting PNV to voting Batasuna 
(Field notes June 2008). This evening thus exemplified the shared experience of repression, 
criminal prosecution and prisoner support activities.  
 
Prisoner support is about solidarity and an act of identification between the supporter and the 
defendant or prisoner. In his last word in his trial, defendant Madariaga said that “any injustice 
creates an antidote which is solidarity. Solidarity is real” (Audiencia Nacional, trial Gestoras, 18 
June 2008). Throughout the Basque Country one can observe the many symbols of solidarity 
with prisoners, such as pictures of prisoners in bars. Numerous balconies in Basque villages 







relation to some of the contentious trials or alleged cases of torture bring large numbers of 
people to the streets. Prisoners who return home can often expect an official honoring 
ceremony in their village. There have been demonstrations in front of prisons and hunger 
strikes for better prison conditions. Solidarity is not limited to the Basque Country. During the 
trial against Gestoras pro Amnistía, a dinner was organized by activists in Madrid. A girl gave a 
speech affirming their solidarity: “We want to show that Madrid is not only the Audiencia 
Nacional and prisons, but that you know that there are people here who are with you – against 
the capitalist and anti-fascist state” (Field notes June 2008). She thus explicitly redefined 
“criminalizing Madrid” as “political support Madrid.”  
 
2. Criticisms within the framework of liberal legalism: De-legitimization of the state 
Several human rights organizations criticize the state for its repressive actions against ETA 
members or left-nationalist activists. Behatokia, TAT, and the Coordinator for the Prevention of 
Torture tirelessly point out where the state is violating its own laws in its struggle against 
terrorism. The rule of law forms the basis for such criticisms. Activists question the legitimacy of 
the Audiencia Nacional, asking what makes it a “court” engaged in “law” instead of a political 
institution doing politics. They rely on liberal legalist principles like formal equality and 
proportionality when they ask why an ETA prisoner should deserve higher sentences than 
rapists or serial killers. As an example of such criticism of trial proceedings, Euskal Herria Watch 
claimed that the judge’s requirement that the defendants in the 18/98 trial all had to be 








A major question in the conversation within the criminal justice arena is whether or not ETA 
prisoners should be considered “equal” to other prisoners or not. Already in 1979, the Attorney 
General wrote: “Justice is not to treat all equally, but to treat unequally those who are unequal” 
(1979:74). In 1989, the Attorney General advocated for a different penitentiary treatment for 
terrorist delinquents, writing that it seemed “absurd” to treat terrorist delinquents similarly to 
ordinary criminals. After the suspicion was raised that in the prisons ETA continued to organize 
meetings and attacks, in 1989 the Spanish state started the “dispersion policy.” This policy 
entails distributing ETA prisoners in jails throughout Spain (and France). In addition, ETA 
prisoners have to change prisons after several years. This policy has been claimed as necessary 
for splitting up “hard-liners” and “soft-liners.”  
 
While the Spanish state thus makes a distinction between ETA prisoners and common 
prisoners, prisoner supporters refer to the equality principle and emphasize that they demand 
that Basque “political” prisoners have the same rights as other prisoners. This controversial 
issue is a topic of much debate among victim groups, prisoner support groups, and state actors. 
Prisoner supporters stress the suffering they and their families go through and call it illegal 
extra punishment of family members.57 A mother with a child in prison said: “They say that only 
one side suffers, but we are suffering too” (Field notes, June 2008). Note here the strong 
dichotomous thinking in terms of Us and Them. Organization Etxerat also criticized the policy 
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and called it a “penitentiary policy of pressure,” pointing out the bad conditions in which 
prisoners were placed (2010). In their demand to “bring the prisoners home,” supporters refer 
to legal instruments such as principle 20 of Resolution 43/173 of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations from 9 December 1988, which prescribes that prisoners can be close to their 
habitual residences if the prisoner so requests.58 Whereas the Basque prisoner support groups 
complain about the dispersion policy, causing families to travel many kilometers to visit their 
family member in prison, the AVT had posters saying that they have to travel so many 
kilometers to see the graves of their loved ones. Anti-ETA organization Basta Ya pointed out 
that it could not make much of a difference whether families visited ETA prisoners in a far-away 
prison or in clandestinity in France (2011). And while prisoner support groups also claim that 
deadly accidents on the roads on the way to visiting prisoners should be attributed to the 
state,59 such claims are viewed as “victimismo” by groups like Dignidad Y Justicia (Interview S-
17).   
 
Another controversial topic is the continuing stream of allegations of torture. Prisoners 
suspected of militancy with ETA or involvement with Kale Borroka frequently accuse the state 
of torturing them during the incommunicado detention (Terwindt 2011). These allegations of 
torture have led to deep suspicion of state law enforcement within the left-nationalist 
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movement. Instead of having a basic trust in the state’s evidence and convictions by judges, 
they assume that evidence is fabricated and convictions are based upon declarations extracted 
through torture. Many of my interviewees assumed that quite a few of “their” people had been 
imprisoned innocently. It is significant that in these criticisms, prisoner support groups draw 
upon the very logic of liberal legalism to demonstrate the ways in which the Spanish state 
presumably violates its own principles. These Criticisms have severely damaged the state’s 
credibility and legitimacy among a substantial part of the population.  
 
This de-legitimating effect led the newspaper El País to accuse these prisoner support and 
human rights organizations of being “ambassadors of ETA.” It criticized the “cover” 
organizations for ETA, whose only real goal was allegedly to discredit the Spanish state. The 
newspaper specifically included international organizations such as Amnesty International and 
former Special Rapporteur for the United Nations Theo van Boven in its criticism, claiming that 
their one-sided commitment to human rights is naïve and counterproductive when their 
informants are ETA militants. The article ended with the advice that Spain should not only be 
respectful to human rights, but also seem that way. Therefore, the article suggested that the 
state would have to step up its efforts to counter the “propaganda” initiatives “ETA/Batasuna” 
was undertaking to improve its profile in the international arena (1 June 2008).  
 
In the contentious conversation about prisoners, the meaning of “social reinsertion” is 







other prisoners. As used by state agents, the term refers to insertion into a life without ETA. 
Families of these prisoners, however, claim that it is contradictory to the aim of reinsertion that 
their visits are being made more difficult. They refer to the Spanish Constitution and 
international treaties, in which reinsertion is supposed to be an objective of the prison 
sentence.60 Critics, however, dispute the very objective of “reinsertion,” asserting that there is a 
real difference between ordinary criminals and terrorist delinquents in this respect (Unzalu 
2008). For example, in order to facilitate reinsertion, prisoners in Spain are allowed to attend 
university studies while they are in prison. Unzalu points out that the image of ordinary 
criminals is that they are outside of social structures and that reinserting them into society 
involves giving them access to these structures. Terrorist delinquents, on the other hand, 
already belong to precisely these structures and will not need reinsertion in this sense. What 
should reinsertion be for terrorist delinquents? For Andoni Unzalu it would mean a “de-
legitimization of violence” and “recognition of the harm caused to victims” (2008:16). “A 
terrorist, who has done three degrees in prison and at leaving receives an honorary ceremony 
for his anterior actions, is not a reinserted terrorist” (2008:16).  
 
3. Bringing the “political” back in: Identification as a “political” prisoner 
While human rights organizations stick with the framework of liberal legalism and demand 
equal treatment of all defendants and prisoners, denouncing treatment of prisoners and 
demanding fair trial proceedings from within the rule of law, political supporters of prisoners 
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reject the existing rule of law and claim that the prisoners are “political” prisoners. Thus, left-
nationalist interviewees consistently made a distinction between “social” prisoners and 
“political” prisoners, emphasizing the differences. Indeed, they identify strongly with the 
“political” prisoners because of their shared political beliefs. The category of “political” 
prisoners obtains a reality in the Basque Country through their ways of organizing and the rules 
to which they adhere (more on this below). This claim of the “political” nature of these 
prisoners is vehemently rejected both in the prosecutorial narrative and by victim 
organizations. The mutual recognition of their political identity between those prisoners and 
their supporters reproduces a rejection of the state’s claim to jurisdiction or the state’s ability 
to classify their actions as merely “crimes.”   
 
Basque “political” prisoners are all part of the prisoner collective, the Collective of Basque 
Political Prisoners (EPPK).61 As a collective they have often organized coordinated protests, such 
as in January 2010, when the 742 prisoners in both Spanish and French prisons protested by 
refusing to leave their cells (this form of protest is called “chapeos”).62 Being part of the 
collective brings obligations. The Collective of Basque Political Prisoners is a very tight 
collective. Everyone is supposed to accept the rules of the collective. Whereas supporters of the 
prisoner collective claim that its goal is to maintain cohesion, the prosecutorial narrative argues 
that prisoners are strongly “controlled” (Field notes trial Gestoras April 2008). Basque political 
prisoners are not supposed to negotiate with the state. Thus, they are always in the 3rd grade, 
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the worst conditions in the prison, whereas they could be transferred to the 2nd grade if they 
accepted to cooperate with the state. Basque “political” prisoners are also obliged to take a 
lawyer from the lawyer’s collective and commit themselves to a “political solution” instead of 
justice in their individual case. This commitment can be strictly enforced by ETA with social and 
even physical pressure, and individual ways out are not accepted.  
 
Inspired by a similar program in Italy, the Spanish government launched a project in 1980 to 
motivate ETA prisoners to accept the rules for a “repenting prisoner” (arrepentido). Even 
though in the beginning various prisoners did accept the proposal, this policy has resulted in a 
failure. ETA reacted harshly against some of the people that accepted the deal with the state. 
For example, ETA assassinated the very well-known former ETA member “Yoyes” in broad 
daylight in her own village while she was tending her daughter (Douglass and Zulaika 1990). The 
anti-ETA organization Basta Ya pointed out that between 1989 and 1995, the dispersion policy 
led 112 ETA prisoners to take advantage of the reinsertion policy (Basta Ya 2011:2). Since 2008, 
the tight collective of Basque prisoners has been showing dissent. Important old ETA members 
have left the collective over a dispute with the current ETA leaders. These dissenting members 
lost the support provided by Gestoras pro Amnistía, the prisoner support group related to the 
left-nationalist movement.63  
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As ETA rejects the state’s jurisdiction, ETA-commando members never defend themselves in 
court.64 Prosecution and sentencing are not recognized as legitimate, but accepted as a matter 
of fact. Indeed, among left-nationalists the prosecution of ETA-commando members is not 
controversial. The trials are generally described as “unproblematic” (Interview S-3).65 Even 
though people may support the armed struggle and maintain and support a war logic (such as 
acts in defense or retaliation, attacks on military targets) to explain ETA’s actions, there is no 
attempt to transfer these definitions to the criminal justice arena and its criminal proceedings. 
The war discourse of the armed struggle is not acted out in the courtroom. ETA militants simply 
refuse to accept the courts as legitimate and thus refuse to engage in the court proceedings.  
 
As prisoner supporters try to bring back the “political,” they systematically deny the state’s 
capacity to confer a criminal status to the actions and authors of “crimes.” While ETA militants 
routinely rejected a juridical defense in the courtroom, ETA did, however, publicly claim its 
actions, provide its reading, and explain and defend them in public declarations and interviews. 
In this way, ETA defended the political nature of its actions. Also, actions of Kale Borroka were 
sometimes claimed in communiqués (Van den Broek 2004:719). These communiqués became 
subject to the scrutiny of prosecutors. At various moments, prosecutors have discussed the 
meaning, goal, and impact of these communiqués as well as the responsibility of those 
fabricating and distributing them. There have been several attempts to bring such 
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communiqués, its authors, and distributors into the criminal justice arena. However, only few of 
such attempts have succeeded. In the 1980s there were attempts to use the crime of apology in 
order to prosecute people who published ETA communiqués. On 9 January 1980, the Audiencia 
Nacional convicted Luis Felipe for a “crime against citizen security” for having rewritten and 
corrected ETA communiqués and information about ETA actions given to him by members of 
ETA (military) in order to spread the information.66 Most attempts to obtain a conviction for 
publishing such communiqués, however, fell flat and for many years I could not find any records 
of more attempts until the theme was taken up again in the macro-trials. In the accusation 
against the newspaper Egunkaria, the investigative judge argued that ETA communiqués are 
not only claims regarding violent actions but also “the expression of a specific partial evaluation 
of situations” (Audiencia Nacional, 4 November 2004:70). Twenty-seven years after the 
conviction of Luis Felipe, the Audiencia Nacional considered the prosecutorial argument proven 
that the Basque newspaper EGIN was the “mediatic front” of ETA as it  
 
maintained the internal cohesion and oriented the activity of the “National Movement of 
Basque Liberation,” magnifying the acts of the terrorist organization and justifying them as 
conforming to the ideology imposed by ETA, in the form that it marked the guide of the 
orthodoxy that fixed the “vanguard” of the criminal organization, represented by its armed 
wing. (Audiencia Nacional, 19 December 2007:178)  
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As the state pushes for the acceptance of its classification and determination of crimes, a highly 
contentious issue has become the refusal to “condemn” ETA and ETA’s use of violence by the 
political party Herri Batasuna and its successors. This refusal to condemn led to the 2002 Law 
on Political Parties and the subsequent illegalization of Batasuna. Article 9.3 of this law 
legislates that a party will be illegalized when it gives “express or tacit political support to 
terrorism.” Basque human rights organization Behatokia has argued that “tacit political 
support” is unacceptably vague and could potentially include many kinds of behavior that in 
their opinion should not be reasons for illegalization (2003). They argued that the law fails to 
provide a clear test for what “political support” entails, claiming that what is meant with this 
law is to illegalize a party that does not condemn acts of terrorism. Behatokia wrote that it may 
be reproachable ethically or morally to not condemn violence, but they argued that it cannot be 
reproachable punitively (ibid.).  
 
This issue has also been brought up during criminal trials. For example, during the trial of 
Arnaldo Otegi, spokesperson of the political party Batasuna, the judge of the Audiencia 
Nacional, Ángela Murillo, asked him whether he condemned the violence of ETA. Upon his 
refusal to answer, the prosecutor said: “Quien calla, otorga,” implying that the silence signifies 
agreement with ETA’s violence (Manso 2010). Left-nationalist activists often reject the word 
“condemn” and its specific moral signification (Frabetti 2008). One interviewee pointed out that 
left-nationalists have often publicly expressed that they “lament” violent actions, which should 








These supporters of “political” prisoners do not deny the fact that militants of ETA-commandos 
have used violence or committed crimes. However, they situate those crimes within the context 
of a political conflict. It is because of this political context, they argue, that once the conflict is 
solved, these “political” prisoners should be released (Interview S-23). In other cases, especially 
in the macro-trials, supporters do argue that defendants are on trial for purely legitimate 
political activities. As we will also see in the cases of Chile and the United States, the reasoning 
of activists is that the more effective the tactics the political movement employs are the more 
repression the state will use. In the Basque Country, a leader from the illegalized youth 
organization Segi argued that “we reach so many youths. We are actually effective in 
negotiating housing for students. That is why they are targeting us” (Interview S-24).  Even 
seemingly just decisions can be interpreted by activists as manipulation by the state. For 
example, in the trial against Gestoras pro Amnistía, the prosecutor dropped the charges against 
two of the defendants. The lawyer in that case argued that this was only done to demonstrate 
that the state keeps the guarantees of the law, but that underneath the verdict was already 
decided even before the trial had started (Field notes, trial Gestoras, June 2008).  
 
In these cases, political supporters challenge not only the jurisdiction of the Spanish state but 
also the very classification of activity as “criminal.” This challenge is most visible in the trials 
against left-nationalist social and political organizations whose members have been accused of 







known as the “macro-trials”). These prosecutions will be analyzed in depth in the next chapter. 
Here it is important to point out that while the definition of the crime as such is not disputed in 
the trials against militants of ETA commandos, it is at the core of the contention in these trials 
against the “ETA network.” The Basque human rights organization Behatokia, for example, 
asserted that social and political activities were the subject of criminal investigation in these 
trials. They argued that previously these facts had been “penally irrelevant” as they belonged to 
“political criticism and the combat of ideas. Thus they are criminalizing goals. They are giving an 
extreme interpretation to the facts in order to include them in the offense of collaboration, 
when it doesn’t belong there” (2003). Behatokia thus argued that not the violent methods of 
ETA but its objective had become the justification for criminal prosecutions and warned that 
this could convert any citizen immediately into a member of an armed organization. In Chile 
and in the United States we can also observe these generalizing claims, such as “any citizen can 
become subject to repression,” which contribute to the identification split and the polarized 
generalized perceptions that anyone can become subject to suspicion and state repression (or, 
alternatively, as we have seen above, the belief that everyone can become a victim of ETA). 
Thus, supporters of Basque “political” prisoners hold that the Spanish state is criminalizing the 








4. Persuading the public of the political definition: Changing the impact of criminal 
prosecutions  
The left-nationalist movement is engaged in a concerted effort to convince the public of the 
legitimacy of left-nationalist social and political activities and the illegitimacy of the state 
response. The counting of “political” prisoners is a recurring phenomenon in each of the 
countries under study here. The Basques, however, have professionalized this act with yearly 
posters with pictures of all of the “political” prisoners, which are distributed throughout the 
Basque country in bars and other places. In 2008, this poster contained 700 pictures, one for 
each of the “political” prisoners, and in addition some empty spaces for the people that remain 
fugitive. Similarly, in reports and websites the message is spread that the Basque prisoners are 
political prisoners. The spreading of the message of repression is also done in person. For 
example, during the trial of Gestoras pro Amnistía, the defendants were traveling throughout 
the Basque Country to give speeches and inform people about their case.  
 
As already mentioned above, often defendants and their supporters argued that the population 
should be concerned about this repression, not only because it is unjust, but also because it 
might victimize them at some point. Basque left-nationalists, for example, maintained that the 
Basque Country is a laboratory of repression techniques that would later be exported to the 







they commented specifically on the general reactions regarding the sentence in one of the 
macro-trials. They referred to a poem attributed to Brecht67:  
 
[F]irst there were a few, and then followed others, but when it was my turn, it was already too 
late. Hopefully this warning will reach those who applaud today or simply look the other way. 
(Asens and Pisarello 2007)  
  
As supporters identify with “political” prisoners, they can decide to engage directly in the 
criminal justice arena by obstructing judicial proceedings or making their voice heard in the 
ongoing conversation about the legitimacy of criminal prosecutions. People defy the state’s 
definition of criminal acts most radically, however, when they collaborate with ETA commandos 
and, for example, provide housing for fugitives. Such efforts aim to thwart the state’s attempt 
to take control and defy its assertion that the criminal justice response is legitimate. ETA 
explicitly expressed its voice in the criminal justice arena when it warned the state to stop 
repressive criminal justice measures:  
 
Don’t attack Euskal Herria. Don’t pass measures such as the Parot doctrine to target Basque 
political prisoners. Don’t prosecute and imprison Basques like Iñaki De Juana. The trials of large 
numbers of Basque youths, and so on and so forth, are all further examples of the exceptional 
state of affairs in our country. Let all this stop, and ETA will have no need to react. (Interview 
with ETA in the newspaper Gara, 8 April 2007)  
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This “conversation” about criminal justice issues can also take place in the streets, for example 
when street violence is motivated by outrage about criminal justice issues (Van den Broek 
2004:719). This was also understood by a prosecutor of Navarra who explained that such street 
actions “intend to call attention to” a variety of things, such as the ETA prisoners, the 
disarticulation of commandos, their opposition to the trials against conscientious objectors or 
draft evaders, and militarism, etcetera (MA 1994:474). In 1994, the Attorney General explicitly 
framed the actions of ETA sympathizers as an “answer” to detentions of ETA’s extortion-
network and the death of an ETA member (MA 1994).68  
 
The most common forms of solidarization with “political” prisoners are attending trials in 
Madrid and participating in public demonstrations in relation to prisoner issues. While the 
prisoners are by no means generally recognized as “political” prisoners, left-nationalists have 
successfully turned the prisoners into a political issue. For a long time the public debate in Spain 
regarding the Basque struggle has been engaged with demands about the amnesty, 
reintegration, and dispersion of their prisoners. Many left-nationalists indeed identify with the 
prisoners and feel that the prisoners are suffering for the same thing every Basque left-
nationalist is fighting for: a free and socialist Basque Country. More specifically, many left-
nationalist activists feel that they could easily have been imprisoned as well. A leader from the 
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illegalized organization Segi said that many people from his organization faced criminal 
investigations. He had no idea why he had not been arrested, although it was clear that he 
expected that this could still occur (Interview S-24).  
 
By persuading the public of the “political” nature of the prisoners, supporters aim to achieve 
material and symbolic support as the prisoners continue to defy the state and its attempts to 
confer a “criminal” status to the defendants and prisoners.  
 
Contested truths: The problem with evidence 
A major role of the prosecutorial narrative in criminal proceedings is to convey the credibility 
and meaning of evidence. As truths are deeply contested in the contentious episode, this 
means that the interpretation of evidence is also at stake. There are many ways in which 
prisoner supporters challenge the credibility of the evidence presented at trials. Most 
important is the allegation that confessions and declarations are obtained through torture. This 
creates uncertainty about the value of these declarations, which often form the main body of 
evidence upon which convictions are based. Already in 1984 the Attorney General spoke up on 
the issue of torture and the “Kafkaesque” situation which this produces (MA 1984:138). He 
wrote that on the one hand there will be a criminal proceeding in the Audiencia Nacional 
investigating a crime based on a declaration made at a police station. This same declaration, 
however, would at the same time be subject to a criminal investigation at one of the local 







declarations and thus the main procedure. The Attorney General called it “dysfunctional” 
(1984:138).  
 
The prosecutorial narrative has systematically condemned incidents of torture while 
representing them as “exceptional.” The Attorney General rejected voices that according to him 
actively portray such incidents as generalized (MA 1993:406). In the description of the torture 
incidents during the Dirty War, the prosecutorial narrative explicitly placed these events in the 
context of the “terrorist phenomenon” and portrayed them as “excesses” of the security forces 
in their activities of “prevention and repression of the terrorist phenomenon and its 
environments” (1993:406).  
 
I have seen several documentaries and read many testimonies in which Basque people, young 
and old, testify to the abuse and torture they have suffered at the hands of the Spanish Guardia 
Civil while detained “incommunicado” in Spanish police stations. For example, Iker reported in 
2005 that  
 
[t]he worst part was hearing the other detainees’ screams. At one point, while I was in the cell, I 
heard another detainee, who, when they opened his cell door, shouted at the Guardia Civil 
officers, “leave me alone, leave me alone!” [dejame en paz] I could also hear screams when I 
was under interrogation. […] They suffocated me with a plastic bag many times, always when I 
was on my feet. At times they also made me do stand-ups while the bag was over my head, 








His testimony was followed by 46 other lengthy testimonies recounting similar or worse 
experiences in 2005.  
 
The front page of the TAT yearly report in 2002 showed a picture of Unai Romano. The photo 
was horrible to see, as his face is swollen, his eyes are bruised black, and he is wearing a brace 
around his neck. On the web you can find the bruised picture next to a picture of Unai Romano 
from before the alleged torture occurred (Koldomikel 2008). He is unrecognizable. If that would 
seem undisputable evidence of torture, the reaction of the judge may seem cynical. The judge 
in Madrid claimed that Unai had inflicted the injuries himself (Gara 2005). A lawyer 
representing a victim organization was equally unmoved by the picture. When I discussed the 
torture allegations with her, she claimed that without any doubt the picture had been 
photoshopped (Interview S-17). The organization Basta Ya published a document titled “The 
false torture of Unai Romano” claiming how Unai and his supporters went to great lengths to 
falsify documents so they could allege the torture (2006). On the other hand, an elderly man 
present at a demonstration in Iruñea-Pamplona for another alleged case of torture said: “here 
no one believes that Romano would have injured himself like that” (Personal conversation, 
January 2008).   
 
These voices contesting the truth claims of evidence presented in criminal trials not only bring 







guilt objectively and beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, these challenges fuel the existing 
distrust towards the Spanish state among left-nationalist sectors of society (Terwindt 2011). 
The Spanish state rejects all allegations. This debate also takes place at the highest levels. The 
2004 report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Theo van Boven about his visit to Spain 
created a controversy. He concluded that whereas accusations of torture may be trumped up, 
he did not believe that they are all fabricated, and moreover he believed that the abusive 
incidents are “more than sporadic and incidental” (2004). Spain’s reaction to this conclusion 
was swift and condemnatory. To give an indication of the tone of this debate, I will cite from 
the response from the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva, 
where it addressed the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
Spain claimed that  
the Special Rapporteur has collected alleged statements from sources identified only as “former 
detainees,” whose anonymity the Government believes is completely unjustified. The Special 
Rapporteur considers these sources to be credible precisely because “a certain pattern had 
emerged” from their statements. From this Mr. Van Boven goes on to conclude that these 
statements cannot be considered to be “fabrications.” It is outrageous that the Special 
Rapporteur should have failed to consider that the versions of these “former detainees” might 
agree precisely because they were acting on the basis of instructions from the organization to 
which they belonged. (Permanent Mission of Spain 2004:2)69  
 
Individuals and organizations actively participate in this debate about torture allegations and 
present arguments of all sorts. For example, an investigative judge maintained that any incident 
of police abuse or torture is not a sign of systematic abuse but simply a rogue police officer who 
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can and will be prosecuted and, if proven guilty, punished (Interview S-22).70 He has frequently 
given his fiat to a period of incommunicado detention. The organization Basta Ya argued that 
supporters of ETA have to assert that ETA militants were tortured to maintain the hero image of 
a militant who would only confess to the police under the highest pressure (2011). On the other 
hand, a Basque human rights lawyer questions why ETA prisoners who are detained in France 
never file torture allegations, which would be expected if it were the ETA policy to do so 
(Interview S-5). I could go on listing the arguments that I have heard on both sides. It is not my 
objective here, however, to go into detail and examine the various arguments supporting one 
or the other position. Rather, I want to indicate the intensity of the debate to illustrate how 
difficult it becomes to achieve a shared truth in the courtroom. A family member of an ETA 
prisoner had no doubts that torture exists: “You have seen the pictures; do you think they do 
that themselves? And why else would they confess?” He thought that the Spanish trials were 
just theater. He was by no means the only one who believed that many Basque youth are 
innocently imprisoned (Interview S-28).  
 
Many criminal cases are built upon confessions whose authors allege coercion in its drafting. 
When that allegation is not considered credible, the confession can still be used as evidence. 
For example, during a trial of the Audiencia Nacional in which the defendant claimed that his 
declarations had been taken after torture, a police officer declared that “the accused 
responded spontaneously, relating some fifteen actions of ‘kale borroka’ in which he had 
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participated” (Audiencia Nacional 51/2005). The Audiencia Nacional decided that the 
declarations were credible considering that the torture complaint that the defendant had filed 
in the Audiencia Provincial from Alava was rejected. That court in Alava decided on 30 March 
2004: “Relevant is that (the complaint) does not deserve any credibility, given that it reports 
the existence of some grave physical aggressions, of which the forensic doctor did not see any; 
therefore, one can reasonably doubt his entire report.” This was cited in the verdict Audiencia 
Nacional in the case 51/2005. While the Audiencia Nacional reproduces this decision, believers 
in the existence of torture, however, easily dismiss the role of forensic doctors, pointing to 
various deficiencies in their documentation, such as the lack of supervision or protocol (TAT 
2005:124). Such doubts about the confession thus question the validity of the conviction in the 
verdict of the Audiencia Nacional in case 51/2005. This illustrates that doubts about one part of 
the criminal justice edifice can “infect” the entire building.  
   
Detainees have often filed complaints about torture during their incommunicado detention. 
This torture-claim discredits any declarations that are signed by detainees and devalues its 
evidentiary value. These complaints are de-legitimized, however, by the prosecutorial argument 
that ETA orders its militants in its manual to denounce torture upon arrest in order to 
delegitimize the Spanish state. Cases dealing with torture allegations are seldom resolved to 
the satisfaction of claimants. Instead, like in the case of Romano, these cases often lead to 
further contention.71 In order to counter the continuing stream of what the state thinks to be 
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false denunciations, charges were made in some cases for the crime of “false complaint” 
against several of the lawyers who had filed such a complaint. An example of such a charge was 
the case against Begoña Lalana in 1992, which was dropped later on (Instruction Court 
Madrid).72 When the mayor of Hernani accused members of the security forces of the 
systematic use of torture in 2008, she was prosecuted for the crime of defamation and 
slander.73 Such criminal cases thus send de-legitimating messages to various audiences, 
discrediting state agents or challengers of the state. Thus, the contention about torture 
allegations sets off a spiral of criminal cases, which all become the subject of renewed 




Since the transition, the young Spanish democracy has been challenged by continued demands 
for independence and criticism of its institutions and its rule of law. ETA’s violent campaign, 
failed negotiations, and a Dirty War in which the government was involved with paramilitary 
activity put continued pressure on the state to deliver upon its part of the imagined “social 
contract,” in which citizens give up their arms in exchange for state protection. Indeed, the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
maltreatment, or torture (CPT 2008:23). Human rights lawyers complain that the sentences in cases of conviction 
are very low. They also refer to specific instances where officials convicted for torture received a pardon or early 
release, such as Enrique Galindo, or the decoration for Melito Manzanas. See also Amnesty International (2004). 
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erosion of legitimacy of state institutions and particularly the criminal justice system has been 
such that interviewees on all sides perceived the criminal justice system to be partial and 
failing. This perceived gap between law and justice is a key characteristic of the process of 
contentious criminalization.  
 
The chief prosecutor at the Audiencia Nacional recognized this “double criticism,” where 
victims of ETA claimed that the state was not doing enough to destroy terrorism, and left-
nationalist defendants argued that they were being persecuted for their ideas. He defended his 
role as prosecutor of “applying the law,” which in a “rechtsstaat,” as he pointed out, “also 
includes respecting the rights of and guarantees to citizens […] including the rights of the worst 
terrorists” (Interview S-21). In his commitment to the rule of law, the chief prosecutor 
emphasized that the law applies to everyone. He rejected any notions of “enemy penology” or 
the practices in Guantánamo Bay, which to him has turned into a symbol for lawlessness for 
this prosecutor, indeed, for the “negation of the rule of law: You cannot defend the rule of law 
while violating the rule of law.” Voicing the core value of liberal legalism, he said that “la 
justicia se basa en la aplicación de la ley,” [Justice is based in the application of the law]. In the 
next chapter, I analyze the prosecutorial narrative and the way it has responded to the ongoing 
battle of interpretation in the criminal justice arena. The scrutiny of several prosecutions over 
the course of the past three decades shows that the “application of the law” is not independent 








III. Expansive Criminalization in Spain 
Collateral damage or targeted assassination? On 22 September 2008, the Basque left-
nationalist newspaper Gara reported the “death” of a Guardia Civil who had been deactivating 
a bomb planted by ETA. The newspaper did not explicitly attribute responsibility for the death. 
The newspaper also did not mention the name of the Guardia Civil. The Spanish right-wing 
newspaper El Mundo, on the contrary, titled its article “ETA assassinates Luis de Conde.” 
Whereas the presentation by the right-wing newspaper makes the incident appear on a par 
with a targeted killing, the presentation by the left-nationalist newspaper makes the death 
appear like unfortunate collateral damage. These different reports reflect the obvious 
differences in perspective in any situation of violent political conflict. But how do these 
differences come to play a role in the prosecutor’s narrative in criminal proceedings? In this 
chapter we will take a close look at the prosecutorial discourse in several criminal trials.  
 
How would the prosecutorial narrative translate the event that occurred on 22 September 
when it presents a case in the courtroom? How would the prosecutor describe the different 
actors that are (allegedly) involved? Will the identity of the Guardia Civil as a member of the 
state security forces be emphasized or ignored? How will the prosecutor describe ETA? Will the 
prosecutor focus narrowly on the events on 22 September or take into account a broader time 
frame? How will the prosecutor incorporate or reject, ignore or respond to the different 








The previous chapter described the meta-conflict as voices speak up in the criminal justice 
arena, actively producing narratives that place or reject blame. In this chapter we will see how 
the prosecutorial narrative develops in the many criminal cases that come before the Audiencia 
Nacional as a product of continued contention in the Basque Country. The prosecutorial 
narrative is far from a static or isolated voice. Instead, we can observe how it actively engages 
in the meta-conflict, adapting to new interpretations of reality and changing its communicative 
strategy as it proceeds to claim authority over the definition of events. This struggle for 
interpretation is visible in the courtroom. For example, from April to June 2008, I was present 
during the trial against Basque prisoner support group Gestoras pro Amnistía, which since 1978 
has lent support to all “Basque political prisoners” as well as “refugees, exiled, and fugitives.” 
The defendants claimed that their work of “solidarity” was being criminalized. In his concluding 
arguments, the lawyer of the Popular Accusation began by redefining the terminology as used 
by the defendants:  
 
They talk about fugitives and refugees. That language is misleading. A refugee is someone who 
as a consequence of a war has had to seek refuge. In Spain there is neither persecution nor war. 
Here we have a free country, where anyone can participate in the elections. (Madrid, June 
2008)74   
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In his statement, the lawyer of the Popular Accusation was redefining the work of “solidarity,” 
making it clear that the people the defendants of Gestoras were supporting were “gunmen” 
instead of “refugees.” In this chapter, we will analyze various instances where concepts, ideas, 
and history are redefined. Instruction Judge Garzón is very explicit about his attempts to 
reinterpret the terminology ETA employs:  
 
The confusion has come to such a point that to avoid it, I ordered that they [the police] make 
sort of a dictionary so that the manipulation of language would not interfere negatively with the 
investigations. For example, the terrorist is called a militant, as if we are dealing with a political 
organization. (Garzón 2005:299) 
 
Thus, Garzón explicitly recognizes the importance of language in the construction of reality. He 
consciously takes on that battle, refusing, for example, to call ETA members “militants.” In the 
following sections I will show the struggle about classifying concepts as it has taken place in 
criminal proceedings throughout the past three decades.  
 
As the prosecutorial narrative translates events into the categories of criminal law, its 
interpretations derive from a specific understanding of the relevant context in which these 
events are situated. In Chapter 1 I distinguished between two ideal-typical modalities of 
prosecution, contrasting de-contextualization with re-contextualization. We can observe that 
throughout the 1990s the prosecutorial narrative increasingly re-contextualizes events. Thus, as 







that took place at a specific time and place, involving a specific set of actors, and excluding all 
considerations of a broader context that could have changed the interpretation of the facts. 
Throughout the 1990s, the prosecutorial narrative re-contextualized single events, connecting 
different events and different actors across time and place in order to construct a different 
narrative that does not frame single incidents as public disorder but instead links these 
incidents to ETA and to terrorism.  
 
Re-contextualization occurred as discontent with the result of prosecutions under the de-
contextualized narratives mounted. As victims and victim supporters mobilized in the criminal 
justice arena and proposed new narratives, the prosecutorial narrative incorporated elements 
of these new narratives. Thus, political contention moved into the criminal justice arena, 
because the context that is chosen or constructed as the relevant background is itself deeply 
contested. The translation of the new narrative into the criminal law framework constituted 
this re-contextualization. The discursive shifts in the prosecutorial narrative, such as the new 
conceptualization of the ETA network and new interpretations of events like honoring 
ceremonies produced a broadening of the legal interest, a broadening of the criminal liability, 
and a loosening of the separation between law and politics. 
 
The business of the prosecutorial narrative is declaring events to be “crimes” and assigning 
responsibility for these crimes to individuals. In Spain, the development of the prosecutorial 







actions and forms of organizing in its conception of criminal activity. This expansion can involve 
a re-drawing of the boundary between the political and the criminal justice arena, where 
behavior that was previously understood to be “political” becomes redefined as “criminal.” The 
expansion can, however, also involve a redefinition within the criminal justice arena, where 
activity that was “merely” criminal becomes defined as “terrorism.” In this chapter I will 
address the expansive development of the prosecutorial narrative in four distinct areas. First, I 
analyze the expansion as a consequence of a redefinition of the organization ETA as a 
“network.” Second, I trace an increased focus on stopping ETA at its perceived “basis”: funding 
and recruitment. Third, I analyze how the prosecutorial narrative has redefined street violence, 
which was formerly prosecuted as a public disorder and throughout the 1990s became 
prosecuted as a terrorist offense. Fourth, the prosecutorial narrative branches out into the area 
of speech acts, prosecuting conduct that had not been defined as criminal before, such as the 
waving of a flag with ETA symbols on it.   
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the prosecutorial narrative has amplified the range of 
“eligible subjects” for criminal prosecution. After a heavy focus on the criminal prosecution of 
ETA militants in commandos in the 1980s, towards the end of the 1990s one can observe the 
criminal prosecution of “aboveground” activists. This had not been attempted before. A lawyer 
for the victim association Dignidad y Justicia told me that, back in 1997, it was thought that 







would be “la bomba” (the bomb)75 – but “nothing happened,” as she put it (Interview S-27). 
Until then, it was considered to be outside the range of the imaginable to prosecute them. 
Similarly, it was thought that the Law of the Parties (leading to the illegalization of Batasuna) 
would be impossible, but according to her that also “went well.” Some interviewees have 
interpreted recent prosecutions of high-level officials in the moderate nationalist party PNV as 
other leaps, as this meant a significant expansion from the criminal prosecution of left-
nationalists to the prosecution of more moderate nationalists (Interviewee S-3). Significant is 
that these prosecutions are not a response to a sudden engagement with criminal conduct by 
these defendants. Instead, these leaps are enabled by novel understandings and interpretations 
of key concepts and images in the prosecutorial narrative, sometimes enabled by new laws. The 
new narrative thus redefines long existing forms of conduct as criminal.  
 
I should say beforehand that the overview of criminal prosecutions is necessarily an incomplete 
discussion and selection out of many cases. Indeed, even from the cases that I touch upon, it is 
impossible to give all the details about the various proceedings, defendants, appeals, and legal 
issues that are involved. I have selected certain criminal prosecutions that I regard to be 
illustrative of a trend.  
 
1. First classification: Conflict or terrorism?  
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Just as in the other country studies, we can observe the phenomenon of “first classification,” 
where actors in the conflict as well as state agents interpret a criminal event as part of a 
broader context. We have already seen that victims generally deny all references to a “conflict.” 
They prefer the relevant context to be viewed exclusively as a matter of “ETA terrorism.” 
Whether described as conflict or terrorism, these classifications-in-context elevate the specific 
criminal event above its particular features, time, and location and places it within a larger 
phenomenon. Significantly, the classification matters in criminal prosecutions as it colors the 
construction of the narrative that determines crimes and criminal liability. The further specific 
re-contextualization of the facts of criminal cases relies upon this basic categorization.  
 
One of the recurring themes in the meta-conflict in the criminal justice arena is the question 
whether acts of terrorism are ordinary crimes or not and whether (the perpetrators of) acts of 
terrorism should be treated differently from (those of) ordinary crimes. The kinds of differences 
and equalities asserted or demanded depend strongly on the context that is chosen. Taking 
terrorism as the relevant context, for example, the dispersion policy is based on assumed 
differences between ETA prisoners and ordinary prisoners. On the other hand, prisoner 
supporters claim a relevant difference when they demand amnesty for their prisoners as they 
place their criminal responsibility within the broader context of conflict.  
 
The classification of events as “ETA terrorism” has as its logical counterpart the “struggle 







war metaphors like the “arms of the law.” This struggle is conceptualized as an overarching 
battle, potentially subordinating single prosecutions to this broader goal. Indeed, a strategy can 
consist of different “tracks,” such as the policy described by the attorney general to combine a 
focus on armed commandos, the arrest of “historical” members of ETA who reside in Latin 
America, prosecutions of the political organizations of the ETA network, prosecution of Kale 
Borroka, action against the glorification of terrorism, and the pursuit of a prison policy that 
dissociates prisoners from ETA (MA, 2010:262).  
 
This first classification is thus a continuous battle, pitching those who claim the conflict as the 
context and those who claim terrorism as the relevant context. The claim to a context is a claim 
that there is a significant difference between a de-contextualized interpretation and a re-
contextualized interpretation. The claimed difference is then supposed to alter the criminal 
prosecution as it would alter the definition of the crime or the claim to criminal liability. A 
continual question of debate is therefore whether the asserted differences are legally relevant 
or not.  
 
Let me illustrate this debate with an example in which the relevance of the political context is 
denied by state authorities. This happened in the trial against a defendant who was accused of 
killing a baker. The killing happened on 13 March 2004, just two days after the mass attacks on 
the trains in Madrid, later attributed to Al Qaeda. President Aznar and his government initially 







the UN Security Council adopted a Resolution condemning the attacks and attributing them to 
ETA (Resolution 1530, 11 March 2004). Batasuna leader Arnaldo Otegi, however, appeared on 
television explicitly denying any involvement of ETA in the attacks. For many left-nationalists 
this was a definitive sign that ETA was not responsible. The issue became a national debate in 
the first days after the attack. Sentiments also ran high locally. In Iruñea/Pamplona, in Navarra, 
a baker was asked by his neighbor to put a sign speaking out against ETA in his window. This 
baker, Ángel Berrueta, refused to put up a sign with the text “ETA No” because he believed that 
ETA was not involved in the attacks. His neighbor, an officer at the National Police, was 
outraged about his refusal and shot him. Significantly, what contributed to this incident was 
Ángels identity as founder and member of the organization Gurasoak, which provides support 
to families whose children are imprisoned for Kale Borroka. Due to this affiliation, the neighbors 
believed him to be an ETA militant. This “ideological discrimination” was later taken into 
account as an aggravating circumstance (Audiencia Nacional, 8 July 2005).  
  
During the trial, the prosecutor, however, framed the case as “una riña de vecinos” [a fight 
between neighbors.] Ángel’s family members, however, emphasize the political climate within 
which the killing occurred.76 They point out that Ángel dared to say “no” against an imposed 
ideology and reality and blame Aznar for having made the references to ETA and the climate of 
“impunity” within which the National Police officer felt justified in his action. Ángel’s daughter 
laments the lack of support for her family. She said: “two months later they kill two Guardias 
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Civiles and the whole world is on the streets. What is the difference with my father? I don’t see 
it” (Vecin@s de Donibane y Eguzki Bideoak 2007). In this case, some voices indicated that the 
case should be placed within a broader context; however, this classification is expressly denied 
in the prosecutorial narrative. This contestation does not only take place in the courtroom but 
also in the streets and, for example, online newspaper forums (e.g., Deia 2010).  
 
The chosen context or the de-contextualization of events can itself thus be a matter of intense 
contestation. This is not surprising, because the chosen context can have a great impact on 
criminal proceedings. This becomes especially clear when the chosen context is changed along 
the way as occurred in a case of protest against the High Speed Train (TAV/AHT). During a 
protest on 3 November 2006, two protesters from Beasain were arrested and charged for 
“public disorder” (Alonso, Lago, and Bárcena 2008). On 15 January 2008, their case was 
scheduled to take place at the courthouse in Tolosa (“Los acusados” 2008). However, at the last 
moment, the crimes were redefined as acts of terrorism and the Audiencia Nacional 
intervened, transferring the case from the local courthouse to Madrid.  
 
What had happened? On 5 January 2008, the newspaper Gara had published an interview with 
ETA in which the organization pronounced itself against the High Speed Train. Now, with this 
information, the protests in 2006 were viewed in a new light and the prosecutions were 
undertaken within the framework of terrorism. ETA decided to oppose the High Speed Train, 







“terrorism.” This redefinition sparked contestation and questions about what constitutes 
terrorism and whether the activists should have known in 2006 that a year later ETA would 
voice its opposition to the project. Anti-High-Speed-Train activists were further put under 
pressure when on 3 December 2008 ETA killed the businessman Ignacio Uria Mendizabal, who 
was responsible for the company involved in the construction of the train. Activists were called 
upon to actively distance themselves from the assassination and condemn the killing, 
something which various left-nationalist activists refused to do.  
 
Placing events in context can thus significantly alter the crime definitions. This is actually one of 
the main grievances of victim organizations. They have criticized prosecutors for being less 
repressive during the truce with ETA. The chief prosecutor of the Audiencia Nacional confirmed 
and justified this trend as he pointed out that some conduct is simply evaluated differently 
during a truce (Interview S-21). “The application of the law depends a lot on the context and 
circumstances of each case. That is a legal criterion and within the rule of law.” He admitted 
that during the truce the prosecutors had been more flexible regarding actions of the 
environment of ETA. However, he defended this as only logical. He argued that meetings and 
demonstrations during a truce, when ETA has stopped violence, have a legal goal when the goal 
is to support the peace process. However, when ETA has broken the truce and returned to 
killing and extortion, then such meetings and demonstrations, when they support the methods 








Therefore, the application of the law cannot be the same in one circumstance or the other. […] 
The laws are applied according to the social reality and the context in which they are applied. 
You cannot claim a rigorous application of the law when the circumstances do not warrant that 
rigor, but a more flexible application. (Interview S-21) 
 
The chief prosecutor thus defended a different interpretation of conduct given a change in the 
context because of the truce. Victims of ETA, however, dispute this belief on behalf of 
government officials in the truce. Indeed, they do not see a truce in the sense of a “peace 
process.” They disagree with the notion that ETA would be working towards peace during that 
period. Instead, they argue that ETA just uses the time to recover strength. Victims of extortion 
by ETA have emphasized that the letters demanding the “revolutionary tax” have continued 
despite the truce. Indeed, a businessman reported that when he denounced the continuation 
of extortion letters to the government (at risk of repercussion from ETA), he was told that he 
was being an obstacle in the peace process (Delgado 2007). The meaning of the truce of ETA is 
one of the topics that is heavily contested in the meta-conflict, with important consequences 
for the interpretation of conduct and the construction of crimes.  
 
While indicating that the interpretation of some actions thus changes with a change in the 
context, the chief prosecutor emphasized that all criminal proceedings for “clear” crimes of 
terrorism continued. In cases of attacks, destruction, arson, actions of Kale Borroka, and 
collaboration, indictments continued to be formulated and people were convicted. “Clear 








2. Armed attacks and the interpretive battle about the identity of 
victims 
 
Context is brought into the narratives competing for dominance in the criminal justice arena, 
for example through the identities of victims or perpetrators. The exclusion of context upholds 
the fiction of abstract individuals who are all equally subjected to the prohibitions and 
protection of the rule of law. Such a position denies individuals any particularistic political 
identities which could be relevant within the criminal justice arena.  
 
Not all identities are considered irrelevant, however, in the various narratives justifying or 
condemning behavior. ETA, for example, has long legitimized its attacks by indicating that it 
targeted “military goals” and that victims were members of the Spanish security forces. It thus 
draws upon the strict distinction between civilian and military targets, which is a cornerstone of 
international humanitarian law regulating the use of violence in war. This distinction is, 
however, rejected by prosecutors, who refuse the rules of war as the relevant framework. 
Indeed, not only do prosecutors reject “war” as a valid context, they often emphasize that 
identities do not matter. For example, in 1994, the attorney general responded to such claims 
of ETA as he mentioned that victims of ETA attacks were both civilians and public functionaries 
or members of the security forces. At the same time he emphasized that the identity or the 







1994:155), thus explicitly denying the relevance of this distinction between civilians and military 
actors in the liberal legalist ideology of criminal justice.  
 
This prosecutorial emphasis on the notion that the identity of victims does not influence the 
definition of the crime should be seen in light of the fact that for many in the Basque Country 
the Guardia Civil are responsible for a long history of repression and are the symbol of the 
military oppression of Franco. A left-nationalist youth told me that no one used to go to their 
funerals. Indeed, when he was younger he used to celebrate when a Guardia Civil died, just like 
many other youth in Basque villages (Interview S-35). Many Basque left-nationalist youth still 
view the Guardia Civil as the enemy and support the left-nationalist campaign “Alde Hemendik” 
to have them leave the Basque Country. The Guardia Civil has been the institution most 
affected by ETA attacks.  
 
Outside the security forces, ETA has killed people from Spanish political parties, the PP, and the 
PSOE, and it has killed journalists, businessmen, engineers in infrastructural projects, judges, 
and prosecutors. These killings send forceful messages to the people that share the same 
profession or the same opinion. While denied relevance in the criminal justice arena, the 
identity of victims thus does play a role in many of the narratives that describe violent events. 
For example, the assassination of a journalist is interpreted as a message to other journalists. 
The interpretation of the relevant identity of the victim thus has practical importance for the 








Andoni Unzalu argued that this is one of the features that differentiates terrorism from 
ordinary crimes. The assassination of an individual does not have as its primary objective the 
assassination of that person but the threatening of a part of the population (2008:14). One 
consequence of these killings is that many people have full-time bodyguards, which severely 
impacts their daily lives and their political liberty to do what they choose to do. It is the impact 
of this specific message tied to the identity of the victim that gives these actions the potential 
to create terror, but not because these targets are indiscriminate. On the contrary, these 
actions create terror exactly because the targets are chosen for a reason, whether it be the 
refusal to pay the “revolutionary tax” or the writing of journalistic articles that are contrary to 
the ideals or practice of ETA. For example, Judge Lidón was shot as he was driving his car out of 
his garage on 7 November 2001. ETA claimed the action on 15 November 2001, calling it “an 
action directed against the Spanish judicial apparatus” (Audiencia Nacional 51/2005). The 
interpretation of the identity of victims in these targeted assassinations is therefore deemed to 
be important in order to take adequate security measures.   
 
The interpretation of the identity of victims is thus inevitably connected to an assessment of 
the intention of ETA. Targeted assassinations are distinguished from ETA victims who were 
killed because they happened to be the bodyguard of these people or happened to be nearby 
when a car bomb was detonated. Sometimes, however, the intention of ETA is contested. This 







a public debate about the question whether the victims were collateral victims (that is, 
unintended but accepted) or whether it was an indiscriminate attack (that is, intended victims 
but regardless of their identity).  
 
The interpretation of the relevant identity of the victims and the difference that is made 
between security forces or bodyguards on the one hand and judges or journalists on the other 
hand alter the message that is sent and understood. The debate about the identity of victims is 
thus constitutive of the message that is understood and thus ultimately relevant in the labeling 
of the crime. While some attacks are interpreted as specific harm against a specific individual, 
other events become labeled as an attack on society. Therefore, identity interpretations cannot 
be excluded from the criminal justice arena.  
 
3. Changing the image: From “pistoleros” to the ETA network  
 
“If the environment didn’t exist, terrorism would be much more marginal; it is the breeding 
ground,” said the chief prosecutor of the Audiencia Nacional (Interview S-21). The image of 
ETA, and specifically its relation to this “environment,” has changed significantly throughout the 
past decades, leading to a very different kind of criminal prosecution.77 In the 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s the prosecutorial focus was on the ETA commandos, their direct support 
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structure, and the armed attacks they committed.78 For example, in 1993 the attorney general 
wrote that the so-called “traveling commando79” was the “desperation” of the Ministry of 
Interior (MA 1993:250). The annual reports from the Office of the Attorney General in those 
years described the dismantling of ETA commandos in the various parts of Spain.80 An essential 
part of the dismantling of the commandos is the dismantling of the support “infrastructure” in 
each city (MA 1993:250). People who arranged transport and provided housing to members of 
ETA were prosecuted for “collaboration” with the organization.81  
 
Since 1998, the focus of criminal justice efforts has shifted from the ETA commandos and their 
direct support structure to what was previously called the “environment” of ETA. Since then, 
members of the left-nationalist movement are being prosecuted for “membership in a terrorist 
organization,” and in 2008 many of these proceedings were still ongoing. In these so-called 
macro-trials, the defendants are not suspected of being a member of an ETA commando or 
otherwise suspected of being directly engaged in armed attacks. The defendants are related to 
ETA because of their activities for other organizations that are alleged to be part of the “ETA 
network” (entramado de ETA). In this section I argue that although little had changed in the 
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relationship of these actors to ETA since the early 1980s, the prosecutorial narrative had 
changed. During the 1990s, the prosecutorial narrative construed a different image of ETA and 
changed its prosecutorial decisions accordingly.   
 
What is ETA? Is it the vanguard organization or the people’s army, as ETA itself claims to be? Is 
it like a mafia and more about money than politics, as some opponents argue? Are they a 
handful of lunatic terrorists who just do not know any other job and thus continue to do their 
thing, as other people claim? Or is it a highly organized network that permeates the whole 
fabric of Basque left-nationalist organizations, as the latest judicial verdicts claim it to be? “ETA 
es mucho más,” said a young man who was sitting on the bus next to me as I traveled from 
Madrid to Bilbao. This phrase – “ETA is much more” – sounds like a refutation of something: 
more than what? It is one of those stock phrases that you hear over and over again when 
people touch upon the subject. Another stock phrase, but then employed by left-nationalists, is 
“nos sobreestiman” – [they overestimate us] (Interview S-3). Again a refutation: In this view ETA 
is a handful, absolutely not as highly organized, and definitely not the grand organization able 
to dictate the behavior of many that has been painted in the latest trials.  
 
Competing images of ETA 
I will not go into detail on the different images that exist regarding ETA. It suffices to show the 
vast variety and differences in the images that currently exist. The competing images of ETA 







much money does ETA need in order to cause trouble? What motivates the members of ETA? 
Are ETA’s leaders motivated by politics or money? Who can be blamed for the fact that ETA still 
exists?  
 
ETA views itself as the political and the military vanguard.82 ETA’s proclaimed goal is self-
determination and a free and socialist Euskal Herria. ETA purports to represent the will of “the” 
Basque people. This perspective was expressed, for example, after an early ETA attack in 1968 
on a member of the Guardia Civil known for the torture of Basques was framed as the 
“execution of the verdict from the Basque people” (Alcedo 1994). ETA thus positioned itself as 
the bringer of justice in name of the Basque people. The view promulgated by ETA is that its 
struggle is comparable to the guerrillas that were present in Latin America. Currently, the 
comparison with the IRA in Northern Ireland is the favorite.  
 
“We all wish ETA could disappear, ETA itself wants that!” Iñaki told me while we were at the 
market place of Gernika (Interview S-4). He is a self-identified left-nationalist and had come to 
Gernika in order to protest the planned visit by the far-right-wing party “La Falange.” He 
strongly refuted the notion that ETA was a terrorist organization. “They are a liberation army,” I 
was also told by a lawyer sympathetic to the left-nationalist struggle.83 Most people 
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sympathetic to ETA emphasize that it acts in defense. ETA in their view is only a reacting force 
to the violence the state imposes on the Basque people. Many left-nationalists deny that ETA 
represents them. ETA is talked about as a necessary consequence of the political situation, but 
not because anyone actually wants it to be there. In doing so, they position themselves entirely 
outside of ETA and talk about it as a fact of nature you cannot really influence, like the rain.84 
  
In other conversations based upon a radically different ETA image, the assumption is that ETA 
starts the violence, and the state reacts to it. Opponents of ETA assume that it is ETA’s goal to 
create terror. Comparisons with Northern Ireland and the IRA are therefore vehemently 
rejected. While in Northern Ireland there was a political conflict with multiple sides, opponents 
argue, ETA really is the only side using violence. Talking about the “environment of ETA,” one 
right-wing interviewee maintained that anyone who does not condemn ETA attacks belongs to 
the environment of ETA (Interview S-13).  
 
Some people conflate nationalism with terrorism in their image of ETA. “The Basque president 
also belongs to ETA,” a family member of victims told me (Interview S-16). He was referring to 
President Ibarretxe and pushing the notion that “ETA es mucho más” to the extreme. He argued 
that the Basque president was as dangerous as ETA because he also pursued nationalist ideas 
and even was proposing a referendum on the issue of independence. According to this 
spokesperson of the Association of Victims of Terrorism, everyone in the Basque Country who 
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has nationalist ideas is in some way connected to the general ETA enterprise and therefore 
more or less connected to the specific actions ETA is responsible for.  
 
What is ETA? The answer to that question is the key to the criminal prosecutions. The question 
“What is ETA?” is important because ETA is considered a terrorist organization.85 As 
membership in a terrorist organization is a crime, the prosecutor has to determine who belongs 
to ETA in order to indict the members. The image of ETA affects the determination of 
membership. Assertions about membership are often disputed. For example, during the trial 
against Gestoras I spoke with a defendant who was an ex-ETA member (armed wing). He 
complained that the prosecutor argued that people who were once a member of ETA will 
always be a member. “What would ETA do with an old man like me?,” he said. “They cannot 
use me” (Field notes, June 2008). His understanding of ETA could not incorporate this notion of 
lifelong membership assumed by the prosecutor.  
 
Shift from the “environment of ETA” to “membership in ETA” 
The image of ETA in the prosecutorial narrative changed radically during the 1990s. Those who 
previously (in the 1980s/1990s) were situated in the “environment of ETA,” loosely described as 
those “political sectors with goals similar to the terrorist organization ETA” (MA 1991:197), 
were prosecuted as “members of ETA” in the 2000s. In order to understand this development, I 
will start with the concept “environment of ETA” [entorno de ETA]. In 1991, this concept 
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appeared for the first time in the Memoria Anual of the attorney general when the prosecutor 
of the Basque Country described under the heading of “terrorist delinquency” that a great part 
of the “street violence” was the responsibility of “what is generally called the environment of 
ETA” (1991:297). It was, for example, understood that collaborators of ETA who provided 
housing to fugitives were coming out of this “environment of ETA.” Also, youths committing 
street violence were considered to be the “environment of ETA” in the sense that ETA would 
recruit from this pool. During the 1990s, this concept of the “environment” became redefined, 
or (more accurately) eliminated from the conceptual tools for prosecution, and replaced by the 
broader concept of the “ETA network.”  
  
Instruction Judge Garzón played an important role in this conceptual development.86 In 1989, 
Baltasar Garzón took office in the Audiencia Nacional, and one of the things he did is to order 
policemen to collect all available documents whenever they arrested an ETA member (2005). In 
1992 there was an important police operation in Bidart in France. This led to the detention of 
the leaders of ETA and the confiscation of an enormous amount of documents. Garzón now 
claims that the analysis of this collection of documents revealed a different picture of ETA than 
what prosecutors had worked with before: “ETA is much more.” Investigative judge Garzón 
attacked the dichotomy that was present in the image of law enforcement the 1980s. The idea 
that the military wing of ETA was separate from the political organization dominated, and as a 
consequence law enforcement limited its efforts to prosecutions of the military wing. Garzón 
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set out to change this conception and showed the connections between them, or what is more, 
that there is no fundamental difference between the wings: it is all ETA. 
 
I argue that the criminal prosecutions changed because the shift in the image of the 
prosecutorial narrative warranted and enabled such a different approach. This does not say 
anything about whether or not the new prosecutorial image is more accurate than the previous 
one. ETA itself has changed, of course, over the course of those years. However, Garzón’s claim 
is not so much that ETA has changed but that its true nature has always been misrepresented. 
Often, it is remarked that the current prosecutions of the ETA network are long overdue, 
partially because it was difficult to obtain evidence on the alleged nature of the relations 
between the different wings or fronts of ETA (a narrative does not account for much when the 
prosecutor cannot prove it).  
  
Garzón’s conclusion about ETA after analyzing internal ETA documents was that “before 
anything this organization was purely politics; even though its methods were violent, it sought 
political changes, according to its sovereign projections over a part of Spanish territory” 
(2005:290). He redefined the military wing as a political organization and in doing so redefined 
the political wing as part of the violent strategy of the military wing, “demonstrating that a 
terrorist organization was something more complex than a mere collection of persons that kills, 
lays bombs, kidnaps, and extorts to achieve its political objectives” (2005:297). Garzón is frank 







ineffective and uncoordinated as law enforcement had been following the rules of the game as 
set by ETA by only focusing on the military wing and accepting the strong division between the 
military wing and the political organization. This had not been effective, and Garzón set out to 
design a new strategy.  
 
In this concept of the ETA network, many people previously situated outside of ETA became 
viewed as “members” of ETA. For example, early ETA refugees in Cuba were suddenly called 
“reserves” of ETA. Further, sociopolitical organizations in the ETA network were linked to ETA 
by way of “functions” they fulfilled within the strategy of ETA towards the goal of ETA, 
understood as subverting the Constitution. Members of these sociopolitical organizations thus 
became perceived as members of ETA. This notion of the ETA network received support among 
many victim organizations. For example, the director of Dignidad y Justicia wrote about the ETA 
network (Portero 2007). 
  
The simultaneous articulation of the meaning of “ETA” and “terrorist organization” 
The switch to viewing ETA as a network paradoxically lies in the recognition of ETA as a political 
organization. It is important to recognize that this conceptualization of the ETA network, 
introduced by Garzón, therefore also has an impact on the understanding of what terrorism 
and a terrorist organization are. Prosecutors had to fight against the “old” image of “terrorism” 
that they themselves helped to create. In the trial against Gestoras it became a mantra that the 







not just a group of gunmen.” They were fighting against the image of “pistoleros” [gunmen], 
which (still) seemed to be something inevitably glued to the notion of terrorism. “You don’t 
need a weapon to be a terrorist,” argued a lawyer with Dignity and Justice against the “old” 
terrorism image (Interview S-27). “Terrorists are not only those who commit attacks, but also 
those that share the strategy and the methods of the terrorist organization, and in addition 
contribute materially to the development of that strategy and those methods, even if they 
don’t use weapons,” said the chief prosecutor of the Audiencia Nacional. Thus, the meaning of 
one concept is always co-created in relation to other concepts. The image of ETA is determined 
in interaction with the image of “terrorism.” If one changes, so does the other.  
 
What constitutes a terrorist organization became a topic of contention when the Tribunal 
Supremo decided in 1998 that GAL did not constitute an armed or terrorist organization.87 The 
decision was made in the criminal prosecution of the abduction of Segundo Marey. The 
considerations for the decision that GAL was not an armed or terrorist organization reflect a de-
contextualization of the incident. At the moment of the Marey abduction, it was the first time 
that the letters GAL were used. This led the judges to conclude that there was not a “stable” 
group of persons. It was furthermore not clear that during the entire abduction the type of 
arms that is necessary for the definition of an armed organization was used. Lastly, the judges 
argued that the “isolated incident” of the abduction did not “perturb the civic coexistence for 
producing alarm or fear proper to terrorism” (Verdict No 2/1998, consideration 15). By 2008, 
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many left-nationalists still talked about this decision and regarded it as evidence of the 
partiality of the justice system.  
 
Contestation about the meaning of a terrorist organization re-emerged during the prosecution 
of members of the Basque youth organization Jarrai/Haika/Segi. Jarrai was the original name of 
the Basque left-nationalist youth organization, which was founded in 1979. After a process 
denominated “national construction,” in which Basque organizations on the Spanish and French 
sides of Euskal Herria cooperated, Jarrai merged with a youth organization on the French side 
to form a new “national” organization. That is how Haika emerged. On 1 May 2001, Garzón 
declared Haika-Jarrai to be illegal. In response to the illegalization, Basque left-nationalist 
youths founded Segi, which was soon declared illegal as well. The prosecution of members of 
Jarrai/Haika/Segi was one of the proceedings against sociopolitical organizations allegedly 
belonging to the ETA network. The prosecutors argued that there was an actual organization 
with hierarchies, the use of weapons, such as manually fabricated explosives, and the intention 
to put pressure on citizens as a complement to the struggle of ETA. Lastly, they argued that the 
organization was subordinated to ETA and obeyed its directives.  
 
In 2005 the Audiencia Nacional declared that the Basque left-nationalist youth organization 
Jarrai/Haika/Segi was an illegal organization but not a terrorist organization. This decision 
sparked renewed contestation about the nature of a terrorist organization, as it was criticized, 







the verdict and declared Jarrai/Haika/Segi a terrorist organization. Unlike the recurred verdict 
of the Audiencia Nacional, the Tribunal Supremo strongly distinguished between an armed 
organization and a terrorist organization and decided that most important is the “nature” of the 
action and the goal that is pursued (46th consideration, #8).88 The conceptualization of a 
terrorist organization (and its conceptual relations to an “illegal” organization and an “armed” 
organization) has thus developed throughout the past decades with much debate in as well as 
outside the courtroom. Significantly, the concept is not developed in the abstract but is given 
its meaning through the application of that concept to certain groups and the refusal to apply it 
to other groups.  
 
The conceptualization of ETA as a network significantly altered not only the conceptualization 
of a “terrorist” organization but also the range of people being considered “members” of that 
organization. As the image of the ETA network changed the view of membership in ETA, it also 
changed the meaning of “collaboration” with ETA. If everyone gets charged as a “member” of 
ETA, collaboration becomes a moot concept that does not cover any actual conduct anymore. 
The network image thus also has an impact on the relation between criminal law concepts. For 
example, the ETA network image raises questions about the applicability of crimes that in their 
definition refer to terrorism, such as glorification of terrorism, threatening with a terrorist 
action, or recruitment for a terrorist organization. What, for example, does “recruitment” mean 
now that the definition of ETA has expanded? Originally, obviously, recruitment for ETA meant 
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recruitment for the military wing. Now, if someone “recruits” a new member for Gestoras pro 
Amnistía (the illegalized prisoner support group), will that be prosecuted as “recruitment for 
ETA”? These questions have not (yet) been addressed in the prosecutorial narrative. An 
absence of criminal prosecutions of, for example, such “recruitment” would indicate that the 
distinction between the military wing and socio-political organizations has not been entirely 
dissolved.  
 
Criminal prosecutions based on the concept of the ETA network 
A newspaper, a prisoner support group, cafés, companies, a youth organization, and a language 
institution have all been illegalized or their activities suspended, and the leadership and various 
members have been indicted and in some cases convicted because of “membership of a 
terrorist organization.” The charge in all of these cases is based upon the idea that a terrorist 
organization consists not only of an armed group, but also includes a complex organization of 
cultural, political, economic, and armed parts that work together for a common goal in one 
coordinated structure. Therefore, the argument goes, all these organizations belong to and 
constitute ETA. A characteristic of the ETA network according to the prosecutorial narrative is 
the “complementarity” of these different organizations and their “functions,” which together 
make up the ETA network, such as the complementarity between the armed struggle and the 
street struggle. Unlike standard reactive criminal prosecutions, these macro-trials were 
therefore not triggered because of a specific violent event. The prosecutions were proactive 







left-nationalist human rights organization Behatokia therefore complained that the new 
interpretation means that what was considered to be legal political activity before is suddenly 
converted into a penal offense, without a legislative reform, creating juridical insecurity (2003).     
 
The argument in several of the macro-trials that what defendants did was “legal” did not 
impress the supporters of these macro-trials. They voiced their frustration that the left-
nationalist activists had previously “abused” the spaces the law gave them to pursue their 
activities. In the words of a representative of the victim organization Fundación Fernando 
Buesa: “the left-nationalists and the sympathizers of ETA, they laugh about the legality of the 
democracy. It is a fraud of law, they make fun of it. In this they are experts and their obsession 
of their life goes into this; all their energies go into this” (Interview S-15). Similarly, Judge del 
Olmo in his accusation of the Basque newspaper Egunkaria clarified that the ETA network  
 
takes advantage of the democratic framework and the establishment in Spain of a democratic 
rechtsstaat, with a foundation in a Constitution and a rights-based legal order and protector of 
the fundamental rights and liberties, and that thus this terrorist organization has generated a 
plural structure, legal and alegal, in which it has embedded the necessary and useful 
instruments for the strengthening and the support of its terrorist strategy. (del Olmo 2004:3)  
  
The president of Dignidad y Justicia has argued that various left-nationalist organizations simply 
changed their name after they were illegalized, making fun of the law. For example, he argued 







Independentistak” (Asociación Dignidad y Justicia 2009:1). These suspicions of one organization 
simply replacing the other led to arrests of 34 youths in November 2009 and another ten in 
October 2010 charged with the intention to recompose the “terrorist” youth organization.  
 
In May 2002, 202 people had already been indicted in the macro-trials, many of whom spent 
time in pre-trial detention. The trial called “18/98” involved the most people, as it affected 
businesses that were alleged to finance ETA, an Euskara language institute (AEK), a cultural 
association (XAKI), a journalist (Pepe Rei), and various other organizations (EKIN, Fundación 
Joxemi Zumalabe, and others). After a trial against 62 defendants that lasted 16 months, 47 of 
the defendants were convicted by the Audiencia Nacional on 19 December 2007. The Tribunal 
Supremo acquitted nine of the defendants on appeal in 2009. The case already mentioned 
against youth organization Jarrai/Haika/Segi had 42 defendants, 24 of whom were convicted by 
the Audiencia Nacional in 2005. On 19 January 2007, the Tribunal Supremo acquitted one of 
them. Other macro-trials were initiated against the political party Batasuna, left-nationalist 
cafés and companies, an association of Basque municipal mayors and councilors, the prisoner 
support organization Gestoras pro Amnistía, and the newspaper Egunkaria.  
 
History in the courtroom  
The prosecutorial narrative in all of the macro-trials involved a description of the history of ETA 
since the end of the Franco regime, when ETA decided to enforce a process called 







democratic structures, many of the cultural and political organizations which were prohibited 
under the dictatorship could start to work above ground, and only the military wing of ETA 
would stay underground. In order to maintain cohesion between the various organizations, ETA 
decided that members of ETA would perform their (illegal) tasks within the underground armed 
organization and simultaneously sit on the (aboveground) board of the various sociopolitical 
organizations. For example, Judge del Olmo alleged that there were persons active in the 
newspaper Egunkaria who were also members of ETA. He emphasized that this was not a 
membership “in the restrictive sense in the direct execution of violence” (2004:2). Thus, the 
judge emphasized that membership in a terrorist organization can include more than 
engagement in direct violence. Further, ETA developed a theory of different “fronts.” The 
armed struggle was just one of these fronts; other fronts were the political front and the “front 
of the masses.” Prisoner support organization Gestoras, as a popular grassroots organization, 
belonged to the front of the masses.  
 
The inclusion of this history within the ambit of the criminal justice arena as relevant legal 
information exemplifies a broadening of the time frame of the prosecutorial narrative. In 
addition, it brought into the courtroom a debate about what the exact nature of cooperation 
was and is between the ETA military wing and the social and political organizations, as well as 
about the relation between the armed struggle and the other “fronts.” Apart from 
reconstructing what was, the very reference to this history raised the legal question of exactly 







organizations constituted a criminal offense. As we will see, this has become a widely disputed 
issue, both inside and outside the courtroom.    
 
The trials against the organizations alleged to constitute the “ETA network” have raised the 
important question in the Basque society of the conditions under which contact with a member 
of ETA turns criminal. This question is on the minds of friends and family members of ETA 
members, but also of people who are not so intimately connected to ETA but who are 
concerned that they may get prosecuted because of “whom they happen to talk with in a bar,” 
as one interviewee put it (Interview S-25). Activists in Barcelona and Madrid complained about 
criminal investigations against activist networks in their cities such as the izquierda castellana 
[Castilian left], which were facing prosecutions due to alleged connections with ETA.  
 
Prosecutors argue that their evidence presented in the courtroom demonstrates the narrow 
cooperation between ETA (military wing) and certain sociopolitical organizations. Left-
nationalists argued, however, that cooperation has not been as narrow as the prosecutors are 
alleging and that the cooperation that did exist should not be criminalized. They maintain that 
this would effectively lead to the simple criminalization of political activity, only because this 
activity has the objective of creating a free and socialist Euskal Herria, which happens to be the 
same goal that ETA has. Arguing that simply criminalizing contact with ETA is absurd, left-







militants for its negotiations, indicating that the mere evidence of contact cannot be sufficient 
for proving a “criminal” cooperation.  
 
Supporters of the prosecutorial narrative in these macro-trials point out that what is missing in 
these left-nationalist arguments is genuine outrage about a possible connection to ETA. After 
one of the trial sessions against Gestoras pro Amnistía, I talked with one of the staunchest 
activists trying to put the ETA network on trial. She was a lawyer and involved in many of the 
macro-trials. “Why don’t they defend themselves?,” she asked me rhetorically. “Why aren’t 
they outraged? If someone accuses me of being a murderer, I would argue that I didn’t do it, 
that I wasn’t there at the time, that it is a horrible thing to accuse me of such a crime. Why 
don’t they argue with us? Why don’t they respond to our allegations?” (Interview S-17). A 
foreign sympathizer of the left-nationalist movement voiced a similar notion: “The problem is 
that they accept the prison. That makes people think that they are from ETA” (Interview S-33).   
 
The organizations fulfill “functions” within the ETA network 
Below I will analyze in more depth the prosecutorial narrative in the case against the 
newspaper Egunkaria and the case against Gestoras pro Amnistía to illustrate some of the key 
concepts and arguments that are the fundament of the basic narrative in each of the cases. The 
case against Egunkaria is in some ways a special case, because after the initial proceedings, the 
prosecutor dropped charges against Egunkaria due to a lack of evidence. It is the only case the 







pursue the case on its own as the Popular Accusation. This is quite extraordinary, and the right 
to continue the Popular Accusation without the backing of a state prosecutor was questioned 
by left-nationalists. While most of the macro-trials ended in convictions, all the defendants in 
the Egunkaria trial were acquitted by the Audiencia Nacional on 15 April 2010. Despite these 
unique features, the prosecutorial narrative in this case relied on the same themes and 
assumptions as in the other prosecutions of the “ETA network.”   
 
Just as different images regarding ETA are circulating, different images compete for dominance 
to describe Egunkaria. Is it a legitimate newspaper that aims to inform people? Or does it aim 
to convince people of the legitimacy of ETA’s struggle? Or is it a profitable company that is one 
of the sources of funding of ETA? For Basque left-nationalists it is their newspaper entirely in 
Euskara, founded by the communal effort of left-nationalists, which meant a huge step forward 
after the Franco regime, under which Euskara was forbidden. Many Basque nationalists believe 
that Egunkaria was closed because it divulged opinions regarding a free and socialist Euskal 
Herria, published ETA communiqués, and was written entirely in Euskara. Judge del Olmo 
instead described Egunkaria as a newspaper that was founded to provide ETA with continuity 
and stability by having the “mediatic-informative-social-economic-financial life” of the 
newspaper (2004:11). Victim organizations support the prosecutorial narrative and explicitly 
defend its liberal credentials as they emphasize that they support freedom of expression and 
reject the notion that Egunkaria was founded with a journalistic purpose (Asociación Dignidad y 








Defendants in each of the macro-trials argued that they were working above ground and 
assumed that what they were doing fell squarely within the boundaries of the law, that is 
within the political arena. Prosecutors and instruction judges were frank about the challenge 
these cases posed, as indeed these organizations did their work legally. For example, in the 
criminal case against the newspaper Egunkaria, the instruction judge explicitly argued that one 
would not find directly violent manifestations of the terrorist activity in the dossier and 
continued to explain that the purpose of the newspaper was to increase popular support 
among the “population of reference,” but with a strictly legal appearance and a cover of 
absolutely legitimate activity (del Olmo 2004:1). So, he wrote, the activity of this newspaper, 
which appeared entirely in the Basque language, was protected by Art. 3 of the Constitution, 
which guarantees freedom of language, and Art. 20 of the Constitution, which protects the 
freedom of information and expression. But, the argument went, this newspaper was clearly 
used by the terrorist organization ETA to achieve its ends and objectives in a mid- to long-term 
strategy.  
 
The problem was thus explicitly that the newspaper was doing work that was clearly both legal 
and legitimate. However, the terrorist organization supposedly employed the newspaper for its 
objectives in the mid to long term because the newspaper was gaining support for the 
organization’s goals among a specific segment of the population (the “population of 







the political decision to project a certain image in its articles. As evidence of this alleged 
partiality, he cited a letter written by someone who refused to sit on the board of Egunkaria 
and argued that in Egunkaria the death of an ETA member was described very differently from 
the death of an Ertzaina (a Basque policeman) or, for example, that Egunkaria failed to mention 
that in one of ETA’s attacks the victims were children (2004:34).  
 
The prosecutorial narrative describes the function of Egunkaria as follows: “to facilitate the 
protection and diffusion (with the help of Eusquera89 or Basque language as cultural cover for 
that) of the terrorist idea and the values and interests defended by that terrorist organization 
(that project called the ‘national construction’)” (2004:2). “Function” is a complicated concept 
in terms of criminal law, as it draws on motive and (indirect) causality, only constituting criminal 
conduct in relation to some other crime. Left-nationalists have been quick to monopolize the 
struggle for interpretation in the Basque Country and spread the now widely accepted notion 
that Egunkaria has been subjected to prosecution only because it is published entirely in 
Euskara. It is clear that the references to Euskara as a “cultural cover” and the widely supported 
project of national construction as an ETA project have provided the necessary ammunition for 
this image. There have been no consistent efforts on the part of the Spanish judiciary to 
effectively counter this interpretation.  
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The investigative judge thus argued that Egunkaria fulfilled a “function” for the ETA network. 
This concept returns in other macro-trials. In the Gestoras trial, for example, the prosecutor 
argued that the “functions” of Gestoras are gaining control over the collective of ETA prisoners; 
facilitating the contact between ETA prisoners and the leaders of ETA; collecting information 
important for the security of ETA; indicating and legitimating targets in society for ETA to kill; 
publishing pamphlets; and recruiting militants. For example, Gestoras launched a campaign 
called “Alde Hemendik” – “Get out of here” – which called upon the Guardia Civil to leave the 
Basque Country. The prosecutorial narrative interpreted this campaign as one of the functions 
that Gestoras performed within the ETA network.  
 
Members of Gestoras explained that one of their activities to monitor and call attention to the 
repression of prisoners and human rights violations against them (Interview S-23). They have 
criticized the Spanish state for a “judicialization of the repression” and have reproached, for 
example, Judge Lidón for one of his rulings. In 2001, ETA killed Judge Lidón. During the Gestoras 
trial, using this incident as an example, the prosecutor argued that the criticism voiced by 
Gestoras constituted “señalamiento” [signaling], one of the “functions” that Gestoras was 
alleged to have for ETA. According to the prosecutorial narrative, the human rights violations 
denounced by Gestoras are supposed to prepare the population for an attack by ETA as well as 
signal to ETA whom to attack. The prosecutor thus claimed that Gestoras had “signaled” to ETA 
to kill Judge José Lidón. In the trial against the journalist Pepe Rei this phenomenon of 







juridical-penal entity” and “alone it is not penally relevant.”90 Señalamiento thus is not a 
criminal offense in itself. However, it played a role in describing the so-called “organic 
relations” between Gestoras and ETA. Defendants of Gestoras criticized this interpretation and 
claimed that this legal-discursive construction is effectively a criminalization of human rights 
work and prisoner support.  
 
Financial contributions 
For many people (outside of left-nationalist circles) I spoke to during my fieldwork, the financial 
contributions from and to ETA would have been decisive in their assessment of the actual 
criminal responsibilities of organizations like Egunkaria and Gestoras. For example, the AVT held 
that Egunkaria was closed because it was founded in 1990 with money from ETA and that 
Egunkaria (like various other organizations) formed a source of money for ETA (Popular 
Accusation, 26 June 2007). In this light, it is surprising that the prosecutor in many cases has 
paid so much attention to other aspects, like propaganda and justificatory remarks. If there 
were actual transfers of money from sociopolitical organizations into ETA pockets, then why 
was the detour into history and justificatory speech necessary in order to allege that all these 
people are “members of ETA”?  
 
In the indictment against Gestoras, the prosecutor described the historical relation between 
ETA and Gestoras and stated that Gestoras was directly financed by ETA at least until 1991. In 
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1991, the so-called “project Udaletxe” was started, allegedly a financial plan in which left-
nationalist organizations (the ETA network) would finance ETA. However, in the verdict against 
Gestoras, there was nothing left of the allegations and evidence of financial transactions 
between Gestoras and ETA, and the court did not refer to these money trails (Audiencia 
Nacional, 15 September 2008; Tribunal Supremo 2009). The only reference to finances 
regarded financial assistance to “refugees” in other countries, which was conceptualized as 
“economic support to the collective of ETA militants located in various Latin American 
countries” (Tribunal Supremo, 13 October 2009:33).   
 
In this section I have analyzed the conceptual shift from a distinction between ETA as the armed 
organization and the environment of ETA to the view that they both belong to a single ETA 
network. I discussed some of the elements of the prosecutorial narrative as this concept of the 
ETA network was translated into criminal law vocabulary. The resulting macro-trials meant an 
important change in comparison to the prosecutorial focus on ETA’s armed commandos during 
the 1980s. The trials expanded the scope of defendants beyond the armed ETA commandos.   
 
Most of the defendants belonged to what is understood to be the left-nationalist movement. 
However, according to human rights organization EH Watch, the macro-trials also affect 
organizations that are “peripheral or outside of the proper left nationalists,” referring, for 
example, to Fundación Joxemi Zumalabe (EH Watch 2008). Thus, there are very different 







la Paz (explicitly mobilizing against ETA) criticized the macro-trials: “from Madrid it may seem as 
if Elkarri91 belongs to ETA. However, seen from a perspective from Bilbao, Elkarri is not at all 
within that bloc. Who decides that? In the prosecutions it seems as if ETA is a Big Brother” 
(Interview S-32). Left-nationalists often joked about the seeming arbitrariness of the choice of 
defendants. “You only know that you are a member of ETA at the moment of the indictment” 
said one Gestoras defendant. Another one joked that as Garzón is deciding who is a member of 
ETA, he is technically recruiting people for a terrorist organization, and should be charged as 
such (field notes, Trial Gestoras, May 2008).  
 
The macro-trials and their charges for “membership” in a terrorist organization have put the 
defendants of these sociopolitical organizations in the same position as the ETA militants from 
armed commandos. Indeed, victim organizations have advocated this equalization. For 
example, when Martxelo Otamendi, the indicted former director of Egunkaria, wanted to travel 
to the United States to cover a story there and petitioned to leave the country,92 the AVT 
advocated that he should not be allowed to travel. They argued that “ETA militants” had fled 
from justice “in similar situations,” such as a precedent involving Josu Ternera, a high level ETA 
member alleged to have been involved in multiple deadly attacks (military wing). They 
emphasized the situation of “indefensión” [lack of defense] that the victims would be in if 
Otamendi would not stand trial (Asociación de Víctimas del Terrorismo 2003). This analogy, 
however, was not accepted by Martxelo Otamendi, who claimed that he had nothing to do with 
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ETA and that he did not intend at all to flee from a trial, as he viewed himself as an innocent 
man (Interview S-2). 
  
4. The end of ETA: Follow the money and squeeze recruitment 
 
The image of ETA and assumptions about its modus operandi thus guide the criminal 
prosecutions in the choice of defendants, the kinds of charges that are leveled, and the 
argumentation for criminal liability. The image and underlying assumptions are deeply 
contested, however, in the meta-conflict and as a result can change over time, changing the 
prosecutorial choices of defendants and charges. We have seen this in the previous section 
about the ETA network and the broadened scope of defendants that are charged as members 
of ETA. But that is not the only area in which the prosecutorial narrative has been contested 
and as a result changes over time. For example, it might be that those being extorted for the 
payment of revolutionary tax will not be treated as victims anymore, but be prosecuted for 
financing terrorism in the future.  
 
Different images compete for dominance in relation to ETA’s finances and its recruitment of 
new members, as victim organizations or prisoner supporters are pushing or criticizing criminal 
prosecutions. Significantly, again we can observe that the prosecutorial narrative changes as a 
result of the adoption of new images. The alternative construction of reality then leads to 







alleged. The prosecution of the financing of terrorism and recruitment of terrorists always 
requires establishing a link between the conduct of the defendant and the terrorist activity of 
ETA. In this sense, these crimes are what I have called “dependent” crimes (Chapter 1, Table 1) 
as they require other crimes in order for the prosecuted conduct to be criminal. In the 
establishment of this link the prosecutorial narrative necessarily invokes a broader time frame 
and the implication of multiple actors.    
 
For years the Spanish state has approached the “struggle against terrorism” with the aim to 
destroy ETA. Two premises have emerged as guides in this struggle to end ETA: without money 
ETA will not be able to pursue its deadly attacks, and without new members it will not be able 
to fill its cadres after detentions. Various victim organizations have emphasized that if ETA is 
squeezed financially it will not be able to continue. “Follow the money,” stressed the director of 
the victim organization Dignidad y Justicia (Interview S-14). He suggested, for example, that law 
enforcement focus its attention on those that facilitate the payment of the so-called 
“revolutionary tax.”93 Businessmen who decide to respond to the coercive letters of ETA were 
often asked to go to individuals or sites of the left-nationalist movement in order to make their 
payment. Portero suggested that law enforcement arrest the intermediaries of these 
transactions (2007b:19). Such prosecutions have indeed been initiated (e.g., case against lawyer 
Arantza Zulueta, 2011). Also, the macro-trials were at least partially founded on the assumption 
that the various companies and sociopolitical organizations that constitute the ETA network are 
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indispensable for ETA’s finances. And the illegalization of Batasuna was partially inspired by the 
notion that public money for political parties should not end up in the pockets of ETA.  
  
The emphasis on cutting the financial means of ETA has also affected prosecutions regarding 
those believed to pay the “revolutionary tax.” During the 1980s and 1990s, the payment of 
these taxes had been framed as “extortion,” given the pressure exerted on those that refused 
to pay. Recently, however, voices have advocated for prosecuting the payment as the 
“financing of terrorism.” Manos Limpias is one of the organizations that put pressure on 
criminal justice agents by filing official complaints regarding payments to ETA. The 
spokesperson of Manos Limpias argued that “when the money is finished, ETA is finished” 
(Interview S-20). While during the 1980s and 1990s the payment of revolutionary tax was 
always the consequence of extortion, Portero reported that since 2000 ETA has initiated a new 
form of collecting money in which it asks businessmen in circles of the left-nationalist 
movement to contribute voluntarily, without any threats (2007b:14).  
 
During the 1980s it would seem unthinkable to prosecute someone for giving money to ETA as 
part of the “revolutionary tax.” Now, that is exactly what is happening. Whereas before it was 
assumed that these payments were made under huge pressure and at the risk of kidnapping or 
worse, now, with or without leaving the assumption of involuntariness, pressure is mounting to 
resist these payments, effectively leading to a standard of strict liability. Thus, in the new 







leading to renewed contestation in and outside the courtroom. In 2006, a prosecution was 
initiated for such payment, and it was reported that an instruction judge believed the two 
businessmen to have paid voluntarily (Colli 2006). In June 2011, the Audiencia Nacional for the 
first time convicted two people for paying the “revolutionary tax” and imposed a sentence of 
one year and three months (Case Bruño). Their active participation in illegalized left-nationalist 
political parties was identified by the prosecutors as an indication of their voluntary payment. 
Instead of perpetrators, the convicted sisters self-identified as “victims of ETA” (EFE 2011).   
 
Apart from squeezing the funds of ETA, there has been an attempt to squeeze ETA’s 
recruitment of young new members, as this would ultimately mean the end of ETA. Basque 
youth, and specifically youth involved in organizing left-nationalist events, are viewed as the 
“cantera de ETA” [the pool of ETA]: the source of future ETA fighters. “The majority of etarras 
[ETA militants] come from the Kale Borroka,” said the chief prosecutor of the Audiencia 
Nacional. “It is their prelude” (Interview S-21). This assumption characterizes the prosecutorial 
narrative. For example, the prosecution against youth organization Jarrai/Haika/Segi was 
partially premised on the notion that its illegalization would make recruitment to ETA more 
difficult.  
 
Left-nationalists perceive that during the past two decades, Basque left-nationalist youth have 
increasingly been targeted with harsh measures. Young inhabitants of squats and leaders of 







subject to criminal prosecutions. Sentences for street violence have increased as a consequence 
of the prosecution of street violence as terrorism, and the law on the minors has enabled 
prosecutors to ask higher sentences despite younger ages. The interpretive battle surrounding 
these prosecutions is characterized by competing images regarding gaztetxes, the organization 
Jarrai/Haika/Segi, and their relations to ETA or Kale Borroka, as well as the way in which these 
images form the basis for the prosecutorial narrative. For example, a left-nationalist lawyer 
disputed the links that prosecutors asserted between gaztetxes and the Kale Borroka (Interview 
S-26). A leader of Segi told about the arrest of six members of his youth organization. They 
were accused of participating in actions of Kale Borroka, but he thought that this was just a 
pretext, suspecting that the real reason of their detention was their activism in gaztetxes 
(Interview S-24). While some thus defend gaztetxes as cultural centers, others argue that they 
are centers of recruitment for ETA (Iturriaga 2002). The various criminal prosecutions involving 
youths thus inevitably come to play a role in this ongoing conversation, as competing voices 
interpret and resist or confirm the images produced in the prosecutorial narrative.  
 
In its criminal prosecutions, the prosecutorial narrative put flesh on the government’s aim to 
destroy ETA by expanding its efforts to eliminate the financing of ETA and its recruitment. The 









5. Street violence: Shift from public disorder to terrorism 
 
Burning an ATM in Cadiz, Andalucía, and burning an ATM in Bilbao, Basque Country… is that the 
same thing, same offense, same crime? It is one of the debated questions in the criminal 
prosecutions of the Kale Borroka or street violence in the Basque Country. Left-nationalist 
activists invariably argued that during the 1980s burning an ATM in the Basque Country was 
prosecuted as public disorder, as it still is these days in Andalucía, and penalties would mostly 
amount to a fine or a conditional prison sentence. Nowadays some young Basques are serving 
up to 18 years in prison for this kind of violence, as the prosecutorial narrative has changed 
significantly and prosecutors decided that it does matter whether you burn an ATM in Bilbao or 
in Andalucía. Left-nationalist Basques are angry about what they view as overt unequal 
treatment of the same facts (Interviews S-3/7/9/12/23/24/25). A lawyer associated with the 
organization Dignidad y Justicia, however, rejected this notion of inequality and asserted that 
the very nature of street violence in Andalucía would be entirely different (Interview S-27).  
 
In this section I review the change in the prosecutorial discourse, the way in which the new 
image is reproduced in actual criminal cases and how the image is informed and contested by 
the different images put forward by opposing groups in society. What are the differences 
between ATM-burning in Bilbao and ATM-burning in Cadiz that are considered to be both 
relevant and attributable to the individual defendants? How did these differences come to be 








Throughout the 1990s the so-called “socialization of the suffering” became widespread (van 
den Broek 2004:721). Youths took to the streets and targeted a variety of businesses, political 
party offices, cash machines, telephone cells, and other infrastructure. This phenomenon is 
widely known as the “Kale Borroka,” which is Basque for “street struggle.” This street struggle 
involves many different kinds of actions (from Molotov cocktails to confrontation with the 
police during demonstrations to the burning of cash machines and buses to spray painting 
graffiti), by many different actors (youth all over the Basque Country), against different targets 
(banking offices, public transport, property of the Security forces, and offices of political 
parties), with many different motivations (political absolutely, and out of frustration for not 
being heard, but also being drunk, adventure, being cool and participating with friends, anger 
towards the police, revenge, sheer stupidity, direct response to police violence), at very 
different places (all over the Basque Country), and at different times (during the night, during 
demonstrations in broad daylight). All of these incidents are connected to a single concept: 
“Kale Borroka.”  
 
Although the concept comes from the streets and from the Basque language, it has been 
incorporated into the official courtroom discourse. The concept is referred to in quotation 
marks, but its meaning is taken for granted as it is not translated or explained. For example, in 
2005 the Audiencia Nacional described that a defendant had declared before the police that he 







point in the same verdict, the court described that the defendant knew an ETA member as they 
were both “in the sphere of the ‘kale borroka’” (e.g., Audiencia Nacional, 12 December 2005).   
 
In the meta-conflict different images compete for dominance of the correct portrayal of this 
phenomenon of Kale Borroka, its actors, the targets, and the motivations. Some actors 
emphasize the political context, such as when the attorney general described the targets of 
Kale Borroka and noted that the attacks were directed against “French interests,” thus locating 
the events in a broader analysis of the demands of the left nationalists (1993:146). Other actors 
downplay the political motives and, for example, portray the radical youths as “victims of 
indoctrination and manipulation by ETA” (Elzo 1996 in: Van den Broek, 2004:717). Left-
nationalists often portray Kale Borroka as political activity. According to Herri Batasuna, the 
“People's political struggle is not only sabotage and burning cash-dispensers, but also meetings 
or sticking up posters in the street ... all this is kale borroka as well” (a respondent in an 
interview with Van den Broek 2004:720). Kale Borroka is always political in this image and is 
viewed as the struggle that takes place outside of the institutions. The words chosen by Herri 
Batasuna emphasize that Kale Borroka as such is not a criminal enterprise, even though specific 
tactics may be criminal as they involve law-breaking or violence.  
 
During the 1980s, events of Kale Borroka were adjudicated in local courts in the Basque 
Country. In 1992, however, the Audiencia Nacional decided to step in and claimed jurisdiction 







national train company. The youths and their lawyers were taken by surprise. Why would their 
case go to the Audiencia Nacional? Based on past jurisprudence, they were convinced they 
would not be convicted under the charges of terrorism. They were mistaken and they were 
convicted to ten years in prison (Case Julen Larrinaga, Tribunal Supremo 1994). Their case 
kicked off a battle between lawyers and prosecutors about the jurisdiction of the Audiencia 
Nacional in these cases.  
 
In the transfer of actions labeled “Kale Borroka” to the Audiencia Nacional, we can observe a 
re-contextualization of the events which enables this shift. Increasingly, acts of Kale Borroka 
were no longer described as separate and isolated events. Instead, the actors were linked to 
ETA, for example as “groups of support to ETA” (MA 1994:156), and the actions were 
understood to contribute to the goals of ETA. Thus, we can observe several legal-discursive 
shifts, such as a broadening of the legal interest, a broader time frame, the prosecution of 
individuals as part of a group, the creation of a pattern, and the broadening of criminal liability. 
At the end of the 1990s, the prosecutorial narrative arguing that Kale Borroka is a matter of 
terrorism had become dominant, and all cases classified as Kale Borroka would automatically go 
to the Audiencia Nacional. The classification of incidents as Kale Borroka and the shift of these 
cases from local Basque courts to the Audiencia Nacional is materially significant not only 
because of the higher sentences that can be given, but also because of the possibility of 
incommunicado detentions and the fact that convicts will be dispersed across Spain. Not 







prosecutorial narrative. In this process of re-defining Kale Borroka as terrorism, the narratives 
simultaneously re-articulated the meaning of public disorder.    
 
In 1992, in the first case where an action of “Kale Borroka” was charged as terrorism, a link had 
to be made to ETA in order for the terrorism charges to stick. The court argued that despite the 
fact that the defendants were not members of ETA, they had “collaborated with the goals and 
objectives of ETA” (Case Larrinaga, Tribunal Supremo 1994). The court argued that as ETA aims 
to create an “environment of collective fear” by conducting activities of diverse sorts, some of 
which are similar to the one in this case (two brothers had thrown Molotov cocktails in the 
office of the train station), then the court understands that an action like this contributes to 
ETA’s goals.94 Interestingly, the Tribunal Supremo did not elaborate on the “similarities” 
between the actions by ETA and the action at stake in this case. It is therefore not clear 
whether the alleged similarities have to do with the kind of target, the kind of incendiary 
device, the inferred political objectives, the location of the crime, or any other aspect that 
apparently is considered to be relevant. From my interview with the defendant, it was clear 
that for him there were more differences than similarities between his action and ETA’s attacks 
(Interview S-23).  
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Orchestrated by ETA or spontaneous? Merely economic losses or terror?   
One of the controversial issues in the meta-conflict surrounding these criminal proceedings is 
whether or not Kale Borroka is orchestrated or spontaneous. Already in 1989, the annual report 
of the attorney general asserted that Kale Borroka is not spontaneous but organized by left-
nationalists and possibly by ETA (MA 1989:123). Similarly, in 1993 the attorney general pointed 
out that often demonstrations organized by Gestoras Pro-Amnistía or Jarrai for detentions of 
ETA activists or hunger strikes led to disturbances of public order, causing damage to official 
buildings, banks, telephone cabins, and urban buses. Indeed, at this point it is already made 
clear that the actions of Kale Borroka are “directly linked to the terrorist phenomenon;” 
however, no mention is made of the nature of the link to terrorism or ETA (1993:147).  
 
Still, at that time, most of the cases were not taken to the Audiencia Nacional. Instead, in the 
majority of detentions of these cases the charge was public disorder, sometimes leading to 
trials of misdemeanors or abbreviated proceedings (MA 1993:416). Also, in 1993, the actions 
were still called “public disorders” and “acts of vandalism” and were attributed to the 
“environment of ETA” (MA 1993:146–147). The harm inflicted by the actions of Kale Borroka 
was mainly described in economic terms. For example, the claim was made that between 1986 
and 1991 the total costs were 200 million pesetas (1993:147). The attorney general noted that 
whereas each single action of street violence did not produce high economic costs, because of 







became visible in the assertion that actions of Kale Borroka affected the “sense of insecurity” 
(1993:147).  
 
As efforts were ongoing to transfer cases of Kale Borroka to the Audiencia Nacional, the 
legislator implemented changes in the Penal Code that facilitated the prosecution of actions of 
Kale Borroka as terrorism. In 2000, a new law (LO 7/2000) was introduced that specifically 
turned various acts into a terrorist crime, such as homicide, illegal detention, and material 
destruction as well as carrying arms or components of incendiary devices, also if the 
perpetrator does not belong to an armed organization but has the goal of subverting the 
constitution, changing the public peace, or creating terror in a specific subset of the population. 
This law affirmed and legalized the change that had already been effectuated in the criminal 
proceedings in the Audiencia Nacional. Also relevant for the punishment of actions of Kale 
Borroka was the change in the Law on the Minors. This law enabled harsher punishment for 
minors, specifically for terrorism offenses (LO 5/2000).  
 
The prosecutorial narrative during the trial against Jarrai/Haika/Segi was also based on this 
assertion that actions of Kale Borroka were orchestrated. In 2005, the prosecutor argued that 
Jarrai/Haika/Segi coordinated the Kale Borroka (Concluding statements, 11 April 2005). In his 
argumentation, the prosecutor drew upon the difference between the so-called x, y, and z-
struggle. This is a theory on the interaction between different kinds of struggle allegedly 







in sabotage, and the third (z) are the ETA commandos (Gurruchaga 2006:301; 2001). “Cells” 
engaged in Kale Borroka were thus understood as “grupos y” (Terra/Efe 2000). Journalist 
Carmen Gurruchaga wrote that Txelis’ reason for promoting the Kale Borroka was that it would 
be a pity if etarras were detained for such low-level actions. Therefore, minors were to be 
stimulated to engage in such actions, especially also because they were suspected to be 
prosecuted only for misdemeanors (2006:300–301). The concept of “Y” groups was heavily 
criticized by the nationalist left. They claimed it was a prosecutorial invention in order to link 
the youth organization Jarrai to ETA (Interview S-23). The idea that Kale Borroka actions fit a 
strategy of ETA or were instructed by ETA clashed with the notion upheld by left nationalists 
that the Kale Borroka was the spontaneous expression of frustration by the Basque youth.  
 
The image of Kale Borroka as organized and coordinated broadens the time frame and the 
criminal liability of defendants. When youth organization Jarrai/Haika/Segi was prosecuted as a 
terrorist organization involved in the coordination of the Kale Borroka, the broader time frame 
and (indirect) criminal liability were visible as the prosecutor argued that the organization was 
responsible for 6,263 acts of Kale Borroka between 6 January 1992 and 5 March 1999, charging 
the 42 defendants with “membership in a terrorist organization” (Tribunal Supremo, 19 January 








Constructing a case of Kale Borroka: An example of re-contextualization 
By 2007, it had become common practice to classify cases of Kale Borroka as terrorism. The 
prosecutorial narrative was firmly based in the image of organized cells, determining the 
chosen time frame, defendants, legal interest, and kind of criminal liability. For example, in 
October 2007, Judge Baltasar Garzón decided on the preventive detention of eight defendants 
(translation by author):  
FACTS: 
FIRST. – From the information we gather that the terrorist organization ETA in the 
development of its criminal action gives special relevance to the so-called street struggle or 
“Kale Borroka” as an element more to its terrorist activity complementing the armed action of 
ETA. In this dynamic the “Kale Borroka” comes to substitute the inactivity of that organization or 
its attenuated activity in the first respect, designing in this way a strategy with the permanent 
coercive effects to the citizens, their liberty and property.  
The groups (“Y” cells) of the “Kale Borroka” are formed around one or various 
responsible persons or dynamizers who propose, proportion, and order the execution of the 
different violent actions per zone.  
Within these activities, the zone Uribe-Costa (Vizcaya) and its area of influence is one of 
the permanent scenes of terrorist action, and it is in this framework that the activity of the 
group of imputed persons took place, between the years 2004 and 2007.  
SECOND. – According the police investigations, the organizers and dynamizers of the 
“Cell Y” operating in the zone of Uribe-Costa who followed the instructions of the terrorist 
organizations were: … . (Auto de procedimiento, 19 October 2007) 
 
In this decision, Judge Garzón starts by positioning the actions of the Kale Borroka as a 
complement to the “armed action” of the “terrorist organization ETA.” The purpose of the 
street struggle is supposedly to make up for the inactivity of the armed organization. Then he 
comments on the organizational structure of the “Y” groups, claiming that they are responsible 
for “dynamizing” the Kale Borroka. He continues by declaring that “Uribe-Costa” is an area of 
permanent terrorist action, and that it is in this area that the activity of the group of defendants 







organizers and mobilizers of this “Y” group, who were following instructions from the terrorist 
organization ETA. The next paragraph of the decision continues by listing the persons of the 
group, the leaders responsible for executing the actions, and an overview of the various actions 
for which these people are held responsible.  
 
The prosecutorial narrative is thus characterized by several typical legal-discursive shifts of re-
contextualization: the construction of a pattern and a group, the broadening of the time frame 
and geographical area, as well as the broadening of the legal interest. From the overview of the 
various actions that are imputed to this “Y” group it is clear that several actions are assumed to 
“belong” together and form “Kale Borroka,” and that several people are assumed to “belong” 
together even though they acted in different constellations. At times only the actual 
participation of one of them is alleged. In none of the actions did all eight of them act together 
(at least, that is not alleged). According to the decision, the actions are done by one, two, three, 
or four persons each time. As presented, the actions listed are assumed to be the actions of this 
“Y” group, making it look like everyone is connected to these actions, if not indirectly criminally 
liable. The “Y” group is described as being responsible for a certain area in which several actions 
were committed between 2004 and 2007. The time frame and geographical area are thus 
broadened and based upon a constructed pattern instead of a single criminal event. Various 
offenses are put forward as the possible crimes that were committed: membership in a 
terrorist organization and contributing to terrorism without being a member of a terrorist 







of the defendants, thus broadening the legal interest from property to public peace. Judge 
Garzón orders for seven of the eight defendants to be placed in preventive detention. He 
motivates this by saying that despite the fact that none of them has a previous conviction, “this 
activity is notorious for its repetition.” In this explicit way, these acts of “Kale Borroka” are 
linked to earlier actions of Kale Borroka and judicial experiences with defendants and 
recidivism. Thus, Garzón construes a “category of defendants” based on the concept of Kale 
Borroka.  
 
During the 1990s, the prosecutorial narrative regarding acts of Kale Borroka thus changed 
significantly, adopting an image of Kale Borroka that postulates the existence of “cells” which 
are coordinated by ETA and fit a broader strategy. The prosecutorial narrative in the case 
detailed above construes a group of defendants who are collectively held responsible for a 
pattern of actions that occurred during an extended time period. The protected legal interest 
shifts from the property of a business or individual to the “public peace.” Single events of Kale 
Borroka are thus re-contextualized, which alters the crime from an offense of public disorder to 
the charge of terrorism.  
 
6. Public support for ETA militants in speech and symbolic expressions 
 
Throughout this chapter I have demonstrated that the development of the prosecutorial 







conduct that was previously not understood in criminal terms. The narrative pushes the 
boundaries of criminal liability in order to hold responsible people that were previously not 
connected to criminal activity. Lastly, the narrative pushes understandings regarding the gravity 
of the conduct and the harm that it inflicts, thus legitimating higher sentences.  
 
So far, I have addressed the expansion of the prosecutorial narrative to include the 
sociopolitical organizations of the ETA network, the payment of revolutionary taxes, areas of 
recruitment, and the Kale Borroka. In this section I address a last area into which the 
prosecutorial narrative moves to translate events into criminal conduct: public support for ETA. 
Such support can be drawn into the criminal justice arena indirectly as part of a broader charge, 
such as when Judge Garzón accused members of Batasuna of membership in the ETA network 
and asserted that Batasuna was involved in justifying ETA’s actions because members of 
Batasuna made remarks such as: “when there are no dead people, they forget the case” (Auto 
de procedimiento, 16 October 2002). In this section, however, I analyze the development of 
narrative devices that directly translate speech and symbolic expressions into crimes, such as 
the “endorsement” and “glorification” of terrorism. By 2010, the prosecution of activities that 
glorify terrorism, specifically prohibiting the exhibition of symbolic images in public spaces, had 









This explicit emphasis is remarkable, as it signifies a radical change from the silence that 
characterized the prosecutorial narrative during the 1980s. The change can only be understood 
in the light of active mobilization on behalf of the victims of ETA terrorism, who have tirelessly 
tried to put these issues on the agenda. It has taken years for their voices to be recognized and 
the crime definitions that they proposed to be adopted in the prosecutorial narrative.  
 
Times have changed. What was “normal” twenty years ago has now effectively been translated 
into criminal conduct today. During a conversation in 2010 with Iñaki, a Basque man around 
thirty, he recalled a funeral ceremony that he had attended at some point in the early nineties 
when he was a young boy. The coffin was covered in the ikurriña, the Basque flag. An ETA 
member had died in prison, and during the ritual someone with his face masked handed a 
memorial object with the symbol of ETA to the mother of the deceased. She lifted it above her 
head and shouted “Gora ETA militarra!” [Long live ETA-m] Thinking back to this event during 
our conversation, Iñaki shook his head and said that would be unthinkable nowadays (Interview 
S-35). Just as it would be unthinkable now for youths, like himself ten years ago, to stand in the 
streets in a “counter-demonstration” and yell “ETA, kill them, ETA kill them” to the so-called 
“blue-ribbon” people demonstrating for the liberty of a businessman that ETA had abducted. I 
pushed him on his participation in these counter-demonstrations, questioning the meaning of 
such slogans. He shrugged and could only say “that was normal.” He also remembered how 








Iñaki was a young teenager at the time. This attitude, however, was embedded in a broader 
social environment. His parents, for example, (moderate PNV voters) would comment 
indifferently, or even with a smirk, on the results of Kale Borroka actions in his village the 
previous day, when they would see the banks with the windows smashed, as was often the 
case. He recalled that the office for temporary jobs had to close because it got its windows 
smashed every three months. No general outrage; it was normal. Now, that would be far from 
normal. When he was young, he used to celebrate when a Guardia Civil died. What is more, 
that was actually normal, he said. Every three days someone died at the hands of ETA. Now, 
that has changed. Iñaki also changed. When I spoke with him in 2010, he was not in favor of 
ETA anymore, although he had not changed his view that ETA had been very important to the 
Basque people. But now things are different, he said, and he thought ETA should lay down its 
arms and the political dialogue should resolve the political situation.  
  
Things changed from being normal to being socially rejected, and now to being subjected to 
penalization. Social support has always been viewed as indispensable for ETA and its militants. 
 
As Maria J. Funes correctly observed, the fact that ETA still exists, even after more than two 
decades of democratic rule in Spain, should be attributed mainly to “its social support from a 
qualitatively significant sector of Basque society”; there is a network that actively supports those 
who commit violent activities, and there is another sector which does not provide direct 
support, but does not look unfavourably upon the activists and their actions either. Both sectors 








The social support for ETA and the legitimization of violence have been the subject of public 
campaigns to de-legitimate violence. The grassroots anti-ETA organization Gesto por la Paz, for 
example, organized a colloquium on this theme (Gesto por la Paz 2006), and recently the 
Basque government has launched a “Plan de Convivencia Democrática y Deslegitimación de la 
Violencia” [Plan for the Democratic Coexistence and De-legitimation of Violence] (31 May 
2010).  
 
The increasing public rejection of violence has also led to louder calls for the criminalization of 
public support for terrorist actions and their perpetrators. The prosecutorial narrative has 
changed significantly as a consequence. In the early 1990s there still was hesitance to draw 
public expressions into the criminal justice arena. Warning against counterproductive effects, 
the attorney general expressed restraint in 1993 regarding the criminalization of “verbal 
manifestations.” He wrote that prosecutors have to act with  
 
great prudence and flexibility […] having to react penally only against conduct whose results are 
especially grave and intolerable, because experience has indicated that a “hyper-
criminalization” in this terrain usually produces effects contrary to those intended. (MA 
1993:406) 
 
Fifteen years later, many criminal prosecutions were ongoing in which the prosecutorial 







prosecutions and explore the meta-conflict about these alleged criminal expressions of support 
for ETA and its militants. Competing narratives dispute the relation between verbal or symbolic 
expressions and ETA and whether or under what circumstances that relation creates criminal 
liability. These questions address the boundary between the political arena and the criminal 
justice arena. Importantly, this boundary has moved during the past decades. The meaning of 
the controversial verbal and symbolic expressions continues to be deeply contested.  
 
In this discussion of the legislation and criminal prosecutions regarding endorsement and 
glorification, my intention is not to give an up-to-date, detailed analysis of current 
jurisprudence and judicial interpretation. Instead, I draw on selected cases and legislation to 
illustrate the changes in the prosecutorial narrative and how it now addresses practices that 
were previously thought to be outside of its proper terrain. This involves the legislative creation 
of new offenses, competing doctrinal interpretations by judges and prosecutors, interpretive 
changes in the boundaries of existing offenses, and new representations of controversial 
practices. I thus conceptualize the prosecutorial narrative as moving within a certain space of 
what is within its reach and what is outside of its reach. The voices in the meta-conflict push 
and pull the prosecutorial narrative, disputing what was taken for granted and proposing 
alternative narratives, thus shifting the space that is deemed to be within the appropriate reach 








It is the liberal dichotomy between ideas and conduct and the fiction of their strict separation 
that is at stake in this expansion of the prosecutorial narrative that translates such verbal and 
symbolic expressions into crimes. They are speech, but they are speech acts. What exactly they 
do is a subject of contention. The prosecutorial narrative comes to emphasize that they should 
be understood as acts of endorsement, glorification, justification, or provocation. As is to be 
expected in a deeply polarized society, what people hear and see varies, and this is expressed in 
the meta-conflict that accompanies these criminal prosecutions.  
 
Pushing the boundaries to prosecute verbal support for ETA during the 1990s 
The prosecutorial narrative attempted to broaden the applicability of endorsement in various 
criminal prosecutions during the 1990s. Two doctrinal issues were raised as the prosecutorial 
narrative attempted to draw verbal support for ETA militants into the criminal justice arena. 
First, does the endorsement of the author of an illicit act constitute the crime of endorsement? 
Opponents argued that criminalization should be limited to the endorsement of a specific 
crime, not its author. Second, the prosecutorial narrative posited that endorsement of a past 
criminal act is sufficient for criminalization. Courts argued, however, that the mere approval of 
ETA actions was not sufficient. Judges maintained that endorsement required the direct 
incitation to commit a crime, which means that there is a real intention to commit a future 
crime (see also Laranburu 2002; Belloch 2000; and Biurrun 2000). Prosecutors (as well as 
several victim spokespersons), however, wanted to penalize any act of endorsement, regardless 








I will analyze one such prosecution in more depth. It demonstrates the commitment of the 
prosecutors to push the boundaries of “endorsement” to include verbal approval of ETA and its 
militants. In 1992, a prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against five council members of 
San Sebastián and charged them with endorsement. After the detentions of ETA leaders in 
Bidart in 1992, the San Sebastian council members had issued a statement including the 
following: “Thus, we extend our most firm solidarity to all militants of our sister organization… 
at the same time we express our profound admiration for their patriotic consistency, their 
heroism and human fortitude.”95 Doubtlessly, the council members expressed solidarity with 
the ETA militants. The question was whether this was a criminal act. On 17 November 1993, the 
Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Bilbao acquitted the defendants. The court reasoned that mere 
approbation of an act is not punishable. Pure notoriety was not enough; the verbal expression 
had to be able to negatively influence the social community, clearly stimulating the commission 
of crimes (MA 1994:147). This defeat resulted in a lengthy discussion of “endorsement” as a 
crime by the attorney general. Acknowledging the somewhat contested place of endorsement 
within criminal law in an exceptionally long discussion of over six pages, the attorney general 
described the history of “endorsement” and the various court decisions that had interpreted 
the various meanings of words like “approbation” and “solidarity.” He expressed a clear 
commitment to continue the appeal in the San Sebastián case and possibly other cases, in an 
attempt to receive a judgment favorable to his interpretation of endorsement. He made it clear 
                                                      
95
 “Asimismo, hacemos extensive nuestra más firme solidaridad a todas y todos los militantes de esa misma 
organización hermana… al mismo tiempo que les expresamos nuestra profunda admiración por su coherencia 







that especially in the case of “terrorism,” endorsement cannot be taken lightly. Thus, after the 
acquittal by the court in Bilbao, the prosecutors appealed to the Tribunal Supremo.  
 
The debate is framed in the typical liberal legalist terms of the freedom of speech and the 
separation between (political) ends and (criminal) means. In his discussion, the attorney general 
adhered firmly to this separation and argued that the verbal expression was not endorsing the 
political ideology of the prisoners but the persons as militants of the terrorist organization ETA, 
which is recognized as an illegal organization. He asked rhetorically: “Is it necessary to 
emphasize that the terrorist band ETA is known not primarily for its political ideology, but for 
the ways its members use to realize, or better, impose it?” The attorney general held that it was 
clearly “praise” and “exaltation” of the conduct of the prisoners when the council members 
called it a “brave struggle” against the “foreign imperialism,” which is, as the prosecutor views 
it, “nothing more than the integration of Euskadi in the Spanish State” (1994:149). The attorney 
general acknowledged that some jurists opined that endorsement is a matter of moral 
judgment and therefore should not be punished. He disagreed however, arguing that it was not 
necessary for a concrete harmful result to be shown (1994:154).  
 
On 4 July 2001, the Tribunal Supremo rejected the cassation arguments of the prosecutor, thus 
closing the possibility to bring such verbal support into the criminal justice arena based on the 
available legislation. However, by this time, the new law on glorification of terrorism (LO 







without having to argue that there was an inductive intention to the verbal expression. The law 
also enabled the prosecution of expressions that glorify the author of a crime, and not just 
glorifications of the conduct. In a different case, the Tribunal Supremo decided on 26 February 
2007 that “glorification” can be done in words or in actions, and it can be to glorify or justify. 
The object of glorification can be the conduct as described in one of the terrorism offenses (Art. 
571–577 PC) or the persons that have participated in these actions. The law also created a new 
offense called “humiliation of the victims,” which introduced for the first time strong 
recognition of victims of terrorism and their humiliation as a new relevant legal interest. The 
chief prosecutor of the Audiencia Nacional called this legal interest the “dignity, tranquility and 
memory” of the victims (Interview S-21). This law gives victims a strong role in bringing cases to 
the attention of the authorities and in defining what exactly “humiliation” means. Victim 
associations have grabbed this opportunity. For example, the organization Dignidad y Justicia 
actively filed petitions regarding photos of ETA militants displayed in bars in the Basque 
Country, honoring ceremonies, and street names commemorating former ETA militants in order 
to generate prosecutions under the new law.  
 
References to ETA or symbols of ETA can be found in many places in the Basque Country: in 
graffiti in the streets, in public speech with references to ETA, or in songs. I will discuss several 
expressions of support for ETA or for “Basque political prisoners” that for a long time were 
habitual practice in the Basque Country and that are slowly are disappearing or changing now 







what exactly a reference to ETA is and what makes that reference criminal. I analyze the 
developing discourse around three controversial practices: the usage of ETA symbols, honoring 
ceremonies for “political” prisoners, and the public display of pictures of “political” prisoners. 
These prosecutions took place before ETA announced its ceasfire and cessation of armed 
activity. At the time of writing, it is not clear yet how this might affect such prosecutions in the 
future.  
   
Criminal liability and the “notorious and public” meaning of ETA symbols  
The first case I want to discuss concerns the waving of a flag with the ETA anagram during a 
soccer match. In 2006, two young Basques (25 and 27 years old) were taken to the Audiencia 
Nacional in Madrid because of the following:  
The afternoon of the day 5th of February of 2006, the defendants Ander XXX and Jagoba XXX are 
together in the soccer stadium of Anoeta to be present at the soccer match between the teams 
Real Sociedad of San Sebastián and Real Mallorca C. de F, occupying spaces of the amphitheater 
of the southern part, carrying a flag on which is painted the word E.T.A. and the anagram of the 
same consisting of an ax and a snake coiled to it, in addition to the words “Bietan Jarrai,” and 
also a star with five points that coincides with the anagram of the juvenile terrorist group of 
ETA, Jarrai, inside of which is painted an emblem of the soccer team Real Sociedad, of which 
they have eliminated the crown which it officially carries. (Audiencia Nacional, 15 November 
2007) 
 
These facts were confirmed by the defendants. They were accused of glorification 
(enaltecimiento) of terrorism.  
 
The Audiencia Nacional argued that the intention of the defendants could have been no other 







terrorist activity of the banda ETA. “The knowledge of what the letters ETA mean and the 
symbol of the coiled snake and the ax are public and notorious” (15 November 2007, 2nd 
consideration). The intention of the defendants was understood to have been to glorify 
terrorist actions, because it was obvious what symbols were shown on the flag. As evidence of 
the criminal conduct, a video of the soccer match was shown. The court noted that the video 
did not show that the defendants displayed any gestures of rejection with regard to the flag. 
“There is no other logical conclusion than that of full knowledge regarding what it means to 
wave the anagram and the name of the terrorist group and reiterate this act in public” (third 
consideration). The two young men were convicted to one year imprisonment.  
 
It is illuminating to read the dissenting opinion by Judge Ramón Sáez Valcárcel in this case. The 
judge started his dissent by pointing out several facts that were not mentioned in the court 
decision. Reading it changed my image of the defendants completely. My impression after 
reading the court decision was that of two active ETA supporters who had intentionally 
fabricated, brought, and waved the flag with the ETA symbols to emphasize their support for 
the armed struggle and Basque independence. In the dissenting opinion, on the other hand, the 
perpetrators became fervent and aggressive supporters (like hooligans) of their club Real 
Sociedad who had randomly picked up a flag that was lying on the floor of what could be 
viewed as the hooligans’ stand of the stadium, while they did not notice or did not care that it 







never uttering any political phrases, not caring about politics, and left the flag after the game 
was over.  
 
Now we have two radically different images of the perpetrators and what they did. Does it 
change the crime? Judge Ramón Sáez Valcárcel concluded that the flag-waving did not 
constitute glorification of any concrete criminal offense or its authors; “in addition, it is 
doubtful that it represents, without more, an exaltation of the band and its methods […] even 
though it expresses in a confused manner a pseudo-ideological position that may seem 
aberrant” (dissenting opinion 4/2007). Judge Sáez Valcárcel thus disputed that the perpetrators 
had the required intention (“dolo”) needed for the crime of glorification, arguing for their 
acquittal. His dissenting opinion put the actions that had been selected for incrimination in a 
very different context, providing a different interpretation to the meaning of the flag with ETA 
symbols, which his colleagues of the bench assumed to be “obvious.”  
 
Legal scholars distinguish between objective and subjective intention. If subjective intention is 
required, the prosecutor has to prove that the specific defendants actually had the required 
criminal intention. If objective intention is required, the prosecutor only has to prove that 
under the circumstances it is reasonable to assume that such intention was present. The 
Audiencia Nacional in this case took “objective” intention as its starting point. Their assertion 
that the meaning of the ETA symbols was “public and notorious” thus created a form of strict 







criminal prosecution, the prosecutorial narrative sent a clear message about the public use of 
symbols of ETA.   
 
Honoring and remembering prisoners versus the humiliation of victims 
It has been common practice among nationalist Basques to organize honoring ceremonies for 
“Basque political prisoners” who were released from prison and returned to their villages. This 
practice has become increasingly controversial. Victim organizations have petitioned for the 
prosecution of the organizers of such ceremonies for glorification of terrorism.  For example, on 
29 January 2008, the organization España y Libertad wrote a petition to the prosecutor’s office 
of the Tribunal Superior de Justicia in the Basque Country. In reference to Article 264 of the 
criminal procedure (L.E.Crim.), the organization approached the authorities because of the 
general obligation of citizens to report crimes and called their attention to an upcoming 
honoring ceremony in Santurce for alleged ETA militant Endika Iztueta, who had passed away in 
Cabo Verde. During the 2000s the prosecutorial narrative has increasingly brought such 
ceremonies into the meta-conflict in the criminal justice arena. Honoring ceremonies were 
mentioned, for example, when leaders of Gestoras pro Amnistía were accused of membership 
in ETA, and the prosecutor described how their function was to organize honoring ceremonies 
in memory of ETA members that had passed away in which “they endorse a crime, to the 
mocking of the victims and the juridical order” (Indictment Gestoras #12). It was not entirely 
clear, however, whether the honoring ceremonies in themselves were considered to be crimes, 







network. Even if the ceremonies were only a part of the “evidence” of a criminal link to ETA, 
this would come close to a de-facto criminalization of the organization of such ceremonies. This 
confusion between the evidence for a crime and the crime itself is typical of the concept of 
“functions” within the ETA network.  
 
In other cases, prosecutors framed honoring ceremonies as the circumstance that can lead to 
the crimes of endorsement and glorification. For example, in 2006 Batasuna leader Arnaldo 
Otegi was convicted to 15 months imprisonment for glorification of terrorism for a speech he 
held during an honoring ceremony commemorating the 25th anniversary of the death of ETA 
militant “Argala” (Reuters 2006). By 2008, honoring ceremonies had become subject to 
prosecution as self-standing crimes. In that year, the mayor of the Basque village Amurrio was 
prosecuted because he allowed an honoring ceremony to take place in his village. Whereas 
honoring ceremonies have thus been pushed deep into the criminal justice arena, it is not the 
case, however, that honoring ceremonies have been turned into illegal gatherings, something 
which would open up the possibility to arrest and prosecute everyone present. Only specific 
persons have been prosecuted for specific responsibilities in relation to honoring ceremonies.  
 
Does an honoring ceremony constitute solidarity with prisoners or humiliation of victims? What 
part of the identity of the prisoner is honored in such ceremonies? “We are honoring my uncle. 
He has suffered so much,” said Txomin, the young nephew of a well-known ETA militant who 







with victims who argued that these honoring ceremonies are humiliating for them. He looked at 
me, seemingly surprised by the suggestion. “Humiliation…? We wouldn’t do it if it were 
humiliating,” he uttered. Honoring ceremonies are a difficult knot to untie. What is it exactly 
that people are doing when they engage in such a ceremony? And is that a criminal offense? 
Put simply: What are honoring ceremonies? Txomin told me that they were honoring the 
person, not what that person has done or not done. It is a suffering for the whole family, 
because that person is far away due to the dispersion policy, and so they honor a person who 
has suffered, and who has fulfilled the punishment. He thinks these things should not be 
illegalized because it is freedom of expression, and every individual is there with his or her own 
motivations.  
 
I confronted him with the fact that for victims these kinds of ceremonies, as well as the pictures 
of ETA prisoners during fiestas or in bars, are experienced by some victims as very insulting and 
humiliating. He was shocked:  
 
We are not protecting or justifying, but it is our family. I can’t put myself into their skin, but I 
don’t think it is humiliating. […] I don’t want to offend anyone, but it is my uncle. I have to 
support him; not only because he is in prison, but also because it is a continuing extortion with 
blackmailing and threats. For example, he puts pictures of his family and an “Arrano Beltza” 
[Black Eagle, symbolizing Euskal Herria] on the wall of his cell. And they tell him to take that 
away; otherwise he won’t get dinner. That is why he has done several hunger strikes and has 








The emphasis on suffering and the need for support and solidarity are constant elements in the 
discourse of the left-nationalist movement. These competing interpretations of honoring 
ceremonies form the background against which the prosecutorial narrative is constructed.  
  
Another contested practice in which Basque “political” prisoners are commemorated is the 
display of pictures in bars throughout the Basque country and during the yearly “fiestas del 
pueblo.” Recently, the practice of naming streets after ETA militants has also become 
contested. Do these pictures signify support for the armed struggle? Do they glorify ETA and its 
militants? Are they a humiliation for victims? Several criminal prosecutions have been launched 
in which these questions were at stake. For example, on 17 September 2009, Dignidad y Justicia 
presented a complaint about a photo displayed during the “fiesta del pueblo” of Durango. The 
instruction judge considered the photo to be a “clear homage” to etarras Harriet Iragui and Igor 
Solana. One of the municipal councilors of the festivities, Natxo Martínez, from the moderate 
nationalist PNV, disputed this interpretation and claimed that in his understanding “the photo 
of a prisoner who fulfills a sentence is only a record that the inmate cannot be present during 
the fiestas of his natal village” (Europa Press 2009).   
  
In each of these cases the competing narratives disagree about the chosen context, and 
particularly about the identity of those involved. This then leads to the juxtaposing 







of victims. A final case illustrates this meta-conflict. In 2008, the mayor of the Basque village 
Hernani was prosecuted for a public speech after the arrest of two suspected ETA militants:  
 
Before anything, this encouragement, this hug and this shower of applause that you have 
offered us, as warmly as possible, to Igor Portu and Mattin Sarasola and to all Basque political 
prisoners who are dispersed in the prisons of France and Spain. We love you!!  
  
The prosecutor claimed this constituted the crime of glorification of terrorism. The judge, 
however, dropped the case because he did not consider the acts to be “constitutive of a crime.” 
The judge had made an analysis of the exact words of the mayor and concluded that the mayor 
had shown her support for Portu and Sarasola because of the fact that they had denounced 
having been tortured during their detention, adding that that it had not been proven yet that 
Portu and Sarasola are members of ETA (Audiencia Nacional, 25 January 2008). The judge 
concluded that there was no concrete support to specific terrorist actions. To support his 
conclusion, he referred to a verdict by the Tribunal Supremo (STS 21/1997) which ruled that the 
defense of ideas – even if they question the constitutional framework – should be allowed, 
because otherwise the figure of glorification could be converted into an instrument to control 
political dissidence (Audiencia Nacional, 25 January 2008). The judge also referred to a similar 
decision in 2006 in which the Audiencia Nacional acquitted a person who had publicly said: 
“Our warm applause to all Basque soldiers who have fallen in this long struggle for self-
determination. He left us, with 22 years, as so many soldiers of ETA, with silent dignity and a 








The prosecutor was not satisfied and appealed this decision to drop the case. He described the 
facts as follows: “expressions in favor of the members of ETA Igor Portu and Mattin Sarasola, 
receiving as answer applause and screams from the public in favor of those members of the 
terrorist band as well as in favor of the activities realized by the armed band ETA” (Audiencia 
Nacional, 3 April 2008). It is clear that the overt facts of the case are undisputed. What is 
contested, however, is which of Portu and Sarasola’s identities are dominant and which events 
should be taken as the relevant context of the speech act. Contrary to the assertions of the 
prosecutor, the mayor of Hernani expressed before the judge that she had made her remarks 
because of the individuals as persons, not as ETA militants. Indeed, she argued that the 
solidarity shown was not with their activities. Instead of interpreting the speech in the context 
of ETA terrorism, she located the speech in the context of the alleged torture by state agents. 
According to her, the expressions were not in support of ETA or of the detainees as members of 
ETA. On 3 April 2008, the Audiencia Nacional ordered that the case be reopened. On 5 June 
2009, the Audiencia Nacional convicted the mayor and she was sentenced to one year in prison 
(Yoldi 2009). On 19 March 2010, she was finally acquitted by the Tribunal Supremo (Sáiz-Pardo 
2010). 
 
This debate about the identity of Basque “political” prisoners or ETA militants and the relevant 
context of verbal support is a recurring theme in the prosecutions. Left-nationalists emphasize 







prosecutors emphasize ETA’s terror campaign. Were the ETA militants referred to by the 
council members of San Sebastián, “Patxi” and “Txelis,” only ETA militants? Alternatively, can 
the Durango militants be seen as only inhabitants of Durango? Victims point out that not every 
inhabitant who happens to not be able to attend the fiestas is memorialized with a photo. 
Indeed, not all prisoners who happen to be (former) inhabitants of Durango are memorialized 
with a photo. Again, the meta-conflict is about the relevant context and whether that context 
should be a basis for criminal liability.  
 
In the past few years there have been many other criminal prosecutions for the use of ETA 
symbols or verbal support for ETA, its militants, or its prisoners. For example, in March 2008, 
after the ETA murder of Isaías Carrasco, the board of soccer club Athletic Bilbao decided to hold 
a minute of silence to commemorate his death before the Sunday match. Someone in the 
stadium decided not to respect this and shouted “Gora ETA” during this minute of silence. After 
a criminal complaint by victim organization Dignidad y Justicia, the person was prosecuted for 
the glorification of terrorism. Another example is the prosecution of the musical group 
Soziedad Alcoholika after a criminal complaint filed by the Association of Victims of Terrorism. 
The AVT argued that several of their songs were offensive to victims of ETA. The group, 
however, argued that they do not support ETA and that the AVT had interpreted their songs 
incorrectly. In November 2006, the members of Soziedad Alcoholika were acquitted of the 








Even though not all of these prosecutions have ended in convictions, the prosecutorial 
narrative is increasingly defining verbal and symbolic expressions as criminal. Also, regardless of 
their outcome, the prosecutions have a real impact on daily life, as people start to assess and 
anticipate the possible reactions by the authorities. For example, Martxelo Otamendi, the 
director of the closed newspaper Egunkaria, voiced protest against his trial for “membership in 
a terrorist organization” and spoke at various public events to spread information about his 
case. In one instance, however, the dean of the University of Gran Canaria refused his presence 
in a forum, because it could constitute the crime of “endorsement of terrorism” (Martín 2003). 
The dean of the University of Gran Canaria had thus listened to the prosecutorial narrative and 
drawn his own conclusion.  
 
Many left-nationalist activists expressed their feeling of juridical insecurity as it was not clear to 
them which actions could potentially be qualified as endorsement or glorification. For example, 
in June 2008 I interviewed the municipal assistant to a left-nationalist mayor of a Basque 
village. He was preparing the yearly fiestas and was not sure how to describe some of the 
activities in the official program. It is a tradition that there is a yearly honoring ceremony for the 
prisoners and refugees of that specific village in the public square. But he was afraid that 
putting that in the municipal program might lead to a prohibition of the ceremony. So he 
changed the title to: “honoring ceremony in favor of the rights of the prisoners and refugees of 
the village.” He remarked: “no one knows anymore what ‘an honoring ceremony in favor of the 







been renamed “Day in Favor of the Rights of the Repressed.” He added that on the public 
billboards people still used the widely known term “Amnesty Day,” but those were not made by 
the municipality, and his concern was to prevent criminal prosecutions against his mayor 
(Interview S-3).  
 
The new 7/2000 law on glorification has thus opened a Pandora’s box of criminal prosecutions. 
After years of neglect, victims have now received an important role in the criminal justice 
arena, a chance some have grabbed at with both hands. The battle about symbols, identities, 
and meanings that these prosecutions have initiated is far from settled. Victims argue for 
placing honoring ceremonies and references to prisoners within the context of ETA terrorism. 
Defendants, however, emphasize a de-contextualized interpretation or recognition of the 
context of state repression. Whereas prosecutors have attempted to create openings for the 
narrative set in the context of ETA-terrorism, judges have often defended de-contextualization 
and the strict separation between ideas and actions. It is clear, however, that the prosecutorial 
narrative has expanded its reach to translate public support for ETA and its militants into the 
condemnatory language of criminal law.  
 
7. Conclusion  
  
The process of contentious criminalization in Spain and particularly the Basque Country is thus 







sentences, the use of anti-terrorism legislation, and the narratives that claim harm suffered and 
place blame on specific individuals or organizations. Key debates in the meta-conflict address 
the questions “What is ETA?” and the question whether terrorism should be treated as an 
ordinary crime or not. After years of neglect and a continued campaign of attacks by ETA, 
victims of ETA organized in professional victim organizations and started to call attention to 
their experiences and claimed “impunity.” Throughout the 1990s, prosecutors and investigative 
judges at the Audiencia Nacional have radically changed their narrative in various ways. These 
changes paved the way for an expansion of the criminal justice arena to cover conduct that had 
previously not been translated into the language of criminal law.  
 
Instead of accepting the separation between ETA as a military organization and the left-
nationalist movement as a collection of sociopolitical organizations, the prosecutorial narrative 
created the concept “ETA network,” around which it started various macro-trials. As part of its 
focus on “ending ETA,” the prosecutorial narrative further put emphasis on the criminalization 
of paying a “revolutionary tax” to ETA and those that facilitate “recruitment.” Street violence 
was redefined as a terrorist offense, and various speech acts were interpreted as a “humiliation 
of victims” and the “glorification of terrorism.” The new narratives enable the criminal 
prosecution of a broader circle of people than were currently being prosecuted.  
 
The broadened scope of the prosecutorial narrative created such a large pool of potential 







others had not been selected. For example, a lawyer from Gestoras pro Amnistía was not sure 
why he had not been indicted along with the other Gestoras-defendants with whom he had 
worked for so many years (Interview S-3). A young Segi activist similarly did not know why he 
was still able to advocate and organize, whereas his organization had been declared a terrorist 
organization (Interview S-24). In the next chapter, this theme of “ambivalent” criminalization 
will be explored in depth in the case of Chile, where it has been the dominant feature of the 
prosecutorial narrative during the past twenty years.  
 
In the meta-conflict, the competing narratives of victims and prisoner supporters proposed 
radically different contexts in order to interpret events. Supporters of Basque “political” 
prisoners read what happens against a context of continued state repression, a lack of political 
opportunities to defend their political project, and a state of exception in which the rule of law 
does not apply. Essentially, they understand all events as part of a political conflict in which 
violence comes from two sides. Victim organizations reject all references to a conflict and 
propose the terrorism of ETA as the relevant context in which events should be interpreted. 
The prosecutorial narrative thus has operated in the face of a continuous battle about the 
relevant context within which the prosecutors should interpret events. After years of de-
contextualization, Judge Garzón criticized the Audiencia Nacional for having played ETA’s game. 
His prosecutions initiated a new narrative. The prosecutorial narrative increasingly re-
contextualized events adopting the context of ETA terrorism, in which terrorism was re-







the context of ETA terrorism no longer applied and that a “peace process” had started in its 
place. Victim organizations have criticized law enforcement for this move and refused to re-
interpret events within the context of this peace process.  
 
Prosecutors re-contextualized events by adopting different images of the perpetrator(s) and 
the crime, which often led to specific discursive shifts, such as a broadening of the legal interest 
from harm to an individual or the property of an individual to broader entities such as “citizen 
security” and “public peace.” Single incidents were perceived as part of a pattern against the 
backdrop of the relevant context. Individuals were prosecuted as member of an organization, 
such as the ETA network or grupos Y in the Kale Borroka. Political motives as well as the identity 
of victims or perpetrators have been drawn into the courtroom as elements of the crime. These 
discursive shifts are a consequence of a different image of the crime or perpetrators, while at 
the same time they reproduce that image.  
 
The images produced in the prosecutorial narrative are contested in the meta-conflict, where 
actors may push for different images. I am fully aware of the possibly instrumentalist motives 
behind these images. Van den Broek has pointed this out in his article on legitimizations of 
street violence used by Basque youths (2004). He identifies differences between what he calls 
“ex-ante” and “ex-post” legitimizations and argues that the discrepancies may be due to the 
fact that youths employ the “ex-post” legitimizations to shield themselves against prosecutions, 







similarly skeptical of the prosecutorial images. They often maintain that the Spanish state is 
simply “inventing stories” in order to bust the entire left-nationalist movement. Self-serving or 
not, the battle around such images forms a core part of the mobilization and discursive action 
in the criminal justice arena. This is understandable, as this chapter has demonstrated that the 
adoption of images in the prosecutorial narrative has real consequences on the penal decisions, 
such as who gets prosecuted, for what and with what kind of sentence.  
 
The analysis of the criminal prosecutions during the 2000s has shown a changing interpretation 
of ETA and the symbols and speech acts in support of ETA militants. This has led to the 
prosecution of many people and kinds of conduct that were not (successfully) prosecuted 
during the 1980s. Without the image of the ETA network there would have been no macro-
trials, and without the change in the definition of Kale Borroka toward terrorism, youths would 
not be sentenced to ten years imprisonment for a Molotov cocktail. This illustrates the 
significance of the hegemonic meaning of events and their translation into the logic and 
vocabulary of criminal law. The changes in the prosecutorial narrative have been produced 
amidst a continuing strong battle between critics and proponents of those images and their 
logical and legal implications, which form the basis of the prosecutorial claims of criminal 
liability. In this process, political contention is drawn into the criminal justice arena as the 
history of ETA has become central to the courtroom debate, the meaning of terrorism has come 







agents of law enforcement have come to be seen (by prisoner supporters and also by some of 
the victim organizations) as partial actors in this conflict.  
 
In the next chapter I turn to the case of contentious criminalization in Chile. The process is 
remarkably similar in that changes in the prosecutorial narrative can be explained by an 
emerging mobilization of landowners successfully appropriating the label of “victims” and the 
development of a counter-narrative by supporters of the defendants in criminal trials. The 
prosecutorial narrative is quick to re-contextualize events in the context of the “Mapuche 
conflict,” adopting wholesale many of the contentious assumptions that construct that context. 
The particular dynamics in that episode, however, are far more ambivalent. In Chile the 
prosecutorial narrative does not systematically extend the reach of the criminal law vocabulary 
like in the Spanish-Basque case. Instead, the narrative goes back and forth between leaving 
contentious action to the political arena and subsequently applying the label of terrorism to 
that same action. Navigating these criminal prosecutions is a challenge for the Chilean 
prosecutors, who, like the prosecutors and instruction judges at the Audiencia Nacional, are 
perceived as partial as they are criticized nationally and even internationally by all actors 









V. Mapuche Activists Demand Land 
Reform in Chile 
 
After the analysis of the contentious criminalization process in the Spanish-Basque conflict, in 
this chapter we move to the far south in Latin America to a conflict that is generally little known 
in Europe or the United States. Indeed, not everyone is aware that there are indigenous people 
in Chile. The Mapuche people are the largest indigenous group in Chile and live in the south of 
the country, predominantly in the 8th, 9th, and 10th region. Tourists travel to the south of Chile 
because of its beautiful lakes and volcanoes. The 9th region is also known as the Araucanía 
Region after the large Araucaria tree which grows there and Temuco is its regional capital and 
informally understood as the main urban Mapuche center. While the Mapuche territory also 
covers part of Argentina (Figure 4), in this research I focus exclusively on the conflict in Chile 
and the criminal justice response of the Chilean state.     
 
Since the early 1990s, this region in the south has witnessed mobilizations, demands, and 
protests which the press has labeled the “Mapuche conflict.” The conflict has been most 
intense in the Arauco province in the 8th region and in the Malleco and Cautín provinces in the 
9th region.  Forestry companies have a strong presence in the valley between the Andes and the 







region, partially because of the tensions in the other regions. The controversial hydroelectric 
dam Ralco was constructed deep in the Andes, where the Bío Bío river has its origin.  
 
Prosecutors have become deeply involved in the dynamics of this conflict, and criminal cases 
have turned into important battlegrounds, where landowners and Mapuche activists play out 
the claimed or imposed roles of victims and defendants. In this and the following chapter I 
explore these criminal cases and the competing narratives that these actors present about the 
events that led to criminal prosecution. How is criminal justice produced or co-produced here? 
How is the rule of law claimed or rejected? How did the prosecutorial narrative develop as a 
consequence of the voices in the meta-conflict? What impact do the narrative’s discursive shifts 
have on criminal justice decisions? What are the images that the prosecutorial narrative creates 
or reproduces? How do these images legitimize the state and its intervention?  
 







   
Figure 4 Map of Territorio Mapuche, Wallmapu96 
 
During my second stint of fieldwork in Chile in May 2009, I visited a Mapuche community for an 
interview with four men who had been convicted under the Law on State Security. In 1997, 
they had been charged for their alleged involvement in the burning of three trucks in the 
plantation of the forestry company Bosques Arauco. The case is known as the “Lumaco” case, 
after the area in which the incident occurred. The Mapuche community to which these men 
belonged had a claim on the land, which was at the time in the hands of forestry company 
Bosques Arauco. During the interview we sat at a wooden table in their community. Outside it 
was raining cats and dogs. Under the table the charcoal from the stove was burning, which I 
used to warm and dry my wet feet. The men were living in the same community, and as I had 
arrived at the house of our host, the others also came in, one in his poncho, all in their working 
clothes. They introduced themselves with few words. Their faces were marked by the life 
outside in el campo. I came to talk with them about their experiences with the Chilean criminal 
justice system and particularly their view on the events that led to their conviction.  
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When we started the interview, I read parts of the initial criminal complaint that had been filed 
in this case to them out loud:  
 
This action put at grave risk the life and physical integrity of the drivers of the referenced trucks, 
provoked serious economic damage both to the company Forestal Bosques Arauco and to the 
different truck owners, and caused a grave disruption to the normal development of economic 
activities involved in the transport of goods. (Official request by the provincial governor of the use of 
the Law on State Security in the Case Lumaco, 2 December 1997) 
 
I also read parts of the verdict in which the court decided that they were guilty of the alleged 
facts. The verdict asserted that the arson caused a disturbance in the economic activities of the 
forestry company. Their reaction to the verdict surprised me. One of them exclaimed: “No dice 
nada en favor de nosotros!” [It doesn’t say anything in favor of us!]. I later commented on this 
remark to a defense lawyer and he voiced the same obvious surprise as I had felt. “Of course 
not, it is a trial against them!” (Interview C-64). It took me a long time to get to an 
interpretation of the defendant’s words. It was easy to just shove it away along with so many 
other remarks that showed the incomprehension of the rules and procedures of the Chilean 
criminal law and justice system that I often encountered among older members of Mapuche 









Even if the remark does indeed demonstrate their lack of understanding of the rules in criminal 
proceedings, it also underlines something that may have become too obvious for those that 
work in the system: the criminal case is a case against a specific person about a specific conduct 
that is circumscribed by the penal law. Everything else is not relevant to the case, and thus out 
of the discussion. Another Mapuche activist criticized precisely this point when he said: “they 
never talk about the presence of the forestry company, about the planes with fumigation, the 
pollution that comes with the wind. That is terrorism” (Interview C-46).   
 
“They don’t say anything in favor of us!” said the four convicted community members. The 
criminal proceedings indeed systematically marginalized their perspective, excluding everything 
that they would have emphasized, as it was not “legally relevant” to the facts of the case. The 
narrative proposed by these four men had a different starting point, different actors, a different 
timeline, and a different plot. The resulting competing narratives about harm, grievances and 
the placing of blame are thus fundamentally incommensurable. Sharing their view of the 
situation, the community members told me that during the Agrarian Reform in 1970 their 
fathers had actually possessed the disputed land but were removed during the Contra Reform (I 
will return to these reforms below). One of the community members summarized their point of 
view: “If I had 1800 hectares and now I have only 800, and I have never sold anything, then 
there is usurpation” (Interview C-60). For them, it was as simple as that. Unlike some other 
activists defending land claims, they made no references to indigenous spirits, shamans, or 







They needed few words to make their case. The land was ours. We are poor, they are rich. We 
have nothing, they have it all. That’s it.  
 
These chapters explore the competing and often incommensurable narratives that have 
contested each other in and around the criminal prosecutions in the contentious episode of the 
“Mapuche conflict” in Chile since the return to democracy in 1989. The Mapuche demand for 
autonomy and land redistribution has strengthened quickly since then, following 
disappointment of ongoing discrimination, continuing poverty, and the slow return of ancestral 
lands. Mobilizations in relation to the land dispute have led to criminal complaints and 
prosecutions. Just as we have seen in the criminal proceedings in Spain, these criminal cases 
have also become part of a process of an intense struggle for interpretative domination in Chile. 
Competing claims of victimhood, impunity, and illegitimate repression and rival notions of 
democracy and the rule of law have become part and parcel of the dynamics in and around the 
courtrooms.    
 
While the prosecutorial narrative did not say anything in favor of them, after the trial the 
Chilean government negotiated with the Mapuche community of Lumaco. Their land claims 
were recognized, and the community relocated to a larger piece of land elsewhere in the 9th 
region. Indeed, despite the seemingly strong vocabulary of “State Security,” they were allowed 
to serve their sentences in liberty, by regularly reporting to the nearest police station. It is this 







procedures and simultaneous political negotiations that characterizes the contentious 
criminalization process in relation to the “Mapuche conflict.”  
 
The Chilean state intervenes in the “Mapuche conflict” in many ways, with poverty programs, a 
land redistribution scheme, and criminal prosecutions. While the Spanish criminalization 
process resulted in an expansion of the criminal justice arena, at the expense of actors and 
conduct that were previously understood to “belong in” the political arena, the role of the 
Chilean criminal justice system can be characterized by a thorough ambivalence, switching 
between general lenience and sudden harsh intervention. The boundary between the criminal 
justice arena and the political arena is not only deeply contested but also regularly removed or 
blurred on some occasions and strongly asserted on others. The state recognizes the legitimacy 
and validity of the Mapuche land claims while at the same time condemning any extralegal 
actions undertaken in the name of those demands. This strict separation of ends and means is 
typical of liberal legalism and liberal democracies. The emphasis on political and legal 
procedures for solving the land claims sits uncomfortably, however, with the state’s failure to 
effectively address longstanding structural inequalities, poverty, and a lack of indigenous access 
to decision-making, while promoting a continuing expansion of the logging industry and other 
infrastructural projects in the areas where Mapuche communities live.  
 
In our 2003 interview, chief regional prosecutor Esmirna Vidal claimed the primacy of “the 







Despite this rhetorical attachment to the rule of law, both landowners and Mapuche activists 
accuse the criminal justice system of partiality and politically influenced decisions. Their 
engagement with the criminal proceedings related to the land disputes brings the meta-conflict 
into the criminal justice arena, as their narratives challenge, criticize, support, and push the 
prosecutorial narrative.  
 
This chapter presents an overview of the contentious episode and its actors, while zooming in 
on the mobilization and discursive action in the criminal justice arena. In the next chapter I 
explore the development of the prosecutorial narrative as it engages with the competing voices 
in the meta-conflict. During the past two decades, the prosecutorial narrative has re-
contextualized many of the alleged crimes within the context of the “Mapuche conflict.” 
Criminal prosecutions have developed from using ordinary criminal laws to laws on state 
security (between 1997 and 2001) and anti-terrorism laws (many indictments since 2002). The 
changes in the choice of these laws coincide with a changing discourse on the national political 
level. The Mapuche conflict transformed discursively from a conflict between private parties 
into a national problem affecting national security. Thus, prosecutors re-contextualized the 
protests of Mapuche activists and placed them squarely within the context of the “conflict.”  
 
With this re-contextualization, the specific interpretation of the conflict chosen by the 
prosecutors and the underlying assumptions about the actors, the issues, and the potential 







prosecutorial narrative often focuses on “radical” Mapuches as the perpetrators responsible for 
the “violence,” “crimes,” and “terrorist actions” that disturb the Chilean economy and national 
security. This particular perspective on the conflict has been promoted by landowners from the 
1990s onwards as they claimed victimhood and impunity. The narrative is contested by many 
Mapuche activists, who blame the state for the continuing dispossession of their lands and call 
attention to the detrimental effects plantations have, for example in terms of erosion and 
decreasing biodiversity.  
 
Prosecutors have become major actors within the dynamics of the Mapuche conflict and the 
prosecutions one of the primary sites where the actors face and interact with each other. 
Mapuche activists distrust the criminal justice authorities, their evidence and decisions. Many 
landowners equally have lost their faith in the authorities. Within this potentially explosive 




The “Mapuche conflict” is visible in a large number of concrete disputes about the building of 
an airport, landfills, viaducts, hydroelectric dams, a coastal highway, the salmon industry, a 







specific conflicts between Mapuche communities, landowners, and the state.97 Many different 
issues are at stake, including recognition for the Mapuche culture and language, socio-
economic inequality, demands for more autonomy, and the claims for lands that were taken 
from the Mapuches in the so-called Pacification of the Araucanía at the end of the 19th century. 
The larger label (and misnomer) “Mapuche conflict” lumps together a host of different disputes 
and incidents under this name, involving different actors, targets, and motivations, and thereby 
assumes instead of questions the idea that they constitute a single phenomenon with a single 
explanation. Mapuche activists often criticize the term as it seems to imply that Mapuches are 
causing the conflict. They propose alternative names such as “forestry conflict.” Still, most 
actors refer to the “Mapuche conflict,” and this is, as we will see, also the label adopted in the 
prosecutorial narrative.  
 
I have limited the study of criminal prosecutions to the period 1990–2009, corresponding to the 
time since the official turn to democracy of the Chilean government in 1990. My analysis is 
based on two periods of fieldwork of six and three months in 2002/2003 and 2009, 
respectively. In total I have conducted more than seventy interviews or lengthy informal 
conversations with defendants, complainants, landowners, Mapuche activists, lawyers, 
prosecutors, and government officials. I conducted observation at prisons, political meetings, 
criminal trials, Mapuche communities, forestry sites, and demonstrations. In addition, I 
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collected numerous written documents, such as trial transcripts, public declarations of different 
actors, newspaper articles, and police records. For more detail about my data collection I refer 
the reader to the methodological appendix.  
 
2. Challenge to the liberal democracy  
 
For the purpose of this analysis, I must briefly introduce the “Mapuche conflict,” although any 
short summary is bound to be partial and incomplete. The goal here, therefore, is not to give a 
final representation of the issues, the actors, and the relevant events. On the contrary, my aim 
here is to give a quick overview in order to indicate the various issues that can be and have 
been contested.  
  
The contention: Competing claims of land rights 
The “Mapuche conflict” has turned into a major national concern during the past two decades, 
often making the headlines of national newspapers. While the conflict encompasses multiple 
disputes, my analysis of this contentious episode focuses on the competing land claims, where 
current non-Mapuche landowners face demands from Mapuche communities. While I use the 
broad term “landowners,” which may evoke the image of a homogeneous group, there are 
landowners of many kinds. They vary from international companies like the Spanish energy 
company Endesa to Chilean owned transnational companies such as the forestry companies 







significant political power like the former state secretary of agriculture Juan Agustín Figueroa, 
and smaller landowners. Despite these differences, all of them claim the legal ownership of the 
lands that they have acquired and state protection of their rights and property. They express 
their interests both individually and through coordinating bodies and alliances, such as the 
National Agricultural Society (SNA) and the Timber Corporation (CORMA). 
  
While landowners want to protect their properties, Mapuche activists challenge the status quo. 
Their demands range from moderate demands for land redistribution and political inclusion to 
more radical challenges to the Chilean state’s imposition, resistance against all forestry 
plantations, and demands for higher levels of autonomy for the Mapuche “nation.” These 
different strands of activism are all part of the “Mapuche movement” which is a collective 
reference to all groups, individuals, and communities that make claims in the name of the 
Mapuche identity. I speak about “Mapuche activists” as a general category to refer to anyone 
who is active in the Mapuche movement without going into much detail about the ethnic 
categorizations and their problems, as I have done that elsewhere (Terwindt 2009). Just like the 
landowners, however, the category of “Mapuche activists” is far from homogeneous, as it 
includes urban and rural activists, radicals and moderates, and highly-educated people and 
people without much formal education. Importantly, the category “Mapuche activists” also 








Between 5 and 10% of the Chilean population currently self-identifies as Mapuche. According 
to the most recent population census taken in 2002, 604,349 people self-identified as 
Mapuches (the total Chilean population at the time consisted of 15,116,435 inhabitants) (INE-
CHILE 2002a; 2002b).98 In the 9th region, the ancestral Mapuche territory, the Mapuche 
population makes up 30.6 percent of the inhabitants (INE 2002b:14). 37.6 percent of the 
Mapuches continue to live in rural areas. Mapuches traditionally lived in communities, and 
most Mapuches in rural areas continue to live in this way. Communities consist of several 
families and can be small with less than fifty persons, or bigger with several hundred persons. 
Mapuche communities often maintain traditional structures with a lonko [chief], a werken 
[spokesperson], and a machi [health specialist and leader of religious ceremonies.] While most 
Mapuches do speak Spanish, a significant number (also) speaks Mapuzugun, the Mapuche 
language (about 24%, Naguil 2010).  
 
In order to understand the current situation and the competing land claims, it is necessary to 
give some historical background of the Mapuche people and the Chilean state. In contrast to 
the indigenous people in other parts of Latin America, the Mapuche people were never 
conquered by the Spaniards. Instead, in 1641 the Mapuches signed a peace treaty with the 
Spanish Crown which recognized their territory. As a signal of official relations, four Mapuche 
ambassadors took a seat in Santiago on 4 April 1774 (Aukiñ 1991:5). After the independence 
struggle of Chile against the Spanish Crown in 1810, the Mapuche territory beneath the Bío Bío 
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river remained in the hands of the Mapuches for another 71 years. Only in 1866 the Chilean 
state considered this unacceptable, and after fifteen years of fighting, in 1881, the Chilean army 
defeated the Mapuches (Bengoa 2002:45) in what has come to be known as the “Pacificación 
de la Araucanía” [Pacification of the Araucanía].  
 
The Chilean state took the Mapuche lands away, and the Mapuches were transferred to smaller 
properties called “reducciones” [reservations]. The land title for these reservations was called a 
título de merced, which was a land title specifically designated to Mapuche communities. It was 
prohibited to sell these land titles (Bengoa 2002:164), although this has happened quite often, 
in exchange for alcohol or even with threats (Bengoa 2002; Barrera 1999). The newly reduced 
territory constituted only 6.4 percent of their original territory (Richards 2010:62). The lands 
that had become available after the “pacification” were sold to immigrants from Europe, the 
so-called colonos, mostly Italians and Germans, who still have a significant presence in the 
south. These immigrants worked the lands and created intensive agriculture. Often Mapuches 
labored these lands for a patrón [landlord]. Land disputes emerged easily as the descriptions of 
the exact boundaries of the pieces of land given to Mapuche communities were quite vague. An 
employee of the national forestry agency (CONAF) explained: “imagine that the title said ‘from 
that tree to that fence.’ And now the tree is gone, the fence moved and there is disagreement 








Since their “reduction” to reservations, some Mapuches have organized themselves in order to 
defend their interests. In 1910 the Sociedad Caupolicán Defensora de la Araucanía [Caupolicán 
Society in Defense of the Araucanía] was founded, demanding better education, for example. 
The Federación Araucana [Araucanian Federation] advocated against assimilation, for the 
recovery of the “stolen” lands, and in favor of an independent republic (Singer Swords 
2002:24).  
 
Throughout the twentieth century there have been a few attempts to redistribute lands. In 
1962, under the governments of President Alessandri and later President Eduardo Frei, the Law 
on Agrarian Reform was enacted (Correa et al. 2005:71), a policy that was continued by the 
socialist government of President Salvador Allende (1970–1973). These agrarian reforms 
expropriated landowners and redistributed the lands.  
 
These reforms have always been contentious. The reforms in the 1960s and 1970s occurred 
under the pressure of land occupations and were not welcomed by all. Some landowners 
mobilized after the occupation of the estates Alaska and Pidenco, which led to the declaration 
of a state of emergency in the province of Malleco in July 1970 (Correa et al. 2005:119). Direct 
action for land reform in 1970 became known as “corridas de cerco” [moving of the fences] 
(Correa et al. 2005:126). During the Allende regime, many landowners fled the country because 
they were threatened with expropriation and feared the bloody events in countries like Cuba 







peasants were standing outside the house of his grandfather yelling “damned gringo, we’ll get 
your land” (Interview C-49). As I will discuss at more length in the next chapter, when in 1992 
the Mapuche organization Consejo de Todas las Tierras (CTT) decided to do symbolic land 
takeovers, this was perceived as threatening partly because of this history of the corridas de 
cerco and the land occupations in the early 1970s.  
 
Many of the land redistributions were reversed after the Pinochet coup in 1973 in what was 
called the Contra Agrarian Reform, leaving only 16% of the recovered lands in the hands of the 
Mapuches (Correa et al. 2005:243; Richards 2010:64). The experience of expropriated 
landowners significantly influenced their view on the subsequent dictatorship and the Mapuche 
demands:   
 
My grandmother is Pinochetista, because she saw how my grandfather got humiliated and 
Pinochet restored order. And then the Mapuches came and asked for work again. They had 
been infiltrated by other people. That is why they acted like that. (Interview C-49)  
 
The Chilean population is still deeply divided regarding the Pinochet regime.  During my 
fieldwork I still encountered positive evaluations of the Pinochet regime, despite the many 









General Pinochet led an extreme neoliberal economic policy based on the theory of the Chicago 
Boys led by Milton Friedman to improve the economic situation in Chile, which had 
deteriorated under the Allende regime. Important for understanding the later conflicts is 
Pinochet’s decision to stimulate forestry plantations. In the first half of the 20th century, 
intensive agriculture in the 8th, 9th, and 10th region in the south of Chile shrank the native forest 
and eroded the land. This led Pinochet to enact a law that was beneficial for forestry 
plantations, which were expected to perform better than agriculture despite the erosion. This 
law, the Decreto Ley 701, provided subsidies for forestry. Various companies and individuals 
made use of these benefits and bought lands to plant eucalyptus and pine trees. The 
reforestation of formerly agricultural lands that were suffering from erosion ended up 
benefiting large companies over smallholders like Mapuche communities. Mapuche 
communities lost their jobs with the landowners who had previously neighbored their 
communities. Instead, they became surrounded by anonymous forestry companies. Fences 
impeded them from having their cattle graze on neighboring lands. In addition, the 
monoculture that was thus promoted and subsidized further eroded the land, causing draught 
to surrounding lands. Over the years, many Mapuches have migrated to urban areas in order to 
find jobs. By 2002, as many as 30.3 percent of the Mapuches had moved to Santiago in their 
search for work (INE 2002b:14).  
 
In 1989, Pinochet lost a referendum, and a democratic government led by President Patricio 







the indigenous people in general, President Aylwin negotiated extensively with Mapuche 
leaders and other indigenous peoples in Chile, a process that became known as the “Parliament 
of Nueva Imperial” (Bengoa 2002:183). The result was the Ley Indígena [Indigenous Act], which 
was enacted in 1993 and included rules about land property and an arrangement in which 
indigenous communities could apply for land restitution. A new government organ, the 
Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena [National Corporation for Indigenous 
Development] (CONADI), was made responsible for the land reforms envisioned in the 
Indigenous Act. CONADI received access to the Fondo de Tierras y Aguas Indígenas [Fund of 
Indigenous Lands and Waters] in order to buy the properties that were demanded by 
indigenous communities. According to the Indigenous Act, the fund can buy lands for 
communities or individuals that do not own sufficient land (Art. 20a) or for communities that 
have a claim on land which is based on a título de merced or another state (judicial) decision 
that grants a land title to the indigenous community (Art. 20b).  
  
This official mechanism for land reform created high expectations and the hope that it would 
finally solve the protracted land conflicts. CONADI has received many requests for lands, and 
between 1994 and 2009 a total of 90,000 hectares were transferred into the hands of Mapuche 
communities under Art. 20b (CONADI 2009a). The number of hectares per transfer has varied 
considerably. At times only twenty hectares were transferred to four families. In other 
instances 2,300 hectares were transferred to a Mapuche community of eighty families. In 







2000: appendix 1). By 2010, one of the larger Chilean forestry companies, Forestal Mininco, 
alone owned more than 391,000 hectares of plantations in the south of Chile (321,000 of pine 
trees and 70,000 with eucalyptus, mainly in the 8th, 9th, and 10th region, Mininco 2010).   
  
Despite the new Indigenous Act and the efforts by CONADI, land disputes are not over. This has 
various reasons. For starters, the whole CONADI process is at odds with the perspective of 
some Mapuche activists: “Buying lands?! That is ridiculous. The lands were ours to begin with!” 
(Interview C-61). Furthermore, CONADI can only buy a piece of land if the owner is willing to 
sell voluntarily. As we will see, this has created significant contention and an incentive for 
Mapuche communities to “make” a landowner want to sell. In addition, the CONADI 
redistribution focuses on communities that have a claim to land based on the land title, the 
título de merced, that they received when they were relocated to reservations. This is not 
satisfactory for Mapuche communities that demand the lands that they owned before the 
Pacification of the Araucanía. The redistribution program is also criticized by non-Mapuche 
landowners. In its commitment to land redistribution, the Chilean government regularly affirms 
that the Mapuche land claim is legitimate. Non-Mapuche landowners are concerned, as to 
them this translates into the notion that their land title is worth less than a título de merced. 
They interpret the government as saying: You are not the legitimate owner of your land 
(Interview C-54). As we will see in what follows, another criticism of the CONADI procedures is 








Since 1990, governments have made explicit efforts focused on the indigenous populations. For 
example, various developmental programs were initiated to stimulate bilingual education, 
intercultural health, and livelihood projects. In 2001, the government installed a Comisión de 
Verdad Histórica y Nuevo Trato [Historical Truth and New Deal Commission], which was 
expected to write a historical report and recommendations for the relations between the 
indigenous populations and the Chilean state. At the same time, however, the neoliberal 
policies of Pinochet, such as free trade agreements, privatization, and large infrastructural 
projects, the target of heavy criticism by Mapuche activists, have been acclaimed widely as the 
reason for the Chilean “economic wonder” and were continued by the succeeding Concertación 
(center-left) coalition governments of President Aylwin (1990–1994), President Frei Ruiz-Tagle 
(1994–2000), President Lagos (2000–2006), and President Bachelet (2006–2010).  
 
During the 2000s indigenous people in Chile advocated strongly for their constitutional 
recognition as “indigenous people.” This was resisted vehemently by groups that feared that 
constitutional recognition would ignite demands for self-determination based on international 
human rights instruments that grant this right to “peoples.” Therefore, the constitutional 
legislator had defined indigenous groups as “indigenous populations” and explicitly rejected the 
terminology of indigenous “peoples.” After the project for recognition had stalled under the 
various regimes of Presidents Aylwin, Frei, and Lagos, President Bachelet finally made a 
proposal for recognition. Similar fears of demands for self-determination explain the fact that 







(ILO) until 2008, significantly later than many other Latin American countries, which had ratified 
the convention during the 1990s. This convention is one of the major international human 
rights instruments for indigenous peoples.  
 
Thus, just as the government was rebuilding the democratic state, procedures, and institutions 
in the early 1990s, it was challenged in this collective enterprise by Mapuche activists who 
criticized its fundaments and the direction it was taking. Even today, some Mapuche activists 
call the Chilean state a “dictatorship in disguise.” Not everyone feels bound by the fragile social 
contract. Meanwhile, Chilean governments have struggled to develop inclusive policies that 
reconcile all Mapuches with their citizenship in the Chilean nation state, while at the same time 
providing sufficient protection to the landowners, who feel victimized by continued incursions 
on their private property.  
  
Demands of Mapuche activists challenge the status quo  
Mapuches expected real change from the new democratic governments. They were soon 
disappointed. In addition to the continuing expansion of the timber industry, governments 
since 1990 have stimulated several new infrastructural projects, such as the building of 
hydroelectric dams in the Alto Bío Bío, a highway on the coast, and a highway around the main 
city in the 9th region, Temuco. Mapuche activists claim that each of these projects has severe 
impact on the territory of Mapuche communities, their cemeteries, the fertility of the ground, 







detrimental effects of forestry exploitation, which leads to erosion, water pollution through 
pesticides, the disappearance of medicinal plants, a decrease of groundwater, and the 
reduction of biodiversity (Seguel 2002). In summers, the government has to ship water into 
some communities due to the extreme drought caused by plantations (Richards 2010:68). 
Further, activists complain that the government does not do enough to protect their rights. In 
various court verdicts, laws on private property or electricity have been privileged over the 
rights in the Indigenous Act. For example, in the decision to build the hydroelectric dam Ralco in 
the Bío Bío River, an indigenous community had to leave its land in the interest of electricity for 
the country, despite the provisions in the Indigenous Act that protect indigenous communities 
against such incursions on their property (Orellana 2005). 
 
Mapuche activists base their demands on a collective Mapuche identity and ground their 
territorial claims in the history of the Chilean state and its relation to the Mapuche people. For 
radical Mapuche activists their ethnicity is not just a reason to reclaim lost lands as the 
descendants of those that were confined to reservations. Instead, the ethnic identity forms the 
basis for their claim as a Mapuche “nation” and thus the right to self-determination. The 
importance of ethnicity is downplayed, however, by landowners and the government, who 
often define the Mapuche problem as a poverty issue. It is true that poverty is widespread 
among Mapuches.99 The Gini index, for example, indicates that Chile is one of the most unequal 
                                                      
99
 A 1998 report from the Chilean private think tank Libertad y Desarrollo stated that the percentage of the 
population living in poverty in the regions where the Mapuches had their original territory, and where at the 






 region), is 33.9 %, 36.5%, and 







societies in South America.100 Mapuche activists, however, though they also denounce the 
structural inequality, claim that they “are not poor Chileans” (Barrera 1999:72, footnote 14). 
Instead, they emphasize their right to the lands on the basis of their history as well as their 
identity as a pueblo, while they claim a different worldview and a special relation between 
them and the land (see also Terwindt 2009).  
 
Some tactics and justifications challenge the law 
Mapuche activists have pressured for land reforms in various ways. Apart from applications to 
CONADI, Mapuche communities have filed civil lawsuits based on their título de merced. These 
lawsuits, however, used to take many years and often ended in a negative decision for the 
Mapuche community. Also, recovery procedures through CONADI were perceived as slow and 
inefficient. Thus, Mapuche activists became frustrated with the official procedures available to 
them. With the first disappointments, mobilization efforts returned. During the past twenty 
years, Mapuche protests have ranged from symbolic land occupations to the use of arson as a 
pressure tool.  
  
There have been different attempts to create organizations that unite Mapuches across 
communities and urban centers. After the return to democracy in 1989, the Mapuche 
organization Consejo de Todas las Tierras (CTT, or Aukiñ Wallmapu Ngulam in Mapuzugun) was 
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founded in 1990 in a first effort to rebuild the Mapuche movement. Later in 1998, a new 
Mapuche organization, the Coordinadora de Comunidades Mapuche en Conflicto Arauco 
Malleco (CAM), was founded in the 8th region in Arauco during a meeting in an old school 
building. The explicit intent of the CAM was to further radicalize the movement because of 
dissatisfaction with other Mapuche organizations, notably also the CTT (Interview C-46). For 
many (former) CAM members, the CAM was an inspiring force leading communities to stand up 
for their rights. Their particular emphasis was on the rural communities and their coordination. 
“The same people from Lumaco went to Traiguén, and then to Collipulli. We came and we 
went, and that work of organization … that is how the CAM started,” said a former CAM 
member (Interview C-59). Since that time, many early members left the CAM and others joined, 
transforming the organization. Over time the CAM has become notorious as the most radical 
Mapuche organization. This organization has also become a major focus in criminal 
prosecutions and will therefore be discussed at more length in the next chapter. While the CTT 
and the CAM are most relevant for my analysis because of their role in criminal prosecutions, 
there are certainly not the only Mapuche organizations that are part of the Mapuche 
movement. For example, in 2006, the first Mapuche political party, Wallmapuwen, was 
founded, and in 2009 a new organization, the Alianza Territorial Mapuche, was founded to 
place renewed emphasis on the leadership by rural Mapuche communities.  
 
Mapuche activists challenge the status quo as they demand land reforms, constitutional 







all sorts of forms: public demonstrations, official negotiations, and also extra-legal action. Some 
actions are symbolic, overt, and mainly or merely communicative; others are direct or coercive 
and covert. Covert actions have included arson in plantations, trucks, and machinery and some 
of these actions have been publicly claimed in declarations by an organization or Mapuche 
community. For example, the CAM claimed an action in July 2009, stating that it demanded the 
“purchase and transmission of the terrains seized by señor Jorge Luchsinger to the Lof 
[Mapuche community] Yeupeko-Filkun. Without any quick response to our demands we will 
radicalize our actions” (Neira 2009). Without such public claiming, however, the attribution of 
most incidents of arson is disputed.  
  
Frequently Mapuche protest actions have led to the desired change. Protests have, for 
example, affected decisions of forestry companies, who have left areas that were too 
conflictive. The arsons also made it more difficult for landowners to obtain insurance, as the 
risk that a plantation could be set on fire became too high in certain areas. Mobilizing 
communities have obtained land as government officials paid attention to the areas where the 
conflict erupted most dramatically. In such areas, the government and landowners have 
engaged in negotiations with Mapuche communities and Mapuche leaders. As a result, 
landowners are eager to point out that in this process the state has made violence effective, as 








A partial overview of some statistics collected by the Chilean government shows the number 
and kind of incidents that took place between 2000 and 2003 (Comisión de Constitución 
2003:78). I present this table not as an objective or final list of the actions, but as an indication 
of the way in which reality is categorized, counted, and presented by the government. It also 
serves to give at least an indication of the scale of the disruptive events.  
 
Table 2 Statistics from a Senate report, restricted to incidents in the summer months January–March, 
when most actions take place 
Actions 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Land occupation 5 11 4 0 
Occupation of public building  3 0 4 2 
Road blockade 2 2 7 5 
Arson 9 8 16 19 
Detentions 15 33 90 55 
Demonstrations  2 2 3 1 
Attacks  9 9 5 11 
 
As Mapuche activists challenge the status quo and engage in extralegal actions, they also 
challenge the Chilean constitution and its laws; they criticize the democratic system and their 
exclusion from it, and they often draw upon legal reasoning and concepts from criminal law to 







customary rights: “Our animals have always grazed on that land,” or “We have always sought 
our medicinal plants there.” They frequently explicitly invoked international human rights law, 
for example the treaty from the International Labor Organization on indigenous people (ILO 
169). Other activists referred to the concept of necessity, arguing that they need land to 
survive, or otherwise they will die, physically or, as a pueblo, culturally. They often displayed a 
sense of urgency, sacrifice, and obligation: “If we don’t act now, we will be dead,” a student 
leader from Chol Chol expressed during a conversation in 2003.  
 
Similar accounts appear in a research study by students from the Catholic University in Temuco 
which listed the personal motivations of youth who participated in “actions committed in the 
context of the ‘Mapuche conflict’” (Santander et al. 2004). Important motivations for Mapuche 
youth to participate in the struggle were their conviction of being entitled to the lands, their 
fear of losing the Mapuche culture, and the necessity due to poverty (2004:132). The students 
noted that the family, the peer group, and the Mapuche community played an important role 
as they tended to stimulate the youth in their actions and convictions (2004:131–132). The 
students further noted that for the Mapuche adolescents the actions were legitimate and just, 
and in their justifications they appealed to the democratic system and freedom of expression.  
 
In their justification for the use of violence, Mapuche activists have often claimed self-defense: 
“Our violence is legitimate. The raids in communities are much worse. They come in with their 







only see that there was a criminal and that they are looking for that criminal” (Interview C-63). 
The radical Mapuche organization CAM similarly publicly defends its use of violence as 
“defensive” (Weftun 2011). The government is viewed as the enemy, not as a source of 
protection. The state is perceived as violent. Activists often criticized the asserted rule of law: 
“The Chilean state is the real terrorist. They are always the first to use violence in favor of the 
so-called rechtsstaat, but what rechtsstaat? There is no way that a Mapuche can respond to 
that violence, such as raids in communities and constant harassment” (Interview C-57). 
Disputing that the laws are protecting the public interests, activists argued that the laws are 
just there for the privileged: “They [Mapuches] are fighting for food. The other is just fighting 
for more money, not for survival,” said a young anthropology student (Interview C-39).  
 
Criticisms of specific laws and the rule of law in general frequently go in tandem with criticisms 
of the lack of democracy: “We have not made those laws; we did not participate in that” 
(Interview C-22). Radical Mapuches who demand more autonomy often ground the justification 
for their tactics in nationalism: “The Chilean laws should only be applicable from Concepción 
and above” (Interview C-61). They also emphasize that they have exhausted all political 
possibilities to be heard; “How many years have we been demonstrating? That would be a very 
long term project. It has already been 150 years. For some the violence doesn’t do anything, 
but I think that is because we are with too few” (Interview C-63); and the fact that dialogue can 







and talk with them. That never happens” (Interview C-72). The discourse justifying extralegal 
protest activity thus fundamentally challenges the Chilean democracy and its laws.  
 
Table 3 Brief chronological development of radicalization in the Mapuche movement 
1989 – 1992 Institutionalization CTT participates in round tables and negotiations towards 
the institutionalization of indigenous demands in the 
Indigenous Act.  
1992 – 1997 Civil disobedience CTT rejects the institutional framework and engages in open 
defiance of the Chilean laws through symbolic land 
occupations and a Mapuche tribunal. 
1997 – 2002 Radicalization  The CAM emerges and replaces the CTT as the “radical” 
actor as it introduces productive land occupations and 
covert actions of arson.  
2002 – 2008 Battle in the 
courts 
Criminal prosecution of the CAM and other Mapuche 
leaders puts activists on the defense. The debate shifts from 
land rights to criminal law issues. Defendants claim 
innocence in covert illegal actions. 
2008 – 2010 Radicalization  The CAM is “back.” Actions become more violent and affect 
a wider range of targets, such as trucks on the highway. 
Covert illegal actions are publicly claimed, while at the same 
time there is more explicit opposition within the Mapuche 
movement. 
 
Defending the status quo 
The landowners’ response to Mapuche claims and actions has been diverse, ranging from 







prosecutions. In the face of land claims by Mapuche communities, landowners generally 
asserted their legal right to the lands that they claim to have bought and acquired legally. In 
addition, they often presented themselves as working hard and contributing to the Chilean 
economy and welfare, arguing that Mapuche activists are only interested in profiting from their 
hard work. They refuse to accept the argument that they are rich and can therefore easily give 
away part of their property or proceeds. Landowners commonly emphasize the formal and 
legal equality between Mapuches and Chileans, like one landowner argued that “it does not 
correspond that this indigenous group wants something else than the rest of the Chileans” 
(Interview C-33).  
  
Even though landowners loudly protest that they will not negotiate with “violentistas” [users of 
violence], many of the land disputes have been negotiated after land occupations or arson put 
pressure on the government and the landowners. Many Mapuche communities have obtained 
demanded lands after having drawn attention to the dispute by means of a land occupation. 
For example, this happened in the Mapuche community “Temulemu,” where CONADI bought 
58.4 hectares of a piece of land called Fundo [Estate] Santa Rosa de Colpi after the community 
had already assumed control of it in a productive takeover. The public relations official from 
Forestal Mininco, the official owner of the estate, said in an interview that Santa Rosa de Colpi 
had become worthless to them as they could not enter the land. Therefore, Forestal Mininco 







or court order as they did not want to set a precedent by selling the land just on the basis of the 
ideology of “ancestral rights” (Interview C-17).  
 
Some forestry companies seem to have accepted the trade-off to let Mapuche communities 
enter the plantations to find firewood in order to avoid arson as the cheapest way of 
prevention: a “short-term solution” to “calm down the situation” and “avoid confrontations,” 
even though they are aware that this is not a “real solution” to the problem (Interview C-34). 
Other landowners have paid attention to “being a good neighbor” for Mapuche communities 
and set up programs that, for example, offer scholarships and other perks (Mininco 1999a; 
1999b; 2002; Tierra Nueva 1998–2002; SOFOFA 2002). Most forestry companies have engaged 
in the process to receive certification such as FSC (Forest Stewardship Council). Such efforts of 
corporate social responsibility are criticized by radical Mapuche activists, who view them as 
mere window dressing.  
  
Since the end of the 1990s, countermobilization by landowners has resulted in the threat of 
escalation. While complaining about the lack of effective state protection, forestry companies 
have employed private security companies to protect their estates, and private landowners 
have similarly provided for the private protection of their properties. In 1999, the forestry 
council CORMA warned the government that private landowners living on their threatened 
property “can find themselves obliged to employ the means that they esteem convenient” 







private landowners had shot at Mapuches, warning the authorities who were considered to be 
too passive that “it’s a miracle that no indigenous has died yet.” These private landowners 
claimed to be ready to defend their estates with all means. With references to the Agrarian 
Reform in the early seventies, a landowner was reported to have said that “they know that we 
defend ourselves well. If they [the Mapuches] want to verify, then they will find out” (Barria 
2001).  A perceived lack of state protection led these anonymous landowners to reclaim their 
right to private violence in defiance of the state monopoly of force. On 11 June 2005, the 
reactivation of the “Hernán Trizano Commando” was announced in an anonymous phone call 
to the local newspaper of Temuco. A note was left:    
Estamos dispuestos a empezar una represalia contra los señores indígenas, en defensa de los 
agricultores, las forestales y las empresas hidroeléctricas… En vista que el Gobierno no ha hecho 
absolutamente nada para detener a los comuneros violentistas ni ha garantizado la seguridad 
de los agricultores […] En virtud de esto, ya comunicamos nuestra constitución, para ir en apoyo 
de los que son atropellados, tenemos los medios y la gente en la Octava y Novena Regiones y no 
trepidaremos en efectuar ajustes de cuentas contra los terroristas mapuche, chilenos y 
extranjeros, que apoyan esta subversión.  
 
[We are ready to start a reprisal against the indigenous gentlemen, in defense of the farmers, 
the forestry companies and the hydroelectric companies… Given that the Government has done 
absolutely nothing to stop the violent community members nor guaranteed the security of the 
farmers […] Because of this, we communicate our constitution, to go in support of those that are 
trampled upon, we have the means and the people in the 8th and 9th region and won’t hesitate 
to set bills against the Mapuche terrorists and Chileans and foreigners who support this 
subversion.] (Anonymous caller cited in: Cayuqueo 2005a:7)  
 
While the state may not have intervened enough to satisfy landowners, police have frequently 
confronted Mapuche activists. In 1999, the chief of Police of the 9th region sent a letter to the 
prefecture of Cautín stating that police operations were conducted too aggressively, especially 







police violence, for example when the removal of land occupations and road blockades were 
followed by violent confrontations (Observatorio Ciudadano 2008). On 17 January 2001, for 
example, it was reported that during such a removal a twelve-year-old girl was hurt by a police 
shot (Toledo 2007:278). On three occasions, despite the official warning against aggressive 
police operations, police bullets killed young Mapuche activists (in 2002, 2008, and 2009).   
 
As both Mapuche activists and landowners increasingly legitimized the use of violent and illegal 
means in order to challenge or defend the status quo, the contention posed a strong challenge 
to the young Chilean democracy and its claim to governance based on the rule of law as well as 
its claim to a legitimate monopoly of force. Indeed, the competing discourses criticized state 
action as well as state inaction, ultimately claiming that the state failed to deliver on its part of 
the imagined social contract on multiple counts. According to landowners, it failed to deliver 
the promised pacification, while according to Mapuche activists it used its monopoly of force to 
arbitrarily repress Mapuches.  
 
Popular support: Extremism, supporters, and polarization  
Both Mapuche activists and landowners thus challenge the Chilean claims to the liberal 
democracy. The exact nature and impact of this dual erosion of legitimacy depends on the 
popular support for both discourses. As described in Chapter 1, Machiavelli (1994) pointed out 
that it matters whether it is a minority or a majority that opposes the government. To 







Mapuche land claims enjoy widespread support among the Chilean population. In addition, 
since the early 1990s, internationally indigenous people have increasingly been recognized in 
treaties and UN resolutions. This explains, for example, the fact that landowners (and especially 
private landowners) feel abandoned in Chile. Equally important, however, (and in strong 
contrast to the Spanish-Basque case) is that the use of violent tactics is strongly rejected, not 
only by the mainstream Chilean society but also within the Mapuche movement, creating a 
strong tension between moderates and a small group of extremists.  
 
The legitimacy of indigenous claims is widely accepted among Mapuches and also among non-
Mapuches. The term “la deuda histórica” [historic debt] to the Mapuche people has firmly 
entered official discourse. In 2006, the Centro de Estudios Públicos [Center for Public Studies] 
(CEP), a private foundation, inquired about the legitimacy of Mapuche demands in a national 
survey: “Si miramos la historia, ¿Ud. cree que el país debe reparar a los mapuche?” [If we look 
at the history, do you think that the country should offer compensations to the Mapuche?] 91% 
of the Mapuches and 79% of the non-Mapuches answered “yes” (CEP 2006:48). This general 
recognition of a debt towards the Mapuche people does not, however, cover more radical 
demands. Specifically, Mapuches have little support for their claims to so-called “ancestral 
lands.” Those are the lands for which communities do not have a Título de Merced, but which 








While Mapuche demands are thus generally considered legitimate, not everyone supports 
violent protests for such demands. Indeed, Mapuches are themselves highly divided on this 
issue. In the same survey executed by CEP, 20% of the Mapuches responded that reclaiming 
lands by the use of force was always justified, while another 40% responded that the use of 
force was justified in some circumstances, and 37% responded that it was not justified. These 
different views about tactics often divide the Mapuche movement and Mapuche communities. 
For example, a man from a sector south of Temuco told me that in the beginning of the 1990s 
there was a break in his Mapuche community. He said about other people in his community 
that “they think we are communists, terrorists, arsonists, conflictivos” (Field notes, April 2009). 
Unlike what was described in Chapter 2 about Spain, in Chile there is a strong public taboo on 
violence, and hardly a publicly accepted discourse to claim it as a legitimate tactic. Significantly, 
more extreme actions have recently been accompanied by public condemnations from within 
the Mapuche movement. For example, the organization Alianza Territorial Mapuche publicly 
condemned an attack on a small farmer in the subprovince Ercilla in the 9th region, adding 
explicitly that they would not have said anything if the actions had only damaged material, but 
clearly condemned actions that hurt persons, even if those persons were police officers:  
 
Mientras haya actuaciones de la CAM que no causen daño a personas civiles, nosotros 
claramente no vamos a decir nada. Pero estamos en contra de que se dañe a las personas o que 








[When actions by the CAM do not damage persons, clearly we will not say anything. But we are 
against injuring persons or attacking life, including that of police officers…] (in: Cayuqueo 2009)  
 
In the Spanish-Basque case it already became clear that popular support is relevant among 
other things because the state depends on citizen cooperation with law enforcement agencies 
in its criminal prosecutions. Indeed, the rejection of violent methods leads some Mapuche 
community members to cooperate with landowners and law enforcement. For example, a 
private landowner reported to the police that members of a Mapuche community had warned 
his family of arsons that were about to be committed. He specifically mentioned that his family 
had been protected on several occasions by people close to the community (Case Lonkos of 
Traiguén, declaration 3 August 2002).  
 
Not all Mapuche people reject such violence for the same reason. For some, the memory of the 
dictatorship is an important factor, especially in the countryside. Some are therefore afraid that 
leaders who speak up will be the targets of violent persecution if the government happens to 
change again, leading them to reject any form of activism (Interview C-52). Some activists 
criticize the use of violence as it has the effect that “all are put in the same sack” and suspected 
of violence and terrorism (Interview C-70). This would lead some to hesitate to undertake even 
an action such as pacifically occupying the CONADI building out of a fear of being viewed as 
“violent” (Interview C-40). More extreme activists argued that these opinions come from 








Another divisive issue within the Mapuche movement concerns negotiation and cooperation 
with the government. Radical Mapuche activists have often accused those who decided to 
negotiate or cooperate with the government of “cooptation” and “treason.” Such activists view 
any kind of cooperation with the government, also in matters unrelated to criminal 
prosecutions, as cooptation. When these activists talk about CONADI or other government 
programs for Mapuches, it is generally in derogatory terms about the Mapuches that work 
there and believe in these programs. They viewed them as undermining the Mapuche struggle 
and unity instead of contributing to fulfilling their demands. Radical activists and radical 
Mapuche organizations adopt a non-compromising stance in which no negotiation with the 
state is possible. The CAM, for example, was intended to be radical from the start. Being radical 
was viewed as positive. Law-breaking was the intention, anti-systemic the label. Thus, they 
positioned their own methods in juxtaposition to those “within” the system. For example, 
about the new Mapuche political party, Wallmapuwen, a young activist said: “They participate 
in the same institutional game as that which is imposed. They are not there,” (Interview C-39). I 
asked him what exactly he meant with “there.” “They are in an intellectual struggle, not in the 
real struggle. They are not in the recuperation, in the land takeovers; they are not there in the 
confrontations with the police,” he answered.    
 
In the face of these internal divisions, both within and among Mapuche communities, activists 
often argued that there is a specific state policy intent on dividing communities. “We are 







9th region. “They are trying to divide us. They love it when we fight between each other; that 
de-legitimizes us” (Interview C-68). In his analysis the state thus engages in a conscious strategy 
to stigmatize “bad” communities. Similarly, other activists claimed that the state privileges 
communities that are agreeable to the state, whereas it penalizes those that oppose state 
projects: a strategy of sticks and carrots. In the next chapter, we will see that the prosecutorial 
narrative draws upon and reproduces this distinction between “good” and “bad” Mapuches.  
 
The Chilean criminal justice system 
As from now on I zoom in on the interaction between actors in and around criminal 
prosecutions, it is necessary to provide a brief description of the Chilean criminal justice system. 
On 16 December 2000, Chile embarked on a Penal Reform. This reform radically changed 
criminal proceedings, from an antiquated inquisitorial system – where one judge both 
investigated and judged the case, often in secret proceedings – to a more transparent 
adversarial system, with public trials, a prosecutor to lead the investigations, and the possibility 
for victims to be involved in the case to make a private accusation. Before implementing this 
new system in the whole country, the Penal Reform was first piloted in two regions, one of 
which was the 9th region Araucanía, and the government directed national attention and 
financial resources to these pilot regions in order to make the Penal Reform a success. In 
addition, a public defense system was set up, and in the 9th region a special Defensoría Penal 
Mapuche [Public Defenders Office for Mapuches] was founded to assist the Mapuche 







elements in the cases, and the usage of the language Mapuzugun (Defensoría Penal 2011). The 
Penal Reform itself has turned into a major topic of contention in the meta-conflict as Mapuche 
activists have accused the government of using the experiment to mete out harsh sentences to 
Mapuches engaged in the land struggle.   
 
In the new system, prosecutors are members of the “Ministerio Público” [Public Ministry], 
which is coordinated by the national office in Santiago, but every region has a separate regional 
office. Art. 1 of the Law on the Public Ministry stipulates that it is an “autonomous and 
hierarchical” organ. Article 3 orders prosecutors to only focus on the “correct application of the 
law.” In doing so, they have to collect information that can prove the criminal responsibility of 
defendants as well as information that would exempt or attenuate such responsibility. The 
Fiscal Nacional [Attorney General] is appointed for ten years after an open application period 
and subsequent selection by the Supreme Court and the Senate. Chief regional prosecutors are 
appointed for ten years by the Attorney General after having been proposed by the regional 
Court of Appeals. The hierarchical structure is expressed in the fact that regional prosecutors 
have to obey the instructions of the Attorney General and under the office of the regional 
prosecutor are local prosecutor offices. By 2010, none of the prosecutors in the 9th region had 
been a Mapuche. To understand the case flow, it is important to know that not all criminal 
cases end in a trial and a judicial verdict. Indeed, that is generally only true in less than 20% of 








Soon enough prosecutors explicitly expressed the burden of the Mapuche-conflict cases. An 
evaluation of the Penal Reform in 2002 reported that what the Public Ministry referred to as 
the “Mapuche problem” was one of the factors that had increased the daily burden for 
prosecutors, which had not been foreseen when the reform was designed. The Attorney 
General therefore pleaded for an increase in the number of prosecutors (Ministerio Público 
2002:158). Since January 2008, the 8th and the 9th regions have even had specific prosecutors 
charged with the prosecution of offenses that arise in the “Mapuche conflict” (Leiva 2008). The 
Public Ministry justified this arrangement with the need for specific expertise. Not surprisingly, 
many Mapuche activists call them the “anti-Mapuche prosecutors.” To give an indication of the 
number of cases that are classified as “Mapuche-conflict cases,” in the year 2008 seven new 
cases prosecuted by the special prosecutor of the 9th region were entered into the database of 
the judicial authorities. In 2009, a total of 32 cases were still listed under his name as “in 
process,” the oldest dating back to 2004 (Poder Judicial 2009).101  
  
From the start, the prosecutors have been proud of the Penal Reform and have defended the 
system as a great step forward in comparison with the old, more inquisitorial, system 
(Interviews in 2003 C-10/11/12/13). As some emphasized, they specifically valued the Chilean 
liberal democracy because they had been part of the struggle against Pinochet (Interview C-
12/13). The rhetoric of liberal legalism had an explicit presence in the prosecutorial narrative, 
especially in response to allegations of partiality by Mapuche activists. In audio files of oral 
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proceedings in 2008 and 2009, the prosecutor frequently started his opening statement with an 
emphasis on the objectivity of and adherence to the rule of law, for example by stating 
explicitly that he did not want to create a “farce,” a common accusation by Mapuche 
defendants (Case Cayupe, minute 32:07). In another trial the prosecutor warned that “we will 
hear discourses of ‘set-ups,’ ‘state terrorism’ and a ‘racist and militarized state,’ but here are 
crimes […] which the Public Ministry tries to prove” (Case Chequenco, minute 8:45). One of the 
private accusers underscored liberal principles by saying that “we do not seek an exemplifying 
punishment, but a just punishment” (Lawyer for transportation company Lasker in Case 
Chequenco). These are clear examples of how prosecutors directly addressed arguments and 
criticisms in the meta-conflict.   
  
Other important features of the Chilean criminal justice system in relation to the contentious 
episode under analysis are the continuing presence of military courts and the anti-terrorism 
law. For offenses related to the military or carabineros [the police], the military courts still have 
exclusive competence. Many Mapuche activists have faced prosecution before military 
tribunals because of crimes involving the police (ibid. 2007:278). This practice is severely 
criticized not only by activists. In 2005, even the Inter-American Court for Human Rights 
reprimanded Chile because of its prosecution of civilians before military tribunals. The court 
argued that military jurisdiction should be restricted to crimes committed by military in active 
service (Toledo 2007:288). Another deeply controversial issue is the use of anti-terrorism 







Terrorist Conduct,” that dates back to the Pinochet era but has since been modified multiple 
times. This anti-terrorism law can work as an “add-on” to many existing crimes. Thus, the crime 
of arson can be charged as a “terrorist” arson attack in conjunction with the anti-terrorism law. 
This law provides for longer pre-trial detention, higher penalties, and the possibility to use 
anonymous witnesses. This law and its usage will be addressed in more depth in the next 
chapter.  
   
Finally, the involvement of the executive government with criminal proceedings is very 
controversial. The Chilean government is highly centralized. Many decisions are made in 
Santiago. This is specifically so in criminal justice issues related to the Mapuche conflict. For 
example, we will see that in some cases, government officials requested the use of the Law on 
State Security because before the Penal Reform, such a request was necessary for the 
investigative judge to apply the law. Another way in which the executive government has 
directly engaged with criminal proceedings is in the role of private accuser (yes, in addition to 
the prosecutor). In addition to landowners that have acted as private accusers, intendentes 
[regional governors] and sometimes the Department of Internal Affairs have also chosen to file 
a private accusation. Between 2001 and 2003, there were more than eighty criminal complaints 
from these governmental actors in relation to cases resulting from the Mapuche conflict, many 
for arson, but also for theft, damages, injuries, public disorder, and usurpation (Comisión de 
Constitución 2003:78). Participating as a private accuser means that the government can have 







governmental lawyers work on such cases in addition to state prosecutors on behalf of the 
population of the region in cases of “public commotion.” The lawyer filing these complaints for 
the governor of Malleco said that, for example, in cases in which a truck had been ambushed on 
the highway, it was impossible for the governor not to file such a complaint, due to this 
presumed “public commotion.” Acknowledging that pressure from corporations in these cases 
is a reality, he said that otherwise the criticism in the media would be obvious: “the 
government does not take responsibility!” (Interview C-56).  
 
This decision of the government to actively take part in these “Mapuche conflict” cases is a 
point of contention in the meta-conflict. Mapuche activists interpret this involvement as a clear 
violation of the supposed neutrality of the government in criminal cases. They see it as 
evidence of the specific persecution of the Mapuche people. Here we already clearly see how 
prosecutors and judges become easily identified only with particular political interests as they 
are no longer viewed as representing legitimate authority in upholding law and order (cf. Miall 
2001:88).  
   
Defining the situation: ambivalence  
Mapuche mobilizations and (the threat of) countermobilization thus challenge the Chilean state 
and its young democracy as Mapuche activists challenge the status quo, demand fundamental 
changes in land tenure, the constitutional position of the Mapuche people, and contest the 







the Mapuche people have in democratic procedures delivering their promises are at stake. 
Despite round tables, the Historical Truth and New Deal Commission, and the CONADI Fund of 
Indigenous Lands and Waters, as well as many civil law suits concerning the validity of legal 
titles, the land disputes have not yet been resolved. Indeed, ongoing projects like the building 
of hydroelectric dams in the Bío Bío River and the coastal highway continue to create new 
conflicts. At the same time, landowners are losing their patience and their confidence in 
effective state protection of their interests and properties.  
 
Actors on both sides have decided that a lack of government protection or a perceived 
democratic deficit legitimize the turn to coercive measures and disruptive protest. As Mapuche 
activists and landowners criticize the state’s failure to keep the promises of the social contract 
and threaten to withdraw their compliance, the state’s legitimacy and its claim to a legitimate 
monopoly on force are at stake. The decision of landowners to carry weapons to defend their 
property thus not only emphasizes their conviction that they are the legitimate owners, but 
also challenges the Chilean legal order as the protector of private property. Similarly, the 
decision of some Mapuche activists to burn plantations not only expresses their opposition to 
forestry expansion, but also challenges the democratic system that would promise to solve such 
disagreements through parliamentary debate. In addition, as they claim ownership over the 
entire former Mapuche territory below the Bío Bío River, they challenge not only the current 
Chilean land titles in the hands of the current land owners but also the legal system in which 







interest.” Significantly, Mapuche demands enjoy the support of a significant part of the 
population, and even some of the extralegal tactics receive public sympathy.  
 
As Nieburg said, in order to maintain control the government has to decide which groups can 
be ignored or excluded at no risk, and which groups cannot be “barred from the magic circle” 
(1968:19). To maintain its control, the democratic government has to address different 
audiences, sending the right messages in order to defend the rule of law, without alienating 
important sectors in society. Who are the relevant actors, who are their stakeholders, can they 
be ignored, or should they be taken into account? How much harm can the different actors 
cause? Are the grievances legitimate, what is the cause of the problem, what is the solution? 
These questions are the topic of debate and disagreement, and the answers change over time. 
One of these debated questions is the role of leaders and outside activists; whether or not 
entire indigenous communities are involved in the controversial actions and whether or not 
those actions have widespread support or not within those communities. Another topic of 
debate is the nature of the threat or harm posed by protest actions, as government actors 
sometimes highlight the physical threat to the lives and bodily integrity of people and at other 
times emphasize the danger to economic development of the region, the importance of the 
forestry sector, and the harmful decrease in investments (Barria 2001). 
 
Thus, in giving answers to such questions, the state “defines” the situation as it puts labels on 







stake. The state’s “definition of the situation” then determines, fits, and legitimizes the state 
response. This is important, because publicly claiming the need to protect “victims” or to 
defend “national security” not only indicates but also legitimizes a certain response. Indeed, if 
the definition of the situation is accepted by the public, the resulting response will be perceived 
as natural and taken for granted. I argue that in defining the situation, the Chilean government 
has set itself up for pervasive ambivalence.  
 
Downplaying the problem versus the fear of escalation 
The definition of the “security” problem, which has been relegated to the criminal justice arena, 
is far from stable. Government officials have alternately emphasized the potential for grave 
escalation with references to “national security” and “terrorism” on the one hand and 
downplayed the security problem on the other, reducing it to several specific incidents and 
private disputes. The next chapter demonstrates that this ambivalence is reflected in the 
prosecutorial narrative in a constant back and forth between de-contextualization and re-
contextualization of events.  
 
At various points during the past two decades, state officials have downplayed the problem, 
localized it in some leaders, asserted control, and expressed confidence that the criminal justice 
system was the right place to deal with the issue. For example, in 1999 the sub-secretary of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs affirmed that “there is no Chiapas, no revolution or Mapuche 







declared that of the 2200 Mapuche communities in the region only 40 or 50 were organized by 
the Mapuche organizations CAM or the CTT (Barria 2001). Again, in 2009 Viera Gallo, the state 
secretary and coordinator of indigenous politics, claimed that “we are not talking about an Al 
Qaeda in the Araucanía region” and “there is no civil war.” “We have to accept that this 
problem exists and treat it seriously, but we must never exaggerate it” (EFE 2009). Indeed, 
despite the tensions and the fear of economic stagnation, the index of Regional Economic 
Activity of the 9th region grew by 19.3 percent from 2000 to 2005 (Invierta en Araucanía 2009).  
 
These arguments also enter the Chilean courtrooms and even the courtroom of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACHR). Thus in 2006, the Chilean state argued that there 
were more than 3,500 Mapuche communities with 203,950 persons in the 9th region, whereas 
only 60 persons were involved in the criminal activity – some of whom did not belong to the 
Mapuche people, as the state emphasized. They therefore “represent a percentage that is 
considerably small in relation to the universe of members of that [Mapuche] people” (Case 
Lonkos of Traiguén, IACHR, consideration 35). The next chapter analyzes in more depth how 
these images and assertions are reproduced in the prosecutorial narratives.  
 
The words chosen to demonstrate government control show the images that dictate the 
conversation, as officials declare what it is not: it is no Chiapas, there is no civil war, and there is 
no Al Qaeda. These negative formulations indicate the ongoing conversation between those 







landowners often criticized this tendency of the government to downplay the issue. Since the 
early 1990s, landowners urged “Santiago” to take the problem seriously and perceive it as a 
national problem instead of a regional problem. For example, in 1999 the CORMA clearly wrote: 
“It is not, as we see, a conflict between private parties” (CORMA 1999a:2). In October 2008 a 
coalition of professional associations reiterated in a public declaration that “this is a theme of 
the country, not only of one region” (CPC 2008). Sometimes, government officials have adopted 
this alternative definition of the situation. For example, when the state secretary for internal 
affairs, Sergio Correa Sutil, was asked in a newspaper interview in 2002 whether they were 
facing a security problem for the country, his answer was a clear “yes” (El Mercurio 2002). 
Similarly, prosecutors have adopted such notions in the courtroom. In 2003, a prosecutor 
referred to the “dignity of Chile,” the “soul and spirit of Chile,” and the “nation” that were at 
stake (Case Lonkos of Traiguén, Field notes, April 2003).  
 
Lawlessness and the prospect of a “state within a state” are recurring themes in accounts that 
stress the severity of the situation. It is true that some Mapuche communities have become or 
claim to be de-facto no-go areas for official authorities. Newspaper accounts from 1997 often 
mentioned “little Chiapas” as a specter. Sometimes, the prosecutorial narrative appropriated 
these images. For example, one prosecutor argued in his opening statement that “[Mapuche 
community] Temulemu apparently is a territorial space that does not obey the Chilean laws.” 







Lonkos of Traiguén). These expressions affirmed and reproduced an image of lawlessness and 
places where the Chilean state does not rule.  
 
Indeed, some actors have used a war metaphor to describe the situation. Judge Karen Atala, 
who was stopped at a road blockade and subsequently threatened with a gun, said:  
 
La guerra de Arauco no ha terminado. Los mapuches están en pie de guerra aún. […] actuaron 
como un batallón disciplinado, con mucha sangre fría, perfectamente coordinados. Si hubieran 
querido matar a alguien, lo habrían hecho. Estábamos en completa indefensión.   
 
[The war of Arauco has not ended. The Mapuches are still on a war footing. […] They acted as a 
disciplined battalion, with a lot of cold blood, perfectly coordinated. If they had wanted to kill 
someone, they would have done it. We were completely defenseless.] (Fredes 2007) 
 
Judge Atala confessed that her first thought was: “Are we in Chile?” (Fredes 2007).  
 
Various actors during the past decade have emphasized that escalation was inevitable. The 
newspaper El Mercurio wrote in 2001: “The Mapuche Intifada. The Indigenous Uprising 
Worsens” (Barria 2001). In 2003, a prosecutor expressed fear of further escalation, pointing out 
that “it” started with crimes against forestry companies and that now small and midsize 
farmers were the victims (Case Lonkos of Traiguén, Field notes, April 2003). In 2006, the 







of landowners. For them it meant that there was a real danger for their life. Attacks on trucks 
on the highway in early 2008 were similarly interpreted as a signal of escalation. Truck drivers 
started to demand bodyguards. On 29 July 2009, the CAM claimed an attack on a passenger 
bus. The local newspaper “Austral Temuco” reported anxiously about this shift of attacks from 
cargo transport to the transport of “human lives.” Just as in Spain, actors thus identify “leaps” 
in the chosen targets and the willingness to inflict harm. Not only landowners feared escalation 
and the possibility of deaths. Some Mapuche activists also expressed that already early on they 
were convinced that violence against them would lead to the death of Mapuche activists 
(Interview C-57). And also a private security guard I spoke with in 2003 claimed that the Chilean 
government should attack the problem at the root and send in the military. “25 or 100 
Mapuche deaths and it is over. Yes, that may be cruel, but there will inevitably be deaths” 
(Interview C-18). Such fear and expectation of escalation has also been adopted in the 
prosecutorial narrative. For example, in one case, the prosecutor argued that when a conflict 
starts with damages, threats, and robberies, it may end with violence against persons (Oral 
proceedings, CAM 2005). 
 
Thus, while the government often publicly downplayed the problem, emphasizing the small 
number of people involved in criminal activity, the alternative definition of the situation 
emphasized that the conflict threatened the whole country, created a situation of lawlessness 
and potentially a state within a state, while the violence was escalating and could possibly lead 







the actual threat posed by radical Mapuche activists. While affected landowners often called 
for more attention from the government and argued forcefully that the matter was grave and 
should be treated as terrorism, at the same time they tried to maintain a low profile to prevent 
the conflict from getting out of proportion and receiving too much negative media attention, 
and therefore negatively affecting their reputation. Just like the government, landowners 
frequently emphasized the individual criminal responsibility of a few perpetrators and the fact 
that the problem was limited to specific regions where the radicals were active.  
 
In framing the problem, government officials have further introduced ambivalence as they 
adamantly distinguish between the “poverty” problem of the authentic and rural Mapuche 
people (political arena) on the one hand and the “security” problem posed by radicals that 
“abuse” the Mapuche identity (criminal justice arena) on the other hand. This distinction is also 
visible in public opinion, as surveys demonstrate simultaneous support for the Mapuche claims 
and for harsher measures against “activists” (Richards 2010:77). The location of the problem in 
a specific set of identifiable individuals and communities has guided the Chilean response. The 
distinction between “good” peaceful communities and “bad” radicals also returns in a concept 
like “conflictive communities,” which served to guide policy on land transfers. To prevent the 
so-called “export of the conflict,” forestry companies and the Ministery of Planning deemed it 
important that “conflict communities” were not transferred to an otherwise peaceful area 
(Mideplan 2002; CORMA 2002b). In the next chapter, I will show how this separation between 







returns in and is reinforced by the prosecutorial narrative in various criminal cases, and how the 
recognition of legitimacy of the demands in combination with the push towards the criminal 
justice system has created a thorough ambivalence. 
 
Ambiguity thus exists in the debate whether the security issue is a big national problem or 
rather consists only of isolated and local events. At the same time, the security aspect of the 
Mapuche conflict has become the dominant government concern, while Mapuche grievances 
concerning, for example, erosion and a decrease in groundwater and biodiversity are ignored. 
Thus, while the “poverty” problem is dealt with by livelihood support programs, scholarships, 
and other attempts to make rural Mapuches part of the Chilean economic wonder, the 
“security” problem is defined as the likelihood that crimes will be committed, and this causes 
the issue to be transfered to the criminal justice arena. The relevant actors are then identified 
as “perpetrators” and “victims.”  
  
The transfer: From civil lawsuits on land rights to criminal prosecutions of arsons 
The transfer to the criminal justice arena very simply means that actions are defined and 
treated as crimes. This transfer can be a deliberate policy. For example, an engineer from a big 
forestry company told me that “it is policy to treat these actions as ordinary thefts and crimes” 
(Interview C-34). As such, it is a de-politicizing move. However, as I will show, the transfer does 








To facilitate the de-contextualization of events, the “Mapuche conflict” is often put in strictly 
juridical terms. That is, the land claims are forced within the framework of land titles and civil 
lawsuits. The relations between Mapuches and Chileans are reduced to a merely constitutional 
issue of formal recognition of indigenous peoples. These legal conceptualizations become the 
contested framework for the debate in the criminal justice arena. 
 
In line with the liberal separation of ends and means, Chilean prosecutors firmly emphasize the 
separation of political objectives and criminal means. “The demands may be just, but they 
[Mapuche activists] have to claim them through political channels. Violence is against the 
democracy,” said one of the prosecutors in 2003 (Interview C-11). Indeed, during a trial in 2003, 
both the prosecutor and the private accusers referred to the “legitimate aspirations” of the 
Mapuches but emphasized that they have to follow the “legal path” (Case Lonkos of Traiguén, 
field notes, April 2003). A legal assistant to the chief prosecutor of the 9th region said: “I can’t 
commit crimes the whole day, thinking I am fighting for something, whatever that may be!” 
(Interview C-13). Typical for the liberal understanding of the relation between crime and 
politics, landowners also stress the distinction between means and ends. “Many of them are 
right in their claims,” said the SOFO lawyer, who works for several farmers, “but that does not 
justify the means they use. If you open that Pandora’s box, then even Bin Laden could become 








The transfer of political contestation to the criminal justice arena implies that the relevant 
issues change. It is the process in which (a part of) the political struggle is redefined in the logic 
and language of criminal justice, and actors of the criminal justice system become involved. 
Instead of arguing whether and how a pine tree affects the soil, the question under debate 
becomes whether or not the Chilean state can use anti-terrorism laws in cases of material 
destruction such as arson. Instead of questioning the lack of representation of Mapuches in the 
national parliament, actors debate whether or not prisoners should have the right to hold a 
religious ceremony in the prison. The shift from lawsuits between private parties to criminal 
prosecutions is accompanied by a discourse that frames the problem in public terms: the 
interests of the entire society are at stake. The transfer to the criminal justice system is also 
enacted by refusals by landowners to negotiate with “violentistas” (Interview C-17). The shift to 
the criminal justice arena is the shift from persuasion and negotiation to the language of 
condemnation and individualized blame. The problem becomes a criminal problem, even if the 
crimes are sometimes recognized to be “politically motivated” crimes. More often, however, 
the prosecutorial narrative downplays political motives and routinely emphasizes self-interest 
as the “real” motivation of perpetrators. 
 
Very concretely, the transfer also means that much of the news reporting in relation to the 
“conflict” is based on police and prosecutorial accounts, thus adopting the state’s viewpoint 
and other dominant voices while marginalizing others. Interestingly, in an analysis of the 







prosecutors had been the most important source for newspapers, as they figured in 26.7% of 
the articles as a source. In comparison, “victims” were only relied upon in 3.3% of the articles 
and “indigenous people” in none of the articles (del Valle 2005:88). Del Valle further points to 
the dominance of police reports and their hierarchical superiority in the construction and 
establishment of “facts” in comparison to other sources of evidence. 
 
“We fulfill a duty,” said the chief prosecutor of the regional attorney’s office of the 9th region in 
Chile, sticking firmly to the ideology of liberal legalism, when I interviewed her in 2003 about 
the criminal prosecutions that took place in the context of the Mapuche conflict (Interview C-
10). When I asked her about the consequences of the criminal prosecutions on the conflict 
dynamics, she maintained that potentially radicalizing effects or the motives of a perpetrator 
were not the terrain of the prosecutor; that belonged to politicians. “We just do our work. It is 
not up to us to think about the consequences. The ideal of equality and the democratic 
construction of the system forbid us to think about the consequences. We follow the rules; the 
rules that have been decided democratically,” declared a lawyer at the regional prosecutor’s 
office in Temuco (Interview C-13). The spokesperson of the regional office similarly declared, 
“we do technical work” (Interview C-11). He wrote: 
Siendo entonces el Ministerio Público un organismo técnico, cuya función es investigar delitos, en la 
ejecución de su cometido no puede tener en consideración circunstancias generales que motivan o 
fundamentan la comisión de un ilícito determinado, si eso fuera así, cuan peligroso resultaría la 
persecución de delitos, la que estaría sujeta a consideraciones subjetivas cuyo alcance nadie esta en 
condiciones de prever.  
 
[The Public Ministry is a technical organism, whose function is to investigate crimes, in the execution 
of which one cannot take into consideration general circumstances that motivate or account for the 







crimes become, which would become subject to subjective considerations whose reach no one is in 
a condition to foresee.](García 2002) 
 
This reasoning places the police and the prosecutors as law enforcers outside of politics and 
thus outside any of the substantive issues that constitute the “Mapuche conflict.” They view 
themselves as outsiders and as not responsible for solving the conflict. Crime control mandated 
by the law is the narrow duty that they fulfill. For the political issues, the law enforcers point to 
the political arena, in which dialogue, negotiation, persuasion, political parties, political policies, 
elections, the parliament, and law-making activities are located.  
 
Mapuche activists attempt to open up space for alternative viewpoints as they work hard for 
the recognition of what they perceive to be the “real” crimes: their removal from their lands 
and confinement in reservations, followed by years of discrimination against their parents and 
grandparents. For many Mapuche activists it is pure cynicism that they are charged with 
“usurpation” when their history tells the story of constant usurpation of their lands. Whereas 
Mapuche activists often place contentious actions against landowners within the context of 
their legitimate demand for land, many landowners avoid the question of legitimacy of the land 
claims entirely and conveniently stick with the narrow focus of criminal justice. Instead of 
engaging with such claims of legitimacy, landowners frequently assert that many of the criminal 
actions are not done by Mapuches or on behalf of the Mapuches. Indeed, a common argument 







activities because they are interested in media attention, adventure, or financial gain. 
Landowners thus disconnect the criminal incidents from the political demand for land reform. 
 
These diverging perspectives are reflected in the different voices that obtain official status in 
the course of criminal proceedings, in witness testimonies or interrogations with defendants. In 
testimonies before police officials or on trial, the testimony of Mapuche activists generally 
includes the long history of the specific land and the details of the land dispute. While 
landowners sometimes mention their perspective on the land dispute and generally confirm 
their legal landownership, they mostly focus on a very narrow timeframe of specific incidents. 
This narrower timeframe is reflected in police expert investigations of the crime scene and the 
specific locations of every event. Similarly, Del Valle (2001) points out that prosecutors and 
private accusers tend to emphasize that a case has to be judged on the basis of the “facts,” 
whereas the defense lawyers generally try to put the “facts” in their historical context. While 
that certainly is the pattern in some trials, it is definitely not always the case that the 
prosecutor keeps to the facts and the defendants aim to put things in context. Indeed, in some 
trials it was the other way around (e.g., Case Lonkos of Traiguén, Field notes, 2003). In the next 
chapter I will argue that it is more appropriate to describe the interaction not as a competition 
between de-contextualization versus re-contextualization but as a competition between 








A case study of ambivalent state intervention: Fundo Ginebra 
The role and intervention of subsequent Chilean governments in land disputes has been full of 
contradictions. Before discussing more systematically some of the contradictions that can be 
found, I will present a case study which illustrates the dynamic of land conflicts and the way in 
which criminal prosecutions and the relevant state agents play a role in this. The following 
account is based on an analysis of police files with witness declarations at the police station, 
interviews by the author, and newspaper articles. Despite its particularities, it demonstrates 
many of the recurring features in such disputes.  
 
At the end of the 1990s, a Mapuche community in the sector of Collipulli demanded forty 
hectares from Fundo [estate] Ginebra, which was in the hands of a private landowner. The 
community claimed that this land had actually belonged to them since 1813; however, in 1918 
they lost it due to the fact that a new landowner refused to give it back after what would have 
been a five-year lease. There were two organizations active in the Mapuche community. Both 
were demanding the forty hectares, but while one organization chose to stick with dialogue, 
the other organization engaged in land occupations. Part of the community was actually 
working on the forty hectares that were disputed, sowing grain. There had been negotiations 
about a purchase through CONADI, but nothing had worked out. In the beginning of January 
2001, leaders from the land-occupying organization of the Mapuche community told the 
landowners they would harvest the current plants. In addition, the leaders requested the 







occupation of their land. In reaction to this warning, the landowners hired a guard, who would 
give notice when a land occupation or arson was to take place.  
 
In the night of 20 January 2001, the guard was attacked while keeping watch on the terrain. His 
arm got broken and his head severely injured. “They left me for dead” was his comment to the 
police after the attack. The landowners were shot at during the same night while driving by the 
estate. One of the landowners was severely injured in his hand, leaving it paralyzed. In reaction 
to the shooting, the landowners shot back with their shotgun and pistol. An activist who 
generally rejected the use of violence mentioned that in that specific case he understood the 
perpetrator because of the nasty relation between the landowner and the community 
(Interview C-28). Estate Ginebra was occupied, the house that was built on it destroyed, and 
everything taken away from the house. For the landowners, who have their permanent 
residence in Temuco, it was their house for summer holidays.  
 
The state filed charges for attempted homicide and started secret negotiations with CONADI. 
The police investigated the crimes, but no one disclosed the identity of the attackers even 
though in testimonies with the police, members of the community clearly showed their internal 
differences about the legitimacy of extralegal activity. While earlier pacific occupations were 
openly recognized by the participants, everyone in the Mapuche community denied any 
involvement in the violent attacks. Finally, one of the community members was convicted to 







was purchased by CONADI and given to the Mapuche community. Thirty-five families received 
403.2 hectares. CONADI paid 2,371,652 Chilean pesos per hectare (CONADI 2009b). 
 
This vignette illustrates some of the typical elements in these land disputes between Mapuche 
communities and Chilean landowners. It shows that personal contacts and also personal 
grievances often play a role in the events. Negotiation, tactics of civil disobedience, and 
violence interact in complex ways. Typical is also that the Mapuche community was divided 
over the use of extralegal tactics, but that everyone still refused to cooperate with criminal 
investigations. Different government agencies played a role: law enforcement agents 
prosecuted a single individual for very a specific event that actually occurred within a larger 
context in which many more people played a role. At the same time, CONADI purchased the 
property and transferred it to the Mapuche community. This illustrates how specific events can 
be transferred to the criminal justice arena, while other parts of the dispute remain in the 
political arena.  
 
Criminal prosecutions thus do not occur in a vacuum. The events at the estate Ginebra 
exemplify the complex situation within which crimes occur and the many governmental agents 
that get involved. The different agents and organs that make up the Chilean state all get 
involved in line with their specific mandates and perceived duties. For a full grasp of the state’s 
role in the “Mapuche conflict,” I would thus have to discuss state interventions ranging from 







and the role of military courts to socioeconomic programs for development and specific 
assistance to Mapuche people. That is, however, outside the scope of this research. Rather, my 
focus will be on the criminal justice arena and specifically the ambivalence pervasive in the 
prosecutorial narrative and criminal justice decisions regarding the “Mapuche conflict.”  
 
Mapuche activists routinely accuse the state of criminalizing the Mapuche protests. 
Landowners often argue the opposite: their concern is that Mapuches can actually get away a 
lot easier with certain crimes because they are Mapuche. My data support both propositions, at 
least in part. There are many instances where the state does indeed react with a heavy hand, 
supporting the perspective of Mapuche activists. For example, the state applies anti-terrorism 
laws, arrests activists on a large scale,102 trumps up charges and employs unjustified police 
violence in Mapuche communities (Observatorio Ciudadano 2008). Many activists have suffered 
long pre-trial detention, and newspaper headlines brand Mapuches as terrorists. Also, some 
activists are tried twice for the same offense in military courts and civilian courts. 
 
However, while the state’s approach can clearly be heavy-handed, at the same time the state 
(and landowners) has actually often been very permissive. There are indications that the state 
occasionally has attempted to avoid criminal prosecutions and convictions of Mapuche 
activists. For example, Mapuche protest actions, such as land occupations and road blockades, 
have generally been removed by the police, but are usually not followed up with criminal 
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prosecutions as the overriding concern in such situations is to dampen the conflict (Interview C-
56). Many Mapuche activists who were briefly arrested were never subsequently indicted or 
tried. The number of Mapuche activists imprisoned at any given point in time – awaiting trial or 
serving a sentence – has hardly ever been more than fifty people and generally less.103 Further, 
it was not until 2000 that the first Mapuche activist actually had to spend time in jail for a 
conviction. Sometimes, to avoid an escalation of events or out of a fear of reprisals, landowners 
themselves have decided not to pursue any prosecutions. Indeed, landowners often prefer 
activists to receive an “alternative solution” instead of a conviction, as they want to avoid 
accusations of “unjust repression” and “political prisoners” (Interview C-42). It is also incredible 
how many Mapuche activists manage to remain fugitive in quite a small territory. A public 
defender said: “I was drinking mate with the fugitives in their own community: so much for 
being ‘fugitive’ [clandestino]; they just hide in their communities” (Interview C-48). And an 
activist told me: “We used to bring in clandestinos for speeches at the university” (Interview C-
72). It is hard to believe that was possible if the Chilean state actually put a lot of effort into 
their tracing. 
 
This leniency in prosecutorial decisions is also reflected in the recollections of Mapuche 
activists. For example, in urban areas the occupation of buildings, such as the CONADI offices, 
was a common pressure tactic. A former Mapuche student leader told me that he had never 
been indicted or prosecuted for such occupations in their struggle for cheap housing for rural 
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Mapuches coming to study in the city of Temuco. “It seemed legitimate to us. The legal 
framework did not take the reality into account. It was a necessity. We had to take care of a 
budget and food for Mapuche students.” It was highly effective indeed: 
 
When we mobilized, within a month we would have the money. […] It was a way to make the 
conflict visible. The occupation of a public building creates a conflict with the citizens, as it is an 
obstacle for the functioning of the institutions. We would send letters to CONADI or to the Regional 
Governor, but all the doors would be closed and everyone would say that there is no money. Then 
the next day when we occupied the building of CONADI there would be money. That has been our 
experience. (Interview C-59)  
 
Reflecting upon an action in Arauco at the end of the 1990s, the former student leader agreed 
that they were probably able to get away with it without much trouble because they were 
Mapuches. He recalled telling his co-defendants, who were sentenced for usurpation and theft: 
“we got off with minor sentences! If we were Chileans, we would still be in prison” (Interview C-
59).  
 
Such examples do not reflect a government or landowners using every opportunity to 
prosecute and punish Mapuche activists as harshly as possible, which would be the “radical” 
perspective on law and politics, in which the law is nothing more than an instrument in the 
hands of the elite. Instead of a straightforward harsh application of the law favoring the elite, a 







simultaneous negotiation with and criminal prosecution of Mapuche leaders; in the use of 
police violence in interactions with Mapuche communities, whereas judges continue to acquit 
defendants on trial; and in the combination of harsh anti-terrorism legislation with restraint in 
the use of penal laws in other instances. I understand the Chilean case, therefore, as a paradox 
of simultaneous oppression and impunity. In my exploration of the development of the 
prosecutorial narrative in these chapters I aim to uncover the dynamics underlying this 
apparent paradox.   
 
A lack of coordination between the different state organs (the legislator, police, military, 
prosecutors, judges, minister of internal affairs) or even outright disagreement can explain 
some of the contradictions. For example, in his inaugural speech, the new head of the Court of 
Appeals in Temuco had commented on the criminal cases that arose in the context of the 
Mapuche conflict and said that those cases should not be sent to them as the criminal justice 
system cannot solve them. It was a frank statement, and several people with whom I spoke in 
2009 referred to those words (e.g., Interview C-64). In September 2010 there was even an open 
confrontation between the executive government and the Attorney General. In the last 
elections in February 2010, Piñera, leader of the right-wing party Renovación Nacional [National 
Renewal], became president of Chile. President Piñera had made promises to Mapuche hunger 
strikers to change their charges of terrorism into ordinary crimes. The Attorney General, 
however, refused to do this, arguing that it would be illegal and unconstitutional and that it 







Attorney General said: “No pretendamos que la Fiscalía arregle un problema de 200 años, de 
180 años.” [We don’t claim that the Public Ministry can solve a problem of 200 years, 180 
years] (Cooperativa 2010). This was one of the few moments in which government authorities 
overtly recognized that the criminal justice system is not the right arena to deal with these 
cases, and as such quite a breakthrough. 
 
Even though the criminal justice arena might not solve the problem, and state agents 
acknowledge this, many events are understood and categorized as “crimes” and thus translated 
into the vocabulary of criminal law and passed on to prosecutors to act upon it. In the next 
section, I analyze how different actors claim victimhood or solidarity with “political” prisoners 
as criminal proceedings create these identities of victims and defendants in indictments and 
oral proceedings. In the meta-conflict that ensues in the criminal justice arena, the competing 
voices propose their own definitions of the situation, challenging or demanding the state’s 
imposition of labels.  
 
3. Mobilization and discursive action in the criminal justice arena 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the processes of victim mobilization and prisoner support 
mobilization are not reserved ex ante for specific political actors. Mapuche activists engage in 
both prisoner support mobilization and victim mobilization. Their claims as victims have, 








Mapuche activists generally claim victimhood for having been thrown off their lands after the 
Pacification of the Araucanía and use criminal law vocabulary when they accuse the current 
landowners of “usurpation.” Such attempts have never been accepted in the courtroom. There 
are no criminal prosecutions to adjudicate the grievance of Mapuches that eucalyptus trees are 
sucking up all their groundwater. These grievances are not successfully defined as “crimes” and 
are therefore not even considered to be within the criminal justice arena. In other cases, the 
understanding of events as crimes may be acknowledged, but prosecutions have been minimal. 
This is the case in claims of police violence, such as raids in Mapuche communities, violent 
searches, disproportional violence in confrontations with activists, and alleged torture by police 
officers to extract confessions.  
 
While their account has not often been honored, Mapuche activists have mobilized as victims 
and pushed for criminal proceedings in some cases. I will briefly provide a short overview of 
such mobilization and the adoption of their narrative in the courtroom. For example, Mapuche 
activists have claimed that the declarations by paramilitary group “Hernán Trizano” constituted 
“criminal threats.” In 2002, Member of Parliament Alejandro Navarro asked the regional 
governor to investigate “Comando Hernán Trizano,” particularly requesting preventive instead 
of “a posteriori” action against these “real anti-Mapuche terrorist groups” and also asking the 
governor specifically to contemplate the use of the Law on State Security (El Mercurio 2010). 







(Toledo 2007:283), and a prosecutor was reported to investigate the commando (Palma 2002; 
Austral 2002c). No indictment followed, however. In 2009, Mapuche activists filed complaints 
about “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing”after communications had been issued in the name of 
this same commando. A spokesman of the commando was reported to have said that “the main 
Mapuche leaders will disappear from the world, due to two cartridges of dynamite which we 
will place in their belts if they continue with the demands for lands” (Chavez 2009; P.A.S. 2009).  
 
Mapuche activists also engaged in active victim mobilization when they argued that the deaths 
of young Mapuche activists Alex Lemún, Matías Catrileo, and Jaime Mendoza were not the 
“accidental deaths” in “confrontations” with the police that the Chilean government portrayed 
them to be. Instead, the activists offered an alternative narrative and claimed that the deaths 
were deliberate assassinations. This narrative fits with the beliefs of many activists, who 
experienced such confrontations with the police and expressed that “The police are out there 
to kill” (Interview C-57). As the cases involved police officers supervised by the Ministry of 
Defense, the trials did not take place in ordinary courts but in military tribunals. In the case of 
Alex Lemún, these proceedings ended in the dismissal of charges, leaving the family and the 
entire Mapuche movement disillusioned. The resulting lack of confidence in fair proceedings 
later led activists to keep Matías’ body hidden for the government during the first few days 
after his death. Activists wanted to protect the body against feared tampering with the 
evidence that the police bullet had come from behind. The activists thus deeply distrusted the 







to mobilize to be recognized as victims in criminal procedures. The death of Matías Catrileo 
garnered immediate solidarity from a wide variety of people, who all came to Temuco to attend 
his funeral. Demonstrations were organized to condemn his death and call for an investigation 
and punishment of the responsible policeman. Spray-painting in the streets of Temuco called 
the policeman a “murderer” [asesino] and decried “state terrorism” (Field notes, April 2009).  
 
For a long time, the police argued that they had killed Matías while defending themselves 
against an attack in which activists were burning haystacks on the land of a private landowner. 
In June 2009, the trial took place against the police officer whose bullet was responsible for the 
death of Matías Catrileo. Evidence confirmed that the bullet had hit Matías in the back, and the 
prosecutors charged the police officer with “unnecessary violence resulting in death” and asked 
for 10 years imprisonment. The judges of the military tribunal in Valdivia convicted the 
carabinero responsible for the death of Matías Catrileo, but sentenced him to two years, a 
sentence he could serve by reporting regularly to the police (La Tercera 2010). The tribunal 
argued that the police officer had acted in “legitimate defense.” The sentence was a 
disappointment for the friends and family of Matías, and a radio host declared:   
 
Acá hay un mensaje a la policía: asesinen tranquilamente por la espalda, porque les van a poder 









[Here is a message for the police: kill tranquilly in the back, because they will apply mitigations 
and you will be able to go home and sleep tranquilly while a family has their child assassinated.] 
(Radio Cooperativa in: La Tercera 2010) 
 
These are the rare instances in which Mapuche activists have officially taken on the role of 
victims in criminal proceedings. Otherwise, however, their claims of victimhood have not been 
“honored.” For example, violence during raids in communities is hardly subjected to the 
scrutiny of courts. The most frequent constellation in criminal cases in relation to the 
“Mapuche conflict” is that Mapuche activists are defendants and landowners occupy the 
institutionally recognized role as “victims.” In the rest of this section I therefore focus upon an 
analysis of landowners who mobilize as victims and Mapuche activists who mobilize as prisoner 
supporters. 
 
Just as in Spain, in Chile the criminal proceedings in relation to the Mapuche conflict have been 
the subject of criticisms by all parties involved. An example is the all-round dissatisfaction 
regarding the frequent acquittal or partial acquittal of many Mapuche activists, sometimes 
after having spent more than a year in pre-trial detention. Such cases naturally upset the 
defendants. In addition, an acquittal implies that no one has been convicted for a presumably 
serious crime, which inevitably dissatisfies the victims. While it is quite common in Chile for 
cases to be shelved, when they are taken to trial there is a conviction in ninety percent of the 
cases (Ministerio Público 2004:19). According to one of the defense lawyers, however, in cases 







relevant also, are the partial acquittals. As LeBonniec (2008:2) points out, often Mapuche 
activists were acquitted of the heavier charges that had provoked the main stigmatizing 
headlines after their arrests and then got convicted on smaller charges, such as arms 
possession or threats, instead of the bigger charges like arson and terrorist organization. For 
example, the lonkos of Traiguén were initially charged with terrorist arson and later only 
convicted for terrorist threats. Also Victor Ancalaf was initially accused of three arsons. After 
the appeal, he was only found guilty of one of them (these criminal cases will be discussed in 
more depth in the next chapter). While such (partial) acquittals may be interpreted as an 
indication of a well-functioning and independent judiciary scrutinizing cases, their frequency 
also throws in doubt the legitimacy of the initiation of such criminal investigations. Such 
acquittals have therefore also raised questions about the validity of the criminal proceedings 
(HRW 2004; Guerra 2010; Sepúlveda 2011). 
 
In the meta-conflict in the criminal justice arena, those mobilizing as “victims” and “prisoner 
supporters” propose alternative narratives as they push the state to adopt or reject certain 
representations of reality and the narrative that condemns and places blame. This battle of 
interpretation addresses the boundary between the political arena and the criminal justice 
arena and the meaning of the different actions and identities of the actors involved in the 
“Mapuche conflict.” For example, while indicted Mapuche activists claim to be political 







done a demonstration or for having sent a letter. They have all used violence, not just 
expressed ideas,” claimed the general manager of the CORMA in the 9th region (Interview C-35).  
 
The dichotomous understanding (victim advocates versus prisoner supporters) of mobilization 
and discursive action in the criminal justice arena corresponds to the fixed roles allotted to 
defendants and victims in the structure and logic of criminal law. Criminal trials can thus induce 
an “identification split” in which actors align themselves according to these roles, fomenting 
existing processes of polarization.  
 
Landowners mobilize as victims: “This is the Far West” 
Private landowner Juan Agustín Figueroa spoke these words in 2003 when he referred to the 
rural Araucanía as the “Far West” and threatened to take the law in his own hands, making 
explicit reference to the social contract, in which citizens give up their right to self-defense and 
hand it over to the state. Spoken by a prestigious lawyer, a member of the Constitutional Court, 
these words carry weight:  
 
En una sociedad los ciudadanos renuncian a su derecho de la autodefensa, porque se la entregan 
al Estado... Sin embargo, cuando éste en el hecho no me la brinda y me deja en una situación de 








[In a society, citizens renounce their right to self-defense, because they hand it over to the 
State… But when [the state] does not lend me its support and leaves me in a situation of 
defenselessness, I am indirectly invited to take justice into my own hands.] (Cayuqueo 2003)   
 
Collective mobilization of forestry companies and private landowners as the “victims” in the 
Mapuche conflict gained force throughout the 1990s. Since the early 2000s they have become 
more effective in getting their definition of the situation (“this is terrorism”) accepted in 
criminal prosecutions, in which they often actively participated as private complainants.  
 
In this section, I focus specifically on the way in which landowners tried to engage the criminal 
justice system. Landowners are, however, not only concerned with punishment and have 
responded to the challenges posed by Mapuche protests in many different ways. In order to 
protect their property, they have hired private security companies, bought guns, and arranged 
for surveillance on their lands, sometimes in coordination with neighbors. They have asked for 
police protection and on occasion have founded what they call “defense” committees (and 
Mapuche activists call “paramilitaries”). In addition to concerns about proper protection, 
landowners have expressed worries about negative publicity (in the case of companies) or their 
good name (in the case of private landowners). Forestry companies have worked hard to 
maintain good public relations and keep the region interesting for investments as they faced 
the difficult task of countering the public image of corporations and landowners as greedy and 
powerful entities facing the “poor and oppressed indigenous people.” Companies have set up 







communities, for example by providing them with work, scholarships, and other services. 
Finally, landowners have negotiated with Mapuche communities about land transfers, either 
officially and in dialogue with CONADI or more informally. Landowner mobilization as “victims” 
in the criminal justice arena should thus always be understood within the context of this 
broader range of interactions between landowners, the state, and Mapuche communities.  
 
For this description of landowner mobilization, I relied on interviews with representatives of 
almost all forestry companies in the region, large and small. I also interviewed one private 
farmer and lawyers representing private farmers and forestry companies. In addition, I used 
information provided in witness testimonies during trials as well as documentation from 
business associations such as the forestry council CORMA. I describe the dynamics of victim 
mobilization by Chilean landowners using the four aspects described in Chapter 1.  
 
1. Self-identification as victim and creation of alliances 
2. Declaration of a common problem 
3. Demanding protection from the state: claiming the rechtsstaat 
4. Defining actions as criminal – employing criminal law 
 
1. Self-identification as victim and creation of alliances 
Landowners claim victimhood and actively create alliances with other landowners to construct 







Spain, Chilean landowners generally recognize the “Mapuche conflict” as a political conflict, and 
some also acknowledge that the demands have some legitimacy. However, they sweep away 
any notion that the current landowners could be (partially) blamed and portray themselves 
exclusively as victims of the situation. “It is a historical problem, and the forestry companies 
have nothing to do with it,” said the regional manager of the CORMA in 2003 (Interview C-35). 
Typical is also the following declaration issued by Forestal Mininco in reaction to the land 
takeover and subsequent confrontations in the estate Santa Rosa de Colpi:  
Hacemos un llamado a la opinión pública a no dejarse confundir por versiones e imágenes falsas 
y tendenciosas acerca de lo ocurrido, que pretenden legitimar acciones de violencia y terrorismo. 
Los graves problemas sociales que aquejan a los habitantes de estas zonas, son muy anteriores a 
la presencia en ellas de empresas forestales. Las reivindicaciones históricas de tierras o los 
problemas sociales, por serios que éstos sean, no pueden justificar el uso de medios de presión 
ilegales y violentos, si queremos vivir en una sociedad civilizada y democrática. 
  
We call for the public opinion to not be confused by false and tendentious versions and images 
about what has happened which have the intention of legitimizing actions of violence and 
terrorism. The grave social problems that exist among the inhabitants of this region date very 
much from before the presence of the forestry companies in the region. The historical claims of 
lands or the social problems, however serious they are, cannot justify the use of illegal and 
violent means of pressure if we want to live in a civilized and democratic society. (Mininco 
1999c) 
 
In their representation as victims, companies reject their image as powerful actors that 
Mapuche activists paint. The general manager of the CORMA in the 9th region said: “we are 
weak! If we had power, we would not have been forced to sell things. Then there would not 
have been arsons” (Interview C-35). The chief of public relations from Forestal Mininco agreed 
that they are weak: “they are threatening us with a match” (Interview C-17). He lamented that 
Mininco did not have much room to maneuver, as he indicated they have to compete on the 







knew belonged to the Mapuches, the chief of public relations talked about “the process” in 
which Mininco acquired almost 400,000 hectares as an automatic development that was simply 
the (natural) “consequence” of Decreto Ley 701, the law enacted in 1974 to promote forestry 
(Interview C-17). In his account, he almost made Forestal Mininco disappear as an actor, 
explaining that it was all a “sociological phenomenon” because of the reforestation from 1975 
onwards. He empathized with the Mapuches when he said: “their lives were changed without 
asking.” As a forestry company, however, he did not see any responsibility: “What does a 
forestry company have to do with a phenomenon from 1880?” He pointed out that Mapuches 
do not want to change. “They want the fruits of development, but without working for it. 
Nobody will admit it, but if you look, that is the truth.” In contrast to the small-scale and 
subsistence Mapuche agriculture, landowners project themselves as entrepreneurs and 
important forces in the economic development of Chile.  
 
During the 1990s forestry companies undertook collective action in order to bring their 
problems with Mapuche mobilizations to the attention of the government and the larger public. 
Still, coordination does not mean that there is a single policy. The president of the CORMA in 
the 8th region, Jorge Cerón [sic], emphasized that “every company applies their own rules, 
according to what the shareholders of the company estimate as being convenient, who are the 
ones that decide how to administer their patrimony and how to resolve their problems”  








While corporate landowners faced Mapuche mobilizations during the 1990s and united in 
response to their protests, during the 2000s, as the attacks on private landowners became 
more frequent, there were also collective actions on their behalf. In 2001, the SOFO [Sociedad 
de Fomento Agricola de Temuco, Society in Promotion of Agriculture in Temuco, founded in 
1918] distributed a manual among farmers giving instructions about how to act in the event of 
a land occupation or another threat. It included information about how to file a criminal 
complaint, listing names and directions of prosecutors and providing information about the 
rights of victims and the possibility to ask for police protection (Barria 2001). In response to the 
attack on the house of private landowner Luchsinger, the “Consorcio Agrícola del Sur” 
[Agricultural Consortium of the South] even offered compensation to the person that found the 
perpetrators (Terra.cl 2005). The arson of Luchsinger’s house in 2006 also triggered several 
members of the farmer’s organization SOFO to support each other by setting up a solidarity 
fund for legal assistance. The director of the SOFO explained this sign of support, indicating that 
there was a fear among landowners that “I could be next” (Interview C-55). Identification with 
the “victim” thus created the basis for fear of victimization and solidarity. Still, according to the 
SOFO director, the number of people supporting the legal fund for victims of attacks was not 
very high, even though there were people that made donations although they did not 
personally experience problems with Mapuche demands. The SOFO lawyer similarly told me 
that by 2009 only 65 farmers were member of the fund, whereas the SOFO had 700 members 








The SOFO, CORMA, and other industry associations frequently cooperated in their preparation 
of common declarations, calling upon the government to intervene in the conflict (CORMA 
1999c; CORMA 2002a; CORMA, no date a; Public Declaration 2001; Public Declaration 2002).104 
Indeed, having united as one collective actor facing one enemy, landowners were able to 
communicate as “victims” and set up a coordinated media strategy, develop position papers 
about the best communication strategy in response to attacks, and critically analyze past 
practices which might have harmed the sector’s image more than necessary (CORMA, no date 
b).  
 
Apart from public declarations and media work, there has been an active lobby to congressmen 
and local governors. For example, the manager of the CORMA had meetings with the governors 
of Cautín and Malleco as well as with the sub-secretary of Mideplan to express their concern 
and press them for actions. Affected landowners or their lawyers have further met with 
senators and the Minister of Internal Affairs (El Mercurio 2008) and cooperated with reports for 
Senate investigative committees. In addition, a coalition of corporate associations initiated a 
scientific investigation about the different “perspectives on peace” from actors involved in the 
conflict (Casas 2009).  
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Despite these efforts to unite in a common victimhood, collective mobilization alternates with 
efforts to emphasize the differences between the different kinds of landowners. Private 
landowners have emphasized that they have always had good relations with adjacent Mapuche 
communities, in contrast to the forestry companies. Smaller forestry companies have 
underscored that they are not the big transnational companies which were the focal point of 
Mapuche protests during the 1990s. A forestry engineer from a big forestry company, however, 
traced the problem back to agriculture: “This is a problem of the last fifty years with agriculture. 
It is not a problem of forestry” (Interview C-34). An example of such boundary-drawing by 
landowners was visible in a session of a special parliamentary committee on citizen security. 
The daughter of one of the often-attacked private farmers said: “We are not terratenientes 
[landowners]. We are not latifundistas [owners of large estates]. That is a lie. […] We work hard 
for what we have; no one has ever just given anything to us.” (Comisión Seguridad Ciudadana 
2009). She attempted to counter the Mapuche legitimizations of the attacks leveled against her 
family and their property, rejecting their ascribed identity as rich and powerful landowners and 
instead emphasizing their hard work. Solidarity thus has clear limits. Indeed, a private 
landowner told me that it was like a disease, because when he experienced problems with 
surrounding Mapuche communities, other private farmers did not want to associate with him 
anymore as they were scared to be next (Interview C-37).  
 
Landowners thus claim to be victims. And while they are not homogeneous, and keep 







victimhood, forming alliances, cooperating in lobby work and public declarations and 
interpreting separate experiences as part of a meaningful whole in the context of the 
“Mapuche conflict.” 
 
2. Declaration of a common problem 
Landowners claim that the Mapuche conflict constitutes the following threats: forced land 
transfers, economic stagnation, insurance troubles, loss of investments, and a threat to lives. A 
collective declaration in October 2008, for example, focused its attention on the decrease in 
investments in the region.  
Sin embargo cualquier emprendimiento se ve afectado por el clima de incertidumbre y 
desconfianza. Ante los hechos de violencia reiterados no  se ha podido emprender por falta de 
seguridad y acoso permanente. Todo ello ha redundado en desempleo y bajo crecimiento. 
Sabemos que la Región de La Araucanía ha visto mermada considerablemente la inversión. La 
inversión extranjera es nula y la inversión nacional ha disminuido en los últimos años. 
 
Any entrepreneurship is affected by the climate of uncertainty and lack of confidence. Facing 
the facts of reiterated violence, it has not been possible to undertake investments because of a 
lack of security and permanent hassle. All this has led to unemployment and low growth. We 
know that the region of the Araucanía has seen a considerable decrease in investments. Foreign 
investment is zero and the national investment has decreased in the last years. (CPC 2008)    
 
Landowners have strategically drawn on the human rights discourse, claiming that they too 
have human rights (see also Richards 2010:80). They criticize the way in which Mapuche 
activists seem to have appropriated human rights as a concept exclusively applicable to 
Mapuches and Mapuche prisoners. For example, when the United Nations Special Rapporteur 







landowners sent him a report in which they listed the violations of their human rights as they 
perceived his focus on the Mapuches to be one-sided (Interview C-43).  
 
Thus, landowners claim that they want to live in peace and tranquility to be able to continue 
their “entrepreneurship” (CPC October 2008). While landowners have sometimes united under 
one umbrella, there are clear distinctions in the kind of harm that private landowners and 
forestry companies suffer. Arson can be a nuisance for forestry companies, but for private 
landowners it can mean that 100% of their property is wiped out (Interview C-35). The lawyer 
for SOFO, representing several of the private landowners, further emphasized that the negative 
portrayal of troubled landowners in national media is what often hurts them the most. He 
called it the “murder of their image” as fellow farmers tend to think that the ones that get into 
trouble are treating Mapuches badly and are only interested in profit (Interview C-42).  
 
Another important difference is that while forestry companies simply hire private security 
employees in order to guard their plantations, private landowners are often living on their 
property and some have claimed to suffer from daily harassment. One farmer family, for 
example, has been living with constant protection by police, who bring the children to school 
and pick them up again. The children have been threatened and harassed and their father and 
grandfather were called “murderers” in graffiti in the village. At one point, they found animals 
cut open on the road. During a session in a parliamentary commission, the family members 







was set on fire when the landowner was still in it. They felt that they have not deserved such 
treatment. “We haven’t damaged anyone, not nature, not anyone. […] What have we done to 
the people that are attacking us?” (Comisión Seguridad Ciudadana 2009).  
 
Thus, landowners lift their own personal experiences out of the individual sphere when they 
declare that they suffer a common problem due to the “Mapuche conflict,” emphasizing the 
economic losses, the lack of investment, and the difficulty to find insurance. In addition to 
claiming such collective problems, private landowners call attention to the daily harassment 
they suffer in which they tend to portray themselves as scapegoats of a larger problem.  
 
3. Demanding protection from the state: Claiming the rechtsstaat 
Landowners have demanded state intervention in order to deal effectively with the common 
problem they are experiencing. They claim that not enough has been done to protect them and 
punish the perpetrators of the crimes. Landowners refer to the rechtsstaat in order to demand 
respect for their property and argue that the state has to deliver order. The president of the 
CORMA in the 8th region explained that forestry companies need a stable and secure 
environment: “forestry activity is long term and requires basic components such as equilibrium 
and maximal tranquility that guarantee the strong investment that they are making” (in: 








In a remarkable similarity with the complaints in Spain, landowners have criticized the lack of 
attention from government officials as well as the low conviction rate. Farmers report that they 
feel unprotected. Even farmers who have 24/7 protection have suffered attacks; it was even 
reported that some pay the police for fuel for their cars to come to protect them (Interview C-
55). Facing the lack of protection by the state, farmers have warned the government. Manuel 
Riesco, president of the Consorcio Agrícola del Sur, said after the attack on Jorge Luchsinger’s 
house on 9 June 2005: “Si el Gobierno no actúa, vamos a tener que actuar nosotros para 
defendernos.” [If the government doesn’t act, we will have to act to defend ourselves] 
(Cayuqueo 2005b). A private landowner complained that when he visited the local governors 
they played down the problem, saying that it concerned ordinary criminals and isolated cases 
and that they could only offer him police protection. He experienced twenty-five attacks of 
theft and arson, but there had not been one arrest in his case (Comisión Seguridad Ciudadana 
2009).  
 
Indeed, many landowners signaled that there had been too few convictions. The lawyer for 
SOFO said that there had been more than fifty criminal complaints filed by landowners 
between 2005 and 2009 and only four convictions and a couple of “alternative solutions” 
(extrajudicial settlements) (Interview C-42). After internal deliberation, a Forestal Mininco 
representative was not even allowed to give me the number of criminal complaints they had 
filed during the past years, because the results were “so bad” (telephone conversation May 







in government statistics in relation to “Mapuche conflict” cases (Comisión de Constitución 
2003:76). Frustrated with the inaction of the government, a forestry company in Galvarino even 
took the initiative to identify the perpetrators of arsons, felling of trees, road blockades, and 
occupations, claiming to be able to prove the participation of the alleged suspects with 
documents that were registered with the carabineros of Galvarino (CORMA 2001). 
 
According to landowners, the lack of convictions is partially due to the fact that actions are 
done during the night, executed by highly prepared criminals, and because they have their face 
covered [encapuchados] and threaten potential witnesses. At the same time, landowners 
criticize criminal procedure, claiming that the standards for sufficient proof are too high and 
that the system gives too many rights to defendants. They also said that too little resources 
were dedicated to solving these crimes, arguing that there was not enough political will from 
“Santiago” to deal with these issues (Interviews C-42/44/54/55).  
 
Landowners thus explicitly call upon the state’s obligations as a quid pro quo in the social 
contract. Private landowner Juan Agustín Figueroa argued that landowners lack the necessary 
protection which they deserve as citizens of Chile (Cayuqueo 2003). The rule of law is thus 
interpreted as an obligation of the state to protect citizens, corporations, and their property. 
“We comply with all the labor and environmental laws. The state has to guarantee us the right 
to private property,” claimed the manager of one of the bigger forestry companies (Interview C-







clearly within the larger framework of the entire legal system and its protection of private 
property. “We want the law to work,” said the manager of one of the smaller Chilean forestry 
companies. “In [sub-province] Ercilla there was a claim without foundation. We bought the land 
legally. They [a Mapuche community] demanded the lands, but they didn’t show any Título de 
Merced. It doesn’t work that way. As a company we want the law to work” (Interview C-33).  
 
4. Defining actions as criminal – employing criminal law 
Landowners have taken up the vocabulary of criminal law and moved into the criminal justice 
arena. They define events as crimes, file criminal complaints, cooperate with law enforcement, 
and propose an alternative narrative about the nature and the perpetrators of the crimes. 
While many landowners have done so, some private landowners as well as bigger forestry 
companies have made the conscious decision not to denounce crimes or file complaints. They 
have decided to maintain a low profile, not to gain any unwanted (negative) publicity, to either 
accept the crimes as a given by-product of the situation or respond in a non-penalized way.  
 
Since 1997, landowners have become an important voice in the criminal justice arena. They 
have criticized the state when it advances a de-contextualized narrative and emphasize that 
attacks on their properties should not be viewed as isolated incidents. Instead, they argue, the 
“Mapuche conflict” should be in the foreground as the relevant context. One landowner, for 
example, expressed his frustration that the government continued to treat the attacks as 







acknowledge his proposed image of an organized commando that perpetrates each of the 
attacks. He asked the government to acknowledge the bigger problem that he was facing: a 
continued series of attacks that was not likely to stop (Comisión Seguridad Ciudadana 2009]. 
Landowners have brought such a re-contextualized perspective into the courtroom, for 
example, when the executive vice-president of the CORMA, Juan Correa Bulnes, was a witness 
for the prosecutor and testified as follows:  
 
There was the idea that [the crimes] were separate facts. Now, we cause public alarm by saying 
that there were 600 of those crimes. And now we have described them in detail, so that the 
government can see how many crimes there are. We want attention for the truth, to enable 
unified action. (Trial Lonkos of Traiguén, Field notes, April 2003) 
 
While landowners generally recognized the Mapuche conflict as a political conflict, they 
stressed that this does not mean that the protest actions are somehow legitimate or actually 
represent the legitimate Mapuche demands. For example, one private landowner said the 
name “Mapuche conflict” is a misnomer. “It is pure terrorist delinquency” (Interview C-37). 
Therefore, they emphasized that specific individuals were responsible for the criminal activity. 
For example, the chief of public relations of Forestal Mininco said that they “never had 
problems in [estate] San Jorge until the Ancalaf family moved there. There are people who are 
experts in creating chaos” (Interview C-17). Thus, while recognizing the “Mapuche conflict” as 







landowners routinely claim their innocence and rejected any justification for the attacks against 
them. They point to the state as the actor that is responsible for the conflict situation.  
 
The re-contextualization of single events as part of an organization and coordination of attacks 
led landowners to define the pattern of actions as terrorism.  
Los actos de violencia no son “situaciones aisladas”, la ciudadanía ha sido testigo del nivel de 
complejidad, de organización y de aumento en la escalada de violencia que ha recrudecido en los 
últimos tiempos. Esto corresponde a un plan de largo plazo con connotaciones ideológicas de 
índole terrorista. 
 
[The acts of violence are not “isolated situations”; the citizens have been witnesses to the level 
of complexity, of organization and the recent escalation of violence. This corresponds to a long 
term plan with ideological connotations of terrorist nature.] (CPC 2008, emphasis added by 
author)  
 
Landowners therefore lobbied for the use of the Anti-Terrorism Law. For example, on 14 
December 2001, the president of the CORMA in the 9th region wrote a letter to the provincial 
governor of the province Cautín asking him to apply the Law on State Security or the Anti-
Terrorism Law regarding the violent acts in Mapuche conflict. On 10 March 2002, the corporate 
associations published a two-page advertisement in the newspaper El Mercurio in which they 
claimed that “terrorism is expanding in the sectors in the Araucanía region” and demanded 
state intervention using the Law on State Security and the Anti-Terrorism Law (Toledo 
2007:282). Indeed, after this advertisement the Anti-Terrorism Law was used for the first time. 
Provincial governors and regional governors in the 8th and 9th region requested the Anti-
Terrorism Law on twelve occasions between 2002 and 2003 (Comisión de Constitución 







view that not only threats to human beings but also material destruction should be subject to 
terrorism laws (Interview C-55). 
 
Landowners have thus actively pushed for the definition of events as “crimes.” They moved into 
the criminal justice arena to deal with the harm that they experienced. Some believed that 
criminal prosecutions would be effective in reducing violence. For example, in 2003 several 
landowners expressed their conviction that the detention of Mapuche activist Victor Ancalaf 
was the reason why mobilizations in the Collipulli area (in the 9th region) had decreased 
significantly. Also, in an interview in 2003 the manager from the CORMA in the 9th region was 
convinced that the penal approach had the desired effect as he observed less arsons and 
attributed this to the use of harsher laws (Interview C-35). Thus, “detentions work!” was the 
motto. Landowners therefore actively assisted prosecutors and the police in the investigation of 
events and also participated as “private accusers” during trials. Forestal Mininco is one of the 
forestry companies that consistently participate as a private accuser during all trials in which 
Mininco is an affected party. They have provided maximum assistance to the process of fact-
finding and judicial investigation. One of the duties of their private security personnel, for 
example, was to make pictures and videos during occupations or incidents and provide witness 
testimony (Interview C-18).  
 
While some thus may have been confident (for a while) that criminal prosecutions would 







and cooperation from authorities. Indeed, it seemed that at the time of my fieldwork in 2009, 
landowners were less confident that the state would engage in criminal prosecutions and 
secure convictions than in 2003. Interviewees in 2009 expressed a perception of continued 
impunity of illegal actions by Mapuche activists. The discontent with the results of the criminal 
justice system even led to an official complaint filed in 2006 by the senator of a right-wing 
political party to remove the regional prosecutor of La Araucanía because of a lack of results. “I 
am tired of filing criminal complaints” said the owner of several plantations in 2009 (Interview 
C-54). The only reason that kept him filing complaints was that the insurance company required 
him to do so. Indeed, some farmers decided to retreat from the criminal justice arena and 
withdrew from cooperation with law enforcers. The director of the SOFO told me that the 
criminal complaints that farmers had filed had had brought so few results that many of them 
had decided not to file complaints anymore (Interview C-55).  
  
While some landowners thus retreated from the criminal justice arena, others emphasized the 
importance of continuing to file complaints. A senior lawyer who represented Forestal Mininco 
in its trials estimated that at least eighty percent of the complaints that he filed were being 
archived without any results (Interview C-44). He did not, however, see this as a huge failure. 
For him, the most important thing was to keep the “system functioning.” Thus, the company 
continued to file complaints: it was not so much the punishment that was important; it was the 
process of labeling that had to continue. Finally, there were landowners who did not have 







criminal justice arena as a default option. For example, the lawyer for SOFO, filing criminal 
complaints on behalf of farmers, acknowledged that the real solution cannot and will not be 
found in criminal prosecutions. “The solution is not in the courtrooms. The Mapuche problem is 
a sociopolitical problem. But while the state is not solving it, we have to continue reacting” 
(Interview C-42). So litigation continued.  
 
In response to attacks on their property, landowners thus have mobilized as “victims” and 
effectively taken up and received the role of victims in criminal proceedings. On various 
occasions, they united and declared their separate experiences as part of a common problem. 
They firmly defined the attacks on their property as crimes and demanded prosecution. 
Landowners thus moved into the criminal justice arena and formed a strong voice in the meta-
conflict. They have strongly criticized the state for the low conviction rate, for not taking the 
issue seriously, and for failing to offer adequate protection. Frustrated with the state’s 
tendency to downplay the problem and deal with separate events in isolation, landowners have 
further pushed the prosecutors to adopt a re-contextualized narrative in which separate events 
are connected and understood as “terrorism.” Despite an increase in criminal prosecutions 
during the 2000s, however, landowners have continued to criticize the state for the meager 
results of prosecutions, and by 2009 some landowners had retreated from the criminal justice 
arena due to this frustration. Others have emphasized either the autonomous importance of 








Prisoner support mobilization in the Mapuche movement 
The voice of “victim” landowners thus pushes the state to take their experiences seriously and 
respond with a “mano dura” [strong hand or iron fist] to attacks on their property. This is, 
however, not the only voice in the criminal justice arena as it is countered by the voice of 
prisoner supporters who propose an alternative reading of events. In response to the criminal 
prosecutions of Mapuche activists, prisoner supporters have rushed into the criminal justice 
arena to challenge the state’s definition of the situation, assist defendants in the practicalities 
of standing trial, and raise awareness in the larger public about the claimed political nature of 
the criminal proceedings. Mapuche activists stand out in their disorganized though widespread 
support for their prisoners, as well as in their hesitancy to fundamentally challenge the Chilean 
state, as most criticism stays within the liberal legalist framework.  
 
This description of prisoner support mobilization is based on in-depth interviews and 
conversations with more than twenty defendants and many supporters and activists in the 
Mapuche movement. I have selected defendants from some of the major prosecutions as well 
as some smaller criminal cases. I have made the pool of interviewees as diverse as possible, 
selecting defendants belonging to the Mapuche organizations CAM and CTT as well as non-
affiliated defendants. I have included rural older community members and young urban Chilean 
sympathizers and everything in between. In addition, I have relied upon the information 








I will describe the focus and activities of the prisoner support groups using the four aspects 
described in Chapter 1. 
  
1. Creation of a prisoner support group: a call for solidarity  
2. Criticisms within the framework of liberal legalism: de-legitimization of the state 
3. Bringing the “political” back in: identification as a political prisoner 
4. Persuading the public of the political definition: changing the impact of criminal 
prosecutions  
  
1. Creation of a prisoner support group: A call for solidarity 
There are a variety of prisoner support groups within and outside of the Mapuche movement, 
and their names and specific stances have changed over time. Some groups specifically chose to 
support only CAM members; others have provided broader support to all defendants related to 
the Mapuche movement. Regardless such differences, prisoner supporters generally attempt to 
reduce the financial and psychological cost of repression. The vicious effects of the hassle with 
an investigation, a trial, and prison can lead to expenses for a lawyer and such banal issues as 
marital problems. Support work varies from visiting prisoners, attending trials, and assisting the 
family with the harvest to organizing demonstrations. During the 2010 hunger strike, some 
activists worked full time as “spokespersons” of the prisoners. Some Mapuche students set up 
regular visits to prisoners in order to learn from them. It is their way of educating themselves 







prisoners as experts, as people who know, as people who have intimate knowledge of what is 
going on. In many instances, activists and also fellow community members try to attend trials in 
which a Mapuche activist is prosecuted and honoring ceremonies are held yearly in the 
memory of young Mapuche activists that have been killed in police confrontations.  
 
The solidarity is based on the claimed common, reified, and generalized Mapuche identity. “It is 
a familiar fight, when a Mapuche struggles for his people,” said one activist (Interview C-68).  
Those inside prison are perceived to suffer for those outside. Identification with the defendant 
reproduces the notion that you could be in his or her place. “They apply the law to us,” said an 
activist who herself had not been prosecuted (Field notes, April 2009). This shifts the emphasis 
from an alleged crime to the shared identity. Compassion and sacrifice are important to 
activists, for example to a young student who told me about his visits to prisoners: “At times I 
get up at five in the morning to walk two hours and catch the bus to Angol to visit my 
brothers.105 It is a sacrifice, but for me it is enriching. I am supporting my brothers,” he said with 
tears in his eyes (Interview C-67). Mapuche activists thus strongly identify with experiences of 
repression affecting other Mapuches. A single confrontation involving police violence against 
one Mapuche in the Temucuicui community (a Mapuche community in the 9th region) is thus 
interpreted as police violence against the Mapuche “people.” Similarly, they interpret a specific 
fight for land in the area Los Laureles as a struggle about the Mapuche “territory.” Events are 
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interpreted in the context of the Mapuche struggle and the historical and continuous 
dispossession of and violence against the Mapuche people.  
 
Mapuche activists tend to have little confidence in the criminal justice system. They perceive a 
lack of access to the legal system, distrust the public defenders, and believe that the legal 
system does not work in favor of Mapuches. Confidence in the state is so low that Mapuche 
activists generally do not believe any of the allegations made against fellow Mapuche activists 
during criminal investigations. As I will discuss in more depth below, this means that the 
authority of the state to yield credible evidence is at stake. A survey conducted in 1999 
reported that only 18% of Mapuches supported the government and only 25% had confidence 
in the government. The support for and confidence in the national parliament were even lower, 
both hardly reaching 10%. In addition, only 13% of Mapuches had confidence in the judicial 
powers (CERC in: Lavanchy 2003:13). Historian Lavanchy concluded that the state had lost its 
legitimacy in the eyes of the Mapuches in general (not just the activists) (2003:13).  
 
This lack of confidence makes it impossible for the rule of law to perform its legitimizing 
function in court. Activists refer to an unfavorable court decision against a Mapuche land claim 
as proof of the way in which the system works against Mapuches, providing grounds for acts of 
civil disobedience. Similarly, whereas an acquittal of a Mapuche activist is understood as proof 
of “unjustified persecution” by prosecutors, a conviction is interpreted merely as the 








2. Criticisms within the framework of liberal legalism: De-legitimization of the state 
Much of the prisoner support work in the Mapuche movement sticks within the framework of 
liberal legalism and aims to delegitimize the state by pointing out the ways in which it does not 
adhere to the rule of law. Liberal supporters are concerned about human rights violations, such 
as the violation of the presumption of innocence, a lack of due process, and incidents of 
torture. While the previous chapters described that lawyers for ETA militants refused to engage 
in criminal defense, in Chile most criminal cases of Mapuche activists are defended within the 
framework of liberal legalism, which emphasizes the presumption of innocence and the fact 
that the prosecutor has to prove beyond reasonable doubt the participation of the defendant.  
 
Just as in Spain, most human rights organizations also adhere to the liberal legalist framework. 
For example, I asked one of the lawyers at the Observatorio Ciudadano about criminal cases 
against Mapuche activists. He referred me to the most famous cases, on which I already had 
information, and I continued to ask him if he could help me to get access to other criminal cases 
that had taken place. He told me that “those are not relevant, because there are no issues of 
human rights involved there” (Field notes, April 2009). I had a hard time getting him to at least 
listen to my project. For him it was really off his radar once there were no “human rights 
violations” at stake in the strict sense of violation of (international) human rights law and the 








The demands in the 2010 hunger strike similarly reflected this “rule of law” basis of grievances, 
when the activists argued that the anti-terrorism law was disproportionate and criticized that 
some Mapuche activists faced charges in both military courts and civilian courts (violating the 
ne bis in idem principle, which prohibits a person from being  tried twice for the same offense). 
In this strike, activists reached out to official organs. For example, CAM leader Hector Llaitul 
wrote a letter from prison to Secretary General of the UN Ban Ki Moon asking for his 
intervention (Radio UChile 2010).106  
 
Many international human rights organizations have spoken out about criminal prosecutions in 
the Mapuche conflict and the use of anti-terrorism laws in particular, such as Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, the International Federation for Human Rights, and the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Their reports and recommendations 
have had important leverage in the public debate in Chile as they were widely discussed and 
cited.  
 
3. Bringing the “political” back in: Becoming a “political” prisoner 
“Have you heard the radio? This morning there was a search in Tirúa, and they detained eleven 
people!” In April 2009, I accompanied Juan to one of the Mapuche communities. The whole day 
the events in Tirúa (city in the 8th region) were the topic of conversation. Everyone in that 
particular Mapuche community was involved with the news and felt for their “brothers” who 
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had “fallen.” There was no mention of what the charges against them might be or whether the 
detainees might have been guilty of these charges. As in the usual conversations between 
activists, that was virtually irrelevant. The detentions were simply viewed as one more 
repressive action against their struggle and their people.  
 
Mapuche activists claim their prisoners to be “political” prisoners. Some organizations provide 
specific descriptions of what that means:  
Para nuestra Organización, Preso Político Mapuche es todo aquel Mapuche privado de libertad y/o 
en proceso, producto de su participación en acciones que apunten a la reconstrucción del Pueblo-
Nación Mapuche, entendiendo por tal los procesos de recuperación de tierras y/o ejerciendo Control 
Territorial sobre predios recuperados, acciones de resistencia ante la represión policial, así como las 
movilizaciones que apunten a la reivindicación de los Derechos Políticos del Pueblo Mapuche.[…] Con 
los anteriores criterios, claramente nuestros hermanos no son presos comunes o delincuentes como 
el estado opresor los ha tratado. 
 
[For our organization, a Mapuche Political Prisoner is any Mapuche whose liberty is taken away, or is 
in that process, as a product of his/her participation in actions that lead to the reconstruction of the 
Pueblo-Nación Mapuche [People-Nation Mapuche], understanding as such the processes of 
recuperation of lands and/or execution of Territorial Control over recuperated lands, actions of 
resistance against police repression, as well as mobilizations that lead to the recuperation of 
Political Rights of the Mapuche People. […] With the aforementioned criteria, clearly our brothers 
are not common prisoners or criminals, as the oppressive state has treated them.] (Meli Witran 
Mapu 2011)  
 
Contrary to such claims by activists, the Chilean state categorically rejects all suggestions about 
“political” prisoners. In her visit to the Netherlands, President Michelle Bachelet officially 
declared that in Chile there are no Mapuche political prisoners. “No one is imprisoned [in Chile] 
because of a specific ideology or because of belonging to an original ethnic group [etnia]” (cited 







about the labels used to define events, victims, and perpetrators in the criminal cases in the 
Mapuche conflict.  
 
In their identification of Mapuche activists as “political” prisoners, supporters seldom directly 
challenge the criminal definitions imposed by the state. Instead, they focus their attention on 
the trajectory of state repression. For a long time, Mapuche activists denied responsibility for 
their covert actions. This meant that they made competing truth claims, not competing moral 
claims regarding the prosecutor’s charges. A former CAM activist explained this choice as a 
consequence of the fact that the Mapuche people were not yet “ready” for such covert 
“violent” actions and would not have accepted them (Interview C-28). Often, Mapuche activists 
entirely ignored the underlying accusation and focused on what they viewed as illegitimate 
repression. For example, in our conversation about an incident in which a security guard got 
burned (Case of attempted homicide 2001), the defendant told me that “no one ever asked me 
whether I did it or not.” He was not sure whether people assumed that he did it and did not 
care or whether they thought he was innocent. He thinks people just did not care about why he 
was in prison. “No, once I was asked,” he added after a while. “A lamngen [sister] asked me 
whether I did it or not. When I said I did, she disapprovingly said ‘ooooh’” (Interview C-57).   
 
Mapuche activists thus shift the focus from the criminalized event to the state prosecution. 
While the state and “victims” argue that prosecutions are the natural response to a “crime,” 







and “naturally” a reaction to “crimes.” Contrary to liberal prisoner supporters who focus on 
separate criminal prosecutions and criticize violations within the framework of the rule of law, 
political supporters interpret single prosecutions within the broader context of repression of 
the Mapuche people. Political prisoner supporters argue that the criminal prosecutions of 
Mapuche activists constitute the criminalization of a social movement, criminalization of social 
protest, criminalization of legitimate demands, and the criminalization of a pueblo. They 
criticize this push of political demands and activism into the criminal justice arena. The term 
“criminalization” does not necessarily refer to any specific event, but to the general translation 
of Mapuche activism into the language and logic of the criminal law, guilt, and punishment. 
“They should not punish the Mapuche struggle, but solve it,” said a former CAM member 
(Interview C-46). Even some human rights organizations have moved beyond the liberal legalist 
framework and adopted this contextualized reading of the criminal prosecutions. For example, 
human rights organization FIDH claimed in 2006 that there is “criminalization” because of the 
many defendants, human rights violations, disproportional sentences, the influence of 
prosecutions on social and political life, and the legitimacy of social and political demands (FIDH 
2006:52).  
   
The term “criminalization” is often used loosely in activist discourse, referring not only to an 
alleged political use of trials but also to exaggerating and stigmatizing media headlines as well 
as supposed violations of due process and excessive police violence. The seizure of potential 







“theft” in order to weaken the movement. Indeed, many Mapuche activists claimed that 
searches and arrests are meant more to disturb and intimidate than to come to any conviction. 
Activists further routinely argued that criminal prosecutions are the result of fabricated charges 
and fabricated evidence against them. They say that the state and corporations are setting 
them up, either by orchestrating the crime itself and then imputing them, or by tampering with 
the evidence and making them seem guilty. Indeed, there have been reports about private 
security employees who claimed to have staged attacks ordered by a forestry company in order 
to frame Mapuche activists for those attacks or in order to justify and maintain their jobs 
(Navarro 2001; Villegas 2007, footnote 67).107 Activists often drew on these incidents in order to 
back up their claim that Mapuches do not commit arsons.  
 
Activists thus expect the repression. Some defendants described that they had just been 
waiting for the blow. For long-time activists, prison converts almost literally into the expected 
“cost” of activism. “I came out pretty cheaply, given my [long] trajectory,” reflected a CAM 
member, employing the metaphor of money and the market to illustrate the “bargain” that he 
got (Interview C-72). Prison or conviction is thus interpreted cynically and calmly as the simple, 
almost inevitable, price one finally will have to pay. They just hope it will not be a high price. In 
the words of another activist: “I accepted the consequences and the risks. The work that I did, it 
is not a hobby; it is about beliefs” (Interview C-39).  
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By placing criminal prosecutions in this broader context of expected repression, political 
supporters thus redefine what the trials are “actually about.” They interpret the detention of 
their leaders, for example, as a deliberate strategy to incapacitate the important political 
spokespersons and community chiefs in that struggle. Also, on various occasions it has been 
suggested that a specific indictment or investigation was the “political punishment” for having 
denounced human rights violations (e.g., FIDH 2006:58). Former CAM activist Pedro Cayuqueo, 
for example, was arrested upon his return from a speech at the UN in Geneva in 1999 and 
activist Juan Pichún was similarly investigated after a tour through Europe in which he had 
given public talks about the prosecutions against his family. Also lonko Juana Calfunao was 
prosecuted after having visited Europe and given speeches at various places (FIDH 2006:58). 
And lawyer Myriam García Reyes was charged with contempt of court after she made public 
classified information about payments regarding protected witnesses in cases related to so-
called “territorial conflicts” (CODEPU 2005). 
 
While most criminal defense lawyers stick with the liberal legalist framework and defend their 
clients without invoking a larger political context of “legitimate demands” and the relations 
between the Chilean state and the Mapuches, one criminal defense lawyer, José Lincoqueo, is 
known to have consistently challenged Chilean jurisdiction in the courtroom in defense of 
Mapuche activists (Toloza 2009). In one case, for example, he described his Mapuche 
defendants as “three foreigners who live outside of the borders of Chile” (Supreme Court, 4 







on the Mapuche treaties with the Spanish Crown and argued that the Chilean court therefore 
lacked jurisdiction over the Mapuche territory:  
El Estado de Chile jamás ha tenido soberanía ni jurisdicción sobre el espacie territorial señalada 
en el sub título, pues esos territorios están y han estado siempre bajo el imperio del Parlamento 
de Negrete de los días 3, 4, 5 de marzo  de 1803, respaldado por incontables disposiciones del C. 
Civil y pertinentes de la Constitución Política del año 1833 […]. 
 
[The Chilean State never has had sovereignty nor jurisdiction over the territorial space signaled 
in the subtitle, as these territories are and have always been under the rule of the Parliament of 
Negrete of the days 3, 4, and 5 March 1803, backed by countless dispositions of the Civil Code 
and the relevant passages of the Political Constitution of the year 1833 […].] (Court of Appeals 
Temuco, 5 January 1998, underlining in original) 
 
His legal arguments have, however, never been recognized by the Chilean courts. 
 
Prisoner supporters claiming defendants as “political” prisoners thus hardly publicly claim 
responsibility for covert actions, hereby cutting off the possibility to defend or redefine those 
actions in the meta-conflict in the criminal justice arena. Instead, in the public battle for 
interpretation they shift attention to the initiation of prosecutions and define criminal trials as 
part of a broader process of criminalization of the Mapuche struggle.  
 
4. Persuading the public of the political definition: Changing the impact of criminal 
prosecutions  
Prisoner supporters challenge the labels of the state and the stigmatizing effect of criminal 
convictions. In doing so, they turn to the larger public in order to persuade more people of the 
alternative narrative, in which prisoners are not criminals, but “political” prisoners. One form of 







that are frequently published on websites. At various moments Mapuche activists have 
succeeded in turning the issue of “political” prisoners into a nationwide debate. For example, 
the 2008 and 2010 hunger strikes and the appeals to the Inter American Court of Human Rights 
have drawn many actors into the meta-conflict in which the criminal justice labels are disputed. 
A specific focus of supporters has been to counter the stigma that comes with the “terrorism” 
label.   
 
Prisoner supporters also aim to turn the negative experiences of repression into a positive and 
essential part of their Mapuche identity. They counter the state’s claim to effectively control 
and eliminate the problem with criminal prosecutions. Instead, prisoner supporters often argue 
that repression will only increase the willingness of Mapuches to become activists and stand up 
against the government or go underground (Interview C-28; Chile Information Project 1999). 
Constant struggle and the battle against repression has become a pervasive part of the identity 
of Mapuche activists, and it is the continuation of this battle that is firmly established as a 
valuable and essential characteristic. Many Mapuche activists see themselves as continuing the 
struggle of their ancestors Lautaro and Caupolicán against the Spaniards. As such, the battle 
itself is worthwhile, and repression is only part of the game. The individual cost of repression is 
thus mitigated in the value of the myth of martyrdom and heroism and the knowledge of being 
a part of the pueblo and its struggle against oppression. In this regard, psychologist Festinger 
said that “[r]ats and people come to love the things for which they have suffered...” (in: 







an essential part of the “education” of the true nationalist Mapuche (Interview C-28). Instead of 
the simple criminal justice premise that imprisonment of “rot apples” will stop mobilizations, 
Mapuches believe in Marrichiweu! – the old Mapuzugun battle cry meaning that for every 
person who falls, ten others will arise.  
 
Prisoner supporters fit repressive events into their narrative of continuous state repression 
against the Mapuche people and bring this narrative to outside organizations, such as Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, and the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Indigenous 
Rights. Often, supporters have been effective in their efforts to draw outside support for their 
prisoners. For example, in reaction to the detentions in the 1997 Lumaco case, the Spanish non-
governmental organization WATU Acción Indígena sent a letter to Antonio Castro Gutiérrez, the 
investigative judge of the appeals court in Temuco, asking to withdraw the charges against the 
members of Mapuche organization CTT and instead start a process of negotiation and dialogue 
(29 December 1997). Thus, WATU specifically asked to reverse the transfer of the events into 
the criminal justice arena and return to the political arena.  
 
Sometimes, prisoner support work also effectively managed to impede the stigmatization of the 
prisoners. For example, despite or indeed even because of his conviction and serving five years 
in prison, Pascual Pichún, lonko of Mapuche community Temulemu, gained widespread respect 
within the Mapuche movement. In meetings, people addressed him admiringly as “lonko” and 







various occasions in order to share his experiences in the struggle for land and his experiences 
during his trial and imprisonment (for example during the visit of the UN Special Rapporteur in 
April 2009).  
 
At other times, however, prisoner support work has not been enough, simply lacking, or 
unconvincing. When given the choice between solidarity or condemnation, many Mapuche 
community members choose to condemn violence and extremism, thus accepting the 
normative framework of the state. Criminal prosecutions have therefore often divided the 
Mapuche movement and communities into “moderates” and “extremists.” Research on 
Mapuche adolescents, for example, revealed that many Mapuche families respect the authority 
of the state and reprimand their children when they get involved with the criminal justice 
system (Colombre et al. 2004:132). One activist complained about this attitude he found among 
his community after returning from prison: “They have all adopted the governmental discourse 
against violence. They have all accepted the image portrayed by the government that any act of 
resistance is terrorism” (Interview C-62). In this way, “extremists” are sometimes isolated 
within their communities. “It was as if I had a contagious disease,” said a defendant as he 
described how former fellow activists and friends started to avoid him and ignored his appeals 
for financial support to pay his lawyer fees. He thought that people were afraid of guilt by 








Prisoner supporters and the state thus engage in a continuous conversation in the criminal 
justice arena about the legitimacy of Mapuche protest activity and the meaning of criminal 
prosecutions. In several cases, activists reported that criminal justice officials encouraged them 
to change their opinions about the use of violence and the appropriateness of illegal methods 
in the struggle. A former CAM member, for example, told me that in 2008, at the end of his 
parole, he had to pass some tests to prove that he had distanced himself from his former 
opinions on the use of violence as a viable method in the struggle (Interview C-57). Another 
former CAM member told me that during the hunger strike in 2005 the prisoners were 
pressured to stop the strike and sign a paper that would confirm that they repented having 
caused harm. All the prisoners rejected (Interview C-46). Activists thus reject the meanings that 
the state tries to impose on them in and around criminal procedures. This was also visible in the 
letter written by two Mapuche activists to the president of the Court of Appeals in Temuco 
asking for “libertad condicional” [parole].  
  
Finally we manifest that for us it is not valid to consider parole as a way to prove that we have 
been corrected and are rehabilitated to rejoin social life, that it instead would be a small 
political signal to recognize on behalf of the state the Political-Judicial error that was made in 
our imprisonment, and that it is your obligation to take responsibility for the violation of our 









Here these prisoners refused the “common” meaning of parole as a signal of “correction” and 
“rehabilization.” Instead, they asked the state to adopt an alternative reading of the parole and 
treat it as a signal of a “Political-Judicial error” that was made in their imprisonment.  
 
“Political” prisoners and their supporters are thus defiant of criminal proceedings and 
authorities in the criminal justice system. As the ultimate demonstration of such defiance, many 
activists have become fugitives instead of facing trial, or have at least considered the option 
(Interview C-72). Some Mapuche activists are even very openly defiant of the criminal justice 
proceedings to which they are subjected. “I have a trial in Collipulli today at twelve o’clock,” 
said a young werken of a Mapuche community while he was in Temuco for a meeting with 
various other representatives of Mapuche communities (Interview C-68; Field notes, June 
2009). In the end, however, he ended up not going to his own trial. “The meeting was still going 
on,” he explained, and laughed a little, when I asked him about this decision and what would 
then happen to his case. “I don’t know,” he said while he maintained his smile. He was 
indifferent. “At some point they may get me, I don’t know.” He had stopped caring about courts 
and trials.  
 
Some activists have been prosecuted for open defiance during detention or during trials. There 
are various criminal cases against Mapuche activists that are the result of alleged disrespect for 
judges or prosecutors, or alleged intimidation of witnesses. All such prosecutions can be 







proper process of criminal investigation and prosecution, and in which it demands respect for 
the state’s authority and legitimacy in carrying out such prosecutions. Some activists have 
therefore been convicted for desacatos [contempt of court]. For example, in 2009 Waikilaf 
Calfunao was charged with contempt of court after standing with his back to the judge during 
his trial. And in 2002 José Nain and Manuel Santander were convicted for contempt of court: 
after a judge decided to maintain their pre-trial detention, they did not react as the state 
expected them to. Instead, the judge described their reaction as follows:  
 
[L]os acusados manifestaron su rechazo, y causaron tumultos y desórdenes, negándose a hacer 
abandono de la sala de audiencias, por lo que el Juzgado de Garantía no pudo continuar con sus 
labores en forma habitual.  
 
[The defendants demonstrated their rejection and caused tumult and disorder, refusing to 
abandon the courtroom, such that the Lower Court could not continue its work in the habitual 
form.] (Angol, 2 October 2002, Tribunal Oral]  
 
Defendant Juana Calfunao even made international headlines when she hit a prosecutor in his 
face after she was convicted of public disorder. She and her family members were afterwards 
convicted for attacking an “authority.” Her husband later told me about the incident that they 
had wanted to send a signal to other communities that you can fight for your rights. He wanted 
to show that you should not have fear; that you can strike back (Interview C-66). Juana herself 







world would at least hear about it (Field notes, April 2009, women’s prison in Temuco). These 
second-order prosecutions are a clear example of how contentious criminalization and the 
battle of interpretation about labels and crime definitions can lead to a cycle of criminal 
prosecutions and continued contestation.  
 
Thus, “victims” and prisoner supporters compete with each other for dominance in the meta-
conflict in the criminal justice arena. The identities in the political arena of landowners and 
Mapuche activists transfer into the criminal justice arena where they transform, as landowners 
automatically identify with other landowners as “victims” and Mapuche activists identify with 
fellow activists as they are “persecuted,” strengthening the process of polarization between 
landowners and activists. This strict division is also visible in the courtroom. Not only do 
landowners and Mapuche activists strictly separate the left and the right of the courtroom 
benches. Often, landowners have cooperated as witnesses for the prosecution. Mapuche 
activists on the contrary have frequently acted as defense witnesses. The few Mapuches who 
have testified for the prosecution are considered traitors by Mapuche activists.  
 
Landowners have quite successfully gained recognition as the major “victims” in the Mapuche 
conflict and converted themselves into quite successful “troublemakers” for criminal justice 
agents. They have construed a narrative that changes the qualification of actions such as arson 
from ordinary crimes into terrorism. In this narrative they emphasize that single events should 







As landowners united they proposed that the legal interest at stake is not just their private 
property but the security of the entire nation. Mapuche activists, conversely, emphasize a very 
different context as the relevant interpretive framework for understanding the criminal 
prosecutions against them: the history of dispossession and continuous discrimination against 
the Mapuche people.  
 
The constant mobilization and discursive action in the criminal justice arena thus creates a 
challenging environment for prosecutors. They receive letters from international organizations 
demanding that indictments be dropped, while at the same time an advertisement in the 
newspaper El Mercurio calls for the application of anti-terrorism legislation. As a practical 
matter, prosecutors experience difficulty finding anyone willing to testify and in terms of the 
effects of their prosecutions they know that even if they manage to imprison one person, this 
will not stop the mobilizations. The conviction rate is low and subject to harsh criticism, while at 
the same time defendants claim their status as “political prisoners.” Landowners claim the rule 
of law as the state obligation to protect them and their property, while criticizing the rule of law 
for providing defendants with too many rights that ultimately hamper convictions. Mapuche 
activists, in turn, challenge the rule of law not only with their references to Spanish treaties and 
a rejection of Chilean jurisdiction but also in their active support for prisoners and fugitives, 
refusing to adopt the condemnatory attitude that the state and its criminal prosecutions 







in the midst of this constant criticism, in the next section I explore in more debt the challenge 
that prosecutors face as they build the evidence for their cases.  
 
Contested truths: The problem with evidence  
I have sketched how the criminal justice arena becomes populated with competing actors, 
mobilization, and meaning-making practices concerning criminal proceedings. In this section, I 
analyze a specific part of criminal prosecutions which is deeply contested: the credibility and 
legitimacy of anonymous witnesses. This illustrates how the process of contentious 
criminalization, the identification split, and the competing narratives from “victims” and 
“prisoner supporters” deeply challenge the criminal proceedings in their capacity to provide a 
shared truth. Of course, disagreement about evidence happens in any criminal case. Here, 
however, people systematically divide along the same lines, discrediting the evidence put 
forward by the opponent and by default believing the evidence presented by their own identity 
group. Thus, many Mapuche activists firmly believe that several of their prisoners were 
innocently imprisoned due to a farce trial and bogus testimonies and landowners are suspicious 
of any evidence claiming the innocence of Mapuche activists.  
 
“And then,” the director of the SOFO told me, “when someone [a witness] recognizes them [the 
defendants], they obtain false documents showing that on the day of the crime they were far 
north working as subcontractors in the fruit industry” (Interview C-55). He had no doubt that 







the defendants. This example illustrates the fundamental problem with the credibility of 
witnesses in the Mapuche conflict. This story that the SOFO director told me and many similar 
stories are passed on among actors. Indeed, I often heard such stories more than once from 
different individuals. The lawyer for SOFO told me the same story as he said that “they 
[defendants] have, for example, managed to obtain false contracts for short-term work to pick 
tomatoes in the Central Region. In that way they proved that they were not here on the day of 
the crime” (Interview C-42).  In this process of (re-)telling such stories, their cumulative 
message corrupts the possibility of the criminal proceedings to settle the matter. About this 
power of discourses, Apter remarked that “[i]ndividuals convey their individual stories to 
reinforce a collective one and draw down in interpretative power more than they put in” 
(1997:12). Farmers have thus become convinced that Mapuche activists prepare their alibis.  
  
Evidence is the basis for truth claims in criminal trials. In the process of contentious 
criminalization in the Mapuche conflict, however, the interpretation of the evidence, the 
authenticity of the evidence, and, in the end, the truth claims that are based on the evidence 
are disputed by the competing groups mobilizing in the criminal justice arena.  
 
As discussed above, landowners often complained that it is so difficult to collect evidence that 
will be accepted in court, blaming the high standards that are required because too many rights 
are allotted to defendants. They feel that without a video of events, nothing gets proven 







Mapuche communities] do not collaborate. They do not accuse each other” (Interview C-44). In 
the face of these difficulties to secure evidence, prosecutors have argued that they need to 
work with “protected” witnesses because potential witnesses often had fear of violent 
reprisals. These witnesses usually lived in or near the Mapuche communities of the defendants 
and claimed to receive threats. Indeed, there have been news reports of former protected 
witnesses whose house was set on fire (Tauran 2012). Prosecutors have therefore argued that 
strong identity protection is the only way in which they could get these witnesses to testify, and 
claimed that the fact that the defense lawyer can interrogate the witness during the trial 
sufficiently guarantees the rights of the defendants. In 2003, anonymous witnesses testified for 
the first time in the trial against the lonkos of Traiguén. Since then, such witnesses have often 
given their testimony from behind a screen, while their voice is made unrecognizable. 
 
Some of the testimonies given by these anonymous witnesses seem to reveal divisions within 
the communities, where some community members reject violence, whereas others argue that 
there is no other way forward.  
En el sector donde vivo siempre estuvo tranquilo hasta el año 1994 […] En la actualidad existen 
problemas en el sector donde vivo debido a que un sujeto de nombre José Osvaldo CARIQUEO 
SARAVIA ha comenzado a revolucionar a las personas invitándolos a movilizarse para recuperar 
tierras […]. 
  
[The sector where I live was always tranquil until the year 1994 [...] At the moment there are 
problems in the sector where I live due to a subject by the name of Jose Osvaldo CARIQUEO 
SARAVIA who has started to revolutionize the persons inviting them to mobilize to recuperate 
the lands […].] (Case Poluco Pidenco, Witness Annex No. 19, 25 June 2002) 
 







En algunas reuniones la directiva antes mencionada, planteaba como forma de presionar y 
obtener tierras en forma rápida, la realización de tomas de tierra específicamente en el fundo 
Poluco Pidenco. Esta idea nunca fue bien recibida por la gran mayoría de la comunidad, pero 
ellos nos decían que no importaba que no fuéramos pero que ayudáramos con dinero y 
alimentos a los comuneros que ejecutaran esta acción pero al final nunca supe que se planificara 
esta toma […]. 
  
[In several meetings the direction mentioned before proposed the realization of takeovers, 
specifically in the estate Poluco Pidenco, as a form of exerting pressure and obtaining lands in a 
quick form. This idea was never well received by the great majority of the community, but they 
said that it was not important if we didn’t go, but that we could help with money and food for 
the community members that execute this action; but in the end I never knew that they planned 
this takeover […].] (Case Poluco Pidenco, Witness Annex No. 20, 25 June 2002)  
 
While landowners are convinced that anonymous witnesses are their only chance to secure 
convictions, Mapuche activists firmly believe that anonymous witnesses are bribed and lie, 
confirming their idea that Mapuches are prosecuted without having committed a crime. On 18 
August 2004, the Newspaper El Gong published evidence that the Public Ministry had spent 
twenty million Chilean pesos (more than 30,000 dollars) for the protection of ten protected 
witnesses in the case Poluco Pidenco (Toledo 2007:286; HRW 2004). In addition to such reports 
suggesting a financial motive behind testimonies, Mapuche activists have no lack of stories and 
speculations about the identity of the various anonymous witnesses that have appeared in the 
trials against them. One witness in the case Poluco Pidenco, for example, was argued to be a 
well-known thief of the community who was relocated after having testified several times 
against his former fellow community members (Field notes, April 2009). Another report 
suggested that “protected witnesses” were actually tortured by the police for their testimonies 
(País Mapuche 2011). Needless to say, Mapuche activists have zero confidence in the value of 








This meta-conflict about the value of these witness testimonies has even led prosecutors to 
address the issue in the courtroom. For example, in February 2009, the prosecutor addressed 
the motivation of the protected witnesses that would testify, asking openly why a witness 
would make the effort to come to the trial, attempting to preempt any of such criticisms (Oral 
proceedings, Case Chekenko, min. 10:00). Polarization between the interpretative communities 
has thus reduced the ability of evidence to fulfill the function of creating a shared truth in the 
courtroom.  
 
4. Overview  
 
In this chapter, I have analyzed the different processes that challenge the rule of law and the 
status quo in relation to land use and ownership in the south of Chile and the position of the 
Mapuche people within Chilean society. The governmental response to contentious events has 
transferred the battle for interpretation into the criminal justice arena.  In the meta-conflict 
surrounding criminal prosecutions, landowners and Mapuche activists dispute the main 
concepts that should be used to interpret, on the one hand, the actions and demands in the 
struggle for the recuperation of lands by Mapuche activists and, on the other hand, the claims 
for defense and protection by the current landowners who call upon the Chilean state to 








As “victims” and “prisoner supporters” engage in the battle of interpretation, it is clear that 
they interpret the “rule of law” differently. Landowners and Mapuche activists are not only 
divided over fundamental questions about land ownership and the relation between the 
Chilean state and the Mapuche people, they are equally divided over the criminal trials, the 
assessment of harm, and the legitimacy of protest activity. In the next chapter, I will analyze the 
prosecutorial discourse as it emerges in interaction with the competing discourses. While the 
political nature of the Mapuche conflict is recognized by most actors, landowners have 
mobilized to define incursions on their property as crimes or even terrorism. The exact 
boundary between the political arena and the criminal justice arena is intensely disputed. In the 
next chapter, I will show that this boundary is continually changing and that the prosecutorial 











IV. Ambivalent Criminalization in Chile 
 
Since January 2008, the state has dedicated two prosecutors exclusively to the “Mapuche 
conflict.” They prosecute the crimes that occur within that context. One would therefore 
assume that it is easy to distinguish Mapuche-conflict cases from ordinary cases. However, 
when I asked how they know whether a case is related to the Mapuche conflict, an honest 
prosecutor answered: “Often we don’t know” (personal conversation, April 2009). Such 
confusion about the “correct” classification was obvious, when, for example, during my 
fieldwork in March 2009, a farmer in Ercilla was murdered. Mapuche activists, landowners, 
prosecutors, and government officials all commented on the nature of this murder, the motive, 
and the identity of the perpetrator. People wondered whether this was a Mapuche-conflict 
case and speculated about the potentially disastrous escalatory consequences if it was. 
Mapuche activists complained that the immediate naming of Mapuches destroys the 
presumption of innocence to which they are entitled. The final consensus in the Ercilla case was 
that this was an “ordinary” murder. The very concern with the classification of the case, 
however, raises the question whether it would have made a difference for the criminal 
proceedings, and if so, how.  
 
In this chapter I even go a step further beyond this practice of classification and ask what is 







Mapuche activists attach very different meanings to the concept. Criminal prosecutions and 
their production of images that speak about the Mapuche people, land ownership, and 
plantations are therefore the subject of intense contestation. The questions I address are the 
following: How has the prosecutorial narrative represented the conflict? How was it contested 
and how did it change over time? To explore these questions, I delve deeper into the meta-
conflict that is raging in the criminal justice arena, about the identity of the relevant actors, the 
issues at stake, and the desired solutions. Which ways of looking at the world are reinforced 
and which are marginalized? I describe how crimes are re-contextualized in the “Mapuche 
conflict” and how that conflict is defined as the prosecutor constructs reality. How do 
prosecutors contribute to the meta-conflict as they speak with the voice of the law?  
 
Prosecutors claim they are “just” applying the law. The images of criminal events and 
perpetrators upon which they rely therefore seem to lead self-evidently to the indictment that 
the prosecutors present. For example, when prosecutors assert the presence of an organization 
that is behind a pattern of terrorist actions, it becomes natural that this organization and its 
members are charged as a terrorist organization. The question is, however, how the image of 
an organization came to be construed.  
 
In the introduction of this dissertation, I already mentioned that the origins of this research 
project can be found in my experience attending a trial that became known as the trial against 







conflict explicitly into the courtroom in constructing the identity of the defendants and the 
“victims,” in his choice of evidence, and in his connection of different events. His narrative is 
exemplary of what I now call a re-contextualization of the criminal event. The trial also became 
one of the best known trials in the context of the Mapuche conflict. It even was the subject of a 
documentary film (Larraín 2007).  
 
In this chapter, I present an analysis of the development of the prosecutorial narrative in the 
context of the Chilean-Mapuche territorial conflict. I aim to show how this narrative has 
changed over time since the 1990s and how the narrative has been the subject of constant 
contestation. I therefore trace the different images that different actors put forward and that 
were or were not be adopted in the prosecutorial terminology and decisions. Further, I will 
describe how the narrative is expressed and translated in the actual decisions and criminal legal 
terminology in criminal proceedings.  
 
I am not going to tell about how big corporations abuse the criminal justice system to 
systematically oppress “poor Indians.” They do, but that would be an unjustifiably simplified 
and partial account of the actual story. Neither will I tell about how “cells” of Mapuche activists 
engage in terrorism and pose a real threat to national security. That is an equally partial and 
simplified take on the situation. Rather than adjudicating between these two partial 
perspectives, my concern lies with the tragically insufficient liberal legalistic response to this 







communities that have been dispossessed, discriminated against, and disposed of during most 
of the existence of the Chilean state. It also fails the majority of the hardworking landowners 
and their employees who are threatened in their businesses. While the state is ostensibly 
hanging on to the rules, vocabulary, and principles of liberal legalism out of routine and to 
preserve its legitimacy, prosecutors enter the stage facing what I would call a catch-22, where 
they are set up to fail one side or the other, or often both.  
 
My account of the process of criminalization in the Mapuche conflict will therefore develop 
without dividing actors into the good guys versus the bad guys, victims versus aggressors. 
Rather than aiming to determine which side is right, my interest is in teasing out the role of the 
prosecutorial narrative. How did it develop? Why did it develop in that way? What are the 
consequences of that? What can we learn about the possibilities and limits of the rule of law?  
 
The fact that the “Mapuche conflict” is a sociopolitical conflict is acknowledged in the Chilean 
courtroom. Prosecutors recognize this conflict and explicitly take a stance it, while positioning 
themselves in line with the principles of liberal legalism. Doing so, they respond to the 
allegations voiced by Mapuche activists in the meta-conflict that the trials constitute the 
criminalization of social protest. Thus, during one trial, the prosecutor argued that “the Public 
Ministry does not persecute ideologies or convictions, and certainly does not attempt to 
adjudicate social conflicts.” Instead, he called upon the “estado de derecho” [rechtsstaat, rule 







“investigate facts that constitute crimes” (Oral proceedings, Trial CAM, July 2005). Here the 
prosecutor reproduced the legalistic image of simple “facts that constitute crimes” which 
presumably can be found, observed, investigated, and adjudicated. He accordingly denied the 
significance of the multitude of voices engaged in constructing narratives about those “facts.” 
He ignored the various actors involved in socially constructing those events, the actors that 
disputed the relevant identities, definitions, and relations that would determine the legally 
relevant meaning of what happened.    
 
So what have prosecutors done? How did they translate events into criminal conduct, and what 
were their charges? It is hard, if not impossible, to find an actual thread or pattern in the 
prosecutions, arguments, and decisions of Chilean prosecutors in relation to the Mapuche 
conflict. It is more accurate to describe their intervention as a complex mixture of ad hoc and 
pre-meditated investigations, drawing upon different available discourses, switching between 
different images, and changing course at various moments in time. Prosecutors in Chile switch 
back and forth between and sometimes mix a de-contextualized approach and a re-
contextualized narrative. I understand the resulting ambivalence as the product of the 
continuous contention and the variable and changing strength of the different actors involved.  
 
I call the criminalization in Chile ambivalent because it hovers between the criminal justice 
arena and the political arena. Sometimes the prosecutorial narrative pushes conduct far into 







Often, though, that push towards the criminal justice arena is accompanied by the 
acknowledgement that the events and demands actually belong in the political arena, resulting 
in negotiation, political promises, and an open involvement of political actors in the 
government. In this chapter I analyze the effort of prosecutors to tease out exactly what and 
who belongs squarely in the criminal justice arena and what and who does not. This means that 
the prosecutorial narrative is actively engaged in the construction of the criminal justice arena, 
defining what is politics and what is criminal. This goes beyond identifying single crimes. It is the 
entire category of “crime” that is up for negotiation. It is this “teasing out” that leads to such 
distinctions as that between “Mapuche radicals” and “the Mapuche people,” where the first is 
created to become the main target of prosecutions in the criminal justice arena and the second 
is reified as the supposed actor in negotiations and the recipient of development and bilingual 
programs in the political arena. These images and the lines drawn are nevertheless constantly 
changing, not in one clear direction of expansive criminalization such as in Spain or in the 
direction of a marginalizing narrow focus on particular subjects like in the United States, but in 
a constant back and forth between the criminal justice arena and the political arena.  
 
I have had to make many difficult choices in writing this chapter as it is simply impossible to pay 
attention to the wide variety of events that occur within the ambit of the criminal justice arena. 
The state is not a monolithic entity, and many different actors (police, military, prosecutors, 
Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister for Development and Planning) are involved. As I have 







forces, special forces, investigative police, or the military play, even though, for example, 
actions such as house searches and detentions constitute a large part of the grievances 
expressed by Mapuche activists. Further, it is impossible to discuss in detail the many criminal 
trials that have taken place since the beginning of the 1990s in relation to the Chilean-Mapuche 
conflict. It is even less possible to give detailed accounts of all the truncated criminal 
investigations and criminal cases that were started but dropped along the way, even though 
these cases have an impact on the investigated suspect, the affected Mapuche community, and 
sometimes even the entire Mapuche movement. Lastly, because prosecutorial activity has 
largely focused on activities of Mapuche activists, this is reflected in my description of the 
prosecutorial narratives. I do not analyze in depth the few criminal prosecutions against 
carabineros in relation to the conflict.  
 
I analyze the prosecutorial narrative in the criminal cases that have taken place in the context 
of the Mapuche conflict. During the past twenty years, Mapuche activists have been accused of 
hurto [petty theft] (of wood), robo [theft] (of wood), usurpation (of land), (terrorist) arson (of 
plantations, houses, machines and trucks), illicit association (terrorist or not), (terrorist) threat, 
injury and attempted homicide (of forestry guards from private security companies). As I 
analyze the prosecutions that have taken place regarding such charges, it should be kept in 
mind that the prosecutorial narrative does not only speak in its accusations, but also in its 
silences. The lack of initiation of criminal prosecutions regarding some types of conduct became 







the Spanish prosecutions, for example, in Chile support for fugitives and speech acts have 
hardly been subjected to criminal prosecutions. Indeed, there has been little public debate 
about these issues and only few calls for their criminalization. Support for fugitives has been a 
governmental concern, but was never conceptualized as a crime. In June 2005, a prosecutor 
expressed this concern and complained in an opening statement that “twelve of the defendants 
are fugitive. That means there is an organization that supports them and protects them. They 
are mocking the justice system” (Oral proceedings, Trial CAM). Despite such statements, there 
has been no criminal case, however, in which a prosecutor actually charged someone with this 
fugitive support as a crime.  
 
Another example illustrates the particular way in which the Chilean state construes the support 
for fugitives positioning in in relation to the criminal justice arena and the political arena. When 
on 20 October 2009 the radical organization CAM declared “war” on the Chilean state, the 
State Secretary of Internal Affairs, Edmundo Pérez Yoma, threatened people and communities 
that intended to provide support for the people behind attacks. If there were any evidence that 
they were “protegiendo a este tipo de delincuentes, esas comunidades no tendrán ninguna 
posibilidad de tener conversaciones con la autoridad para posibles entregas de tierras” 
[protecting this type of criminals, those communities will not have any possibility to engage in 
conversations with the authorities about the possible transfer of lands] (cited in: Lichtenegger 
2009). Importantly, this statement expresses that the sanction for such support is not sought in 








Just as the concern about fugitive support has not translated into actual criminal prosecutions, 
the Chilean prosecutorial narrative has been relatively silent in relation to speech acts glorifying 
or justifying illegal protest activity. A parliamentary commission has, for example, suggested to 
investigate Mapuche internet pages and their relation to “violence” in the “Mapuche conflict” 
more closely (Comisión de Constitución 2003:67), yet no prosecutions have followed. On 5 
December 2003, the newspaper El Mercurio reported that several senators had taken the 
initiative to call for a prosecution of the leaders behind land takeovers because of their vocal 
support for such actions. They specifically called for the detention of Aucán Huilcamán who  
justifica y promueve esas acciones emprendidas por indígenas, a través de entrevistas, 
conferencias y comunicados. […] Huilcamán respalda públicamente las medidas de presión de las 
comunidades mapuches. […] [D]icho apoyo constituiría una inducción a la comisión del delito de 
usurpación, contemplado en el artículo 457 y siguientes del Código Penal. 
 
[justifies and promotes these actions undertaken by indigenous people, in the form of 
interviews, conferences and communiqués. […] Huilcamán publicly backs the means of pressure 
of the Mapuche communities. […] This support constitutes an incitement to the commission of 
the crime of usurpation, as contemplated in Article 457 and further of the Penal Code.] (El 
Mercurio 2003) 
 
Despite this call for his prosecution, Aucán Huilcamán was not prosecuted for incitement. In 
one instance, lawyer José Lincoqueo was charged and convicted for inciting people to commit a 
crime as he had convinced some Mapuche community members that entering the land of the 
forestry company was legal according to the old Spanish treaties (Case Temulemu 1999). “Some 
of the people thought that what they did was legal,” said one of the participants in this 
takeover (Interview C-59). “The lawyer had said so, and they believed him.” He smiled and 







Apart from this conviction, the prosecutorial narrative has been silent on the topic of speech 
acts, despite calls for such prosecutions. This is one of the instances where the prosecutorial 
narrative is surprisingly more reserved, than might be expected from the overreach such as the 
use of terrorism laws in other cases.    
 
The prosecutorial narrative is constructed with the logic and vocabulary of criminal doctrine 
and legislation. The lack of prosecution of people engaged in the support for fugitives or speech 
acts is therefore reflected in the prosecutor’s use of doctrinal concepts to define the 
perpetrator. Unlike the many constructions used in Spain, where various activities of “support,” 
“incitement,” or “collaboration” are criminalized, in Chile defendants were generally accused as 
direct authors of a crime. Even though Chilean law allows for the possibility to be accused as a 
“complice” [accomplice] or helper to a crime, these forms of authorship were not used in the 
actual indictments in the cases that I reviewed. I also did not observe constructions like 
“conspiracy,” where a string of “preparatory activities” is penalized, regardless of the outcome, 
which is a prosecutor’s favorite in the United States as I will show in the next chapters. In a few 
cases, the prosecutor used the modality of “encubrimiento,” which is best translated as 
“obstruction of justice,” meaning that someone either benefits from the crime, knows about 
the crime but failed to report it to the authorities, or has covered up the crime. In a few cases, 
the prosecutors accused activists of membership of a criminal organization. These cases will be 








Ambivalence is not only expressed in a decision to prosecute or not, but also in the penalties 
that are asked and imposed. In one serious case, for example, a defendant was charged with 
attempted homicide and the violation of the Law on State Security after a private security guard 
of Forestal Mininco suffered burn injuries because his car was set on fire during an ambush at a 
Mininco plantation in 1999 (Case attempted homicide). In that case, the prison sentence was 
remarkably low. Marileo was sentenced to 541 days for the Law on State Security and three 
years and one day for attempted homicide, but only served three months in prison. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, such incidents involving injured persons are often invoked by 
landowners and prosecutors to emphasize the danger of the situation and the potential threat 
to human lives. A low prison sentence in such a case has been one of the reasons for 
landowners to engage in victim mobilization and demand for harsher state intervention. This 
was, however, one of the few incidents in which physical injury inflicted by Mapuche activists 
was severe. Therefore, the following analysis centers on prosecutions regarding land 
occupations and arson of machinery and plantations.  
  
1. First classification: Re-contextualization in the “Mapuche conflict”  
 
Agents throughout the criminal justice system have started to use the “Mapuche conflict” as a 
relevant category to classify criminal cases. For example, to conduct their criminal 
investigations, the police have photo collections with the label “Mapuche conflict” in which 







in relation to Mapuche mobilizations (Field notes, trial Chamichaco, May 2009). Also, in January 
2008 two special prosecutors were appointed “with exclusive dedication to cases of the 
Mapuche conflict” (Leiva 2008). During one trial, the lawyer representing the Ministerio del 
Interior [Department of Internal Affairs] as private accuser explicitly explained that the 
department had decided to participate in the trial because the illicit facts had been executed 
“in relation to the so-called Mapuche conflict” (Oral proceedings, Trial CAM 2005). Judges also 
use the “Mapuche conflict” as a relevant category. In many of the court verdicts one can read 
references to the conflict (variously labeled as “territorial conflict” or “Mapuche problem”) as 
the context in which the facts took place or should be interpreted.  
 
The category is relevant because Mapuche-conflict cases are assumed to be different from 
common crimes.  A lawyer at the Public Ministry said: “when you put a pyromaniac behind 
bars, the problem is solved. Imprisoning a Mapuche activist doesn’t solve the problem” 
(Interview C-13). “It is complicated,” he said. “It is more than a juridical problem. It is not about 
individuals. The whole country is involved.” And his colleague said: “It is a social problem, of the 
whole society. That is the same with drug criminals. We know that there is another motivation 
behind their crimes than is the case with common crimes” (Interview C-12). Thus, to discuss 
how to deal with these different kinds of cases, the regional head of the prosecutor’s office 
consulted with the State Secretaries of Internal Affairs and Development and Planning (La 
Tercera 2002). Such meetings with political actors clearly show that the events in the “Mapuche 








In order to determine the population of criminal cases relevant for my inquiry and select the 
criminal cases to analyze in more depth, I had to determine what exactly counts as a criminal 
case in relation to the Mapuche conflict. As one of the defense lawyers said (Interview C-48), 
there are some short-cut ways to “recognize” a criminal case that is related to the Mapuche 
conflict: 
- because of the charges: usurpation and terrorism are generally related to the Mapuche 
conflict 
- because of the region where the facts take place: for example, Temucuicui is a well-
known conflictive area 
- because of the defendants: when Héctor Llaitul is one of the defendants it is likely that 
the case is related to the Mapuche conflict as he is seen as the unofficial commander of 
the CAM  
 
Now, all of this may seem simple for anyone who is a little familiar with the region and its 
history. The seeming clarity of these features, however, belies the process behind the very 
phenomenon that I have placed at the center of my research: How is it that these apparent 
“facts” have come to be related to that what we call the “Mapuche conflict”? Of course, anyone 
can see that the above rules of thumb do not constitute a watertight system. It may well be 
(and does occur, although very little) that other people are charged with usurpation or 







having anything to do with the Mapuche conflict, such as intra-familial violence. Finally, even if 
Héctor Llaitul is indeed the commander of the CAM, he may well become involved in a criminal 
case that is unrelated to his CAM activities, such as speeding on the highway.  
 
Indeed, as already briefly indicated above with the example of the farmer murdered in Ercilla, 
the classification of events is not necessarily obvious. For example, contrary to public image, 
throughout my conversations with landowners, it turned out that “wood theft” is not 
necessarily or only a Mapuche-conflict case. Wood theft actually constitutes a problem far 
beyond the “Mapuche conflict.” One landowner, for example, used the word “mafia” to 
describe the organized practices of professional thieves unrelated to Mapuche demands 
(Interview C-55). Another landowner complained about the ineffectiveness of the criminal 
justice system in relation to such thefts in a way similar to landowners’ criticisms related to 
Mapuche-conflict cases. “They were Chileans and there was no land claim involved,” he said. 
Still, there were never any prosecutions for the arsons and wood theft he experienced, and the 
one prosecution there was ended in an acquittal (Interview C-54).  
 
The proper classification of events is an important dispute in the meta-conflict in the criminal 
justice arena, for example in cases of plantation fires. While companies attribute many fires to 
Mapuche activism, activists blame the summer heat, touristic accidents, or malicious attacks by 
companies themselves for insurance purposes or to give Mapuches a bad name. Mapuche 








The classification of criminal events as part of the Mapuche conflict has concrete consequences 
for the prosecutorial narrative. The notion that such a category of cases exists has not only led 
to the appointment of special prosecutors. The re-contextualization of events in the Mapuche 
conflict can also lead to the prosecution of defendants as members of an allegedly illegal or 
terrorist organization, a shift towards a broader legal interest, and the allegation of indirect 
responsibility instead direct responsibility for a crime. Re-contextualization of an event can 
induce a scale-shift in time and space. For example, if events are understood to have happened 
in the context of the Mapuche conflict, the relevant space in the prosecutorial narrative can 
shift from a specific house or property to the whole of the 9th region or even to the entire 
country. Similarly, in Mapuche-conflict cases the relevant victims of a specific case can shift in 
the prosecutorial narrative from the direct victims who live on or own a particular property to 
all landowners with properties that are adjacent to Mapuche communities or to all “Chileans.”  
  
2. The defendants: “They are not the Mapuche people!”  
 
In 2008, landowner Luchsinger’s lawyer visited the Minister of Internal Affairs and urged him 
not to view the recent arson attack at Luchsinger’s house as a matter of the Mapuche people. In 
his opinion, “there is a specific group that commits these terrorist acts, absolutely oblivious to 
the origin, ethnicity, race or condition of any species” (cited in: El Mercurio 2008). Why did this 







discuss the image of the defendants that is constructed in the prosecutorial narrative. This 
image is in continuous construction as it develops in the context of a continuous “conversation” 
between the actors in the criminal justice arena. In this conversation – that resembles more a 
series of reciprocal allegations than a constructive dialogue – the image is constantly evolving 
and different elements are emphasized at different times. Some elements, however, stand out 
and have become part of a more stable template which will be highlighted here.  
 
The “ingredients” of this conversation are the asserted differences and relations between 
“Chileans” and “Mapuches” as well as the differences and relations between the Mapuche 
activists and the whole of the Mapuche people. This exchange between different voices in the 
meta-conflict takes place in and around specific criminal prosecutions. Mapuche activists have 
spread the message that Mapuches can be persecuted only because of their Mapuche identity. 
This claim was provided credibility in 1994 through the prosecution of 144 Mapuche leaders 
and members of the Mapuche organization Consejo de Todas las Tierras (CTT) (more on this 
case below in section 4). Their standing within their communities and the widespread 
participation of elderly people, women, and children in the symbolic land occupations made 
this prosecution a symbol of “the Mapuche people.” That message caught on and has become a 
shared belief among at least a part of the Mapuche youth. Prosecutors attempt to counter that 
message. In 2009, special prosecutor Velasquez, for example, repeated at the start of his 
opening statement that “this trial is not about repression, as they [the defendants] like to say” 








While prosecutors thus deny that Mapuches are persecuted because of their identity, criminal 
justice agents do use the Mapuche label all the time as a relevant category to describe and give 
meaning to events in transcripts and verdicts. For example, in one case, the judges considered 
that it was not logical that someone outside Mapuche communities should have perpetrated 
the crimes, as the incident fitted the goal of creating harassment and fear, and no “property of 
Mapuches” was damaged (Verdict, Case Lonkos of Traiguén, September 2003, consideration 
15). This reference to “property of Mapuches” not only invoked the Mapuche identity as a 
relevant category. It also expressed a clear Us versus Them logic.  
 
The Mapuche identity is a political identity (Tilly 2007:9) and the subject of an interpretive 
struggle and questions in the criminal justice arena. Are the defendants Mapuche? Do they 
represent the Mapuches? Do “the Mapuches” really want to engage in mobilizations, or are 
they manipulated by external infiltrators, Chileans, or foreigners? Are the defendants really 
motivated by their claims based on the Mapuche identity, or do they take advantage of the 
Mapuche identity for personal profit? This debate about the identity of defendants is 
embedded in a broader debate within Chilean society about the relations between Mapuches 
and Chileans, the characteristics of Mapuche ethnicity, rules about who are Mapuche and who 
are not, as well as the obligations of the Chilean state towards the Mapuches and the rights 








The liberal legalist imperative is to ignore any identity claims. While prosecutors claim to do 
exactly that, at the same time their statements about identity construct an image of “the” 
defendants in Mapuche-conflict cases. The prosecutorial narrative emphasizes that defendants 
do not represent the Mapuche people and that they are a minority without much support. 
Landowners purposefully contribute to this image, for example when the lawyer of landowner 
Luchsinger visited the Minister of Internal Affairs. Mapuche activists, however, contest the 
image of isolated radicals. The courtroom thus has become an important space in which the 
relation between Mapuches and Chileans and the meaning of the Mapuche identity is 
constructed and contested.  
 
Mapuche or Chilean 
In contrast to other Latin American countries, the Chilean identity is not perceived to be a mix 
with indigenous identities, as, for example, is the case in Mexico (Jung 2008). The Chilean is not 
perceived to be “mestizo” and according to a commentator in a newspaper Chileans always 
viewed themselves to be the Englishmen of the continent (Jaramillo 2005). As mentioned 
briefly in the previous chapter, Mapuche activists have claimed recognition for their unique 
identity and recognition of the Mapuche people as a “people” in the constitution. Whereas the 
current “constitutional recognition” does refer to a “multicultural” Chile, Mapuche activists, 
other indigenous activists and critical lawyers like José Aylwin argued that this does not provide 
the real recognition that offers indigenous people the possibility to assert their rights (Marin 







which they rejected what they called the “false constitutional recognition” (Mapuche Noticias 
2010). Mapuche activists challenge multicultural or intercultural initiatives as they argue that 
this only means that they have to learn or adopt the Chilean perspective, whereas Chileans will 
not accommodate the Mapuche perspective. Thus, outside of the criminal justice arena there is 
an ongoing debate about the relations between Chileans and Mapuches and the kind of 
adaptation or recognition that is required from and between these identity groups. The meta-
conflict in the criminal justice arena, however, inevitably draws on and feeds into this debate.  
 
The Mapuche label is more than a simple descriptive device. Claims about the Mapuche identity 
are at the heart of the whole conflict, as Mapuche activists ground their claims in their 
Mapuche identity, arguing that they are heirs of the Mapuches that were thrown off their lands 
(during the Pacification of the Araucanía) and that the Mapuches are a people with the right to 
self-determination. While acknowledging some legitimacy, landowners refuse to accept these 
arguments wholesale. For example, the general manager of the CORMA expressed his view that 
Mapuches “take advantage” of their identity and demand more than they deserve (Interview C-
35). “The Mapuches are poor Chileans with a lot of social problems, who take advantage of 
their being Mapuche to produce this kind of conflict,” said another forestry representative 
(Interview C-34). “They claim to be more Chilean than we are,” thus perpetuating the Us versus 
Them dichotomy. Therefore, in the narratives of landowners, the Mapuche label is often 
understood in opposition to the Chilean identity and simultaneously invoked and rejected. 







arson of Luchsinger’s house that the perpetrators were not Mapuches but “simply Chilean 
terrorists” (Terra.cl 2005).  
 
Mapuche activists also refer to their Mapuche identity when they claim that, contrary to 
Chilean landowners, Mapuches do not want to exploit nature, but live in harmony with it. 
Landowners dispute this ideal. Instead of “harmony” they see laziness: 
 
It is not possible to transfer lands to the Mapuches… that will be an absolute misery, because they 
do not work. That won’t resolve the problem. That won’t end their miserable state. Have you seen 
how their lands are that the state has purchased for them? Nothing remains, not one tree, they 
don’t produce anything! ... Indians never work. The Mapuche is predatory, doesn’t have intellectual 
capacity, no will, no economic means, no equipment, nothing… The Mapuche is sly, twisted, disloyal 
and abusive. (A landowner cited in: Cayuqueo 2005b) 
 
Other landowners argue that this envisioned “living in harmony with nature” is not what “the” 
Mapuches really want. “They only want their kids to study and have another life” (Interview C-
17). Dismissing the sincerity of the defendant’s references to the Mapuche label entirely, some 
landowners claim that it is not about the land, but just about economic profit. Many 
landowners attribute personal motivations like financial gain and the desire for power and 
media attention to Mapuche leaders. Theft of wood, for example, is primarily seen as a profit-
driven business, where ideology just comes in handy as an excuse but is not the primary 








Just like the landowners, prosecutors often explicitly ignore or even deny these identity claims. 
“They are ordinary Chilean citizens. We don’t make a distinction between Mapuches and 
Chileans,” said the spokesperson for the regional Public Ministry in the Araucanía (Interview C-
11). The regional prosecutor, for example, explicitly denied that the Coordinadora Arauco 
Malleco (CAM) was an indigenous organization. At the same time as the perpetrators are thus 
denied to be Mapuche, prosecutors highlight their respect for the Mapuche people. For 
example, the regional prosecutor emphasized her respect for “la etnia” [the ethnic group] and 
told me: “I grew up in the countryside and know the people; I have a lot of respect for them” 
(Interview C-10). Note that she said “them” and thus simultaneously located her own person 
outside that group. “This is not a trial against the Mapuche people,” said another prosecutor at 
the start of the trial against two lonkos (Field notes, Trial Lonkos of Traiguén, March 2003). The 
explicit negation of the Mapuche identity reveals the significance of the categorization as well 
as the contested meaning of what it means to be Mapuche, and what the criteria for that would 
be. In 2002, after the detention of alleged CAM-members, even the Minister of Interior 
declared that  
 
this is not a detention of Mapuches. This is a detention of persons on whom criminal information 
has been collected. Among these persons are Mapuches, persons who judged by their last names 
are mestizos, and Nordic persons who can hardly link themselves to the Mapuche people. If one 








In stark contrast to these assertions that activists are prosecuted “as Chileans,” in trial 
transcripts defendants are often identified as “Mapuches” or as belonging to the “Mapuche 
ethnic group.” Thus, in the prosecutorial narrative the Mapuche identity is often recognized as 
a descriptive marker. The identity is denied, however, as relevant in the relation between the 
defendant and the Chilean state.   
 
The prosecutors that emphasized to prosecute Mapuche activists “as Chileans,” did so in 
explicit reference to the core values of liberal legalism, emphasizing the formal equality 
between defendants and all Chilean citizens. At the core of this debate, thus, we find 
competing claims about difference and equality and their relation to the rule of law. The 
regional prosecutor claimed that 
 
it is about objectivity. When we let that go, it becomes dangerous. It is about juridical security. 
That gives citizens confidence in the justice system. It would create uncertainty if we 
distinguished between races, colors, political parties or religion. We believe in the transparency 
of the justice system. We investigate crimes independent of the motivation that lies behind it. 
(Interview C-10)  
 
Both the emphasis and the explicit denial of the ethnic identity reproduce the identity of the 
activists as a relevant factor in the conflict. The ethno-nationalist label for the Mapuche conflict 
has conveniently worked to downplay the landowners’ economic interests.  While Mapuche 







people, at the same time they have often resisted the term “Mapuche conflict” as it 
perpetuates the notion that Mapuches are the problem and that they are to blame. Instead, 
they prefer to call the conflict the “forestry conflict” or “territorial conflict.”  
  
True Mapuches or criminals 
The identity dichotomy Chilean or Mapuche is thus one level at which the identity of 
defendants in the courtroom is constructed, where the prosecutorial narrative demonstratively 
denies that defendants are Mapuches and claims to prosecute defendants as Chileans. At the 
same time, the prosecutorial narrative construes the identity of defendants in relation to an 
imagined “good” or “true” Mapuche. The construction of the identity of the defendant is 
closely related to the construction of the boundary between the criminal justice arena and the 
political arena. Asserting that boundary implies a strict distinction between political and social 
problems on the one hand and criminal matters on the other. Parallel to this dichotomy, in the 
prosecutorial narrative we can find the distinction between the “true” Mapuches and the 
“criminals,” a distinction that is also made by landowners. For example, a forestry manager said 
that “it is only a small group that makes trouble. With the rest of the indigenous people we 
have a good relationship, we give them work” (Interview C-7). This distinction has also been 
identified by scholars, who have contrasted the “indio permitido” or “authorized Indian” 
(Richards 2010:72) with the “insurrectionary” Indian (Hale in: Richards 2010:72). I agree with 
Richards when she claims that the authorized/insurrectionary dichotomy has governed the 







criminal prosecutions, for example, when prosecutors claim that it is a minority that is on trial 
and subjected to anti-terrorism legislation, not all of the Mapuches. The emphasis on the 
“minority” fits the government’s assertions that the conflict is a focalized problem, “territorially 
concentrated.” Thus, in prosecutorial opening statements the notion is repeated that “there 
are a total of 1,500 Mapuche communities, of which not more than three hundred demand 
lands and not more than sixty have been involved in illicit facts” (Oral proceedings, Trial CAM 
2005).  
 
In this narrative, “true” Mapuches are considered to be a people who want to live in peace but 
have a poverty problem (e.g., Berdichewsky 2002). One prosecutor reproduced this image in 
the courtroom when he argued that the “true” Mapuches have calluses on their hands because 
of their work on the land (Field notes, Trial Lonkos of Traiguén, April 2003). As he said this, the 
Mapuche supporters that were present looked at their hands, making jokes about their 
authenticity as Mapuches. Later on, they repeated the jokes among themselves: “Show me 
your hands; let me see if you are a Mapuche according to Mister Bustos [the prosecutor]?!” 
(Field notes, April 2003).  
 
Activists reject the distinction and the nice words about the “true” Mapuches. “They only say 
that in order to keep the Mapuche bowing for the domination,” asserted a Mapuche activist 
(Field notes, April 2009). As Le Bonniec (2008:2) points out, the construct of the “bad” Mapuche 







of the assistance offered by the state in its various social programs directed at eradicating 
poverty and supporting education. Indeed, the construction of the “good” Mapuche fits in well 
with the multiculturalist discourse that has been hegemonic in the Chilean public sphere since 
the early 1990s (Richards 2010). While this discourse does recognize the indigenous 
populations of Chile at a cultural level, at the same time it is hesitant to confer any rights, as 
was visible in the opposition to constitutional recognition and the ratification of the ILO 
Convention 169. The multiculturalist discourse does not question power structures that benefit 
some ethnic groups more than others.  
 
In order to substantiate the distinction between the “good” and the “bad” Mapuches, 
prosecutors are keen to point out that Mapuche communities are highly divided on the issue of 
recuperation of lands and the legitimate ways to achieve this. “[Not only landowners, but] also 
the Mapuches are afraid of the radicals,” asserted the regional prosecutor in a conversation 
shortly after the detention of a majority of the CAM members (Interview C-10). Another 
prosecutor juxtaposed violent activists with “the peaceful families, which are the majority, the 
people that want the institutional ways, with CONADI, with the government” (Oral proceedings, 
Trial CAM 2005). Prosecutors frequently argued that community members ask for police 
protection and are afraid to testify during trials. Police reports equally draw upon and 
reproduce this dichotomy as in one report where they described that “minorities” were 
“agitating” and “dividing” the community as they “introduce violent formulas” in the struggle 







reinforced in newspapers publishing stigmatizing allegations of “paramilitary training” and 
possession of “weapons” (e.g., Notimex 2009). Chilean anthropologist Saavedra has pointed out 
that the frequent use of “los encapuchados” [the masked persons] as a reference to activists 
further dehumanizes this minority (Saavedra 2002:5). This image of a radical and dangerous 
minority is contested by activists, who emphasize the central importance and participation of 
ordinary community members in actions like land occupations and the slingshot as their main 
“weapon.”  
 
The trial against the lonkos of Traiguén was a strong example of the identity politics in the 
courtroom. The defendants ostensibly presented themselves as Mapuches, as they appeared in 
their traditional clothing and addressed the audience in Mapuzugun. As prosecutors have 
aimed to set defendants apart from the larger Mapuche people, they often argued that the 
defendants do not represent the Mapuche population. “They use the name of the Mapuche 
people,” said the prosecutor about the defendants during the trial against the lonkos of 
Traiguén (Field notes, March 2003). He emphasized that the majority of persons even within 
their own communities did not share the violent ideas that the defendants allegedly promoted. 
This is only one example where the prosecutor responds explicitly to the identity claims of 
defendants. In turning the alleged absence of reciprocal identification and support of fellow 
activists and community members into an important element of the identity of the defendants, 
however, the prosecutor actually moves away from the abstract rational individual in liberal 







their community – as they have done in several trials – the question comes up whether that 
would actually be relevant for the determination of the criminal offense. Why would 
prosecutors make the effort to demonstrate that defendants do not represent their 
communities? Anthropologist Le Bonniec (2008:6, footnote 13) reported that in the trial against 
the lonkos of Traiguén in September 2003 the prosecutors even used anthropologist Faron to 
point out that the lonkos were not the real traditional authorities of the Mapuche community 
that they claimed to represent. In the trial against members of the CAM the prosecutor relied 
on the principles of democracy (and the alleged absence of such mechanisms within Mapuche 
communities) in order to dispute the claims of representation: “The defendants will try to 
demonstrate their representativeness of the Mapuche people, but without democratic 
elements of national or popular representation, they only represent themselves” (lawyer 
representing the Department of Internal Affairs in oral proceedings, Trial CAM, 27 July 2005; 
this case will be analyzed in more depth below). In this courtroom conversation about the 
Mapuche people and who would legitimately represented them, “the” Mapuche people 
become a reified notion, recognized in the abstract, but with no clarity as to how to perceive, 
define, or represent them in reality.  
 
Prisoner supporters try to publicly counter these arguments made by the prosecutor that the 
defendants do not carry their support. For example, many people from the Mapuche 
communities were present during the week-long trial to support their lonkos. The logistical 







men, and women to all travel from their community, arranging lodging with sympathizers in a 
different city for at least forty people. The battle for interpretation about the Mapuche identity 
and the relation between defendants and “the” Mapuche people was thus taken to the space 
outside of the courtroom, where the supporters played on their musical instruments and 
performed ceremonial acts (Field notes, April 2003).  
 
The media, some political parties, and landowners have often argued that the mobilization of 
Mapuches is caused by outside “manipulation” and “infiltration” and “indoctrination” (e.g., 
Barrera, 1999:72; Interview C-37). Many different groups of people have been suspected of 
direct outside involvement in Mapuche mobilization: foreigners (in particular American and 
European students), radical leftists (who belong to the Communist Party, or (former) guerilla 
groups such as the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario or the Frente Patriótico Manuel 
Rodríguez), ecologists (who are struggling against the hydroelectric dams in the Alto Bío Bío), 
international terrorist groups (particularly links with the FARC and ETA have been suggested), or 
“academics from the seventies” (in particular anthropologists, Interview C-42). “They are used. 
They don’t invent it themselves,” said the former owner of Fundo Ginebra (Interview C-37). 
“Many foreigners come here and put things in the head of the Mapuches,” was another 
illustrative comment (Field notes, April 2003). Such allegations have hardly been substantiated 
by or led to any criminal prosecutions of foreigners or other “outsiders.” Rather, small incidents 
have seemed to take on mythical proportions in the meta-conflict. For example, in 1999 there 







to spend a few nights in Mapuche community Temulemu while they were engaged in a land 
occupation. He was subsequently accused of involvement in the occupation and deported from 
Chile (Case Arnaud Fuentes, Appeals Court Temuco 1999). His case fomented speculations 
about the involvement of foreigners, and I heard repeated references to his person in 
interviews.  
 
The image of “foreign linkages” is drawn upon and reproduced in prosecutorial decisions, as is 
illustrated in the following example. In 2001, an independent Mapuche media collective made 
fun of the constant allegations of links to foreign terrorist groups and wrote the words “Bin 
Laden Corporation” on their website with a fake address in Saudi Arabia. Immediately a 
complaint was filed in Santiago, and a judicial investigation followed (Ansa 2001; Fredes & 
Gómez 2002). The website editor commented: “We just wanted to laugh about all the paranoia, 
such as that people thought that there could be suicide attacks here. […] We had black humor; 
this was typical of our media collective. But the other part did not identify this as humor” 
(Interview C-28). The failure to understand such a reference as a joke indicates the existence of 
radically exclusionary interpretative communities that lack a shared code to interpret such an 
utterance meaningfully or a lack of willingness to adopt that interpretation. The Mapuche 
media website was subsequently analyzed in a report on “cybernetic terrorism” published in 
the newspaper El Mercurio, referencing various academic, advocacy, and human rights 
websites allegedly involved in promoting Mapuche “violence” (Richards 2010:75). Thus, a 







narrative subsequently draws upon the identity images that are thus produced. For example, 
during one trial, the website of this independent media collective was used as evidence in order 
to prove that an arson incident had been a “terrorist” arson (Field notes, Trial Lonkos of 
Traiguén, April 2003). The prosecutor argued that the website had reported about the 
defendants in that case, and at the same time the website provided links to other “terrorist 
groups” such as the FARC. This mere fact of simultaneous mentioning on a website was relied 
upon as evidence during the trial, in order to demonstrate the “terrorist” nature of the alleged 
arson, and simultaneously reproducing the image of foreign linkages with terrorist groups.  
 
Another aspect of the identity image of the defendant that is construed in the prosecutorial 
narrative regards the number of defendants on trial, and the kind of role that they are alleged 
to have had in the alleged crime. In this regard, the prosecutorial narrative has moved towards 
a focus on the “leaders” or “instigators” of actions and mobilizations. The prosecution of 
members of the organization CTT in 1994 involved 144 defendants. Since then, prosecutors 
have focused on a more limited number of people. While many activists have faced arrest and 
investigation, the actual criminal prosecutions have concentrated on specific individuals, 
communities, and families. For example, in several trials, only the official lonkos or 
spokespersons of a Mapuche community were prosecuted for actions (such as land 
occupations), in which many people from their communities had participated. This practice has 
reproduced the image of a “violent minority.” This practice also fits the belief of prosecutors, 







stop the crimes. For example, the detention of leader Victor Ancalaf was believed to have 
decreased crimes significantly (Interview C-19). Data of criminal investigations shows that 
prosecutors specifically looked for external “radicals,” such as in the following request from a 
prosecutor in a case of violent usurpation, theft, and arson:  
   
It is equally solicited to investigate whether members of some organization unconnected to the 
sector have brought about, planned or participated in these events, and whether there are persons 
who participate as activists in illegal takeovers. (Case Nueva Imperial 2002, Emphasis added by 
author) 
 
The search for “leaders” is also visible in many of the transcripts of interrogations by the police 
and prosecutors, in which frequent questions are: Who gave orders? Who directed the rest? 
Who was the spokesperson? This purposive selection of defendants from a larger group of 
participants reproduced the image of a radical minority of “activists.” The construction of 
criminal cases thus provided a perfect feedback loop with the general hegemonic narrative on 
the causes of the problems in the region.   
 
In several prosecutions, leaders, activists, and external manipulators were held to be 
specifically criminally liable for actions – indeed, more liable than the “manipulated” Mapuche 
communities. In the prosecutorial narrative, the organizations CAM and CTT are specifically 
construed as troublemakers, because of their activities in Mapuche communities. When 







they sometimes refer to the CAM or CTT. For example, in 2003, Mapuche community “José 
Millacheo Levío” announced a land occupation and claimed that it was done “with the help of 
the neighboring communities in conflict and the Coordinadora Mapuche Arauco Malleco” 
(Public Declaration 2003). Instead of “help,” prosecutors interpret the relations between 
Mapuche communities and outside activists as “infiltration.” One prosecutor, for example, 
argued that the CAM is “infiltrating the communities, creating fractures in the communities” 
(Opening statement, oral proceedings, Trial CAM, June 2005). Similarly, a CTT activist told me 
that while he was convicted for usurpation when he was “supporting” a community to reclaim 
land, the community members that had participated in the land occupation were acquitted. 
“They accused us of being activists. The others were acquitted. […] The community had more 
legitimacy,” he said (Interview C-53).108 During the trial against another activist for the Mapuche 
cause, her “Chilean” identity was explicitly emphasized by the prosecutor (Field notes, Trial 
Lonkos of Traiguén, April 2003).  
 
Mapuche activists resist this defendant image that is constructed in criminal prosecutions. They 
emphasize their Mapuche identity and claim the participation and support of the Mapuche 
people, specifically the Mapuche communities, rejecting all notions of outside infiltration and 
manipulation. Mapuche activists work hard to project their self-image as representatives of a 
larger Mapuche people. Landowners in turn project their enemy image into the public arena of 
Mapuche activists as marginal outcasts without public support in order to locate their actions 
                                                      
108
 This shows the negative connotation that “activist” has in the Chilean context. Lacking a better word, I continue 







squarely within the criminal justice arena. The identity boundary that the landowner’s narrative 
draws up between “manipulating activists” and “the Mapuche people” thus reinforces the 
boundary between the political and the criminal justice arena, legitimizing the criminal 
prosecutions and the definition of the conduct of activists as “crime.” Both constructions of 
reality aim to influence the prosecutorial narrative, which is the focus of this meta-conflict, and 
during trials and in prosecutorial decisions it can be observed that the prosecutor adopts or 
specifically rejects concepts and claims from the competing discourses.   
 
Thus, in criminal investigations and indictments, the prosecutor selects defendants and in doing 
so constructs their identity. The identity images construed and reproduced in this prosecutorial 
narrative isolate “radical” Mapuche activists and reify “the” Mapuche people as an authentic 
and unified voice. Mapuche activists criticize the notion that these authentic Mapuches are 
“manipulated” by external elements and foreigners as a continuation of the subordinate 
position that Mapuches have occupied within Chilean society and their assumed lack of 
capacity for autonomous decision-making and purposive action. At the same time as 
prosecutors emphasize the authentic “Mapuche” identity, they ostensibly treat defendants as 
“Chileans.” In the process of the creation of these identity images, separate and isolated 
incidents involving different actors are understood to form a unified and coherent whole for 
which Mapuche “radicals” are responsible. The individual and highly personal circumstances of 
each case are thus put in the background, whereas the “common” features are foregrounded. 







particular and personal relations to the alleged “perpetrators.” The specific identity 
construction of those victims is explored in more depth in the next section.  
 
3. “The” victims 
 
Not only the defendant, but also the victim is constructed in the prosecutorial narrative. This 
victim image is in many ways a counterpart of the image of the defendants in the previous 
section. Victims are a key concept in the discourse of prosecutors. “We feel responsible for 
protecting the victims,” explained the head regional prosecutor (Interview C-10). “We care 
about the victims,” she said, pointing out that victims were demanding relief and asking her 
how long they had to wait for the state to act. While prosecutors refer to “the” victims as the 
obvious legitimation for their prosecutions, it is not obvious to all who the victims are. Despite 
the liberal imagination of a society in consensus regarding what counts as a crime (and thus 
who as a victim), there is a lack of consensus about the identification of the victims in the 
“Mapuche conflict” which becomes visible in the competing mobilizations of “victims” in the 
criminal justice arena as was described in the previous chapter.  
 
In several trials, the prosecutor shifted the focus from individual victims in particular cases to 
the asserted collective victimhood of “the” victims in the “Mapuche conflict.” In this shift, 
prosecutors re-contextualize events, and the prosecutorial narrative shifts from direct 







of fear that is asserted to exist. This is specifically so in cases in which actions are framed as 
“terrorism,” because that legislation introduces “fear” as a basis for victimhood. The 
prosecutorial narrative understands those with fear to be a specific group or sector in society, 
for example the landowners that live adjacent to Mapuche communities or Mapuche 
community members who disagree with the “violent minority.”  
 
The prosecutorial narrative explicitly engages with the self-images and enemy images of 
victimhood that compete in the meta-conflict. “In this trial, people were given a voice who 
normally don’t have a voice: the victims,” stated the prosecutor in closing his arguments, 
claiming that “the victims” don’t have a voice, don’t appear on television, and don’t give press 
conferences (Field notes, Trial Lonkos of Traiguén, April 2003). Thus, not only did he refer to the 
ways in which prisoner supporters had strategically used the media, he also incidentally 
inverted the slogan that Mapuche activists often use when they claim to “give a voice to those 
without a voice” in the marginalized Mapuche communities. The prosecutor explicitly 
addressed this inversion of discourses when he warned the tribunal that the defendants would 
present themselves as the weaker part. “We are the racists, the violators of human rights,” he 
stated, echoing what he expected the defendants to say. He emphasized that (in the arson 
attack) smallholder Juan Sagredo Marin lost “the only patrimony that he had.” Thus, the 
prosecutor explicitly responded to the enemy images that Mapuche activists have constructed, 
such as David versus Goliath, poor versus rich, oppressed versus aggressor. He clearly 







millionaires, magistrate, they are not tall blonds with green eyes. They are Chileans, and as 
Chileans they need their rights to be respected.”  
 
In some of the terrorism trials, various landowners, from smallholders to big forestry 
companies, have been called upon to testify about arson attacks and land occupations that they 
suffered. By calling these witnesses, the prosecutor created a category of victims to 
demonstrate the fear in a sector of the population (as prescribed in the anti-terrorism 
legislation). At the same time, while emphasizing their commonalities, differences between 
these landowners were ignored. For example, in the trial against the lonkos of Traiguén, 
landowner Agustín Figueroa was framed as being part of a bigger group, aligned with a poor 
farmer (Juan Sagredo Marin), thus providing an alternative image to the allegations of him as a 
rich and powerful man: “We are not talking about forestry companies,” said the prosecutor, 
“we are talking about middle and small-scale landowners” (Oral proceedings, April 2003).   
 
In this meta-conflict about the identification of victims, Mapuche activists, the prosecutors, 
government and landowners make competing claims about the “ordinary” Mapuches in rural 
communities. While Mapuche activists claim to represent the Mapuches living in rural 
communities, prosecutors claim that those peaceful Mapuches are actually the victims of the 
violent radicals. The prosecutor in the trial against the lonkos of Traiguén argued that those 
within the communities who disagreed with the violent means were ostracized and had their 







proceedings, March 2003). Similarly, in 2001 the regional governor had expressed his view that 
“El resto de las comunidades vive en paz y no quieren esto. ¡No lo quieren!” [The rest of the 
communities live in peace and don’t want this. They don’t want it!] (Barria 2001). Landowners 
co-construct this narrative every time that they emphasize that the majority of Mapuche 
community members reject violence. For example, a manager of Forestal Mininco claimed that 
90% of the workers in Mininco are Mapuches, that they are peaceful, and that the majority 
does not agree with the methods of the CAM (witness statement, Trial CAM, 27 July 2005).  
 
Who speaks for “the” Mapuche? All actors (activists, landowners, prosecutors, and other 
government actors) claim that they know what “the” Mapuches want and use this in the 
criminal justice arena to support their claims and labels. My own interviews have mostly 
focused on those that have received the role of defendants and victims as direct participants in 
the meta-conflict in the criminal justice arena. However, in this arena the actors frequently 
claim to be speaking for other actors. Significantly, the prosecutors claim to speak in the name 
of “the” victims, whether landowners or victimized or “manipulated” Mapuche communities. 
Defying the defendant’s claim to speak for the Mapuche people, the prosecutorial narrative 
sometimes presents the anonymous protected witnesses from Mapuche communities as the 
representative voice of the “real” Mapuche people. These claims to speak for the victimized 
Mapuches or to know what they want inevitably represent only a limited and partial view of the 
more diverse and complex reality. I have spent quite some time in several Mapuche 







While it has given me an insight in the existing range of viewpoints and dynamics among and 
between communities, that is not enough to make any claims about who “the” Mapuche 
people are, what they want, how their views are best represented, and whether or to what 
extent they are victims or not. Instead of acknowledging this variety and complexity, different 
claims of representation are thus competing in the criminal justice arena and in the process 
objectifying the Mapuche ethnicity, the communities, and the “people.” 
 
Not only the victimhood of “the” Mapuches (as victims of a radical minority) is contested, but 
also the victimhood claimed by private landowners and transnational companies. Mapuche 
activists resist the victim label that landowners claim and receive in the courtroom. They accuse 
them of racism and hold them at least partially responsible for their dispossession. A 
community member in Temulemu argued, for example, that seventy percent of the current big 
landowners are children of those that were involved in fraud in the past (Field notes, April 
2003). Landowners publicly and explicitly resist these images of them as guilty of former 
dispossession. For example, after arson on two estates, Forestal Mininco issued a press release 
emphasizing that there were no official demands for the two estates in any court, and that 
there had not been Mapuche owners of the estates since at least the year 1907 (Mininco 
1999d). Thus, they rejected any wrongdoing, while referring back to the Chilean legal 
framework. In the end, however, what matters mosts to activists is that the landowners are 
rich, and “maybe they are not guilty, but they do have the land,” as a former CAM member put 








While Mapuche activists blame current landowners for their role and knowledge in the former 
usurpation of the Mapuche lands, the prosecutorial narrative portrays victimized landowners as 
having done everything to prevent hostilities but just having “bad luck.” During the trial against 
the CAM for example, the lawyer in the role of private accuser argued that he was representing 
a concrete victim, who was “just one of the thousand anonymous victims who are affected in 
their daily lives because they had the bad luck, the misfortune, to be the owner of a property in 
a specific place at a specific time” (Opening statement, oral proceedings, Trial CAM, June 2005). 
The prosecutor in that trial exclaimed in his opening statement that the landowners “have done 
everything possible, everything humanly possible, to live in peace. What can one say, as the 
landowner of a property, when your neighbor after decades and decades suddenly says: ‘this 
[property] is declared to be in conflict’”? While the prosecutorial narrative thus refers to 
Mapuche communitues as “neighbors,” Mella and Le Bonniec (2004) point out that this leaves 
out the history of the creation of private property and how those landowners and Mapuche 
communities came to be neighbors. Contrary to the Mapuche activists who demand change and 
accuse landowners and forestry companies of taking their lands and resources away, the 
prosecutor described the status quo as a situation of “peace,” thus marginalizing the 
perspective of Mapuche activists.  
  
The prosecutor in the case against the CAM echoed the views of landowners when he argued 







Mapuche community members, specifically to avoid trouble (Opening statement, oral 
proceedings, Trial CAM, June 2005). Landowners feed this narrative in which they are already 
doing “everything possible” to live in peace. Around criminal proceedings and during trials, 
landowners often emphasize their good relations with the adjacent Mapuche communities and 
their efforts to help them. For example, a private accuser stated during a trial that “days earlier 
he had taken [the defendant] a part of the way in the truck and offered him clothes for his 
children, as he had told him that he had seven children…” (Del Valle 2001). Another landowner 
reported to the police that  
[H]asta que comenzaron los conflictos entre propietarios chilenos y comuneros mapuches, el 
trato con las comunidades aledañas al predio, fue muy bueno. Se les daba trabajo a los 
comuneros mapuches y se les trataba de incorporar a un número importante de ellos a las 
labores agroforestales del campo. 
 
[Until the conflicts between Chilean landowners and Mapuche community members started, the 
relations with the adjacent communities were very good. One gave work to the Mapuche 
community members and attempted to incorporate an important number of them into agro-
forestry jobs on the land.] (Case Lonkos of Traiguén, Declaration 3 August 2002, Traiguén)  
  
Richards also observed references to paternalistic “generosity” in her interviews with the 
Araucanía elite, and she concluded that “the Mapuche provide convenient evidence for the 
European farmers’ benevolence and superiority” (2010:82). That narrative is also presented in 
the courtroom. One private landowner, for example, claimed that his grandfather had built a 
public school and a health clinic for the communities after acquiring the property around 1942 
(testimony, Trial CAM, verdict 2005). Richards (2010) points out that landowners often 
selectively remember a good relation with the Mapuche communities and place the contention 







land occupations that may have occurred during the Agrarian Reform in the early 1970s. This 
selective focus on good relationships contrasts with the discourse of activists, which tends to go 
back to the relations that Mapuches had with the Spanish Crown. Adopting a broader time 
frame, activists perceive the status quo as a continuation of the violence inflicted during the 
Pacification of the Araucanía.  
 
The image of “the” victims is a key component of the prosecutorial narrative that seeks to 
accuse Mapuche activists of specific crimes. In this brief description of the image of the victims 
in the prosecutorial narrative, I have focused on the portrayal of landowners and “the” 
Mapuche people as victims of a violent minority. Prosecutors de-emphasize characteristics of 
landowners that Mapuche activists attribute to them, such as that they would be rich and 
powerful. Instead, they emphasize that small-scale farmers are also negatively affected and 
that private landowners are not “blond and tall.” The discursive positioning of landowners and 
“the” Mapuche people as victims is reproduced and institutionalized in criminal proceedings. 
Mapuche community members who testify, sometimes anonymously, against the “radical 
minority” are portrayed as the representative voice of the “real” Mapuche people. A variety of 
private landowners and company representatives are invited to testify in various trials, where 
their particular experiences are linked together into the common experience of victimization as 
landowners. In the creation of this image of “the” victims, the prosecutorial narrative is at the 
center of the meta-conflict in the criminal justice arena, challenged by Mapuche activists and 








4. Shift from symbolic land occupations to criminal organization 
 
In the previous sections, I have analyzed the construction of the main actors of the 
prosecutorial narrative: the defendants and the victims. What follows traces the construction of 
the alleged crimes and the interpretation of Mapuche protest activities as crimes. I will argue 
that caught up in the meta-conflict and the general ambivalence in defining the situation, the 
prosecutorial narrative is going back and forth between de-contextualization and re-
contextualization of the allegedly criminal events. In this section, I turn to an important criminal 
case that is the first instance of re-contextualization in this contentious episode since the 
transition to a democratically elected government after Pinochet. I will demonstrate the 
significance of re-contextualization by describing how this move influences the choice of 
defendants, the selected criminal offense, and the arguments for criminal liability. 
 
The transition and the dialogues between the new government and Mapuche representatives 
triggered high expectations for land reforms. Already in 1992, however, there was 
dissatisfaction among Mapuche activists regarding the political promises and the possibilities of 
the Indigenous Act. The activists from Mapuche organization CTT did not feel bound by the 
Agreement of Nueva Imperial, in which other Mapuche organizations had negotiated with 







CTT decided to carry out what Chilean anthropologist Bengoa described as “the much-feared 
and remembered land occupations” (Bengoa 1999:196).  
 
Founded in 1990, the CTT presented itself as an organization of traditional authorities from 
different Mapuche communities (Mariman 1995). It started a process of recuperations, 
entering lands near the communities in symbolic rituals in which elderly people, traditional 
authorities, and children participated. It also started a “Mapuche newspaper,” Aukiñ, the 
“Mapuche Voice.” In March 1992, the first Mapuche Tribunal was inaugurated in order to 
strengthen the Mapuche “institutionality” (Aukiñ 1993a). In light of later events, these activities 
are all pretty innocent. Indeed, looking back, one defense lawyer described the activities in the 
early 1990s organized by CTT as a “joke” compared to the nature of the protest actions in 2009 
(Interview C-47). Still, in 1992, landowners and the Chilean government considered the CTT 
activities to be threatening. For example, in an internal analysis of the situation in 1989, the 
new government had explicitly warned of possible land occupations and “corridas de cerco” 
(Toledo 2007:254). José Mariman wrote that the recuperations created “terror” in the minds of 
the landowners (1995). Not only were the land occupations perceived as a threat, so was the 
Mapuche Tribunal’s challenging of Chilean laws and jurisdiction. Therefore, Sr. Joaquín Chuecas 
Muñoz, the regional governor of the 9th region, filed a petition for a criminal investigation.  
 
On 23 June 1992, special Judge Antonio Castro Gutiérrez initiated proceedings against leader 







member of the criminal organization Consejo de Todas las Tierras (CTT). In addition, the other 
143 defendants of “Mapuche origin” were accused of usurpation, criminal organization, 
contempt of court, theft, and damages (CIDH 2002).109 To build this case against the members 
of the organization CTT, Judge Castro pulled together different incidents of land occupations, 
for which complaints were sitting at the police offices without successful prosecution, to 
construct a pattern which, together with an alleged common objective, became the basis for 
the charge of a criminal organization. Thus, the investigative judge interpreted the symbolic 
land occupations organized by members and communities of the CTT as actions of a criminal 
organization. A public defender recalled that 
 
it was election time and the government didn’t want to seem soft. The trial meant the end of 
the harmony that had existed between the Concertación [government coalition] and the 
indigenous organizations. The investigative judge aggregated the various open cases that existed 
against the different actions undertaken by CTT, arguing that they were related. (Interview C-47) 
  
In 2009, I interviewed José, CTT activist and one of the defendants in the case, about their 
activities and the subsequent prosecution. He recalled their hopes and expectations when the 
CTT started mobilizing in the early 1990s: 
Those who participated were elderly, traditional authorities, machi, werkenes, and children. […] 
There was a lot of hope. The idea at the return of democracy was that we were going to be 
listened to, that there would be an opening in the attitude towards the Mapuche. At that 
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moment, Patricio Aylwin was president and had adopted a dialogue with the Mapuches. We 
never imagined that they would apply the same laws as the military regime. They said that we 
were against the state. We were not at all against the state. We were just demanding 
compensation for the historical debt. It was an opportunity. Our position was entirely 
legitimate. We thought it would be received positively. (Interview C-53) 
  
His testimony lays bare the striking discrepancy in the way in which he defines what they were 
doing and how it was received. Faced with the criminalization, José kept pushing their actions 
back into the political arena.  
 
The indictment sparked strong resistance and attempts to counter the criminal labeling and 
redefine the events. “We demand acquittals” was the front page of their newspaper Aukiñ in 
November 1992, accompanied by pictures of a grand demonstration showing an assembly of 
older men and women wearing symbols of their Mapuche identity, such as clothing and musical 
instruments. The Aukiñ editorial defined their actions as “the crime of reclaiming historical 
rights,” (1992a) and that language continues today. The accusation was interpreted as an 
accusation of “the” Mapuches. “Los mapuche no hemos cometido ningún delito solo hemos 
reclamado nuestros derechos como es la tierra […] los winka son los usurpadores no los 
mapuche.” [We Mapuches have not committed any crime; we have only demanded our rights 
to the lands. […] The winka are the usurpers, not the Mapuches], said lonko Juan Coliqueo at a 
public demonstration (Aukiñ 1992c). Leader Aucán Huilcamán defended CTT as a legitimate 
organization: “no nos hemos organizado para cometer delito, sino para promover nuestros 







(Aukiñ 1992c). The CTT activists emphasized the context of dispossession as the proper 
framework to judge their actions.  
 
Acusar de usurpación de tierras a las comunidades Mapuche, es lo más aberrante que existe en 
la historia Mapuche y chilena. Con esto se pretende desconocer que los mapuche son los 
verdaderos dueños y originarios de estas tierras, es pretender revertir la historia […]. 
 
[Accusing Mapuche communities of usurpation of lands is the most erroneous thing that exists 
in Chilean and Mapuche history. It is an attempt to deny that the Mapuche are the real owners 
of the land, an attempt to reverse history […].] (Aukiñ 1992b)  
 
The 144 defendants were selected because they had signed a letter that explained the 
demands for land and the related actions of recuperation. According to José not everyone who 
had signed the letter had actually participated in the recuperations. It is true, though, that they 
were all members of the CTT, and that is what they got charged with, the letter being the 
evidence of their membership. As such, the land occupations were the crimes that were 
attributed to the organization, and the members were held responsible even if they had not 
personally participated. The move towards re-contextualization of the single events of land 
occupations thus was constituted by a broadening of the relevant time frame and criminal 








The re-contextualization of the separate land occupations was justified in the indictment which 
expressed that, for the Chilean state, far more was at stake than the harm inflicted by single 
acts of land occupation. The underlying fear was that of a state within a state. The investigative 
judge argued that CTT posed a threat not only because of the land occupations but because of 
its defiance of Chilean authority in general:  
El caracter [sic] ilegal de esta asociación se encuentra suficientemente acreditado con el 
desconocimiento de la autoridad, la creación y funcionamiento de un tribunal Mapuche, creación 
de bandera y emblema, el tener un periodico [sic] clandestino denominado AUKIÑ, hacer 
presiones contra las autoridades. -  La existencia de una asociación de personas denominadas 
Consejo de Todas Las Tierras, que se autodefine como Organización estructural Histórica 
Mapuche, constituída [sic] por lo que ellos llaman sus autoridades originarias. - Que esta entidad 
postula la existencia de una Nación con toda la significación que este termino [sic] da al Derecho 
político.    
 
[The illegal character of this association is sufficiently attested in its disregard for authority, the 
creation and functioning of a Mapuche tribunal, the creation of a flag and an emblem, the 
clandestine newspaper called Aukiñ, and its pressuring of authorities. The existence of an 
association of persons called Consejo de Todas las Tierras that defines itself as the structural 
Historical Mapuche Organization, constituted by what they call their original authorities; that 
this entity postulates the existence of a Nation with all the significance that this term gives to 
the political Law] (Accusation cited in Aukiñ 1993b).  
 
The defense took the battle of interpretation about the Mapuche identity and representation 
into the trial as it aimed to explain what the real nature of CTT was. The defense lawyers 
discussed the concepts of Lonko, Machi, Weupife, and Werkenes, arguing that these are true 
roles in Mapuche tradition, not an invention of an illicit organization. That same battle of 
interpretation was subsequently fed back into the public sphere when the defense statement 
was reprinted in a shortened version in the “Mapuche voice” Aukiñ (1993c). Referring to the 
customs as they have been throughout known Mapuche history, so long ignored by the Chilean 







autoridades del Pueblo Mapuche a fin que este se manifieste y se relacione con el resto de los 
chilenos mediante la organización  que es propria y natural” [an effort to assemble the 
authorities of the Mapuche People once again so that they can manifest and relate to the rest 
of the Chileans through an organization that is its own and is natural] (Reprint of part of the 
defense statement in: Aukiñ 1993c). 
 
After the conviction of 141 defendants on 11 March 1993, the CTT appealed and lost the case 
and was later rejected at the Supreme Court. The case went on to the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights, where it is still under consideration. Despite the labeling of the 
CTT as a criminal organization, however, none of the 141 convicted defendants has spent time 
in prison. Defendants did lose political rights, though, and were impeded, for example, from 
running for president. Thus, while the state has symbolically dragged the CTT and its activities 
into the criminal justice arena, de facto the organization CTT still exists today and has not 
ceased to be active in the mobilization of communities and other happenings in name of the 
Mapuche people. Their basis of support has decreased over the years, but a survey in 2006 
demonstrated that at least 10% of (self-identified) Mapuches claimed that the CTT represented 
them “a lot” (CEP 2006).110  
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The prosecution of the Mapuche organization CTT did something that had not happened 
before. Until then, prosecutors had investigated and prosecuted acts of land occupations 
separately. For example, in 1991 thirteen Mapuches were prosecuted for “usurpation” after 
they had occupied the estate “Santa Clara” in the 9th region (Barria 2001). Instead of continuing 
that route, in 1992 the investigative judge made a discursive shift. In this prosecution against 
the CTT, the prosecutorial attention shifted from the particular occupation of specific land 
estates on specific dates and particular damages done to the fences or produce to a broader 
time frame and a broader geographical scope. The narrative re-contextualized separate 
incidents of land occupation in order to create a pattern and a meaning above and beyond the 
individual land occupations. The prosecution against Consejo de Todas las Tierras thus displays 
several of the elements that I have listed as re-contextualization in Chapter 1. The narrative 
shifted attention from individuals to a collective, stipulated a pattern, and invoked a broader 
legal interest.  
  
Not only were the specific “criminal” events of land occupations drawn into the criminal justice 
arena. Instead, an entire Mapuche organization was defined as “criminal,” and even those 
members that did not personally participate in the occupations were captured by the logic of 
criminal liability. This was only possible because the prosecutorial narrative shifted from a de-
contextualized modality to a re-contextualized interpretation of events, which then enabled the 
expansion of the criminal justice arena to incorporate acts and persons that were previously 







Mapuche activists presented a counter-narrative defining their actions as primarily political and 
symbolic instead of criminal. The trial became a battle about the identity and legitimacy of the 
Consejo de Todas las Tierras and their representation of the Mapuche people as well as the 
legitimacy of the Mapuche land demand. Interestingly, after this criminal case land occupations 
à la the CTT model have hardly been prosecuted. The contention about the criminalization of 
land occupations is explored in more depth in the next section.   
 
5. What is land for, who owns it, and who is the usurper?  
 
In this section, I analyze the way in which land occupations have been defined in the 
prosecutorial narrative since the prosecution of the CTT. Prosecutions of land occupations, or, 
more to the point, the lack of such criminal prosecutions, should be understood against the 
background of the legitimacy of the Mapuche demands for land restitution and the recognition 
of these demands among the larger Chilean population. A survey conducted at the end of the 
1990s showed that land occupations as a protest action enjoyed widespread legitimacy among 
Chileans, stating that 80% of Chileans thought that “the Mapuches are right in the conflict 
between forestry companies and Mapuche communities” (CERC 1999:1).111 
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 region. That is 
what 80% of the population thinks, whereas 10% considers that the companies are right” (CERC 1999:1). The 
specific question was: “in the last weeks there has been information about incidents between groups of Mapuches 
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In its attempts to allocate land occupations to the arena in which it “belongs,” the prosecutorial 
narrative is deeply ambivalent. In the previous section I noted that despite the determination of 
the CTT as a criminal organization and the conviction of 141 of its members, none of the 
defendants spent time in prison and CTT has continued to exist. Indeed, CTT has continued to 
engage in land occupations and only on a few occasions have activists been prosecuted for this 
conduct. Since 1994 symbolic land occupations have hardly been prosecuted at all, de facto 
giving activists the space to claim such occupations as political actions that should be situated in 
the political arena and responded to within the logic of persuasion and negotiation, even 
though landowners continue to claim that it is a crime and should be prosecuted as such. 
Indeed, between 2001 and 2005, it was routine practice not to prosecute such occupations, 
described Jorge Correa Sutil, former sub-secretary of the Department of Internal Affairs:   
[E]l Gobierno de la época se abstenía de actuar en los casos conocidos como “tomas virtuales de 
terreno”, donde grupos concertados ingresaban pacíficamente a los predios, convocaban a la 
prensa y luego se retiraban sin necesidad de intervención policial masiva y sin dejar tras ellos 
daños importantes a la propiedad. 
 
[The government of that period abstained from action in cases known as “virtual land 
occupations,” in which coordinated groups peacefully entered the lands, called the press, and 
then left without the necessity of massive police intervention and without leaving behind 
significant damages to the property.] (Comisión de Constitución 2003:32) 
 
Whether intended as official policy or not, this permissiveness added to a publicly recognized 
legitimacy of Mapuche land demands.  
 
Perceiving this lack of law enforcement, landowners have been pushing the meta-conflict about 







and defend private property. For example, in a public speech in 2002, the president of the 
CORMA defended the importance of private property, economic progress, and the strict 
application of the “rule of law.” He explicitly condemned any tendency to take extra-legal 
factors such as “popularity, the ethnic origin, friendship, economic, social or political position” 
into account when judging actions. And he specifically criticized the permissiveness towards 
Mapuche land occupations and argued that the social order would weaken when the 
application of the law was made dependent on “the popularity of a cause, the socioeconomic 
situation of the criminals or their capacity to voice their demands in the media.” He emphasized 
the liberal legalist value that the law be applied “with rigorous equality to all […] members [of 
society].” (2002a).  
 
While so-called “virtual” or “symbolic” occupations have thus de facto been excluded from the 
criminal justice arena, “productive” occupations have been the subject of several criminal 
prosecutions. Contrary to merely symbolic occupations, productive occupations, which started 
in 1998, go beyond the simple entering of a piece of land. Instead, communities proceed to 
work on the land and extract trees or wheat for sale or consumption. While some transgression 
of property lines has actually been customarily allowed in the relations between business 
farmers and their workers and adjacent communities, productive occupations go far beyond 
such incidental incursions. Over time, landowners and the state have therefore come to re-








With the criminal prosecutions, the sociopolitical dispute about land ownership, land value, and 
land use transferred to the criminal justice arena. The competing discourses give radically 
different answers to the questions: What is land for, who owns it, and who is the usurper? 
Landowners argue that property is sacred and legally in the hands of the current landowners. 
Mapuche activists in turn claim that the Chilean state owes a historic debt to the Mapuche 
people.  
 
While the fundamental dispute is about legal ownership of properties, productive land 
occupations also feed ongoing disagreement between Mapuche activists and landowners about 
the meaning of land and proper land use. In addition to claims about national self-
determination and the significance of the Mapuche territory, Mapuche activists reject the 
exploitation of the land and demand instead a respect for native forests and a desire to live in 
harmony with nature. They also emphasize that communities need the land because otherwise 
they do not have enough resources for their children and they will continue to live in poverty. 
This need is aggravated by the fact that much of the lands are severely degraded due to 
erosion. Landowners emphasize, however, that Mapuches traditionally never were farmers and 
that they do not have the knowledge and techniques to fruitfully work the land. Landowners 
therefore argue that giving land would never solve the poverty problem as more children will 
be born and Mapuches will need more land every time they divide the land among their 
children. Indeed, the president of the CORMA argued that those living on land acquired by 








In this meta-conflict in and around the courtroom, actors attempt to reclaim vocabulary and 
assert their specific interpretation and values. While Mapuche activists are accused of the 
criminal offense “usurpation of land,” they systematically refer to the state as the “usurper” 
and to landowners as “usurpers.” Activists resist the label “land occupation” and assert that 
what they are doing is “recuperation.” They reject the notion that they could be guilty of the 
crime of usurpation. One activist asked me: “How can the owner be guilty of this crime? And 
the thief arrests the owner?” (Interview C-61). They thus juggle and invert the hegemonic 
vocabulary. And when landowners in hegemonic discourse are systematically referred to as the 
“dueños de la tierra” [landowners], CTT leader Aucán Huilcamán proclaims that the Mapuches 
are the “real” dueños de la tierra.  
 
Landowners also employ this strategy of inverting arguments that are thought to be firmly 
within the domain of the opponent. For example, when Mapuche activists emphasize ecological 
affinity to affirm their superiority, forestry companies specifically detail how their plantations 
contribute to ecological equilibrium and the conservation of native forests. Landowners also 
criticize the “myth” that only indigenous people could have a strong connection with nature 
(Interview C-54). Thus, we can observe how actors appropriate terms and arguments that 
initially “belonged” to the opponent. And of course, these arguments are also reproduced in 
the courtroom. During trials, private landowners specifically dispute the accusation that they 







land did not only mean financial gain for them, but also had emotional value (Field notes, Trial 
Lonkos of Traiguén, April 2003). They pointed out that their ancestors were also buried on their 
land (Larraín 2007), thus inverting the common claim made by Mapuches that the land is 
special to them because their ancestors are buried there. In this way, keywords and key 
arguments are re-appropriated by the opposing discourse and given a different meaning. The 
words and arguments chosen in the prosecutorial narrative are of great significance in this 
linguistic battle. The prosecutorial narrative participates in this meta-conflict about land 
occupations and the meaning of land as it emphasizes that the value of land should be 
measured in money.  
  
A fundamental issue in the meta-conflict is the question of legal and legitimate land ownership. 
Mapuche activists criticize the idea that because of the war in 1881 the current landowners 
have acquired “legal property” and reject this as a form of unacceptable victor’s justice. Thus, 
apart from making demands based on titles that they received when they were brought to 
reductions – the reduced pieces of lands reserved for them after the war – they also refer to 
Spanish treaties to make their claim to “ancestral lands” consisting of ten million hectares 
below the Bío Bío River. “Our Mapuche nation has not taken distance from those treaties nor 
has it violated them, having to affirm their complete validity and recognition from our part” 
(Aukiñ 1991:5). This claim is based on the notion of land as “territory” (the land that belongs to 
a nation and people) as opposed to land as “tierra” (land which can be divided into individual 







treaties is undisputed, and therefore activists claim that land occupations are not crimes but 
political events. A lonko described it as a “shout of protest to the state and the rich” (Interview 
C-27). Contrary to the landowner’s perspective, they rhetorically ask “Why do we need titles if 
all the land was ours”? (Interview C-62).  
 
Mapuche activists have attempted to frame their demands with an explicit reference to Chilean 
laws. On 16 January 1999 a founder of the Center for the Study of Indian Law sent a letter to 
the CORMA declaring that the rights claimed by the forestry companies are “imaginary rights” 
which “are violently unconstitutional” with reference to the laws of 2 July 1852 and 4 
December 1866 (on file with author). Thus, the letter demanded that “in faithful and integral 
compliance with the Chilean laws, constitutions, codes and serious laws, return the usurped 
lands to the real owners and otherwise the indigenous communities will take care of it.” 
Landowners, however, refused to accept this logic. While recognizing the legitimacy of títulos 
de merced as a valid title within the current legal system, landowners specifically resist the 
notion of “ancestral rights,” which challenges the basis of the Chilean legal framework. They 
reject the notion that “anyone who can claim to have been there first would be able to exercise 
an eternal right to the land,” said the representative of Forestal Mininco. “Then the Chinese 
might be able to claim land here! That is not valid, and that damaging discourse could sow an 
extremely dangerous conflict” (Interview C-17). One landowner rejected the Mapuche claims 
because “in the end, they were never the owners of these lands; rather, they only lived in an 







rights, the representative of forestry company Bosques Cautín laughed (Interview C-33): “The 
hospital in Temuco, the indigenous say that it is theirs!”  
 
Landowners thus dismiss the reading of history in which treaties with the Spanish Crown and 
the Pacification of the Araucanía lead to current obligations for the Chilean state. Their position 
is supported in the current Chilean legal framework, as Mapuche assertions of land ownership 
are not recognized without titles that have been recognized in a civil court. In 1999, the 
“ancestral lands” were explicitly excluded from CONADI’s Fund of Land and Water, which 
purchases land for Mapuche communities (Toledo 2007:260). In the Indigenous Act, only lands 
which were granted to the Mapuches after the Pacification of the Araucanía were considered to 
be “indigenous” (Richards 2010:68).  
  
These competing narratives about landownership and land use traveled into the criminal justice 
arena and also popped up in the prosecutorial narrative. Sometimes, the prosecutor explicitly 
dismissed the claims to ancestral lands. For example, in his opening statement in the trial 
against the Lonkos of Traiguén, the prosecutor argued that since 1992, various intellectuals, like 
Chilean anthropologist José Bengoa, have spread “theories” about the history of Chile and the 
Mapuches which have resulted in the land claims. Mella and Le Bonniec (2004) point out that 
the prosecutor thus reduced land claims to theories and to something that is recent, ignoring a 
long history of claims and mobilizations in which Mapuche communities have gone to Chilean 








The emergence of productive occupations 
In 1998, the Mapuche community Temulemu did for the first time what came to be called a 
“productive” land occupation, as they not only entered but also exploited the forestry 
plantations on the estates Santa Rosa de Colpi and Chorrillos. They based their claim of 
landownership on a judicial decision from 1930 by the Tribunal de Indios [Court for Indians] 
(Barrera 1999:69). One participating activist told me the story:  
We entered and started a little company. People from the community simply came to work. 
Instead of occupying the field as a symbolic action, we did a “productive” recuperation. That 
meant that instead of asking attention for our demand and hoping that it would get solved, we 
just put the land to our use. We started cutting the trees and transporting them. People from 
the community who came to work would get their pay at the end of the day. […] With a hundred 
people we occupied it for three months. We made a camp and installed a wooden campground. 
We had an industrial saw machine and a modern production. We paid a daily wage to anyone 
that came to work. It was a highly unusual system. There was no such thing as reclaiming 
“sacred” trees. It was all about the higher quality of life for the people. The wood was used 
firstly to build houses for the people, and secondly for sale. (Interview C-59)  
  
The productive land occupation came to be connected to the concept of “territorial control.” 
This idea was coined by José Huenchunao, an early leader of the Mapuche organization CAM. In 
“productive” land takeovers, communities would simply start working the land during the day 
and patrolling at night. This practice still existed in 2009, when a community member from the 
coastal area told me that “we are guarding the territory in order to prevent the company from 
entering. We get up early and work in shifts,” (Field notes, April 2009). These occupied estates 








Such occupations are not clandestine operations, but often publicly announced. For example, 
on 13 January 2003 a Mapuche community sent out a public declaration stating that they had 
occupied Fundo Nupangue:  
 
This occupation develops with productive activities inside the estate and will be done for an 
undefined time. […] This action expresses our rejection of the usurpation of the ancestral 
Mapuche lands that both individuals and transnational companies, especially forestry investors, 
had done previously. (Public Declaration 2003)  
 
Contrasting these occupations to the “peaceful” symbolic land occupations, landowners portray 
the productive land occupations as a different phenomenon, with different actors and different 
motives. The complementary images of the symbolic land occupation and the productive land 
occupation display a dichotomy similar to the distiction between the “good” Mapuche and the 
“bad” Mapuche. In the landowner’s narrative, the symbolic land occupation transformed into 
the peaceful action of a “good” Mapuche, turning those involved in productive occupations into 
the criminals. “Before there were women, children, and lonkos,” said the lawyer of one of the 
biggest forestry companies. He attributed a different motive for participation to these “women, 
children, and lonkos”: “For them it was really about the land.” About the later land takeovers 
he said: “they do not care so much about the land as about something more, such as 








Transfer into the criminal justice arena 
The lack of a systematic criminalization of symbolic land occupations (or the symbolic 
occupation of urban buildings) provided space for Mapuche activists to claim these tactics as 
political protests instead of plain crimes. Landowners, however, fear for the potential 
legitimization of occupations and other actions which they want to be clearly labeled as crimes. 
In a public speech, the director of the CORMA referred specifically to past experiences with 
productive occupations, such as the sawmill that the Temulemu community built:  
 
Can one occupy with force the property of a neighbor when one has been waiting several years 
for a solution of housing? Can a group of Mapuches attack with an ax a patrol of Carabineros in 
Lumaco, or with bullets a farmer in Victoria and others in Collipulli? Can someone systematically 
steal wood from his neighbors because he believes that the lands belonged to him at some 
point? Can one burn woods and houses, attack and intimidate workers, assault trucks and build 
clandestine sawmills when one is dissatisfied with the current situation, established in the 
Chilean laws? (CORMA 2002a) 
 
Productive land occupations have been transferred into the criminal justice arena and the 
logging of trees and harvesting of grain during such occupations have been defined as crimes. In 
these prosecutions, the historical context of the relation between “neighbors” and the 
Mapuche land claims were generally ignored. Instead, the prosecutorial narrative tended to 
focus narrowly on the specific damage done to trees and produce on a specific property, 







case, for example, there was considerable debate about what the costs of a tree are, whether 
one cubic meter is $10,000, and whether 400 trees then come to $3,200,000 or not. In another 
case, eleven members of Mapuche community “José Millacheo Levio” from Chequenco were 
accused of the theft of between 30 and 800 sacks of wheat. Also in that case, the focus was on 
the specific costs and the judges decided that about 10,000 kg of wheat were taken. The value 
of the wheat was estimated at 945,500 pesos, as every 100 kg was estimated to be 9,455 pesos 
(Case Chequenco).  
 
Mapuche activists often resist this “capitalist” way of defining and valuing land, which focuses 
on financial “profit” only. Instead, they claim to wish to live in harmony with nature. 
Landowners in turn claim the importance of protecting private property and securing 
investments as public and national interests. A representative from a forestry company said 
that a plantation is indeed a “productive unit,” and the function of a pine tree is to be 
converted into timber (Interview C-34). In the meta-conflict alternative claims about the value 
of land, territory, productivity, and wealth thus compete for hegemony, which would mean that 
particular interests are successfully represented as universal interests and the fact that the 
status quo is a product of history is denied. For example, in such a move to represent and work 
for the common good (instead of particular interests), the CORMA director claimed that “the 








While the prosecutorial narrative thus emphasizes financial damages in order to construct the 
case, at the same time, private landowners often highlight their emotional attachment to their 
land. The fact that more was at stake than financial profit was indeed recognized during the 
Chequenco trial. In that case landowner María Magdalena Silva Correa had abandoned her 
property after she got tired of the constant attacks. In recognition of the way in which this had 
affected her, the convicted community members of “José Millacheo Levio” not only had to pay 
the damages to the produce, but also emotional damages (Case Chequenco). Still, the land itself 
was evaluated in financial terms.   
 
Criminal prosecutions of those engaged in productive land occupations thus define such actions 
clearly as crimes, specifically because of the economic damage that is incurred to the private or 
corporate landowners. At the same time, however, there are numerous cases where such 
criminal prosecutions are followed by political negotiations. This was, for example, the case 
after the Temulemu productive occupation. Fifteen participants were convicted of usurpation 
and theft of wood. Afterwards, however, negotiations with CONADI resulted in the land being 
transferred to the Mapuche communities that had engaged in the productive occupation. This 
transfer fueled the meta-conflict about land use. Forestal Mininco declared publicly that it did 
not believe that the handing over of lands was the solution to the grave situation of poverty 
that affects the rural sector in the 8th and 9th regions (Public Declaration, Mininco 1999e). This 
declaration was issued a few months after Mininco sold the estate Santa Rosa de Colpi to 







between the criminal justice arena and the political arena, questions about the legality and 
legitimacy of land occupations become intricately connected to the issues of land ownership 
and land use.  
 
The prosecution of defendants for their actions in a productive occupation required a re-
contextualization of separate actions and incidents as a part of that enterprise. For example, in 
the indictment of the Temulemu case, the prosecutorial narrative connected a collection of 
separate incidents, as these were construed into a pattern. Various actions on different dates 
with different participants were listed: some actions were qualified as “usurpation” and “theft” 
between 20 September and 16 October 1998, and there were also actions of usurpation and 
theft on 16 November 1998. Separate events were thus re-contextualized as being part of a 
larger whole: the productive occupation. Lonko Pascual Pichún, the chief of the community 
Temulemu, was accused of the facts in both instances. The other defendants were different for 
each set of facts. Apart from the fact that all of the actions were related to the estate Santa 
Rosa de Colpi, it is not entirely clear why they were prosecuted and sentenced together. It is 
clear, however, that there was a move beyond single incidents. This is also reflected in the fact 
that the investigative judge, Archibaldo Loyola, was investigating the existence of an 
“underground organization composed of Mapuches and non-Mapuches who take advantage of 
the situation for their own benefit in order to transport and commercialize stolen wood” 
(Barrera 1999:77). The specific mention of “non-Mapuches” clearly reflects the image of the 







this chapter. The search for an “underground organization” indicates a move from the 
investigation of particular individuals towards an investigation of (members of) a collective.    
 
Landowners were dissatisfied with the result of the criminal prosecutions of such occupations. 
In the Temulemu-case, for example, prosecution took place and fifteen people were convicted. 
But none of them actually spent time in prison, regularly reporting to the police station instead 
(similar to probation). After the community members were removed from the estates, Forestal 
Mininco exploited the plantations cutting the trees. After various attempts to replant, they 
abandoned the ground in 2001. “What is Fundo Santa Rosa worth?” the representative of 
Forestal Mininco asked me. “Zero. We cannot enter it,” he said, answering his own question 
(Interview C-17). Any future plantation there cannot be adequately protected. He added: “in 
theory it would be one million pesos because of the value of the ground, and then added to 
that the planted trees having a value dependent on their age.” Also, many of such occupations 
have not led to prosecutions or convictions. The lawyer for the governor of sub-region Malleco 
confirmed that when there is a land takeover, the government is more concerned with 
removing the occupants than with engaging in the procedures necessary for effective 
prosecution (Interview C-56). Therefore, landowners continued to call for more attention to the 
grave effect of these occupations. In 2002, the CORMA director was clear about their 
frustration: “Without a doubt, sirs, parliamentarians of the region, we are very tired, worse, 








Productive occupations as lawlessness and a loss of control 
According to one of the public defenders, smaller transgressions of the law such as theft and 
usurpation are only prosecuted if they are perceived to be the overture to worse actions 
(Interview C-47). Indeed, small transgressions of the law are perceived as a customary practice, 
characterizing the relations between rural neighbors, and more specifically the relations 
between business farmers and their workers, who often come from Mapuche communities. 
The already ambivalent border between the political arena and the criminal justice arena is 
thus further blurred by the fact that many instances of small theft are viewed within the 
framework of what one landowner called the “laws of the countryside” (Interview C-55). As 
long as farmers have the feeling of being in control of the situation, they do not mobilize the 
criminal justice system. Productive land occupations, however, clearly indicate to them the 
start of lawlessness and escalation.  
  
When one talks to members of Mapuche communities as well as landowners, it is clear that 
“coexistence” in the countryside is characterized by an absence of state agents and the laws of 
the state. Customary practices and solving things among each other is the rule, state 
intervention the exception. Hulsman (1986) pointed out that state intervention is the exception 
everywhere, but it seems to be even more so in the rural areas of the south of Chile.  It used to 
be common for Mapuches from rural communities to enter other properties to look for 
firewood or have their animals graze on the land. This was not always permitted, as a young 







their animals as a fine in a private settlement (Interview C-58). The boundaries between the 
legal, customary, the accepted, and the illegal are vague in the countryside. The SOFO director 
said that workers commonly take some grain or fertilizers from the private landowner who 
employs them for use in their small farm practices, comparable to the practice in some 
companies that employees sometimes use copy machines for their own purposes or take small 
office materials, such as pens, home. He emphasized that the rural areas are always far from 
authorities. “It is difficult to protect property.” So farmers were used to “thieving” and to a 
certain level that was part of an unspoken agreement. “But then,” the SOFO director said, 
“forty or sixty animals in two months; that is not like a single pen anymore.” He contrasted 
“thieving out of necessity” to “organized thieving” and added that this second type also 
contains an “ideological component” (Interview C-55). Landowners came to perceive references 
to poverty and a history of violence and exclusion as a carte blanche to take from them and 
that some community members simply were taking advantage of their work.  
 
Over time, these productive land occupations have therefore obtained a meaning within the 
prosecutorial narrative that goes beyond the specific occupation of a property or the specific 
damage to trees. This is specifically visible in trials in which the prosecutor has charged 
defendants under terrorism laws. In the trial against the Lonkos of Traiguén, the prosecutor 
commented that after pieces of land had been “unilaterally” declared to be in conflict, “those 
terrains left the sphere of Chilean legality. They became a no man’s land” (Oral proceedings, 







“unilateral” declaration of a property to be “in conflict” is a “euphemism” that is “utilized to 
announce that any kind of crimes will be committed in the property.” According to him, the 
negative economic impact of such a declaration is obvious, as the “commercial value” of the 
property “practically disappears” the moment that “it cannot be exploited, the moment that 
anything that is planted can be destroyed, that it won’t be possible to harvest without a police 
contingent.” He concluded that “no one is interested in buying conflicts” (Opening statement, 
oral proceedings, June 2005). These productive land occupations have thus come to be 
perceived as the start of a series of crimes, potentially ending in arson.  
 
Thus, while symbolic land occupations were de facto transferred back into the political arena, 
the prosecutorial narrative interpreted the damage done by productive land occupations as 
crimes, and thus confirmed a conceptualization of the value of land in terms of financial losses. 
Most importantly, however, such productive occupations obtained the meaning of an overture 
to lawlessness and escalation within the prosecutorial narrative. At the same time, such 
occupations have sometimes led to negotiations with CONADI, signalling the ambivalence in the 
definition of the situation. Furthermore, not all of such occupations were consistently 
prosecuted, leaving landowners dissatisfied with what they perceived as a lack of protection. 
 








On 1 December 1997, for the first time activists set three trucks on fire. A former CAM activist 
explained this as follows:  
 
The arson in Lumaco was the response to the limits of the Indigenous Act. A lot of people had 
confidence in that law, they thought it would create a better place for their community, but it 
wasn’t what they had expected. The discrimination, racism, the misery, and the prepotency 
lived by the community people in Lumaco; that led to the burning of those trucks. (Interview C-
57)  
 
This incident led forestry companies and the state to speculate about an underground 
organization and a “Chilean Chiapas.” The newspaper El Mercurio reported with the heading 
“Nuestro Pequeño Chiapas” [Our Little Chiapas] on 28 February 1999 (cited in: Barrera 
1999:74). Contrary to such suspicions of an underground organization, activists that 
participated in the event emphasized that the arson had not been planned but occurred 
spontaneously in the heat of the moment because of their anger (Interview C-23).  
  
Immediately the day after, Regional Governor Oscar Eltit wrote a request to demand for the 
application of the Law on State Security. Twelve people were indeed indicted under this law 
and it was argued that the action counted as the destruction of means or elements that are 
used in public service or for industrial activities, such as the mines, agriculture, or transport, as 
described in the Law on State Security. The trucks were the property of private owners who 







Arauco and whereas the truck owners were the most direct victims, it was understood that the 
target of this action was the forestry company. “Their goal is to paralyze the productive 
activities of the company Forestal Bosques Arauco in Fundo Pidenco,” the regional governor 
wrote (Request, 2 December 1997).  
 
This first time use of the Law on State Security in the Mapuche conflict instead of ordinary 
criminal laws implied a shift in the legal interest that was at stake. It means that not only the 
property right of a private party was threatened, but also the security of the state, shifting from 
a narrowly defined legal interest to a broad and generally vaguely defined legal interest (see 
also Mariman 1998; Valle 2001).  
 
Often, Lumaco is viewed as the incident that really ignited the conflict. It is easy to see why the 
conflict emerged forcefully in 1997. Forestry plantations take about twenty years to grow. The 
legal instrument that enabled forestry companies to invest and plant (DL 701) was enacted in 
1977. Thus, in 1997 the forestry companies started to exploit many of the plantations that were 
planted after the enactment of DL 701. Mapuche communities wanted a fair share instead of 
watching all the wealth of their lands go abroad. As actions of protest, the estate Pidenco was 
occupied and a road blockaded. Participating in the land occupation and the road blockade, the 
Lumaco community members perceived themselves as pioneers in the struggle after a long 








After the arson, they were detained and charged with the Law on State Security. The governor’s 
request for the application of this law is a typical example of a re-contextualization of events. 
The regional governor emphasized that the relevant context for this petition was the fact that it 
was not the first time that the forestry company had been affected and that there was a 
pattern of actions against it. He mentioned that on 13 October 1997 there was a land 
occupation, the occupation of a road in Fundo Pidenco, and an incident of arson in that estate. 
In the search for the perpetrators of the arson, Regional Governor Oscar Eltit gave orders to 
look for those who were involved in an earlier occupation of the offices of CONADI by Mapuche 
organizations, thus making a clear connection with Mapuche land demands. He also presumed 
that members of the Mapuche community Pichi Loncoyán were involved. The regional governor 
specifically also called for punishment of the “intellectual authors” of the crime. “They have 
become progressively more violent, and they are instigated by leaders who maybe do not 
participate in the material action, but they are the intellectual authors, whose responsibilities 
should be determined in the investigation” (Request, 2 December 1997). Thus all the elements 
of re-contextualization are present, as the regional governor explicitly called for a deliberate 
search for leaders, intellectual authors, and aboveground supporters and claimed that 
organizations were involved and separate incidents were connected in a pattern.  
 
A re-curring issue in the meta-conflict about arsons in the Mapuche conflict is the question 
whether it damages property or poses a threat to lives. In the Lumaco case, the regional 







at “grave risk” (Request 2 December 1997). Mapuche activists, however, denied any risk to 
human lives and emphasized that care was taken that the truck drivers stepped out of the 
trucks and were brought to safety before the trucks were set on fire (Interview C-23). They 
dispute that the real worries have anything to do with physical injuries. Instead, activists argue 
that the threat to economic interests and land ownership are the real underlying concerns.  
 
While the use of the Law on State Security indicates that the government responded harsly, and 
the broadening of the legal interest seems to communicate recognition of the threat posed by 
such arsons, there are signals that – despite ostensibly harsher rhetoric and laws – prosecutors 
have actually sought to minimize the impact of criminal proceedings on Mapuche communities. 
In this case, after spending two months in prison awaiting trial the defendants were convicted 
but could serve their time by presenting themselves monthly at the court. A defense lawyer 
told me that the choice for the Law on State Security was informed not only by the broadening 
of the legal interest but also by the fact that the penalties under that law were actually lower 
than they would have been if the defendants had been prosecuted for ordinary arson 
(Interview C-47). This indicates attempts to dampen the conflict that is recognized as political, 
in which the defendants are not marginal criminals, but represent a larger constituency. The 
Lumaco community members who were convicted, however, continue to deny their 
involvement in the burning of the trucks and argue that they were merely prosecuted because 
of their participation in earlier land occupations (Interview C-60). Reproducing the strict 







symptomatic of the government’s ambivalence in these situations – the government on the one 
hand prosecuted what it had defined as crimes, and on the other hand recognized the land 
demands as legitimate. Thus, after their trial the Lumaco communities negotiated with CONADI, 
received 634 hectares, and were relocated.    
 
After the Lumaco case, the state initiated four other prosecutions on the basis of the Law on 
State Security against Mapuche activists in relation to land disputes (Valle 2001). With the Penal 
Reform in 2001, however, the executive government was prohibited from recurring to the Law 
on State Security, as the prosecutors obtained the exclusive power over charging defendants. 
Instead of the Law on State Security, from 2002 onwards, the Anti-Terrorism Law was used 
multiple times. Just as in the Lumaco case, the prosecutor in these terrorism cases argued for a 
broadening of the relevant legal interest from individual property to the public order and public 
security. This will be discussed in more depth in Section 8.  
  
7. What is a plantation and what is at stake when one is burnt down?  
 
One of the actions most feared by landowners is arson in plantations. Landowners have actively 
pushed for more attention to this issue, firmly placing it in the criminal justice arena and 
attributing responsibility to Mapuche activists. Mapuche activists in turn consistently deny any 
responsibility and provide competing accounts of the causes of forest fires. Underlying the 







value and impact of plantations and the forestry industry. While the forestry industry claims to 
be essential for Chile’s economy and progress, forestry plantations and their harmful effects are 
among the primary grievances of Mapuche activists and rural Mapuche communities.  
 
Many of the criminal complaints filed by forestry companies did not lead to criminal 
prosecutions or convictions, leading them to decry the situation of “lawlessness” they are 
experiencing. Throughout the years, they have increasingly labeled forest fires as “terrorist 
acts.” Even more important than the direct economic loss, they point to the threat of a loss of 
confidence in investments, which is highly important in the case of produce that needs 
seventeen years to grow. In addition, they emphasize the threat to persons that forest fires 
pose.  
 
Landowners have been successful in having this definition of the situation accepted by the 
government. In March 1999, a parliamentary commission was installed to assess the threat due 
to the growing number of arsons in the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th regions, with a special focus on the 
influence of the “property conflict between indigenous communities and private parties” on 
arsons. The report emphasized the importance of the forestry sector for the country and the 
economy, as the sector provided 120,000 jobs and represented an export of 2 billion USD per 
year (Comisión Especial 2000). Intentional arsons were called a grave threat given the national 







companies: Chile, país forestal. The report further argued that the forest fires add CO₂, threaten 
the ecosystem, and can aggravate climate change.  
 
The report was framed in the logic and language of criminal law as it described the kinds of 
forest fires that occurred and the kind of liability that could be alleged, making a distinction 
between “malicious” and “negligent” arsons. It reported that in general about 38% of the forest 
fires were intentional, due to playing youth or negligent tourists, implying that the other 62% of 
the forest fires (for example due to summer heat) indeed could not be located in the criminal 
justice arena. In the 9th region, however, about 90% of the arsons were deemed intentional, 
often assumed to damage forestry companies. One of the consulted experts made a difference 
between the arson as an end in itself (pyromaniac) or a means (Mapuche activist).  
 
The report also confirmed the lack of prosecutions that landowners criticized. In 95% of the 
cases, the perpetrators were not found, and in less than 1% there was an actual legal sanction 
(Comisión Especial 2000:25). A lawyer from a forestry company indicated that the lack of 
convictions was due to a lack of evidence (Interview C-9). The small percentage of solved 
forestry arsons led to outrage among forestry companies. Landowners called for criminal 
prosecutions and the rigorous application of the rule of law to bring back confidence and the 
possibility of investment. “As growers of plantations we need a stable economy and confidence 








What are plantations? Competing images in the meta-conflict 
The underlying debate in the meta-conflict surrounding arson is about the meaning, value, and 
impact of plantations. Not surprisingly, forestry companies emphasize the importance and 
beneficial role of plantations, while Mapuche activists point to the detrimental effects.  
 
Plantation owners argue that forestry activity is in the “public interest” and beneficial to Chile, 
to the native forests, and for job creation. Chile was, after Brazil, the country with the most 
forestry exploitation in Latin America (Lira 2001), and lumber products are the second largest 
export product of Chile after mining (Invierta en Araucanía 2009). Indeed, forestry companies 
claim to provide jobs and wealth for the region. A forestry company in Galvarino (affected by 
various arsons) wrote that “we make an effort to generate riches and jobs in a region which is 
immersed in the most extreme poverty” (CORMA 2001). Forestry companies emphasize that 
pine and eucalyptus were planted on eroded soil that was qualified as not being suitable for 
agriculture. Farmers sold their lands eagerly to forestry entrepreneurs as the land had become 
eroded and bad for agriculture. This was the rationale behind the law DL 701, enacted by 
Pinochet, which initiated the expansion of forestry in the south of Chile. These trees need 
between 18 and 22 years of growth before the felling starts. Therefore, a representative from 
Bosques Cautín argued that “a plantation is an activity that permits the degraded zone to 
recuperate” (Interview C-33). These arguments are also brought into the courtroom, for 







“he thought that what he did was a good for the country, as he reforested lands that stood idle 
(testimony 27 July 2005, Trial CAM).   
 
Mapuche activists, however, present a very different story and particularly critize the notion 
that these plantations serve the public interest. The turn from agriculture to plantations 
changed the daily lives of Mapuche communities as it often became prohibited to look for 
firewood in adjacent terrain or have their animals graze in a larger territory. Mapuche activists 
also dispute the notion that the plantations create jobs, as manual labor is only needed in the 
planting and felling seasons. They further criticize plantations for their monocultures, lack of 
biodiversity, and the erosion they create in adjacent communities as these imported trees use 
more water than the land can offer. They dispute that plantations are good for the recovery of 
the land. Nearby streams dry up, and communities can no longer get water from their wells. 
When I put these allegations in front of the manager of one of the forestry companies, he 
agreed that especially eucalyptus sucks a lot of water. “But,” he defended his company, “there 
is nothing within the law that says that one cannot have eucalyptus for reasons of water” 
(Interview C-34). It is important to note that he was not cynical, and I do not cite him as an 
instance of particular carelessness. He simply portrayed the perspective that makes sense not 
just for his company, but for all the forestry companies in the region. It is an indication of the 








Competing images of forest fires: Criminal events versus natural causes  
Besides this fundamental and essentially political debate about the value and impact of 
plantations, the meta-conflict addresses the question about the causes of such arsons, which 
comes down to the allocation of such events inside or outside the criminal justice arena. The 
prosecutorial narrative firmly argues that Mapuche activists are responsible for the arsons. For 
example, in the trial against the Lonkos of Traiguén, the prosecutor argued in his opening 
statement that “it is not logical that in the province of Malleco there are 500 arsons. Curiously, 
80–90% take place in the property of farmers, medium and small, and forestry companies. That 
doesn’t happen in any part in Chile” (Oral proceedings, April 2003). Landowners equally tend to 
attribute the arsons to Mapuche activists. Forest fires, however, occur often and can have 
many causes. Since 1982, the 9th region has seen between 1500 and 2500 arsons every year 
(CONAF 2011). In criminal cases, the prosecutor therefore has to prove that an alleged arson 
was intentional. To do so, the prosecutor generally points to the fact that there are multiple 
“foci” where the fire started, which makes it highly unlikely that the fire was natural or 
accidental.  
 
While both symbolic and productive land occupations are overt activities, Mapuche activists 
generally have denied any responsibility for the arsons. That denial brings a very different 
dynamic of narratives in the courtroom because it changes the debate from a question of the 
legitimacy of an action to the issue of attribution. For a long time, there was no public claiming 







that his strategic assessment was that the “Mapuche people were not ready for this yet” 
(Interview C-28). Indeed, the general attitude among Mapuche activists still is that a “Mapuche” 
would not do this. Thus while activists engaged in productive land occupations are defiant of 
the criminal label and claim their action as legitimate, regarding allegations of arson they 
reproduce the image of a Mapuche who is peaceful and law abiding. “Mapuches don’t do 
arsons,” activists told me over and over again. Mapuche activists therefore provide alternative 
accounts of competing truth claims (instead of competing moral claims) of the cause and 
responsibility for the arsons. They claim that other factors than deliberate arson could cause 
the forest fires, such as the hot summer weather and draught, which would deny the existence 
of a crime and remove the entire event from the criminal justice arena as the logic of individual 
guilt would not apply. Their attribution to natural factors such as the heat takes away the need 
to blame anyone and turns the event into a natural consequence instead of a crime.  
 
Activists also often attribute fires to staged attacks by the forestry companies or private 
security companies to receive insurance money, maintain jobs, or to blame it on Mapuches. 
This would not remove the event from the criminal justice arena but allocates guilt and criminal 
responsibility elsewhere. In interviews, they frequently pointed to the evidence that emerged 
after the suicide of a forestry employee to prove that such incidents have happened (see for 
more information about this case Navarro 2001; Langelle 2006; Villegas 2007, footnote 67). 







that these were staged as well, for example by forestry companies, to induce judges to come 
down hard on the Mapuche activists who were on trial (Field notes, March 2003).  
 
The accounts that Mapuche activists provide for the arsons thus focus on alternative truth 
claims, which either frame the event as a natural disaster, or attribute responsibility to other 
actors. They do, however, also provide alternative moral claims, providing legitimacy to an act 
of arson, if it were done by Mapuche activists. Activists argue, for example, that arsons are 
negligible in comparison to the structural violence caused by plantations. This means that – in 
the hypothetical case that Mapuches were responsible for it, they deny that it was a crime, but 
see it as a legitimate form of struggle. An activist who formerly belonged to the Mapuche 
organization Ad Mapu expressed it in this way: “If it were Mapuches who are doing this, then it 
would be legitimate” (Interview C-24). A few activists simply acknowledge arson as one of the 
tactics in the repertoire of resistance, but redefine the act and dispute that it is a crime. “It is a 
form so that they listen,” said a werken of a community in the 9th region:  
 
Before, the state never listened to the Mapuches. […] For me it is not a crime. I support it, 
because the state is guilty, not the Mapuches. Because the state would not listen before, and 
would not return the lands before, I agree with the Mapuches. There are also a lot of Chileans 
who support it. It has been successful as well; they have achieved the attention of the 








A former CAM member similarly explained that in some communities it is a very accepted form 
of struggle:   
 
It is well looked upon as it attacks the direct enemy; it is a slap for capitalism. It can make you 
respected. It is a way to not be practically trampled upon. Finally you are lifting your head to 
meet the enemy head on. That is also when there are confrontations and you face the most 
direct enemy in the eyes: the Carabineros or the PDI (Policía de Investigaciones). (Interview C-
57)  
 
A final issue in the meta-conflict about the criminality of arsons is the question of harm. What is 
at stake when a plantation is burnt down? Landowners criticize arsons for three reasons. First, 
they argue that arsons pose a threat to the lives of employees of the forestry company, the 
private landowner, or firemen.  
 
Second, landowners argue that plantation arsons impede economic growth by stalling 
investments in the region, decreasing profits. There are fears that investments will go to 
Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. For example, a newspaper article reported about investments 
of Chilean forestry companies going to Argentina (El Diario 2001). In a public declaration, the 
CORMA claimed that forestry companies lost more than 80 million USD due to arsons, including 
the costs to combat those fires (CORMA, no date c). Elsewhere the CORMA argued that the 
conflict had led to a decrease in the percentage of forestation, a decrease in the value of land, 







value of land is only observed in countries “in a state of war.” This was due to a decrease in 
investments in the zone claimed to have the effect of a loss of 1.2 to 2.4 million USD (CORMA, 
no date a). By 2008, the CORMA and other business associations argued that foreign 
investment had gone to zero whereas national investment had decreased (CPC 2008). Already 
in 2002, payments for insurance had increased by approximately 40%, further depriving 
landowners of profits. The CORMA pointed out that these higher insurance fees affects all 
forestry holders, regardless of their relation to the conflict (2002c), thus making a move 
towards generalizing victimhood. Last but not least, the fear for arsons led some companies to 
start felling their plantations before they were fully grown, fearing that otherwise they may not 
have any profits at all (Barria 2001). Activists have sometimes expressed their doubts about the 
decrease of profits as a result of arsons (Interview C-59). Also Chilean historian Toledo 
(2007:262) argued that forestry companies and the government exaggerated the economic 
impact of Mapuche mobilizations as well as the number of arsons.112  
 
Third, plantation owners argue that arsons represent the destruction of an ecosystem and a 
conversion of the land into “deserts.” Thus, adopting the ecological concern from the narrative 
of Mapuche activists, landowners claim that arsons actually cause not only economic damage 
but also considerable ecological harm. In contrast, activists often argue that arsons are actually 
beneficial for the soil. Activists argue that the plantation fires bring the land back to its original 
                                                      
112
 He cites a thesis from the Faculty of Physical Sciences and Mathematics of the University of Chile, which 
demonstrates that there was not much negative impact on the economic situation of forestry companies: Pharo 
Hakon, (2004) “Evaluación de las Perdidas Económicas Generadas Por El Conflicto Mapuche en la Novena Región,” 







state, and they expect that after a few years nature will restore its harmony again. Mapuche 
activists see a plantation as a harmful anomaly in the region and the return to soil as a good 
thing: giving space to real nature: “Why should it be permitted to cut an oak tree that may be 
protecting the water, but the eucalyptus plantation of a forestry company cannot be touched?” 
A community member in Temulemu explicitly rejected the notion that Santa Rosa de Colpi was 
now a desert: “What is a desert? A plantation! There are now birds and foxes again in Santa 
Rosa de Colpi” (Field notes, April 2003).  
 
While community members of Temulemu thus praised the possibility of the estate to return to 
a “state of nature,” the value assessment by Forestal Mininco was based on the market value of 
the land and its produce. Just as in the criminal prosecutions of land occupations, in criminal 
prosecutions regarding arson the prosecutorial narrative often reproduces the hegemonic 
financial perspective as the right (and only) way to judge the value of a plantation. One 
prosecutor complained during his opening statement that if you go to the sectors of Didaiko 
and Temulemu, you will see “deserted terrains,” and “in this region, nobody wants to invest, 
nobody wants to give insurance” (Oral proceedings, Trial Lonkos of Traiguén, April 2003).  
 
Case Fundo Alaska 
After this overview of the different voices competing for hegemony in the meta-conflict that 
surrounds the criminal proceedings in cases of arson, I will now turn to such a case in which 







prosecutors offered different narratives to translate the events into the language and logic of 
criminal law and interpret the harm done, the motives for the arson, and the value of forestry 
plantations. On 2 December 1999, a part of Fundo Alaska was set on fire. On 6 April 2001, the 
case was brought before the Tribunal de Letras [Court of Justice] in the village Collipulli. The 
court’s summary of the events was very specific, maintaining a narrow time frame.  
Los hechos que dieron origen a esta causa ocurrieron el día 02 de diciembre de 1999, en horas, de la 
tarde, en el interior del fundo Alaska, Comuna de Ercilla de propiedad de Forestal Mininco, cuando 
un grupo de 60 mapuches de la Comunidad Temucuicui, provocaron diferentes incendios de bosques 
ubicados alrededor de la casa del fundo mencionado, debiendo intervenir Carabineros para que las 
brigadas de incendio pudieran extinguir los 16 focos de incendio, siendo atacados con boleadoras y 
hondas, lográndose la extinción del incendio a las 20,15 horas. 
 
[The events that gave rise to this case occurred on 2 December 1999, in the afternoon, at the estate 
Alaska, Comuna Ercilla, on Forestal Mininco property, when a group of 60 Mapuches of the 
Community Temucuicui set fires in plantations located around the house of the mentioned Fundo, 
requiring the intervention of the police so that the fire brigades could extinguish 16 foci of arson, 
while being attacked with slingshots and catapults, managing the extinction of the arson at 20:15h.] 
(Verdict Tribunal de Letras Collipulli, 6 April 2001)  
 
While the aforementioned description of the events simply asserts that there were different 
arsons, the defense offered a competing definition of the events. The defense lawyers argued 
that what had been claimed to be arson was in reality the “barricades” that the Temucuicui 
community raised and set on fire (bonfires) in order to defend themselves against the shootings 
by the police, as a confrontation between the police and the community had arisen in which 
the community threw stones and used slingshots while the police shot “chemical deterrents” 
(tear gas) (Verdict, Appeals Court Temuco 2002). Those bonfires were then interpreted to be 
intentional arson of the plantation. The court dismissed this version and pointed out that three 







the fire, and that the fire had gained a character of non-governability (ibid.). Thus, the events 
were qualified as arson.   
 
The narrow definition of this event into the secondary reality of criminal law was disputed by 
community members of Temucuicui. Years after this case had been decided, they still resented 
the verdict, as became clear in my conversation with them in April 2009. During a visit to 
Temucuicui, some community members asked me how I could explain how the person that 
burned down many hectares in the famous national park of Torres del Paine got away with a 
fine, whereas they were imprisoned (Field notes, April 2009). (Actually, the persons with whom 
I spoke were not imprisoned, but two of their leaders were, and they strongly identified with 
them). They referred to an incident that had occurred a few years before and quickly became 
front page news in Chile and was even reported internationally. On 17 February 2005, a Czech 
tourist caused a fire that destroyed about 5,500 hectares of Chile’s best known National Park, 
Torres del Paine (Torres del Paine 2011; Cooperativa 2005, La Nación 2006). He had been 
cooking in an area that was not designated for camping. He was indicted by the Public Ministry 
based on a law (Ley de Bosques [Forestry Law]) that penalizes arson when it is the result of 
negligent behavior. In the end, he was sanctioned with a fine of 121,000 Chilean pesos (the 
maximum fine for this offense, which at the time was not more than 250 USD) and set free by 








For the members of the Mapuche community asking this question, the disastrous result 
consisting of the destruction of the natural forest in Torres del Paine was highly upsetting. Their 
concern highlights the value they attach to natural forests versus monoculture plantations, as 
the case juxtaposes the non-monetary value of nature in Torres del Paine versus the financial 
value of a pine plantation. For the members of Temucuicui, the damage done was much more 
important than the difference of intentionality versus negligence that played a crucial role in 
the decision of the judge in Puerto Natales. This case reflects the importance that the criminal 
justice ideology attaches to the intention with which an act is committed, as opposed to the 
factual damage that has been done. Accidents generally fall outside of the ambit of criminal 
law. Negligence often leads to a lesser charge or punishment. Deliberate intention and 
premeditation, however, can yield severe charges and punishments, specifically when this is 
combined with political demands, legitimate or not. Indeed, the legitimacy of the demands 
does not (and, according to strictly liberal values should not) alter the criminal qualification. The 
Temuicui members resisted this prioritization of intent over the kind of damage that is done.  
 
The hegemonic discourse thus assumes the monetary value of plantations and the importance 
of those plantations for the “progress” of Chile, and the prosecutorial narrative reproduces 
these values. In the Alaska case, the prosecutor emphasized the forest fires as a severe 
problem. The economic and ecological damage were asserted and presented as a public 
problem, affecting Chile’s economic potential and identity as país forestal. Particular interests 







in this public interest, as Mapuche activists do not express any concern about the fires. Indeed, 
they do not claim to be affected by the forest fires and minimize or reject the notion that it can 
be ecologically damaging. Thus, their lived experience and their reality of forest fires are 
radically different from the experience of forestry companies. Despite the prosecutor’s claim to 
investigate these fires in the public interest, Mapuche activists and many Mapuche community 
members do not feel that the prosecutor represents their interests.  
 
As has been typical in these cases, the prosecutor had chosen to charge the leaders of the 
community with these arsons, even though many people of the Temucuicui community had 
participated in the mobilizations and the confrontation with the police on 2 December 1999. 
However, it turned out not to be so easy to prove their criminal liability. Because their direct 
involvement in setting the plantation on fire could not be proven, there was a shift from direct 
to indirect liability. The judges of the Appeals Court agreed with the arguments of the defense 
that the testimonies that framed the defendants as the direct authors of setting fire to the 
centers of the arson were not credible or reliable. In order to still hold them criminally liable, 
the court argued that “authors of the crime” are not only those who directly take part in the 
execution of setting something on fire, but also those who hinder a third person from 
intervening to combat the arson, as they are facilitating the conditions necessary to realize the 
arson. The court thus broadened the liability of the defendants. The court considered it proven 
that defendant José Nain had participated in the group that was throwing stones and branches, 







help of carabineros, who also faced confrontation. The judges therefore convicted him as 
“indirect author” according to the Chilean Penal Code, Art. 15 No. 1, which penalizes hindering 
the prevention of a crime. This creation of criminal responsibility for the leaders of the 
Mapuche community was criticized by the defense lawyers and Mapuche activists interpreted it 
as a signal that the Chilean state was deliberately imprisoning its leaders.  
 
The prosecutorial narrative thus reproduces the financial value of plantations, emphasizing the 
decreasing investments as a result of the arsons, marginalizing the perspective of Mapuche 
activists that the land is better off without such monocultures and excluding from the 
courtroom arguments about the detrimental effects of plantations on the surrounding lands of 
Mapuche communities. Further, in order to hold individuals accountable, the prosecutorial 
narrative focuses on the deliberate intention with which plantations are set on fire, whereas 
Mapuche activists would rather talk about the actual harm that is inflicted or the legitimacy of 
the underlying demands. While the prosecutorial narrative thus ostensibly reproduces the 
hegemonic discourse and the perspective of landowners, until 2003 only few cases of arson 
were brought into the courtroom. And, in the few cases that were tried, the results were 
characterized by typical Chilean ambivalence. In the Alaska case, defendant José Nain spent five 
years in prison, whereas by 2010 defendant Marcelo Catrillanca was still a fugitive – even 
though this had not impeded him once in a while to give interviews to Mapuche journalists. 







community. Landowners responded to what they perceived as widespread “impunity” with 
stronger demands to prosecute such arsons as “terrorism.” 
 
8. From ordinary crimes to terrorism  
 
In the previous sections I have argued that since the case against the Consejo de Todas las 
Tierras symbolic land occupations were hardly prosecuted. Productive occupations have been 
prosecuted for the damages that were caused, but landowners claimed that this did nothing to 
secure their property, especially as most sanctions did not lead to actual imprisonment. 
Prosecutions in cases of arsons led to sanctions in only 1% of the cases. And the Law on State 
Security did also not yield very high sentences. Landowners, therefore, continued to plead for 
the use of anti-terrorism legislation and to define these arsons as “terrorism.” This means a 
significant shift in the protected legal interest from private property to public security and the 
presence of a motive to create fear.  
  
Landowners have been very dissatisfied with the prosecution of isolated crimes, which often 
resulted in conditional sentences (probation) while they would still lose their property, as in the 
case of Santa Rosa de Colpi. As described in the previous chapter, landowners mobilized 
collectively and offered a re-contextualized account, emphasizing that there is a connection 
between different incidents that constitutes a pattern of terrorism. They argued that it is not 







the CORMA wrote a letter to the investigative judge Archibaldo Loyola to request the use of the 
anti-terrorism law for the actions by Mapuche activists in Traiguén and Lumaco (Barrera 
1999:100). After 2001, proponents of the terrorism discourse located their claims within the 
international climate, within which anti-terrorism legislation has become the dominant mode of 
response, which enables higher penalties and broader investigative authorities. Thus, to justify 
the use of the anti-terrorism legislation, the CORMA referred to UN Resolution 56–88 of 24 
January 2002, in which “ethnic terrorism” is condemned (CORMA 2002a). The Anti-Terrorism 
Law has practical advantages for the investigation of a crime, as it permits longer pre-trial 
detention, secret investigations for six months (instead of the normal sixty days), the protection 
of witnesses through anonymity, and the interception of telephones (Vargas 2010; Univisión 
2009). A lawyer representing one of the biggest forestry companies asserted, however, that the 
qualification of events as terrorism is not just about the practical advantages, but also about 
giving the actions the appropriate name (Interview C-44).  
 
While landowners thus pressure the government to adopt their terrorism narrative, 
government officials throughout the years have taken changing positions regarding the demand 
to use the Anti-Terrorism Law. Some have refused to seek the application of that law. For 
example, former Regional Governor Belmar claimed she never filed complaints using the 
qualification of terrorism. According to her, prosecutors autonomously sought the qualification 
of terrorism in some of the cases (Comisión de Constitución 2006:11). Indeed, in 2001 Berta 







the case,” she said, “the Law on Internal State Security and the Anti-Terrorism Law would be 
used” (Barria 2001). While regional authorities thus often counseled against the use of that law, 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Santiago was an important actor behind the shift towards 
terrorism qualifications due to pressure from the parliament and the senate (Comisión de 
Constitución 2006). While the Anti-Terrorism Law has been applied on many occasions now, 
there has not been a clear discursive shift towards a consequent representation of Mapuche 
protest actions as terrorism. Instead, the interpretive struggle about these terrorism 
qualifications is still ongoing, reflecting a deep-seated controversy in Chilean society.  
 
The re-qualification of facts as terrorism instead of ordinary crimes in the prosecutorial 
narrative invariably involves doctrinal shifts that are embedded in a re-contextualization of 
events. In anti-terrorism charges single incidents are interpreted beyond the local confines of 
specific events involving isolated actors. Instead, local events are understood as threats to state 
security, democracy, and the rule of law and are considered to be of national importance, 
claiming a broader legal interest. Thus, in the trial against the CAM, the lawyer representing the 
Ministry of Interior described the threatened legal interest as “the very power of the state and 
its supremacy” (oral proceedings, June 2005). Instead of selecting single events and prosecuting 
individuals for narrowly defined acts, in order to make the case for terrorism the prosecutorial 
narrative interprets several events as part of a larger whole and constructs patterns, 
organizations, a broader legal interest, a larger group of victims, broader time frames, and a 







case, or for which no perpetrator could be found, were given a higher priority because they 
were understood as part of a pattern of “terrorism.” Re-contextualization can thus make legally 
relevant what was thus far excluded from criminal proceedings in de-contextualized modalities 
of the prosecutorial narrative. In what follows I will look in-depth at some of the key 
prosecutions that were the result of this re-contextualized prosecutorial narrative.  
 
The contested use of the Anti-Terrorism Law 
The first case in which anti-terrorism legislation was used in relation to Mapuche protests was 
against leader Victor Ancalaf. He was accused of burning trucks in the Alto Bío Bío. This is the 
mountainous Andes region where the construction of the hydroelectric plant Ralco and the 
dam in the Bío Bío river by the Spanish company Endesa caused considerable controversy 
(Orellana 2005).113 On three separate occasions in 2001 and in 2002, three trucks and a 
bulldozer used for the construction of Ralco were set on fire. Pressure mounted in March 2002 
after the third incident. The farmers’ association SNA qualified the incident as “terrorism,” and 
members of parliament were reported to request a harsh response (Austral 2002a; 2002b). On 
19 March 2002, the governor of the Bío Bío Province presented a request to use the anti-
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 The head of CONADI, a government organ for indigenous development, opposed the project publicly. The Frei 
administration removed him (Orellana 2005:521). The environmental impact assessment (EIA) was first rejected by 
all 22 public agencies that evaluated it (ibid 2005:520). Only direct intervention of the Frei government led 
CONAMA, Chile’s environmental agency, to accept the EIA. In 1998, Endesa started the construction of Ralco. The 
1993 Indigenous Act provided indigenous people with the decision-making authority over their lands. The 
Mapuche-Pehuenche people living in the Alto Bío Bío were offered relocation by Endesa. Many families signed 
these agreements, according to Orellana because “grandiose promises, pervasive poverty, large amounts of 
alcohol, threats and lack of legal support all conspired to induce many families to sign exchange agreements” (ibid. 
2005:521). Seven families, however, refused to sell their lands. Their insistence threatened the construction of the 
whole plant. In 2000, Eduardo Frei used a law on electric services and granted Endesa energy concessions, 
superseding rights granted in the Indigenous Act. This enabled the company to construct the plant despite the 







terrorism laws in the prosecution of the three incidents. In November 2002 Ancalaf was 
arrested and accused of the three arsons. In the trial against Ancalaf, the court explicitly put the 
arson in the context of the “Pehuenche conflict”114 and the “opposition to the construction of 
the Hydroelectric Plant Ralco.” Re-contextualizing the separate incidents of arson, the court 
literally argued that “[i]n this context, the facts have occurred as a way to demand the 
authorities for solutions or impose demands to revert the existing situation of the construction 
of the plant” (Appeals Court Concepción 2004, Consideration 19). The court made clear that the 
arson put in danger the “physical integrity” of persons and “public or private property” as the 
“directly attacked goods.” At the same time, moving towards a broader legal interest, the court 
explicitly considered that the more significantly affected legal interests in this case were the 
“public order” and “public security” (ibid. Consideration 23).  
 
Since the conviction of Victor Ancalaf, many more Mapuche leaders and activists have been 
charged under the Chilean anti-terrorism legislation. In this analysis I focus on the four 
terrorism cases that were tried between 2003 and 2007 and led to the conviction of nine 
people under the Anti-Terrorism Law.    
 
Table 4 Four cases based on the Anti-Terrorism Law before new prosecutions on the basis of the Anti-
Terrorism Law started end 2008  
Case Date Decision 
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Victor Ancalaf 30 November 2003  Conviction 
Victor Ancalaf Appeal 4 June 2004  Partial acquittal 
Lonkos of Traiguén  14 April 2003 Acquittal 
Lonkos of Traiguén re-trial 27 September 2003 Conviction 
Poluco Pidenco 1  22 August 2004  Conviction 
Poluco Pidenco 2 3 May 2005 Conviction 
Poluco Pidenco 3 7 April 2006  Acquittal 
Poluco Pidenco 4 8 February 2007  Conviction 
CAM 1  9 November 2004  Acquittal 
CAM re-trial 27 July 2005 Acquittal 
 
In each of these cases, multiple defendants were charged, several of whom chose to escape the 
proceedings in clandestinity. The cases illustrate how re-contextualization works through 
doctrinal choices and the construction of the prosecutorial narrative: a broader time frame, a 
broader geographical frame, inclusion of the motive, a focus on a collective, an expansion of 
the kind of involvement that is deemed criminal, a larger group or category of victims, and a 
broader legal interest. Just as in the case against Ancalaf, each of the other terrorism 
prosecutions also reflects the involvement of the executive government in the request for the 








Re-contextualization: The contested choice for the context 
In these four terrorism prosecutions the prosecutorial narrative re-contextualized events in 
order to arrive at the interpretation of facts as “terrorism.” The narrative justifies the terrorism 
charges with reference to the context, a pattern, and the motive of pressure. For example, in 
the case against the Lonkos of Traiguén, the prosecutor argued: “If four hundred arsons in this 
region, if burning houses within a predio, if burning eighty hectares of a plantation … if that is 
not terrorism, I don’t know what is.” He described that the situation was such that farmers 
were in fact threatened as they could choose between “you give me half of your house, or we 
burn it.” The pressure had an effect, acknowledged the prosecutor, and that was the problem:  
 
The most preoccupying are the sales under pressure. What the defendants seek is for those 
lands to be bought. They demand for the authorities to buy. And sadly, we have seen that the 
strategy has worked. (Oral proceedings, Trial Lonkos of Traiguén, April 2003)  
  
Smilarly in the Poluco Pidenco case the prosecutor emphasized that the event fit in with a 
larger premeditated plan to create a climate of insecurity, instability, and fear to become the 
victims of “similar attacks” among this sector of the population, which was the case in “all 
crimes committed in the region during the last years” (summary of the allegations of the 
prosector in the verdict Tribunal Penal Angol, 22 August 2004). The prosecutor pointed out that 
the fundo Poluco Pidenco had frequently been the object of intentional arsons, theft, and 








Mapuche activists contest this representation of the context of the Mapuche conflict as 
terrorism. The prosecutorial narrative is based on a re-contextualization of specific events as 
part of the “Mapuche conflict,” which according to the prosecutors refers to “numerous grave 
crimes committed in distinct places in the 9th Region, including arson of plantations, farm fields 
and patronal houses” (Chilean state in: IACHR, Case Lonkos of Traiguén, 21 October 2006, 
consideration 35). For Mapuche activists, however, legitimate land claims provide the context 
for properly understanding the protest events. For example, in the case of Poluco Pidenco, the 
Mapuche community Tricauco has a claim on the lands, as they regained part of them during 
the Unidad Popular government in 1971. After the coup, the army removed the Mapuches in 
1977 and subsequently transferred the land to CONAF to be bought by Mininco S.A. in 1978–
79. The Tricauco community has, however, continued to demand the land back (Mella and Le 
Bonniec 2004). Similarly, in the case of the Lonkos of Traiguén, the Temulemu community has a 
claim on land that is currently in the hands of the Figueroa family.  
 
Thus, there are two competing versions of the relevant context that attempt to interpret 
events. Within the prosecutorial narrative, only rarely is “conflict” meant to refer to the larger 
context of Chilean-Mapuche relations throughout the entire twentieth century. Instead, it 
usually refers to the “category of crimes” that the narrative created. For example, in the 2005 
trial against the CAM, the Department of Internal Affairs claimed that it had been 
demonstrated that “the conflicts [had] diminished by 70 percent” since the judicial actions (Oral 







by Mapuche activists, who would hardly claim that conflicts have diminished since the judicial 
actions. Similarly, while a private accuser representing Forestal Mininco argued that the CAM 
prosecution sought “the origin” of all the crimes (Oral proceedings, June 2005), Mapuche 
activists see the Chilean state and the dispossession of their lands as the “origin” of all their 
problems, thus giving a different definition to “all the crimes.” 
 
Making the terrorism charges stick – the battle about the “terrorism” label  
The use of the Ant-Terrorism Law has been controversial from the very beginning. The trials in 
each of the four terrorism prosecutions discussed above drew national and international 
attention. During the trial against the Lonkos of Traiguén, for example, in addition to direct 
supporters many prominent persons visited the trial, such as the leader of the Communist 
Party, representatives of Amnesty International, and Jorge Andrade, secretary of the Ministry of 
Planning and Development. The cases ignited a battle about the terrorism label, and 
significantly, in each of these cases, the judges rejected terrorism charges at some point only to 
be corrected by the Supreme Court later on. The prosecutors thus had a hard time making the 
terrorism charges “stick.” Their battle took them to various re-trials as they faced judges who 
refused to accept the terrorism qualification.   
 
In an early hearing in the case Poluco-Pidenco, the first judge (Nancy Germany) rejected the 
qualification as terrorism. The Court of Appeals in Temuco even confirmed her judgment. The 







Supreme Court rejected the complaint but decided that the judge had exceeded her 
competencies in her dismissal of the terrorism qualification, and she was removed from her 
position. The defense lawyers in the case perceived this as a “very strong message to judges” 
(HRW 2004). In the (first) trial in this case in August 2004, the judges confirmed the terrorism 
charges and convicted the defendants to ten years and one day: the longest sentences that by 
then had been handed out in relation to the Mapuche conflict. Many of the defendants in this 
criminal prosecution, however, had decided not to wait for the trial and the resulting 
conviction, but chosen to go fugitive. Therefore, there have been multiple trials for this arson, 
as over time people were caught by the police or decided to turn themselves in, tired of the 
fugitive life (Interview C-58). While the second Poluco Pidenco trial confirmed the terrorism 
qualification, in the third trial, on 7 April 2006, the judges decided that the facts did not 
constitute a “terrorist” arson. According to them, the prosecutors failed to prove a 
premeditated plan or the intention to cause fear.115 The defendant was even acquitted. In a 
subsequent trial in 2007 against another defendant in this case, the judges confirmed that the 
arson was not a “terrorist” arson, resulting in a five-year sentence for common arson.  
 
In the prosecution against the CAM, the prosecutors really tried hard to have the defendants 
convicted as members in a terrorist organization but had to give up after two trials. In 
November 2004, the members of the CAM were acquitted for the first time. The prosecutors 
                                                      
115
 In addition, in the third trial, the judges decided that the participation of the two defendants was not 
conclusively proven, as the witness statements did not corroborate each other. The witness statements that were 
dismissed as evidence in the third trial for a lack of credibility are the same witness statements that were used as 







petitioned for nullification at the Supreme Court. They succeeded; the trial was nullified, and 
they gave it another try. They returned in the second trial with a different “story” about the 
“terrorist organization,” based on a different image of the CAM and the illegal activities 
attributed to the CAM. During the second trial in July 2005, the prosecutors proposed a kind of 
Babushka model, as they did not claim that the CAM itself was a terrorist organization (as they 
had in the earlier trial), but that under the wings of the CAM some people were engaged in a 
terrorist organization. The lawyer representing Forestal Mininco argued that the defendants 
“took advantage” of the structure of the CAM “to constitute a parallel illicit association.” Thus 
“in the same structure two organizations coexist,” one licit and one illicit, “with some 
overlapping members in the same space” (Oral proceedings, July 2005). The court, however, 
refused to convict the defendants.116 The prosecutors thus failed to establish the CAM as a 
terrorist organization.  
 
Fear: A contested key element of “terrorism” 
Mapuche activists strongly dispute that their actions could constitute terrorism. For example, 
during a cultural happening in Temuco, several young female Mapuche activists emphasized 
that in their public actions, such as collecting food for prisoners, they wanted to make clear that 
they are not terrorists (Field notes, February 2003). Landowners, however, interpret the arsons 
as intimidating. For example, one landowner declared that he understood the arson as an “act 
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 In the second trial, the prosecutors additionally charged the defendants for membership in a “criminal” (i.e., not 
terrorist) organization, thus giving the court the opportunity to convict the defendants without using the terrorism 







of intimidation against the landowners […] to effectuate the ceding in the face of pressures and 
give up the land for good” (Case Lonkos of Traiguén, Declaration 3 August 2002, Traiguén).   
 
According to the Anti-Terrorism Law, in order to prove that a specific action or organization is 
“terrorist” or “terroristic,” the prosecutors have to prove that the actions were premeditated in 
order to create fear among the population. Indeed, a “terrorist” charge puts the burden upon 
the prosecutor to prove that the arson was something other than the act of a pyromaniac. 
Instead, it has to be proven that the objective was to instill fear. In each of the trials, therefore, 
the prosecutor called upon various landowners as well as, for example the director of the 
CORMA to provide testimony during the trials about such fear.  
 
Mapuche activists and other critics of the terrorism charges dispute the notion that widespread 
fear exists. One elderly man from the Temulemu community said: “according to a survey we 
have the support of 85% of the Chilean population. How is it possible that there is fear then?” 
(Field notes, April 2003). Activists often reverse the fear claim. A Mapuche from the community 
Pantano in the 9th region said: “they argue that we scare them, but they make us live in fear. 
The idea that you can be detained arbitrarily because I am Mapuche!” (Field notes, April 2003). 
Others argue that the actions would only be terrorism if it caused indiscriminate fear in the 
entire Chilean population, not just in a limited geographical area (for example Claudio Pavlic 
Véliz, the regional public defender, in: Comisión de Constitución 2006:14). Prosecutors, 







trial, for example, they drew upon the distinction between good and bad Mapuches to argue 
that the trial was specifically also in the interest of the “real” Mapuche people:  
 
In this case, we aren’t persecuting an ethnic group or a specific community. In fact, several of 
our witnesses are Mapuche community members. To them, they have only ended up 
impoverished because of the destruction of sources of labor, their own goods; they have gotten 
fear, including physically, for not adhering to the violent method of this association, or because 
they improved their economic situation through institutional avenues, with CONADI, or through 
the state. They are the primary parties interested in seeing this rural terror end. (Verdict, Case 
CAM, 27 July 2005)  
 
While the prosecutors thus claimed that the CAM was disconnected from the Mapuche 
communities, in a survey in 2006, 54% of the Mapuches who knew the CAM responded that the 
CAM represented them either a little or a lot.117 By 2009, the CAM was not very popular 
anymore among Mapuche communities or in the Mapuche movement. Still, a significant part 
would still have agreed with a female Mapuche student who said: “I disagree with their 
methods, but I do think it is necessary for some people to be more radical in this fight” 
(Interview C-40).  
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 The question was posed how many Mapuches knew the CAM. 33% of the surveyed Mapuches affirmed that 
they knew the CAM. Of these 33%, there were 22% who answered that the CAM represents them a lot, and 32% 
answered that the CAM represents them a little. About 16% of the Mapuches that were surveyed responded that 







The question whether Mapuche activists intended to create fear among (a subset of) the 
population was also addressed in the case against the CAM members. In its verdict, the court 
pointed out explicitly that the goal of the CAM is legitimate as it is even recognized in the 
Indigenous Law No. 19,253, in which the land is recognized as “the main fundament for the 
existence and culture of indigenous people” (Fuenzalida no year). This judicial interpretation 
shows the ambiguity of the meaning of a “goal.” Criminal law scholar Norrie already analyzed 
the distinction between a “causing motive” and an “ulterior intention” as well as the strategic 
ways in which courts and other actors can switch between these two modes (1992:38). 
Prosecutors in the CAM case had argued that the goal was to “intimidate” and “pressure 
victims to buy peace, ceding parts of their predios,” while they “seek to create a climate of 
insecurity, instability and fear in various sectors of the region.” Thus, while the prosecutors 
relied on the “causing motive” in order to argue that the CAM was a terrorist organization, in 
their decision the court explicitly emphasized the legitimacy of the ulterior intention (land 
transfers) in order to come to its verdict. On 27 July 2005, the court considered that whereas 
the CAM did “prepare” for its actions in terms of deciding what to do when the police come and 
how to evade arrest. However, the court deemed that this is not the kind of premeditation that 








Membership in a terrorist organization: Discursive shift from the individual to the 
collective  
In the case against the CAM, there was not only a shift in the legal interest. The prosecutors 
also changed the focus from the individual to the collective. This has several important 
consequences, such as the choice of defendants and the kind of liability that is at stake. The 
search for an organization and different functions of different members, for example, also led 
to the indictment of a defense lawyer for collaboration with the CAM. In addition, in their initial 
indictment in December 2002, the prosecutors also accused a Chilean mill owner of having 
financed the CAM. Both of these charges were later dropped.  
 
The use of this doctrinal device of charging an “organization” forces the prosecutors to create 
an image of that organization. During the trial, competing images of the CAM were offered: 
Mapuche activists defended the CAM as a legitimate organization engaged in a legitimate 
struggle. The prosecutors, on the other hand, constructed an image of the CAM as a well-
trained hierarchical organization with connections to foreign terrorist groups. They argued that 
the CAM had created “cells” and that there was a functional hierarchical structure 
distinguishing between “leaders” and “operative members.” A landowner called the CAM a 
“logo organization” as cells could just adopt the signature. Indeed, one of the expert witnesses 
even argued that the CAM had a “mediatic front” consisting of electronic newspaper El Gong 
and the CAM publication Weftun. The prosecutors dedicated a lengthy analysis to 29 issues of 







or a report given of an event of the Mapuche sport palin in one of the occupied properties. 
Relevant is thus that the image upon which the prosecutorial narrative was based influenced 
the way in which evidence was selected and interpreted. During the first preliminary hearing on 
6 December 2002, evidence included ETA pamphlets that defendants had in their rooms, 
pictures of Che Guevara, as well as audiotapes of Victor Jara, a well-known communist singer-
song writer who was killed in the early days after the Pinochet coup (Gutiérrez and Madariaga 
2002). The Temuco judge who decided that the pre-trial detention could be prolonged 
confirmed that this was brought as evidence (Interview C-36). During the trial in July 2005, 
piece of evidence #25 was “subversive literature” including the (apparently legally significant) 
sentence: “Capitalism is a giant only for those who are at their knees.” These pieces of evidence 
were interpreted to signify a dangerous motive and objective. The fact that such examples are 
used evidence in the courtroom has caused outrage among Mapuche activists. One activist 
accused in the case Poluco Pidenco, claiming innocence, sighed: “they say that our nguillatúns 
[religious ceremonies] and palins [sport games] are meetings to conspire about crimes! They 
should get to know our culture” (Interview C-30).  
 
Over time, different actors have offered highly different accounts about the nature, 
membership, and capacities of the CAM. Speculations about CAM membership in 2009 by 
former CAM members and some other Mapuche activists often invoked a picture of a loose 
group of “lost youth” trying to find meaning in their lives without many connections to the 







and their supporters, however, continued to defend the CAM as a principled organization, close 
to the Mapuche communities, as well as the legitimacy of their demand for land and autonomy. 
A longtime member of the CAM emphasized in 2009 that what is important about the existence 
of the CAM is not so much its structure or its members. He pointed out that what counts are 
the ideas of the CAM.  
 
If a Mapuche community executes a “productive recuperation” and talks about “territorial 
control,” that means that the CAM is alive, even if there are no actual links between that 
community and the organizational structure of the CAM. It is the radical ideas and radical 
methods of the CAM that are important. (Interview C-72)  
 
Other accounts in the media and especially from right-wing politicians have claimed a very 
different picture of a professional, foreign-trained, hierarchically organized guerilla group that 
had access to heavy weaponry and the willingness to cause great havoc. In contrast, in its 
decision to acquit the CAM in 2005, the court pointed out that the CAM lacked the necessary 
material means and leadership for terrorist attacks (27 July 2005). 
 
The shift from the individual to the collective and the charge of “membership” also influenced 
the kind of liability that was at stake. The defendants in the CAM case were accused of specific 
participation in different events without much overlap. Together, though, they were held 
responsible for the “organization.” Prosecutors argued that they even did not have to prove 







organization” (opening statement, lawyer representing the Department of Internal Affairs, June 
2005). The crime consisted only of the membership and the consciousness, knowledge, and will 
to be a member of the organization and its criminal plans. The prosecutors asserted that it was 
also not necessary for the defendant to be aware of the details of any of the actions that the 
organization executed. Unlike the crime of conspiracy in the United States (next chapter), there 
is no specific action required on behalf of the defendants to be guilty of membership in a 
criminal or terrorist organization. “The crimes are committed also if the criminal program is not 
put into action” (ibid. June 2005).  
 
The ambivalent line between the political arena and the criminal justice arena 
The contentious criminal proceedings have elicited the participation of many different voices in 
the meta-conflict about the terrorism qualifications. Ultimately, the intense debate about the 
appropriateness of the terrorism qualifications and the use of anti-terrorism legislation in these 
cases is about the question where the line should be drawn between the political arena and the 
criminal justice arena. This is not only a discursive battle between landowners and Mapuche 
activists. It is also a controversy between different government agencies and changing 
perspectives over time. In the previous chapter I already identified the ambivalence of the 
Chilean “definition of the situation,” which alternates between downplaying the situation and 
denying that the situation is like “Chiapas,” “Al Qaeda,” or a “civil war” on the one hand and 
pointing to links with foreign terrorist groups and the threat to human lives and economic 







landowners and qualified actions such as the arson of a plantation as “terrorist” acts, other 
arsons were prosecuted as common arsons. The prosecutorial narrative thus reflects the 
ambivalence with which the Chilean state tried to demarcate the line between the criminal 
justice arena and the political arena. The result is continuous ambivalence in the use of the 
Anti-Terrorism Law.  
 
The push into the criminal justice arena is supported by a belief in the effectiveness of a 
conviction. Figueroa’s grandson, for example, told me during the trial against the Lonkos of 
Traiguén: “I want the violence to stop. That is what the trial is for: one person in prison, as a 
precedent” (Field notes, April 2003). Whereas liberal legalism stresses individualization, the de-
contextualization of a case, and the proportionate punishment of a single perpetrator, the 
belief in the effectiveness of bringing a conviction as a deterrent example forefronts the 
identity of Lonko Pascual Pichún as a Mapuche leader. When this goal-rational motivation is 
taken to its extreme, the situation becomes, as one defense lawyer said, one in which “they 
want to convict someone, guilty or innocent” (Interview C-25). Expressing a similar confidence 
in prison sentences, in a reaction to the first Poluco-Pidenco verdict the sub-secretary of the 
Department of Internal Affairs, Jorge Correa, affirmed that the judges had “contributed to the 
pacification of the provinces in the south of Chile” (Toledo 2007:286).  
 
The use of anti-terrorism legislation has led to criticism both within Chile and internationally. 







and the erroneous use of anti-terrorism legislation (Comisión de Constitución 2006). Chilean 
legal scholar Myrna Villegas claimed that the use of the Anti-Terrorism Law in these Mapuche-
conflict cases is an example of enemy penology (2007). A lawyer representing the office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for Latin America and the Caribbean 
attended the trial against the CAM as an observer which led him to use a comparison with the 
2005 bomb attack in London to condemn the use of anti-terrorism legislation regarding the 
arsons in the Mapuche conflict: “Aquí por amenazas o por quemas de un potrero se quieren 
aplicar los mismos criterios con los que se actúa frente a quienes pusieron las bombas en 
Londres. La desproporción no puede ser mayor” [Here, for threats or burning a field they want 
to apply the same criteria with which they act against those that laid bombs in London. The 
disproportionality couldn’t be bigger] (cited in: Cayuqueo 2005c). International human rights 
organizations have equally expressed their concern about the use of anti-terrorism legislation 
(HRW 2004; FIDH 2003; Vargas 2010). Secret cables published by WikiLeaks showed that also 
American officials were critical and had close contact with the Chilean government about 
Mapuche “terrorism” and the CAM. Their assessment was that media reporting of the Mapuche 
actions were exaggerating the situation and that in fact Mapuche actions were hardly violent 
and mostly targeting property. Indeed, the cables also pointed out that the three deaths that 
resulted from the conflict in the past ten years had all been young Mapuche activists (U.S. 
Embassy in Santiago 2010; Gallego-Díaz 2010). In this debate about the application of the Anti-







Rights Commission of the UN during the 2009 proceedings of the Universal Periodic Exam 
(Univisión 2009).  
 
Some of these criticisms of the Anti-Terrorism Law stick with the liberal legalist framework and 
call for the changing of terrorism charges into ordinary criminal charges. Liberal critics have 
argued that the sentences are too high and disproportionate to the damage that was done. For 
example, five years imprisonment is a high sentence for a mere “terrorist threat” if one takes 
into account that in Chile there have been cases in which murder has yielded a sentence of five 
years. Many of these criticisms, however, have gone further and actually pushed the situation 
back into the political arena, questioning more fundamentally the transfer to the criminal 
justice arena. Former UN Special Rapporteur Rodolfo Stavenhagen, for example, condemned 
the use of anti-terrorism legislation, claiming that a legitimate demand had been criminalized 
(Stavenhagen 2003:§40): “Charges for offences in other contexts (such as terrorist threat and 
criminal association) should not be applied to acts related to the social struggle for land and 
legitimate indigenous complaints” (ibid. 2003:§69–70).  
 
A major theme in the battle for interpretation around the use of the Anti-Terrorism Law in 
these cases is the issue of property damage. The former sub-secretary of the Department of 
Internal Affairs defended the policy of including arson as a terrorist offense, arguing that Spain 
and Germany have similar provisions (Jorge Correa in: Comisión de Constitución 2006:31). In 







“contempt for human life” asserting that no such thing had emerged from the available 
evidence. On 5 July 2006, the Chilean parliament proposed to change the Anti-Terrorism Law to 
the effect that only those actions that affect lives, not material things, could be qualified as 
terrorism. Landowners, however, resisted the idea that attacks on property would not be 
protected in the Anti-Terrorism Law. Using the vocabulary of “human rights,” they resisted the 
idea that some human rights would be more fundamental than other human rights (Villegas 
2007). Landowners thus explicitly defend the inclusion of property damage within the relevant 
legal interests of anti-terrorism legislation. At the same time, in the courtroom they continue to 
emphasize the threat that arsons pose to human lives. For example, during the trial against the 
CAM, many witnesses expressed their fear of bodily injury. A forestry private security guard 
said:  
 
Considering everything said before, a generalized feeling of fear in this line of work exists, for 
those who dare to do so see themselves exposed to suffering personal aggressions or even to 
losing their lives and their goods due to the attacks. (Declaration 28 May 2003 before the 
prosecutor in Temuco)  
 
Most remarkable in the described cases is the persistence with which prosecutors continued re-
trials in criminal cases after the judges had acquitted the defendants or rejected the terrorism 
qualification. These adamant attempts to convict Mapuche activists under terrorism charges 
and reverse acquittals have been heard loudly and clearly within the Mapuche movement and 







persecuted for claiming their Mapuche identity and for demanding their lands back. Giving 
voice to this belief, the defense lawyer Fuenzalida criticized that in the courtroom it seemed to 
be sufficient for the defendant to be Mapuche to assume that he or she was part of an 
organization or movement that aimed to create fear.118   
 
Despite the fact that prosecutors have thus worked hard to obtain convictions on terrorism 
charges, even they have been ambivalent about the terrorism label, not entirely prepared to 
push Mapuche activists into the stigmatized place of being viewed as “terrorists.” “They are not 
terrorists but their actions are terrorism,” said one of the lawyers in the prosecutor’s office 
(Interview C-11). Remarkably similar was the statement from a high official at the Department 
of Internal Affairs:  
Magistrado, es muy simple. En Chile no hay terrorismo, pero en Chile sí se han cometido delitos 
terroristas y esa son cuestiones completamente diferentes… Hay dos personas que ya fueron 
condenadas por amenazas terroristas, pero decir que hay personas que han cometido delitos 
terroristas no nos puede llevar a decir que en Chile hay terrorismo.  
 
[Magistrate, it is very simple. In Chile there is no terrorism but in Chile terrorist crimes were 
committed, and those are very different things… There are two persons who were already 
convicted for terrorist threats, but to say that there are persons that have committed terrorist 
crimes cannot lead us to say that in Chile there is terrorism.] (HRW 2004) 
 
Thus, even though it was clear that even the prosecutors felt awkward about declaring these 
Mapuche activists “terrorists,” they maintained that the actions definitely fall within the 
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penaba, en definitiva, atendiendo a la categoría de la persona imputada, acercándonos peligrosamente a un 








parameters of terrorist actions: “Even if it is not like ‘Bloody Sunday’ in Northern Ireland,” said 
another prosecutor, “it is the same underlying logic” (Interview C-13).  
 
In 2006, there were even legislative efforts to move the situation back into the political arena. A 
parliamentary commission studied the anti-terrorist prosecutions and made a comprehensive 
proposal including provisions about land transfers and a call for a pardon for Mapuches who 
were convicted for crimes connected to land demands and who rejected violence (Comisión de 
Constitución 2006:75; Comisión de Derechos Humanos 2006). The significance of this law lies in 
the fact that the legislature attempted to modify judicial verdicts that were understood to be 
final. It thus shows the struggle between the different state powers about the scope of the 
criminal justice arena. Another legislative effort tried to add a provision to the Indigenous Act, 
explicitly connecting the criminal cases to the demands for land. Under this provision, 
indigenous people were to be punished under ordinary laws (instead of terrorism charges) only 
if they committed crimes while demanding the rights protected in that law. This provision thus 
not only reinforced the distinction between indigenous people and non-indigenous people at 
the time of committing crimes, it also reinforced the motive as the key element for determining 
the available laws in criminal proceedings. The provision further added that if the court were to 
decide that the (criminal) acts “exceeded the claims” (such as land demands) (i.e. were 
disproportionate), the punishment could be raised (Navarro, no date). Both legislative 








Not only the legislative branch but also the executive powers have been critical of the use of 
the Anti-Terrorism Law. For example, President Bachelet avowed in her presidential campaign 
in 2006 not to use the Anti-Terrorism Law in the conflict (Cooperativa 2006). She did not fulfill 
her promise, which itself represented an executive encroachment upon the independence of 
prosecutors and judges. For a while between 2004 and October 2008, no new criminal 
prosecutions were started under the Anti-Terrorism Law. Indeed, typical of the Chilean 
ambivalence, incidents such as arson of trucks on the highway that had been qualified as 
“terrorism” before were later prosecuted as “common arsons” (e.g. Case Chamichaco). In 
October 2008, however, the anti-terrorism legislation returned into play when some students 
gathered at the highway of Temuco intending to block the road. They allegedly threw a 
Molotov cocktail at a police car and were indicted under terrorism charges (Case Fennix and 
Jonathan). Since then, many more Mapuche activists have again been charged under the Anti-
Terrorism Law for the arson of trucks, buses, plantations, and houses. These terrorism charges 
led to a long hunger strike initiated in 2010 by those detained activists in order to demand that 
the terrorism charges be replaced with common criminal charges, igniting again a debate about 
the appriopriateness of the terrorism qualification between prosecutors and other government 
officials. In a major case in 2011, fourteen defendants were acquitted of these terrorism 
charges (Case Cañete). Thus, the interpretive battle and the ambivalence about the terrorism 








Continued criticism of a lack of prosecutions and convictions regarding land occupations and 
arsons has thus led prosecutors to reframe their prosecutions and assert a broader interest 
than just the specific truck or plantation that was set on fire, adopting the terrorism narrative 
as promoted by landowners. The use of the Anti-Terrorism Law has, however, been very 
controversial, and prosecutors have not consistently categorized arsons as terrorism. Instead, 
the Chilean state has been deeply ambivalent, which is reflected in charging decisions, the 
national debate, and judicial decisions.  
 
9. Discursive shift at the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights  
 
Dissatisfied with the criminal proceedings against them, Mapuche activists have taken some of 
their cases to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). Four cases in which 
anti-terrorism legislation was applied were admitted after domestic means were exhausted.119 
Individuals can bring cases to this commission and allege that the state has violated their rights 
as laid down in the American Convention. In these procedures the tables are turned: the state 
has to defend itself as defendants claim that during the judicial proceedings against them the 
state has not abided by the rules. In some cases, the commission made recommendations for 
“amicable settlements,” which means that the parties are encouraged to settle the case out of 
court. If an amicable settlement cannot be reached, the commission can decide to “admit” 
cases for actual consideration. The decision to admit cases is a moment of triage in which the 
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commission decides whether cases, if the allegations are proven, violate the human rights of 
the American Convention. In legal lingo, in the first admission stage the case is not judged on its 
merits, but prima facie.  
 
Table 5 Cases brought to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR)  
Case Date  Allegation Decision 
Consejo de Todas las 
Tierras 
27 February 2002 Violation of American 
Convention 
Admitted after amicable 
settlement was rejected 
Pascual Pichún and 
Aniceto Norín (the 
“Lonkos of Traiguén”) 
21 October 2006  Violation of American 
Convention 
Admitted  
Poluco Pidenco 23 April 2007 Violation of American 
Convention 
Admitted 




The proceedings before the IACHR have become a new battleground in which the role of the 
commission is disputed, as is the precise nature of “amicable settlements” in relation to law 
and politics as well as the legitimacy and legality of the Chilean criminal proceedings vis-à-vis 
Mapuche-conflict cases. With its specific and exclusive focus on the violation of human rights as 
laid down in the American Convention, the IACHR is an exemplary institution of liberal legalism. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that petitioners (defense lawyers representing defendants) 
framed their concerns about the “criminalization of the Mapuche activists” within the logic and 







American Convention). Using that vocabulary, the petitioners addressed some of the central 
issues of the meta-conflict, such as the identity of the defendants, as they argued that their 
clients were convicted based upon assumptions related to their ethnicity instead of their 
individuality and the facts of the case. For example, the “Lonkos of Traiguén” (Pascual Pichún 
and Aniceto Norín) claimed before the IACHR that their case of violation of human rights is not 
an isolated incident but part of a consistent pattern in which indigenous people who reclaim 
their land rights are systematically repressed by the state, especially by the use of anti-
terrorism legislation and the Law on State Security (in: IACHR 21 October 2006). The 
commission seems open for this narrative. In its prima facie judgment in the case of Ancalaf, for 
instance, the commission considered that the application of a “special penal regime more 
severe than the common regime because of his ethnic origin” could constitute a violation of 
Article 24 of the American Convention (IACHR 2 May 2007).  
 
The Chilean state tried to avoid a discussion about the complaints about its domestic 
proceedings by framing the international involvement as a breach of its sovereignty. For 
example, in the CTT case it affirmed its right to “use all available legal proceedings to re-
establish the public order when it is threatened or broken” (communication, 5 June 1998 in: 
IACHR 27 February 2002, consideration 22). This view was supported in the Chilean media, for 
example in an article in the newspaper El Mercurio that criticized that the “external 
jurisdiction” of the IACHR made a joke out of the authority of the Supreme Court as it induced 







in the case Poluco Pidenco the Chilean state emphasized that the IACHR was not a court of 
fourth instance with the authority to revise the facts and evidence but a complementary 
control with a subsidiary character to provide recourse when due process has been violated, 
but not to reverse the judgments of lower courts (IACHR, 23 April 2007, consideration 37).  
 
In response to the allegations that the Chilean proceedings had violated due process, the 
Chilean state defended the way in which the arrests and trials had taken place by the 
appropriate and legitimate police and courts. If mistakes were made, for example in the 
identification of some of the defendants, then these mistakes should not be taken out of their 
context, the Chilean state argued. The state rejected the interpretation that these errors were a 
“plot destined to violate deliberately rights or judicial guarantees, [the errors were] certainly 
not a discriminatory policy against the indigenous of the Mapuche ethnic group” as the 
petitioners claimed (cited in: IACHR 27 February 2002).  
  
While domestically the Chilean state has emphasized the separation between the political 
arena and the criminal justice arena, in the IACHR proceedings, politics encroach upon the logic 
of criminal justice. For example, in the case of the CTT, the IACHR brought politics back into the 
case as the proposed “amicable settlement” had to deal with land demands, thus clearly 
pushing the situation back into the political arena. Indeed, the Chilean state responded in kind 
(and thus acknowledging the relevance of the land demands) by emphasizing that it had made 







example by enacting the Indigenous Law and founding CONADI. The Bachelet government has 
attempted to negotiate with the Consejo de Todas las Tierras and also with the lonko of 
Mapuche community Temulemu, Pascual Pichún. The government even offered Pichún more 
lands if he would drop the case before the IACHR, but he refused. During a meeting with fellow 
Mapuche activists, he said that he was more interested in the larger struggle and the rights of 
Mapuches than receiving more land for his own community (Field notes, meeting Temuco, May 
2009).  
 
In the case of Ancalaf, proceedings before the IACHR also blurred the boundary between the 
criminal justice arena and the political arena. The displacement of Mapuche communities 
because of the construction of the hydroelectric dam Ralco led to an amicable settlement 
before the IACHR (in a separate case) after petitioners (not Ancalaf) had claimed irregularities in 
the permissions given to the energy company Endesa. This settlement also included provisions 
regarding the criminal case against Ancalaf, who was being prosecuted for his alleged 
involvement in the arson of trucks in resistance to the construction of Ralco. The Chilean state 
was held to provide “humanitarian assistance in favor of the family of señor Ancalaf Llaupe” 
(IACHR Report of amicable settlement 30/04 cited in IACHR, Case Ancalaf, 2 May 2007, footnote 
8). In addition, the state had to contemplate “benefits” if Ancalaf were to be convicted in the 
criminal proceedings against him. This settlement put the criminal case against Ancalaf squarely 
in relation to the administrative irregularities that occurred during the building of the 








Thus, in the proceedings before the IACHR, not only is the Chilean state suddenly in the position 
to defend its criminal proceedings. The IACHR also pushes the Chilean state explicitly to 
understand the criminal cases in relation to the demands for lands and to find a solution within 
the political arena. Further, the proceedings before the IACHR question the appropriateness of 
the use of the Anti-Terrorism Law. When actual or potential international audiences are 
involved, “terrorism” is the standard neutralizing argument to counter allegations of human 
rights violations. The Chilean state has also used this label in order to justify its proceedings and 
its use of, for example, anonymous witnesses. The IACHR still has to give its final answer 
whether or not to accept this qualification in the Chilean cases.  
 
10. Conclusion: the paradox of simultaneous oppression and impunity  
 
In these two chapters I have explored the dynamics of criminal proceedings in the context of 
what is known as the “Mapuche conflict.” Specifically, I have examined when and how the 
prosecutorial narrative in these proceedings transformed as a consequence of the collective 
mobilization and claim-making and the understanding of single events as part of a larger whole. 
When did the prosecutor take the differences between a pyromaniac and a Mapuche activist 
into account? When did these differences become “legally relevant”? How were these 
differences described and what effect did they have on the criminal prosecutions, charges, 







prosecutions related to the Chilean-Mapuche territorial conflict. I analyzed the key concepts in 
this narrative and the way these concepts are given their content and meaning in the battle of 
interpretation that takes place in the criminal justice arena.  
 
Most importantly, I hope to have shown that the voice of the prosecutor is doing much more 
than “just applying the law.” Instead, the prosecutorial narrative becomes part of an intense 
debate about the events that led to criminal prosecutions, thus constructing images of 
defendants and victims that are deeply contested. The prosecutors thus inevitably engage in 
identity politics. Similarly, the objects that are at the core of contentious events, such as the 
property, land, plantations, and the best way to conceptualize their value are disputed. 
Significantly, not only that what is expressed in prosecutorial decisions and oral arguments, but 
also the silences in the prosecutorial narrative are heard loudly as well. The perceived successes 
and failures of criminal prosecutions in meting out justice are translated into mobilization and 
discursive action by “victims” and “prisoner supporters,” thus drawing actors and arguments 
into the criminal justice arena. The complexity of these criminal prosecutions is not only due to 
the fact that it is difficult to find perpetrators or evidence. It is equally difficult to construct the 
boundary between the criminal justice arena and the political arena. Wherever prosecutors 
attempt to exclude “politics,” other actors will bring it back in, be they prisoner supporters, the 
Chilean government itself in negotiations with CONADI, or the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights. Just as important, by re-contextualizing events as part of a larger whole, the 







single events bring in a larger context, while at the same time denying the political meaning of 
choosing that context.  
 
So, how does the Chilean criminal justice system work in the “Mapuche conflict”? How is the 
rule of law defined, asserted, defended, rejected, and criticized? How does the prosecutor deal 
with the competing narratives that struggle for hegemony in the criminal justice arena? How is 
criminal justice produced, or maybe we should say co-produced, by the various voices that 
participate in the meta-conflict? Who are the producers and what does their product look like?  
 
The first remarkable feature of the criminal proceedings and the battle for interpretation that 
surrounds them is the enormous number of people that get involved with the production 
process of criminal justice. Its language is adopted by many different people and organizations, 
in meetings between high-placed officials in Santiago, at the fireplace in a remote house in a 
Mapuche community, in public demonstrations in Temuco, and in business e-mails between 
forestry companies. While they all draw upon the basic framework provided by the criminal 
law, such as the dichotomy between victim and perpetrator, and liberal notions of equality and 
the presumption of innocence, their specific uses of the vocabulary and the translation of their 
lived experiences into that general framework differ greatly. Their experiences and the meaning 
they give to those experiences differ. The analysis also showed how over time, definitions can 
change. For example, symbolic occupations which were considered to be radical in the early 








There is an explicit effort on the part of the prosecutors to present the criminal trials as 
objective, in line with the presumption of innocence, and in accordance with a strict use of 
evidence to come to conclusions. Still, the analysis of the cases demonstrates how the 
prosecutorial narrative inevitably engages with the meta-conflict and how it shifts discursively 
between de-contextualization and re-contextualization. The prosecutorial narrative inevitably 
reproduces the ideas and assumptions of one of the competing narratives, for example, by 
portraying plantations as crucial to the development of the economy of Chile or by emphasizing 
their monetary value. Similarly, the prosecutors claim to act in the public interest, but this 
highly depends on the interpretation of key concepts, such as security. For example, 
landowners demand the protection of their “physical and juridical security” and assert this as a 
public interest. Their definition of “security” is not accepted, however, by Mapuche activists, 
who emphasize the survival of their people and the threat to their livelihoods because of 
forestry plantations encroaching upon biodiversity and water availability.  
 
It is remarkable that, just as in Spain, both the challengers to the status quo and the defenders 
of the status quo, both those who are given the role of “victim” in criminal proceedings and 
those who are subjected to trials as “defendants,” are highly dissatisfied with the role and 
performance of criminal trials. Both landowners and Mapuche activists continue to perceive the 
criminal justice system to be unjust, characterized by political decisions, and particularly partial 







criminal justice policy and in the definition and qualification of specific events as crimes. In 
response to the calls by landowners, at various times the prosecutorial narrative turned 
towards a re-contextualized approach drawing on the terrorism narrative in order to secure 
convictions and broaden criminal liability. Mapuche activists have resisted such criminalization 
and continue to push the situation back into the political arena, with some success.  
 
The Chilean-Mapuche territorial conflict and the process of criminalization that has been such 
an intricate part of the conflict dynamics over the past twenty years pose difficult challenges to 
the liberal democratic pretentions of the Chilean state. Prosecutors are struggling to maintain 
the established order without losing legitimacy among significant parts of the population. While 
prosecutors rhetorically emphasize the “legitimate aspirations of the Mapuche people,” they 
simultaneously underscore the liberal distinction between ends and means. Mapuche activists, 
however, challenge the status quo not only with their demands for land reform, but also 
because they are asking the following questions: What methods are allowed in a legitimate 
struggle for which the state does not provide the appropriate methods to achieve these 
legitimate objectives? And to what extent should the rule of law be respected, which is partially 
responsible for actually blocking the achievement of legitimate objectives?  
 
Instead of assuming a fixed, externally available rule of law, an analysis of the meta-conflict 
reveals the different kinds of rule of law that each of the actors collectively imagines and 







the CAM, the lawyer representing Forestal Mininco juxtaposed a “terrorist organization” with 
the “rule of law” and argued that the terrorist organization imposed a different way to “resolve 
conflicts” than that which is the accepted form in the “model of social coexistence which is 
called ‘the rule of law’” (Oral proceedings, June 2005). Landowners consequently refer to the 
rule of law as the framework that gives them the right to protection. Mella and Le Bonniec 
(2004) point out, however, that the “rule of law” which is so defended today is a relatively 
recent construction in the Araucanía. Only 130 years ago, there still was another, non-Chilean, 
order. The land ownerships which are at the center of the current disputes originated in the 
same rule of law that was then imposed upon the region and the Mapuches who inhabited it. 
Indeed, in one of the cases on the Law on State Security defendants were qualified as “violators 
of ‘our’ judicial system,” thus perpetuating the Us-Them divide (del Valle 2001). Recognizing the 
discrepancies in the understandings of the rule of law, one of the Lumaco community members 
said: “The rule of law is for them. No peñi, not one of us can defend our law. […] We don’t steal 
from nobody: the Mapuches reclaim their rights” (Interview C-60).   
 
Ambivalent criminalization 
The prosecutorial narrative and the decisions in the criminal justice arena may appear 
contradictory in many ways. Harsh laws alternate with acquittals and leniency. Claims about a 
possible “Chiapas” and links to international “terrorism” are followed by downplaying 
statements about a “few radicals.” In these two chapters about the Chilean-Mapuche territorial 







contradictions within the discursive battle that is taking place in the criminal justice arena, in 
which images of “terrorism” compete with images of “legitimate social protest.” This battle 
continues to this day and none of these images has achieved clear hegemony. This battle 
becomes visible in the criminal justice arena as a battle for the relevant context to interpret the 
criminalized events.  
 
An analysis of the process of criminalization in the Chilean-Mapuche territorial conflict is full of 
paradoxes. I have pointed out the ambivalent images that are at work to interpret the problem. 
This ambivalence is also pervasive in criminal proceedings and decisions. While many Mapuche 
activists have experienced arrests, raids, and charges, only a few are finally convicted. Those 
who are convicted are often convicted for lesser charges than were initially brought. I have 
shown the intense struggle for interpretation that swamps the criminal justice arena as 
landowners, forestry companies, and private business farmers are angry about what they 
perceive as continuing impunity. They advocate the “terrorism” narrative and harsher 
measures. On the other hand, Mapuche activists receive support from a significant part of the 
Chilean population as well as from international sympathizers and human rights organizations. 
They challenge the state in its definitions of the situation and the course of criminal 
proceedings.  
 
While activists are prosecuted, the state engages in many efforts to negotiate and seek 







partially placing the situation in the political arena. While blaming a few radicals for the 
violence, the government continues to frame the “Mapuche problem” as an issue of poverty, 
education, and integration. While the demand for land restitution is recognized as legitimate, 
more radical proposals for alternative scenarios of progress, development, and autonomous 
decision-making are not taken into account. Chile continues to be a país forestal, and the 
Mapuches continue to be “its indigenous people.” That seems to be non-negotiable and indeed 
necessary and “natural.” The frequent negotiations with defendants and the fact that some 
defendants are even offered money or land in exchange for retracting more radical demands or 
challenges to the state indicate that some government officials think that such offers may be 
enough to appease the individual activists.  
 
The liberal ideology of the “separation of powers” sometimes turns into a “denial of 
responsibility” as the Mapuche conflict is tossed around like a hot potato between the various 
governmental powers involved. The transfer to the criminal justice arena is, in a sense, a denial 
of responsibility of actors in the political arena. It is a denial to deal with the structural causes of 
the conflict and the competing land demands. At the same time, law and politics continue to be 
thoroughly mixed, which was also visible, for example, in some of the legislative efforts to 
soften the impact of the anti-terrorism legislation.  
 
Criminalization of those with legitimate claims to land (acting with illegal tactics) distracts from 







which are based on different laws. This tension was visible, for example, when the Electricity 
Law took precedence over the Indigenous Act and the hydroelectric dam Ralco was built, while 
Mapuche communities were displaced. Underlying all of the criminal cases are unresolved 
disputes about land rights, indigenous rights, private property, and the right to and appropriate 
use of natural resources.  
 
The transfer into the criminal justice arena leaves these contentious events and their 
underlying demands in the hands of the police, prosecutors, lawyers, and judges, whereas they 
do not have the instruments to engage in the logic of political persuasion or negotiation, let 
alone resolution of these disputes. Mapuche activists similarly frequently are captured by the 
criminal justice dynamics and fight their struggle exclusively within the criminal justice arena, 
such as when they engage in prisoner support mobilization and denounce state repression. 
Their energy is expended on endless debates about traitors and mutual suspicion in Mapuche 
communities. Their focus on individual police officers and individual landowners impedes a 
translation into the concepts and ideas that would be necessary to address the structural 
competing interests. The displacement of the actual issues to an arena and logic fundamentally 
incapable of addressing these issues explains the widespread impotence experienced by all 








Competing narratives for re-contextualization 
Contentious criminalization in Chile is thus characterized by ambivalence about the boundary 
between the political arena and the criminal justice arena. The very transfer of events into the 
criminal justice arena is often accompanied by partial cancelations of such transfers or odd 
combinations with continued interaction in the political arena. This ambivalence is also 
reflected in the meta-conflict surrounding criminal proceedings. Most fundamentally, the 
competing voices in the meta-conflict propose different contexts for interpreting the events 
that become the subject of criminal proceedings. These voices push the prosecutors to depart 
from a de-contextualized understanding. Indeed, over the course of the contentious episode 
since the early 1990s, criminal cases have frequently been placed within the context of the 
“Mapuche conflict.” When the “Mapuche conflict” classification is used, however, it is 
important to question the meaning it is given, because it turns out that actors offer radically 
different interpretations. Criminal prosecutions that re-contextualize single incidents within a 
context of “terrorism” expand the time frame beyond the narrow incidents of arson or theft. 
They simultaneously, however, ignore the alternative context with an even larger time frame 
that Mapuche activists propose in which the entire history between Chile and the Mapuche 
people is taken into account. The re-contextualized criminal law vocabulary, logic, and structure 
thus inevitably produce an image in the courtroom that is heavily contested.  
 
The prosecutorial narrative has mostly interpreted the “Mapuche conflict” as a context of 







discursively from the individual to the collective, from isolated incidents to a pattern, and from 
a narrow legal interest to a broader legal interest. Thus, taking “terrorism” as the relevant 
context, prosecutors have departed from a narrow focus on the protection of property, which 
can be defined by indicating a specific time, place, and owner, to a broader legal interest such 
as, for example, national security or democracy, which is not necessarily located in a specific 
time, place, or person.  
 
While events are often classified as “Mapuche conflict” cases, thus assuming certain motives 
and identities, alternative explanations for forest fires and the role of, for example, ordinary 
mafias in the theft of wood receive scant attention. Also, if members of a Mapuche community 
take wood from an adjacent plantation, it is not clear why it is legally relevant whether or not 
this is part of a larger scheme of “ideological infiltration.” Paradoxically, the re-contextualized 
narrative seems to reinforce the notion that the motivation behind actions is always political, 
whereas many voices among landowners, but also within the Mapuche movement, dispute 
that.  
 
In addition to a struggle about the context and “terrorist” nature of the crimes, actors also have 
competing accounts of who is actually leading and participating in the struggle. Ultimately, this 
discursive struggle about the identity of defendants and their claims to representation is 
simultaneously a debate about the Chilean democracy and the prosecutorial claims to act in the 







are considered to be “violent” and even “terrorist.” The voice of Mapuche activists is thus 
ignored and discredited. Prosecutors emphasize the role of outsiders, foreigners, and 
infiltrators in the planning and execution of crimes, taking advantage of the Mapuche identity 
and grievances. The dichotomy between the good Mapuches and the external radicals 
legitimates a harsh response against the “radicals.” Mapuche activists, however, argue that the 
struggle is about the Mapuche people and that the role of outsiders is wrongly interpreted, 
overstated, or simply untrue. Landowners and prosecutors view the CTT and the CAM as 
instigators and manipulators and contrast them to the “peaceful” Mapuche. “The CTT and CAM 
manipulate and instigate communities and put ideas in their heads. The people in the 
communities do not invent and want ‘this’ themselves,” said one forestry manager (Interview 
C-34).  
 
The prosecutorial narrative thus perpetuates the notion that the “community members” are 
the “real” Mapuches who have the legitimacy and whose will is imagined to be more authentic. 
The prosecutors thus negate the possibility that the defendants in these trials represent the 
Mapuche people or even their own Mapuche communities. Denying the defendants the 
capacity to represent, the prosecutors claim to act in the “public” interest. While certainly the 
CAM has lost popularity and legitimacy during the past decade, activists argue that both the 
CTT and the CAM did and to a certain extent still do enjoy a certain legitimacy and 
representativeness among the Mapuche movement and the Mapuche communities. Mapuche 








Thus, just like in Spain, the prosecutor’s office in Chile has become a key actor within the larger 
dynamics of the Chilean-Mapuche territorial conflict. In the next chapter, I turn to the 
mobilization of environmentalist activists in the United States, their challenges to the status 
quo, their protest actions, and the subsequent criminal prosecutions. While the meta-conflict 
about the criminal prosecutions and the patterns of victim mobilization and prisoner support 
mobilization in the United States are highly similar to those in Spain and Chile, the overall 
development is different. The prosecutorial narrative in relation to extremist environmentalist 
protest in the United States is not expansive like in Spain or ambivalent like in Chile. Instead, 
the narrative zooms in on a small group of activists and portrays them as eco-terrorists. Doing 
so, it marginalizes them by drawing boundaries between those that are pushed into the 
criminal justice arena and those that are forced to choose sides and – if they cooperate with 









VI. Eco-Radicals Claim Defense of 
Animals and the Earth in the United 
States 
 
Who are the real eco-terrorists? And when does that which is offensive, obnoxious, or 
dangerous become illegal or even terrorism? These are the central questions at stake in the 
meta-conflict that surrounds the criminal prosecutions in relation to “extremist” 
environmentalist activism.  
 
1. Introduction: Who are the real eco-terrorists?  
In October 1997 Peter Young raided six mink farms in the Midwest. He was arrested for these 
acts after seven years of living as a fugitive. When he got to talk to his lawyer, his counsel said: 
“it is incredible; it seems that the prosecutors are more interested in your friends than in the 
issues in the indictment. They are making a master list with the names of your friends” 
(Interview US-15).  
 








In the words of journalist Will Potter, who allegedly coined the term, the “Green Scare” is the 
“disproportionate, heavy-handed government crackdown on the animal rights and 
environmental movements, and the reckless use of the word ‘terrorism’” (Potter 2011b). This 
raises some questions. Do prosecutors, FBI agents, and judges also perceive a “Green Scare”? 
Or does the “Green Scare” only exist in the minds of paranoid animal rights and 
environmentalist activists? And how do targets and victims of animal rights and 
environmentalist protest activity talk about the criminal prosecutions against the activists?    
 
The counterpart of the Green Scare is “eco-terrorism.” The researcher’s guide to safety, 
security, and media relations at the University of California at Davis, elaborated by the UC Davis 
police department in 2002, described that “[t]he history of animal/environmental extremist 
groups can be traced to England, with all groups now falling under the broad category of ‘eco-
terrorism’ – defined as any crime committed in the name of saving nature” (2002:2). The guide 
continues to describe the Animal Liberation Front, the Earth Liberation Front, and a short 
history of the attacks on researchers at UC Davis by animal rights extremists and groups in 
opposition to genetically modified agriculture.  
 
In this and the next chapter I will describe what happens in this phenomenon labeled 
alternatively as the Green Scare or as the law enforcement response to eco-terrorism. I will 
trace its features, nature, and emergence. When did the term “eco-terrorism” emerge? When 







movement instead of individuals? In the next chapter I focus on the prosecutorial narrative and 
choices in criminal prosecutions in relation to the environmentalist struggle in the United States 
over the past decades. The main emphasis will be placed on the last ten years, in which law 
enforcement has stepped up its efforts to counter extreme protest tactics and achieve 
detentions and convictions.  
 
This chapter starts with a short introduction to the competing goals at stake in the conflict: 
animal rights and preservation of nature versus the use of animals and the earth for human 
purposes. I pay attention to the mobilization of activists, their tactics, and the relations 
between “radicals” and mainstream actors. Then I briefly discuss the U.S. criminal justice 
system and its legislation as far as it is relevant to understanding the criminal prosecutions of 
the past twenty-five years, which brings us to the processes that take place in the criminal 
justice arena. I devote special attention to the development of the state’s “definition of the 
situation,” which guides the assessment of the seriousness of the challenge the United States 
faces. I discuss some of the prevalent images that prosecutors draw upon to understand and 
respond to “eco-terrorism.” Such images portray the nature of “organizations” like the Animal 
Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front, the people that are attracted to this activism, 
the people that are the driving forces behind the actions, and the likelihood that material 
destruction will turn into violence against human beings. With “eco-terrorism” as the dominant 
lens for government action, the situation transfers to the criminal justice arena. In an analysis 







environmentalist and animal rights protest activity as “victims” in criminal proceedings as well 
as “prisoner support mobilization” and the way in which defendants and their sympathizers 
challenge the criminal proceedings and the classifications of conduct that prosecutors put 
forward.  
 
After this “setting the stage” of the political conflict and the transfer of a significant part of that 
conflict into the criminal justice arena, the next chapter analyzes in depth the ways in which the 
state has used its criminal justice apparatus to criminalize the tactics that activists employ, 
exploring some of the main debates such as the tension between free speech and internet 
organizing and the role of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) involvement in activist cells. I 
will analyze the competing classifications of the environmentalist protest activity and the way in 
which these discursive efforts get translated into the choices the prosecutor makes, such as 
who gets indicted, what charges are brought, and how the law is interpreted and the criminal 
law doctrine applied. I analyze the prosecutorial narrative and the specific discursive shifts that 
characterize its development throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In particular, I will identify three 
shifts that profoundly influence the way in which environmental protest is characterized and 
prosecuted: (1) the shift towards proactive prosecution; (2) the shift from the definition of 
conduct as sabotage or property destruction to “eco-terrorism”; and (3) the shift towards the 








Just as in the other country studies, I have had to make choices about what to select. There 
have been many prosecutions and ongoing criminal cases in relation to the environmentalist 
movement. Without aiming to provide a comprehensive or even representative overview of all 
those cases, I have selected several cases in order to illustrate the argument that I will make in 
these chapters. In this research, I am most interested in the way in which prosecutors draw the 
boundary between the political arena and the criminal justice arena. I have thus selected cases 
that demonstrate the characteristic features of this process of boundary drawing. It will 
become clear that in the United States, an important voice in this process is the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI). 
 
I will describe what I have called the “marginalization” of actors that occurs as the prosecutorial 
narrative proceeds to mark the boundary between the political arena and the criminal justice 
arena. The marginalizing discourse in the United States centers on the concept of “eco-
terrorism” and enables the isolation of activists who are prosecuted under that label. Solidarity 
across the radical and mainstream spectrum of environmentalism in the United States is weak. 
Criminal prosecutions draw upon and reproduce the dividing lines and debates among such 
groups from different sides of the spectrum about the legitimate means of struggle for animals 
and the earth. The prosecutorial narrative establishes firm walls between the criminal justice 








I thus explore how the prosecutorial narrative asserts and draws upon the different logics that 
are dominant in the political arena and the criminal justice arena. The political arena and the 
logic of democracy in the prosecutorial narrative place importance on the “public opinion” and 
“persuasion” of people while reaching for their “hearts and minds.” At the same time, many 
environmental activists do not feel that public support will save the earth and the animals. 
Instead, their experience is full of stories in which political negotiations were decided by other 
factors than public support as the lack of transparency or the power of money turned out to 
make it difficult to achieve victories by increasing public support. Some activists thus have 
turned to “direct action” which sidesteps public support and simply “does the job.” The 
prosecutorial narrative locates such action outside of the political arena and defines it as 
criminal.     
 
My fieldwork in the United States took place in the fall of 2007 and the fall of 2008. During that 
time I attended a two-week criminal trial in Sacramento. I also interviewed two prosecutors, 
five criminal defense lawyers, and four environmentalist activists and I conducted participant 
observation during an animal rights conference in Boston and during several animal rights 
protests in New York City. I have tried to arrange interviews with pharmaceutical companies, 
but they declined due to “security reasons.” In Germany, I had an informal conversation with 
representatives of a pharmaceutical company which also has offices in the United States. My 
request for an interview with the FBI in Washington was rejected with the argument that they 







observation, I have collected numerous books and articles, legal transcripts, legislation, public 
declarations, and government reports. I watched videos on YouTube of protest actions and 
materials collected by activists working undercover in the meat industry or research 
laboratories. I further visited many websites of environmentalist activists, websites from those 
who are directly affected by such protests, like fur farmers and scientists, and those who 
campaign for harsher measures against activists, like the Center for the Defense of Free 
Enterprise. For detailed information regarding my data I refer the reader to the methodological 
appendix.  
 
2. Challenge to the liberal democracy 
 
I start out with a brief description of this conflict, the actors, competing goals, failed civil 
lawsuits and political negotiations, the development of protest tactics that fundamentally 
challenge the status quo, and the responses to those tactics. I will write a tiny bit on the 
underlying philosophy of “speciesism,” which is important for understanding the radical claims 
for animal rights and wilderness. Far from being complete, this short introduction merely serves 









The contention: Animal rights and wilderness versus the human use of animals and the earth 
Just like the “Mapuche conflict,” the eco-conflict in the United States actually refers to a 
collection of struggles and disputes that have also changed over time. Environmentalism is an 
issue that goes back a while in American history, engaging actors across the political spectrum. 
It is worthwhile to note, for example, that conservationism was given a big boost by President 
Theodore Roosevelt, who introduced the national parks in the early 1900s. The 
environmentalist movement consists of various actors, ranging from animal rights groups to 
activists concerned with the sea, the forest, and specific geographic struggles. During the 1990s, 
for example, many activists of Earth First! were involved in the struggle for the Headwoods 
wilderness area, where they opposed the Pacific Lumber Company. Other struggles address 
wolves, whales, buffalos, horse slaughtering practices, protection of the red squirrel habitat in 
Arizona against an observatory, or the environmental impact of genetic engineering. In each of 
these struggles, the opponents or targets of the demands of the challengers vary. They can be 
hunters, scientists, universities, companies, circus operators, or the government.  
 
The environmentalist movement, its demands, and its opponents 
The environmentalist movement in the United States is thus highly diverse and I will not go into 
full detail, as this has been done elsewhere (e.g., Scarce 2006, Jasper and Nelkin 1992). I will 
point out some important differences between the groups that together form the 
environmentalist movement and clarify the terminology that I use for these different actors. In 







(for example Earth First!), the sea (such as the Sea Shepherds), and the animals (such as the 
Animal Liberation Front). I also refer to all activists that struggle for both earth and animals as 
“environmental activists,” thus specifically including “animal rights” activists. Indeed, while 
these groups tend to have a distinct focus, there is good reason to analyze them as belonging to 
a single broader movement. Many animal rights activists have come from the wilderness corner 
and vice versa, and thus there is an overlap in activists. Also, some companies are targeted both 
for animal rights issues and for biodiversity concerns, an example being Monsanto. As we will 
see in these chapters, the government and the targets also lump environmental protest actions 
together under the umbrella term “eco-terror.” And environmental activists maintain a website 
for “eco-prisoners,” reporting on all the prisoners from these diverse struggles together. As a 
consequence, I will also refer to them as one movement.  
 
Within the broader environmentalist movement, there is an important distinction between 
activists that care for animals or the earth out of a humanist concern and those that put 
animals and the earth first. Broadly speaking, the first category is interested in animal welfare 
(as opposed to rights) and in the conservation of nature for human purposes (such as 
recreation, tourism, and hunting). The second category regards this interest as reflecting 
“speciesism,” which means that species membership (such as being human) is the basis for 
special rights and benefits. These activists reject human needs or human superiority as a valid 
basis for the use of animals and the earth. Instead, they emphasize the independent value of 







for example, advocating for animal rights instead of animal welfare and advocating for 
wilderness instead of sustainable development.  
 
This perspective is visible, for example, in the name chosen by the group Earth First!. Activists 
of Earth First!, the Sea Shepherds, and the Animal Liberation Front all share the same premise 
that society should abandon the human-centered perspective towards nature. Wilderness is 
not scenery, animals are not meat, and minerals are not resources. All of those words 
(“scenery,” “meat,” “resources,” and also “progress”) reflect the bias of a society that tends to 
look at nature as something to be used (“exploited”) by human beings. These are murky issues, 
also within the environmental movement, also for the more radical activists. Not all radical 
animal rights activists, for example, reject animal welfare laws. But it is not their ultimate goal. 
What should be clear is that the fundamental divide is not between people who love animals 
and people who do not. It is about changing the relationship between humans and the earth. 
Animal rights activists, for example, do not have “pets.” At most, they may have “companion 
animals” – “I cannot own another living being,” said activist Janet.  
 
This philosophy of “speciesism” leads to many concrete and difficult questions, such as whether 
animal testing should also be rejected when it concerns life-saving medicines. A pharmaceutical 
researcher asked me: “will those animal rights activists be consistent and refuse medicine when 
they get a specific illness that we provide the treatment for?”120 In these issues, all facts and 
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morals are disputed: activists may claim that the research can be done in other ways, without 
using animals in a cruel way, or without using them at all. This is not the place to go into these 
details. Suffice it to note that given the way society in the United States is organized, the 
number of specific issues challenged by environmentalist activists is vast: fur, vivisection, circus 
animals, hunting, logging, construction projects, SUV’s (sport utility vehicles), the meat industry 
(slaughterhouses, chicken factories), research labs; each of these “targets” provides ample 
room for discussion, protest, and action in the environmentalist movement.  
 
Only some of the groups or individuals involved in environmental activism have been the 
subject of criminal investigations and prosecutions, most particularly individuals believed to act 
in name of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), and the campaign 
Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC). These groups will therefore receive the most attention 
in these chapters. The relation between these groups and the broader environmentalist 
movement, though, will come to the center of my analysis of what goes on in these criminal 
prosecutions.  
 
Before we turn to those criminal prosecutions it is important to describe the actors on the 
other side of the story, i.e., the “targets” of environmental protest and their allies. The list of 
individuals, companies, and organizations using animals and the earth for specific human-
centered purposes is long: circus people, hunters, logging companies, biomedical researchers, 







government organizations on this side of the equation, ranging from agencies such as forest 
services to certain senators or Congress members defending these interests. Indeed, activists 
often point out the complicity of the government in continuing what they see as harmful 
practices, as scientific research is often subsidized and also logging operations have received 
many subsidies, which in the end is taxpayer money.121 
 
These actors have often created associations and alliances speaking on their behalf, such as the 
Fur Commission, the National Association for Biomedical Research (NABR), and the National 
Animal Interest Alliance (NAIA). There are also organizations that were specifically founded to 
create a voice against radical or extremist environmentalism and animal rights advocacy, for 
example Wise Use, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Center for the Defense of Free 
Enterprise, Animal Concerns Community, and the websites Activist Cash and Meatingplace. Ron 
Arnold from Wise Use argues against the perspective held by many environmentalists that a 
catastrophe is imminent if humanity does not change its current practices. Instead, he argues 
that “[t]he earth and its life are tough and resilient, not fragile and delicate (Arnold 1996). In 
response to the demands of animal rights activists, Teresa Platt from the Fur Commission 
explicitly favors the domestication of animals: 
So what are the goals of these terrorists, and how desirable are they in reality? Although much 
has changed in the last million years, some things have remained constant. Water, undrinkable 
salt water to boot, still covers 75% of the Earth's surface. About 10% of the landmass – or just 
2.5% of the planet – can support agriculture to feed and clothe us. The other 97.5% of the 
planet can support grazers and predators and birds and fish, animals which consume what are 
to us inedible plants and animal life and convert them to food and clothing for our use – but we 
must take the lives of these animals to reap these benefits. The domestication of animals over 
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the last ten thousand years has contributed greatly to the Earth's ability to provide for us all. 
(Fur Commission 1999)  
 
Similarly, a scientist whose research is funded by the National Institutes of Health claimed the 
social benefits of their work:  
 
Responsible use of animals in research aimed at improving the health and welfare of the 
mentally ill is the right thing to do, and we will continue because we have a moral responsibility 
to society to use our skills for the betterment of the world. (Daily Mail Reporter 2010) 
 
Environmental activists pose a strong challenge to the liberal democracy as they claim to speak 
for those who have no voice. This is not just a description of the fact that human beings cannot 
understand the language of animals. More fundamentally, it addresses the fact that within the 
human system of democracy, animals and nature do not have a voice. They do not count, they 
do not have a vote, and their interests are not considered. Within this system, the earth and 
the animals only count if there are human interests at stake. It is that fundamental exclusion 
that is challenged by environmental activists. The concept of “animal rights” expresses this 
notion clearly, and as such it is a highly controversial idea, often ridiculed by opponents. For 









Environmentalist demands challenge the status quo as they demand profound changes in the 
organization of industry  
Just as in the other country-studies, in order to justify their collective actions, the 
environmentalist challengers of the status quo claim the urgency and legitimacy of their 
grievances and actions, challenge the state’s jurisdiction, dispute the validity of current laws, or 
point out the deficiencies of political avenues.122 They often actively construct their own “laws” 
and rules for engagement, sometimes explicitly defending the use of destructive action to 
achieve their goals.   
 
In this section, I describe the different protest activities developed by the activists, which are 
informed by their ideology, the de-legitimization of the legal and political structures to get 
things done, their frustration with other forms of protests, their lack of confidence in the state 
and big companies, and the legitimization of illegal actions. This development of tactics is a 
dynamic process of interaction between targets, activists, the media, and law enforcement. 
Activists constantly search for tactics that are the most effective and the least costly, while 
taking into account certain moral principles. The development of protest tactics and their 
controversial status draws ultimately on competing views regarding constitutionalism, 
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democracy, and liberalism. Below in section 3 and in the next chapter I will discuss how these 
debates are brought into the courtroom.  
 
Self-proclaimed “eco-warrior” Dave Forman described the situation as a war:  
 
The ecologist Raymond Dasmann says that World War III has already begun, and that it is the 
war of industrial humans against the Earth. He is correct. All of us are warriors on one side or 
another in this war; there are no sidelines, there are no civilians. Ours is the last generation that 
will have the choice of wilderness, clean air, abundant wildlife, and expansive forests. The crisis 
is severe. (1991)  
 
This citation expresses very well several elements from the radical eco-discourse that are 
important for understanding the activists and their tactics. We observe (1) a sense of urgency, 
(2) a need to take responsibility, (3) a necessity to choose a side, (4) a war perspective, (5) there 
is no neutral ground, and (6) what is at stake is enormous: the Earth.  
 
Compassion, urgency, and responsibility are the three keywords in the discourse of challengers 
of the status quo in each of the country studies. Also U.S. activists often appeal to anger, 
passion, and compassion.123 In a talk at New York University animal rights activist Peter Young 
expressed his sentiment of compassion by referring to a quote from an activist from the 
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Weather Underground in a documentary about that group. Young argued that this quote 
captures what makes a good activist. “Why would you go so far?,” a former activist from the 
Weather Underground was asked. The answer was: “there wasn't a single moment between 
1965 and 1974 that I was not haunted by the images of Vietnam; down to while I was making 
toast.” Thus, Young argued: “It is very emotional. Whenever in the evening I am doing some 
hedonistic thing such as reading a book I want to feel the guilt. Not excusing inaction. Place that 
burden on yourself” (Field notes October 2008).  
 
Similarly, at one of the New York City protests I attended, an activist was wearing a sweater of 
the Animal Liberation Front with the motto: “If not now, when? If not you, who?”124 The sense 
of urgency and responsibility expressed in these short lines is a returning feeling among 
activists. Young (2005b) voiced this sense of urgency that activists have explicitly as a reason for 
his mink releases: “It was just before pelting season 1997, and within a month all mink on 
American fur farms would be dead. […] I can say I appreciate the sense of urgency that drove us 
this far. As bad as jail can be, I’d have always felt worse doing nothing.”  
  
In addition to urgency and compassion, environmentalist activists voice a clear sense of 
obligation to act for those who do not have a voice, and they urge others and themselves to 
educate themselves about what is happening in their neighborhoods and in their country. This 
knowledge subsequently creates a responsibility to act upon it. An animal rights activist offered 
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as a comparison helping an old woman in the street who is assaulted. “You could not just do 
nothing when you see that happening, when the old woman does not have the means or 
strength to defend herself and you do” (Interview US-15). The activists thus express an emotion 
of personal suffering because of the destruction and cruelty that they perceive. Their judgment 
is that they would be guilty and complicit if they did not act, making them prepared to sacrifice 
their own freedom for these higher values.  
 
Arguing that democratic avenues are too slow (urgency is needed to save dying animals and the 
disappearing wilderness) and compromises are not acceptable, radical activists challenge the 
liberal democracy and its faith in legal and political avenues. This emphasis on “No 
Compromise!” – the title of one of their magazines – is one of the major differences between 
radical and non-radical activists. As radical activists proceed to defend animals and the earth, 
they construe their own rules that guide their decisions. Thus, they profoundly challenge the 
U.S. legal system and the legalistic call for strict obedience to the laws. These activists 
emphasize, however, that law-breaking for their political goals is not just a blank check for 
doing anything that would be most effective. Instead, they have engaged in multiple efforts to 
establish guidelines for their actions. For example, Foreman has written a book, Ecodefense: A 
Field Guide to Monkeywrenching, which intends to “establish guidelines for monkeywrenching 
that would help it be more effective, strategic, ethical, safe, and secure” (1991:119).125 Well 
known among activists (and incidentally also prosecutors) are further the ELF and ALF 
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guidelines, to which everyone who wants to claim an action in the name of the ELF/ALF has to 
abide. Most important in these guidelines is the respect for any animal, human and non-
human.  
ALF GUIDELINES:  
1. TO liberate animals from places of abuse, i.e. laboratories, factory farms, fur farms, etc, and 
place them in good homes where they may live out their natural lives, free from suffering.  
2. TO inflict economic damage to those who profit from the misery and exploitation of animals.  
3. TO reveal the horror and atrocities committed against animals behind locked doors, by 
performing non-violent direct actions and liberations.  
4. TO take all necessary precautions against harming any animal, human and non-human.  
5. To analyze the ramifications of all proposed actions, and never apply generalizations when 
specific information is available. (ALF 2011a)  
 
The willingness of extremist activists to place the lives of animals above the U.S. laws 
constitutes a direct challenge to the rule of law. In addition, their conviction to place the lives of 
animals and the urgency to preserve wilderness above the current wishes of the majority of the 
U.S. population is a challenge to the democracy. Justifying their position, activists sometimes 
argue that “the people would want this if they knew,” and they criticize the lack of 
transparency of the meat industry and the fact that slaughterhouses and laboratories are 
always and on purpose hidden in buildings without windows (Interview US-15). In their defense 
of civil disobedience and property damage, activists often refer to distinctively American 
examples, such as the Boston Tea Party and the anti-slavery campaign including the 
Underground Railroad (Cook 2006, Scarce 2006:74). Many activists further told of specific 
experiences where they felt that the democratic avenues did not provide real possibilities for 







the argument that the impact would be economically crippling, thus annulling the democratic 
victory fought for by the activists (Interview US-16).  
 
Ecological sabotage (ecotage) is the destruction of technology in defense of nature (Scarce 
2006:12), such as smashing laboratory equipment used by vivisectionists, ramming whaling 
vessels, or tree spiking. Justifying such actions, activists often argue that they are non-violent as 
they take precautions to avoid injuring others. For example, tree spikers warn loggers before 
the trees are cut and arsonists have aimed to only strike unoccupied buildings (Scarce 2006:13). 
Some activists challenge the notion that the destruction of property is violence. Indeed, they 
argue that it is exactly the fact that animals are turned into “property” which makes it okay to 
kill them, instead of being the violent act that activists claim it to be. Beef instead of cow, 
poultry instead of chicken, and pork instead of pig are the linguistic masks that hide the lives of 
the animals and turn them into food for human beings. Activists also define their actions as 
“defense” and reject the notion that they are the aggressors. They focus their attention on the 
crimes that they perceive are committed by their targets and view their own actions as the 
proper prevention of such crimes. They thus redefine their own actions accordingly. For 
example, Australian radical environmentalist John Seed argued that destroying a bulldozer to 
preserve the environment is “property enhancement” (Scarce 2006:12). Despite such 
justifications, the legitimacy of illegal tactics such as sabotage has been and still is heavily 
debated within radical organizations, like Earth First!.126  
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While some activists explicitly call for property destruction, there is no open discourse justifying 
the use of violence against human beings. Central to the justifications of law-breaking is the 
distinction between “property” and “animals” (in activist lingo “human and non-human” 
animals). Thus, while law-breaking and material damage are frequently accepted, there is a 
general taboo on harming any living being. The only exception here might be a remark by a 
surgeon and one of the “press officers” of the ALF, Jerry Vlasak. During a conference in 2003 he 
remarked that killing an animal researcher would save (animal) lives.127 This highly controversial 
remark has been interpreted by some as justifying the assassination of animal researchers. 
Vlasak has argued that he is “not advocating, condoning or recommending that anybody be 
killed” (citation from a 26 July 2004 BBC interview in: Best, no date).   
 
General overview tactics 
In this paragraph I will provide an overview of the range and development of the tactics that 
environmental activists have employed throughout the past decades. The range of tactics used 
by environmental activists is very broad. It is impossible, therefore, to provide a detailed 
description of all different kinds of actions. I will focus on the major characteristics and 
developments, discussing some of the most important and contested tactics.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
Those nails can be, however, dangerous for those taking the trees down. They have to be taken out before cutting 
the trees. Such tactics are thus imposing costs on the companies. Activists always announce tree spikes in order to 
avoid harm to human beings and to protect the trees. 
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 His remark has been reproduced on many websites, for example the site Animal Scam: “I don't think you'd have 
to kill – assassinate – too many vivisectors,” Vlasak said, “before you would see a marked decrease in the amount 
of vivisection going on. And I think for 5 lives, 10 lives, 15 human lives, we could save a million, 2 million, 10 million 








Protest activity often forms part of what activists call “campaigns,” which consist of a 
coordinated series of actions against a specific target or for a specific cause. Such campaigns 
may include both legal and illegal activity, including tree sits, home demonstrations, spray 
painting, sabotage, and undercover investigations. Each of these actions has their own logic and 
justification. Some activists only engage in actions that will appeal to the larger public. Others 
care only about the direct effect of their actions on animals and the earth. Some of the tactics 
of activists are geared towards gaining publicity and being “newsworthy.” In this regard, it 
should be noted that actions that include major material damage and undercover actions often 
achieve farmore attention in the media than actions of civil disobedience or a banner that has 
been hanged. During the course of three decades a couple of actions have received major 
intention due to their specifically high impact. For example, in 1987 there was an arson attack 
on the Animal Diagnostic Laboratory of the University of California at Davis which caused $4.6 
million in damages. In 1997, the construction of a ski resort in Vail, Colorado, was attacked, 
causing $12 million in damages. Those actions and the high cost that was inflicted are rather 
exceptions. Most of the tactics that figure in these chapters had a lower impact in terms of 
damages but were employed far more frequently.  
 
Tactics of activists are not only dependent on the expected media impact but also on the 
expected law enforcement response. Activists engaging in civil disobedience expect short jail 







of an action thus always plays a role either in the assumed effectiveness or in the way the 
action is carried out. With some of the tactics the whole point is to keep within the boundaries 
of the law. Other tactics emphasize direct effect over legality. Activists often refer to the 
concept of “direct action” to explain the choice of their tactics and the possibility to break the 
law. Direct action is not intended to persuade the larger public such as is the case with 
leafleting and demonstrations. While these latter protest activities start the “career” of most 
activists, often activists shared their frustration with such forms of protest and complained that 
they do not “work” (Interviews US-5/15/16).   
 
In light of their specific relation to the rule of law and the different logics of the political and the 
criminal justice arenas, protest tactics can be divided into (1) the use of lawsuits, court 
injunctions, and appeals to law enforcement; (2) vigilante actions focused on the enforcement 
of existing laws (such as undercover investigations); (3) communicative action, which can be 
further divided into purely persuasive action (such as leafleting), communication that is 
offensive (yelling “puppy killer”), and messages that include property damage (spray-painting 
red – to signify the blood of animals – paint on fur and butcher shops); (4) direct action aimed 
at directly obstructing perceived future harm to animals or the earth, which can be further 
divided into legal action (boycott), civil disobedience (tree sitting, locking oneself to a machine 
or truck, occupation of a building), and property damage (tree spiking, sabotage of machinery, 
also known as “monkeywrenching,”128 and arson).  
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Environmentalist activists have made use of lawsuits and court appeals on many occasions, thus 
playing according to the rules. They have been active in the drafting of environmental laws and, 
for example, the Animal Welfare Act in 1985. They often file complaints against organizations 
they allege to have violated such laws. Sometimes this is successful. For example, in 1998 the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) filed a lawsuit against Huntingdon Life Sciences 
after People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) released an undercover video in which 
monkeys were thrown around and a seemingly conscious monkey was dissected in the 
laboratory in New Jersey. The USDA fined the company $50,000 for 28 alleged violations of the 
Animal Welfare Act (Cook 2006). Environmental activists have also taken legal action against 
infrastructural and logging projects and challenged environmental impact assessments (EIA). 
Such efforts have increased control over animal research as well as oversight for construction 
projects.  
 
Some activists have taken the enforcement of existing laws a step further and acted as 
vigilantes, such as the Sea Shepherds and also, for example, In Defense of Animals. The laws are 
there, but because they argue that the enforcement is not good enough, in their actions they 
aim to draw attention from law enforcers or simply enforce the law themselves.129 A specific 
kind of such vigilante work consists in undercover investigations. Activists have engaged in 
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 For example, In Defense of Animals struggled to end cocaine experiments at New York University in which 
monkeys were used. In 1995, the U.S. Department of Agriculture backed IDA's claims by accusing the foundation of 
“keeping several dozen chimpanzees in undersize cages and causing the avoidable deaths of at least five 







undercover investigations in order to disclose bad practices, animal cruelty, and other 
violations of the law. For example, in 1981 Alex Pacheco of PETA went undercover at the 
Institute for Behavioral Research. His findings led to a police raid of the laboratory and the 
prosecution of the lab researcher. The case is known as the “Silver Spring Monkeys” and is 
credited with starting the animal rights movement and leading to the Animal Welfare Act in 
1985 (Scarce 2006:121). Material resulting from such undercover investigations is often also 
used for educational purposes to inform the public.  
 
Communicative action can be either purely persuasive or, as we will see in the next chapter, be 
classified as bullying, terrorizing, or stalking. The latter form of communicative action thus 
specifically straddles and sometimes explicitly challenges the line between the political arena 
and the criminal justice arena.    
 
Direct action is not necessarily illegal. Activists have engaged in legal direct action such as 
boycotts of shops and products. For example, at the end of the 1990s, PETA called upon 
consumers to boycott companies like Colgate whose products were tested at Huntingdon Life 
Sciences. Within months, Huntingdon lost half of its customers (Kolata 1998). Characteristic of 
direct action, however, is that it sidesteps the indirect avenues of political dialogue and 









Prioritizing the goal above strict obedience to the law, activists have also engaged in civil 
disobedience actions, including sit-ins and lock downs. Civil disobedience is overt and can still 
be intended to change “hearts and minds,” which means engaging in the logic of 
communication and persuasion in the political arena. It can also, however, be intended as a 
direct action. Such actions are often closely connected to parallel legal steps. For example, 
while a court is deciding on an injunction, activists may engage in a road blockade in order to 
prevent logging until the court has issued an injunction. This was the case, for example, when 
environmentalist activists challenged the legality of the construction of a road in 1982 in the 
Little Granite Creek area and the validity of the environmental impact assessment. The judge 
did not issue an injunction on the construction, meaning that the construction would start 
despite the pending lawsuit. Only in hindsight can it then be established whether the road 
should have been built. Some activists refused to accept this logic as it would be too late for the 
nature lost in the process. Thus they resorted to direct action in order to prevent the road from 
being built before the lawsuit had been heard in court. Earth First! members also blockaded 
bulldozers in order to delay construction until a court injunction could halt the building of the 
road. Thus, such civil disobedience aims to do exactly what a legal decision could enforce later 
on. In North Kalmiopsis, such a blockade continued for three months until the injunction was 
granted. In these cases, activists explicitly frame their actions as protective. Drawing upon the 
language and thinking of the criminal justice system, they frame the actions of the other as 







criticize the “moderate mainstream” that lets the crime occur and determines the legality of 
the action only afterwards.  
 
While the abovementioned examples of direct action are overt, at other times, activists have 
argued that the existing laws and possibilities for lawsuits are not sufficient and have resorted 
to covert “direct” action.  
 
Where all animal welfare and most animal rights groups insist on working within the legal 
boundaries of society, animal liberationists argue that the state is irrevocably corrupt and that 
legal approaches alone will never win justice for the animals. 
–ALF Press Office (CrimethInc 2011b)  
  
For example, when in 1989 activists broke into the lab of a researcher at Texas Tech University 
whom they called a “career vivisector,” they argued that there was no point in alerting the 
authorities of the “cruelty” of the experiments, because the federal Animal Welfare Act does 
not cover animals during experiments; lacking even a requirement to use anesthesia. Such 
break-ins have led to considerable damages; in this case $70,000 worth of damage (Scarce 
2006:124–125).  
 
The tactics of activists thus always express a specific relation to the existing rule of law, either 








Defending the status quo 
Targets of environmentalist protests do not just sit on their hands. Some companies and 
academic researchers have initiated civil lawsuits against activists. In other cases, they have 
asked the judge for injunctions, for example in order to establish a minimum distance between 
protesters and the company. Alternatively, or in addition to such measures, some decided to 
employ security cameras and private security companies in order to provide protection to 
individual employees.130 Companies affected by the SHAC campaign initiated several civil 
lawsuits against SHAC.131 Such lawsuits impose financial burdens on activists as they have to 
spend money on discovery and deposits. Protestors engaged in tactics like lockdowns often 
were ordered to pay restitution (Scarce 2006:76).132 While it is important to be aware of the 
range of actions employed by targets, most of my attention will go to the ways in which targets 
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 These measures were taken in response to the SHAC campaign. In the civil lawsuit with the plaintiffs TEVA 
Pharmaceuticals and Svokos, the president of New Jersey corporation Plantex, against SHAC, it was mentioned that 
“Svokos' installed security cameras at his home, and employed a private security company to protect his family 
and home from defendants' unlawful activity.” In addition, Plantex “installed security cameras and other security 
systems in its Hackensack, New Jersey office as a result of the SHAC USA campaign” (Decision in Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA). 
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 For example, Huntingdon relation Stevens filed a lawsuit against SHAC. SHAC activist Josh Harper mentioned 
this in a speech (Harper 2002:2550).  
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 An example of such a combination of both criminal and civil lawsuits occurred in 1987, when activists occupied 
a truck to prevent the building of a road that subsequently would enable logging in North Kalmiopsis, a wilderness 
area in Oregon. Six activists (dubbed the “Sapphire Six”) were arrested and convicted to fifteen to twenty days in 
jail in addition to a fine of $250–350 per person. They also had to pay compensation of $1,761 to the logging 
company (Scarce 2006:69). In addition to this criminal trial, the logging company Huffman & Wright filed a civil 
lawsuit as the activists had locked themselves to one of its trucks. Scarce described the lawsuit as a “SLAPP”: 
Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation, where community organizations or activists end up spending all their 
money defending themselves in court instead of challenging projects of a developer or corporation. It was the first 
lawsuit against an act of civil disobedience in which punitive damages were demanded. After a week-long trial, the 
jury awarded the company $25,000 in punitive damages and $5,000 in actual damages. Scarce describes how this 
lawsuit intensified the debate between advocates of civil disobedience and advocates of “ecotage,” and Earth 
First! activist Foreman argued that such lawsuits pushed activists away from (overt) civil disobedience towards 







of environmentalist protest have formed alliances and engaged in the criminal justice arena to 
call upon the state and the rule of law for better protection of their interests.  
 
Popular support – extremism, supporters, and polarization  
 
If you are opposed by a minority, it is easy to neutralize them, and your actions need not cause 
much resentment; but if you are opposed by the vast majority, then you are never going to be 
safe, and the more blood you shed, the weaker your hold on power becomes. So the best policy 
you can pursue is to try to win the allegiance of the populace. (Machiavelli 1994:122) 
 
Machiavelli emphasizes the “allegiance of the populace” as an important consideration for 
rulers. It is important, therefore, to pay attention to the position moderate organizations and 
activists take towards extremist activists, the boundary-drawing, and polarization, specifically 
between the moderate mainstream and the extremist fringe. Moderate environmental 
organizations explicitly distance themselves from the “radicals,” as they call them, considering 
them unrealistic in their demands and violent in their means.  
 
Several terms are commonly used to distinguish between different activists across a wide 
spectrum of possible forms of activism. Thus, we often encounter labels such as radical, 
mainstream, moderate, or extreme. I find it useful to explain how I use these labels and 
propose that activists can be distinguished according to three indicators. First, it is possible to 







which I will refer to with the words mainstream or fringe. Further, activists can be distinguished 
according to how strictly they define their goals. They can be open for negotiation, which 
stands in contrast to “radical” activists who reject compromise.133 Finally, activists can be 
distinguished according to the means they use, which can be moderate or extreme.  
 
Of course, the exact meaning of these labels is continually contested, relative, and locally 
constructed. For example, while “extremist” is often a euphemism for “violent,” it can also 
mean engaging in more aggressive, more confrontational, or illegal behavior without destroying 
property or injuring a living being. Further, it is important to emphasize that the labels 
represent a continuum, although they are represented here as if they were dichotomous. Also, 
while theoretically the alternative combinations of these six positions can lead to a variety of 
sorts, there often tends to be a silent assumption that activists can be classified as either fringe, 
radical, and extreme or as mainstream, open for compromise, and moderate. This aligning of 
characteristics, however, while it indeed sometimes is the case and is certainly reproduced in 
existing narratives regarding the environmentalist movement, does not follow logically and 
should be established empirically instead of being assumed. Groups and individuals in the 
environmentalist movement are constantly categorized in terms of these labels and also 
actively claim these labels for themselves. For example, the Humane Society (“We’re the 
nation’s largest and most effective animal protection organization,” Humane Society 2011) and 
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the Sierra Club (“We are the largest and most influential grassroots environmental organization 
in the United States,” Sierra Club 2011) belong to the moderate mainstream.  
 
In terms of the means that they employ, Earth First!, the Hunt Saboteurs Association and 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) straddle between moderation and 
extremism. On the extreme side we find the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), the Earth Liberation 
Front (ELF), the Sea Shepherds Conservation Society, and Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty 
(SHAC). ELF and ALF go much farther than Earth First! went. There are no “street theater” or 
tree-sits in the name of the ELF, as Scarce (2006) put it. As I said, labels like “moderate” and 
“radical” are relative and dependent on subjective judgment, and individuals and organizations 
can also change over time. The website ActivistCash, for example, calls the Humane Society a 
“radical” organization as it developed from an animal welfare organization to an animal rights 
group.134Indeed, challenging its self-proclaimed moderate stance, a full page advertisement in 
the New York Times brought by the Center for Consumer Freedom claimed that the Humane 
Society was helping a “terrorist” group to raise money (Potter 2008). In this way, the labels are 
just one expression of the way in which voices compete in the criminal justice arena about the 
nature and legal meaning of such actions.  
 
Characteristic of the dynamics within the broad spectrum of the environmentalist movement is 
that there is widespread popular support for “compromising” goals, animal welfare,and basic 
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conservation of nature, whereas there is very little support for radical goals, such as the 
demand for animal rights and the claim to go back to wilderness. The Sierra Club has 1.4 million 
members, and the Humane Society claims to be backed by 11 million Americans (Sierra Club 
2011; Humane Society 2009). The ALF and the ELF do not have memberships, and public 
support is hard to measure, but it is generally assumed that the numbers are small, especially in 
comparison to these “mainstream” organizations. Thus, while the general public opposes cruel 
treatment of animals, they do eat meat and think animals can be used to develop medications 
for human beings. And while most people are in favor of some conservation of nature for 
recreation purposes, they do not support a return to wilderness.  
 
Mainstream organizations actively resist the tendency by the press to lump all environmentalist 
organizations together. In a press release in 2003 the Sierra Club publicly distanced itself from 
the Earth Liberation Front and complained that their actions hurt the entire movement (Sierra 
Club 2003).135 Such boundary drawing is also evident in the following statement by Caryl Terrell, 
Sierra Club legislative coordinator in Madison: “I walk in to a meeting of the Natural Resources 
Committee and they say 'Oh, you're with those extremists!' So I have to take time explaining 
that the Sierra Club isn't part of this and doesn't support these actions” (citation from Shepard 
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Express Metro: in Sierra Club 2003). Similar press releases are sent out, for example, by the 
Humane Society in reaction to actions by the Animal Liberation Front.136  
 
Not only in their words, but also in their actions the mainstream organizations try to create a 
distance from “extremist” organizations or individuals. An example is that the Sea Shepherds 
Conservation Society’s board of directors (not so moderate themselves) kicked Jerry Vlasak off 
the board of the Sea Shepherds after he had expressed the opinion that killing a scientist or 
animal tester could save many animal lives. PETA also publicly rejected extremist means when it 
was reported to assert that  
 
PETA has no involvement with alleged ALF or ELF actions. PETA does not support terrorism. 
PETA does not support violence […] In fact PETA exists to fight the terrorism and violence 
inflicted on billions of animals annually in the meat, dairy, experimentation, tobacco, fur, 
leather, and circus industries. (Frieden 2005) 
 
Scarce describes the “old” environmentalist movement as being “realist” and “pragmatic” and 
following the politics of lobby and compromise (Scarce 2006:15). Indeed, the mainstream 
groups are squarely in the political arena, engaging in negotiation and compromise. It is here 
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Society sent a letter to Senator Inhofe in which it complained that witness David Martosko of the Center for 
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that many current radicals were disillusioned. Those open for compromise, however, argue that 
the hard-line stance will never lead to a seat at the bargaining table. Radicals on the other hand 
have given up their belief that it is possible to achieve the change that they want to see through 
the political and judicial channels. They refuse to engage in the logic of bargaining and “give-
and-take.” The radical “wing” of the movement decided not to accept compromise anymore 
and instead sits in front of bulldozers or up in trees. This distinction between compromise and 
radicalism, though, is not as strict as it might seem. For example, Earth First! was founded with 
the explicit goal to make the proposals of the Sierra Club look reasonable (“niche theory,” 
Scarce 2006:6).  
 
The labels “mainstream” and “radical” are relevant to understanding the meta-conflict in the 
criminal justice arena and the construction of the prosecutorial narrative, because they are part 
of the images that turn up in criminal proceedings. For example, during the sentencing hearing 
of activist Daniel McGowan, the prosecutor referred to an incident in which McGowan threw a 
pie in the face of the Sierra Club president. Prosecutor Peifer was reported to have commented 
on this incident, claiming that this was “more than a symbolic act” and that by this time Daniel 
had given up on “mainstream” environmentalism (Anonymous 2007).  
 
U.S. government officials draw upon and reproduce the observed (and promoted) difference 
between the moderate environmentalist organizations and extreme “eco-terrorists.” For 







on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, the chairman of the subcommittee relied on the 
scholar Dr. O’Connor, who defines eco-terrorism as a “fringe-issue form of terrorism aimed 
primarily at inflicting economic damage on those seen as profiting from the destruction and 
exploitation of the environment.” Then the chairman continued to distinguish between eco-
terrorists and the rest of the environmentalist movement, again drawing upon a definition from 
Dr. O’Connor: “Environmentalists work within the system for preservation, and ecoterrorists 
seem to want to destroy civilization as we know it in order to save the planet” (Committee on 
the Judiciary 2006).  
 
Thus, the different actors are co-producing a boundary between the compromising mainstream 
on the one hand and the radical groups on the other hand. Extremist and radical fringe groups 
have little to no support from the moderate and compromising mainstream organizations and 
as I will discuss in more detail below, these divisions are stimulated by the government. In the 
next chapter I will show how the prosecutorial narrative draws upon these labels and the 
underlying polarization.    
 
The US federal criminal justice system 
Before we turn to the transfer of the dynamics in the eco-conflict to the criminal justice arena, 
it is important to provide some basic information about the United States’ criminal justice 
system. The United States is made up of fifty states and a federal district, and each state has its 







of my research to federal prosecutions.137 This is the level where most of the high-profile 
criminal cases against environmental activists have taken place and also where the FBI and the 
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) operate. It should be noted, though, that many of the 
developments at the federal level, such as the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, have been 
replicated at the state level (Parker 2009).  
 
There are some significant differences in comparison with the Spanish and Chilean 
prosecutions. In Spain, “terrorism” prosecutions are the exclusive domain of the Audiencia 
Nacional in Madrid. In Chile, almost all prosecutions in relation to the “Mapuche conflict” are 
done in the southern offices in Temuco and Concepción. This type of geographical clustering is 
not present in the United States. Environmentalist actions take place across the United States, 
and there is no similar mechanism through which cases become the exclusive province of one 
or two attorney offices. Still, there has been substantial effort to coordinate activities and 
ensure cooperation between different agencies and different attorney offices. This is apparent, 
for example, when in the press release after the conviction of the SHACdefendants the New 
Jersey prosecutor thanked FBI agents in New Jersey, Minnesota, Seattle, and Little Rock as well 
as the U.S. Attorney’s offices for the districts of Minnesota and Arkansas (United States 
Attorney’s Office, Dist. of N.J. 2006). Many government agents were involved in this 
investigation, at different levels and across different states. Coordination is often facilitated by 
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the Joint Terrorist Task Forces. It is noteworthy that many of these environmentalist cases are 
taken up on the federal level, while generally the majority of criminal cases are dealt with at the 
state level.138The shift from state prosecutions to federal prosecutions is significant: because 
prosecutors at the federal level represent the whole nation, their involvement reinforces the 
message that these cases are of national concern.  
 
The process of a criminal prosecution 
In this section I will briefly explain some of the main features and agents of criminal 
proceedings in the United States which turned out to be relevant in the prosecution of 
environmental activists: the FBI, federal attorneys, the grand jury, plea bargaining, the jury 
(selection), and the judges. Criminal proceedings are guided by the presumption of innocence, 
which is repeatedly communicated in judicial and prosecutorial documents. For example, below 
the press release announcing the indictment of activist Rod Coronado in 2006 the following was 
printed in bold letters: “An indictment itself is not evidence that the defendant committed the 
crimes charged. The defendant is presumed innocent until the Government meets its burden in 
court of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” (U.S. Attorney California 2006). Below I 
describe some of the steps that are taken in U.S. trials in order to prove the guilt of a defendant 
while respecting the presumption of innocence.  
 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
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As I have indicated earlier, the FBI is an important actor in shaping the prosecutorial decisions 
in relation to the prosecution of environmental activists. The FBI has launched undercover 
operations and engaged in investigative work before cases have gone to trial. The case against 
Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC), for example, was the result of a two-year investigation 
by the FBI with assistance from the New Jersey State Police. In another case, FBI informant 
“Anna” did undercover work for two years before the “cell” in which she operated was 
arrested. The FBI strongly focuses on intelligence in their attempts to deal with what they have 
labeled a domestic terrorism threat.139 While overall between 1993 and 2003 the number of 
special agents dedicated to the FBI's counterterrorism programs more than doubled, the FBI 
created an entire section devoted to the study of eco-terrorism (Lewis 2004). Cooperation 
between the FBI and other state agencies is facilitated in the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). 
The FBI claimed that the JTTF’s played an important role in the arrest of several ELF “cells” 
(Lewis 2004). These task forces have been criticized for their broad mandate. Since the scandal 
of the Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) between 1956 and 1971 there had been 
guidelines for the FBI regarding their undercover operations in political organizations, limiting 
such investigations to occasions where there were indications that a crime had been or was to 
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 From the testimony of the Deputy Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division of the FBI:  
 
[W]e have strengthened our intelligence capabilities. Since 2003, we have disseminated 64 raw 
intelligence reports to our partners pertaining to animal rights extremism and eco-terrorism activity. In 
addition, since 2004 we have disseminated 19 strategic intelligence assessments to our federal, state and 
local counterparts. And we have developed an intelligence requirement set for animal rights/eco-







be committed. In 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft changed these guidelines, permitting 
FBI investigations in many more instances. In 2008, a new set of guidelines was issued.140 
 
Since 2002, the FBI has often emphasized its work regarding eco-terrorism, as it has made “the 
prevention and investigation of animal rights extremists/eco-terrorism matters a domestic 
terrorism investigative priority” (Lewis 2004). In 2004, the FBI declared that in 34 FBI field 
offices they had over 190 pending investigations associated with ALF/ELF activities (ibid.). In 
2005 the FBI affirmed that eco-terrorism is “one of the FBI's highest domestic terrorism 
priorities” (Lewis 2005). 
 
U.S. Attorneys 
Prosecutors are important professional “characters” in charge of executing the liberal legalist 
paradigm in criminal proceedings.141 The prosecutor represents the government and in trial 
transcripts the prosecutor is also literally referred to as “the Government” as they present 
criminal cases “on behalf of the United States.” As they perform a professional role, the 
outcome of a criminal prosecution does not have the kind of impact it has on the defendant. 
“Whether we win or lose, we walk out through the same door,” as one prosecutor put it 
(Interview US-2). Federal U.S. Attorneys are appointed by the president for terms of four years. 
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 A historic explanation of the development of the guidelines can be found in the speech by Hon. Robert Scott in 
the House of Representatives (Scott 2008) and (Kozaryn 2002). The Department of Justice released a transcript 
with background information about the new guidelines that were issued in 2008 (Department of Justice 2008). The 
FBI issued a factsheet about these guidelines (FBI 2008b). The current guidelines can be found at: 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf.    
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In contrast to attorneys at the state level, it is not an electoral position. There are 94 U.S. 
Attorneys, one for each judicial district, each acting as the chief federal law enforcement officer 
within his or her particular jurisdiction. U.S. Attorneys and their assistant U.S. Attorneys are 
part of the Department of Justice, and the Executive Office of United States Attorneys provides 
support and oversight. I interviewed two assistant U.S. Attorneys who were the lead attorneys 
in specific “eco-terror” cases. These prosecutors often work closely with FBI agents and take 
part in the decisionmaking about the criminal investigation.  
 
When I started my interview with the prosecutor in the SHAC case with a general question 
about the animal rights movement, he immediately claimed to have no overview of the bigger 
picture. “I don't study the animal rights movement,”he said, thus reaffirming his commitment 
to a de-contextualized narrative. While the FBI does monitor the environmentalist/animal rights 
movements, the two U.S. prosecutors that I interviewed refused that approach. When I asked 
them about the fact that the FBI had designated the environmentalist activists as the number 
one domestic terrorism threat, they shrugged and indicated that they thought that was just an 
FBI spiel with which they did not have much to do. One prosecutor added that while the SHAC 
defendants apparently thought the prosecution was a “Bush” policy, he asserted that “nobody 
from Washington ever told us to do this case.” He thus referred to “Washington” as shorthand 
for the politicians from whom the prosecutors distance their policy, which is asserted to be 
based on the law, not on politics. These prosecutors thus claimed their decision-making 







terms of the gravity of the alleged crimes: “We don’t go after people smoking pot” (Interview 
US-13). The U.S. Attorney in Oregon made a similar point when he explicitly stated that “we 
would be seeking the same [terrorism] enhancement if this case had been prosecuted under 
the previous administration. This is not a political prosecution” (Terrorism Enhancement 
Hearing, Case Operation Backfire 2007:19). 
 
Grand juries 
Grand juries are bodies that deliver indictments and are a pivotal aspect of the criminal justice 
procedures. This aspect receives ample attention in the section below on prisoner support 
mobilization, as activists perceive the grand juries as a crucial element in the “Green Scare.” 
Prosecutors present their case before grand juries in order to obtain an indictment. They can 
subpoena people to come and testify before the grand jury. Witnesses testify without a defense 
lawyer, even though the witness may be indicted later on.  
 
Plea agreements 
As with all criminal cases in the United States, plea bargains are the key to most of the “Green 
Scare” prosecutions. In a plea agreement, the defendant waives his or her right to a trial. 
Indeed, trials are rare. Some activists have gone to trial and almost invariably received harsh 
sentences. During one trial, I interviewed a prosecutor who emphasized that he had tried to 
settle the case (Interview US-1). “The kid goes for more years than necessary now.” Also, he 







appeal, because in the United States the right to appeal is reserved exclusively for the 
defendant. In addition, the prosecutor emphasized that it is good for the “public” when people 
admit what they have done. The prosecutor viewed it as the best demonstration that the 
prosecution was correct and legitimate. During trial the mere existence of a plea bargain of co-
defendants cannot be construed as evidence against the defendant. The prosecutor 
emphasized, however, that the plea bargain of co-defendants has symbolic leverage for the 
prosecutor, not only because co-defendants are witnesses at the trial, but also because it 
means that defendants acknowledge the prosecutorial authority, the basis of the charges, and 
punishment. Even though a trial is likely to be evaded if possible, prosecutors may decide to go 
to trial to send the message that it is just not possible to receive a low plea bargain without 
cooperation. In his justification for taking the case to trial, the prosecutor asserted that he 
would like to prevent any “kid down the line”from getting sentenced to prison. “That is worth 
it” (Interview US-1). In the next chapter, I will discuss in more depth this image the prosecutor 
produced of “kids” who will be deterred by prosecutions.  
 
The plea bargain system in the U.S. has created many fights within the activist community. 
Previous friends, colleagues, and even former partners have turned against each other in order 
to receive the best plea bargain. There are several different plea bargains one can get. A non-
cooperating defendant gets a plea bargain in which the defendant does not cooperate with the 
FBI or the prosecutor. A cooperating defendant, in contrast, promises to assist the prosecution 







bargaining invariably could tell about the different offers that they received from the 
prosecutor. For example, Peter Young said that he was offered a plea bargain in exchange for 
returning to the activist community after his sentence as a mole. Another offer was to name 
names of people he used to have contact with (Interview US-15).  
 
Cooperating defendants often justify their cooperation by saying that they did not reveal 
anything “that the FBI didn’t know already.” Still, these defendants are invariably criticized 
harshly by the activist community and often excluded from further support. If one defendant 
decides to go to trial (and thus refuses any plea bargain), a plea bargain of cooperating co-
defendants often includes the consent to be a witness against their co-defendant. The first 
defendant to agree to a cooperating plea bargain thus gets what is called the “best seat on the 
bus” as any plea bargain after that is likely to be less beneficial to the defendant, because that 
defendant often cannot offer more worthwhile information to the prosecutor. Prosecutors call 
this strategy to get multiple defendants to enter a plea agreement “working up the chain” 
(Interview US-2).  
 
Though trials are a relatively rare phenomenon in the U.S. (in the estimation of one prosecutor, 
U.S. Attorneys have about one trial per year, Interview US-2), cooperation by activists against 
other activists is a recent phenomenon. One of the defense lawyers attributed this to the high 
sentences that have come into play: “Those federal sentences finally cranked them down,” he 







the activist community which involve people being labeled as “snitches” and people that do not 
cooperate as “heroes.”142 I will return to this dynamic in the section on prisoner support 
mobilization.  
 
Judge and jury 
In the U.S. system, juries decide upon the facts of the case, that is, whether they consider that 
the prosecutor has proven the facts “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The selection of a jury is 
highly important for the outcome of the case. Therefore, prosecutors and defense attorneys 
have the opportunity to strike jurors that seem to be partial and in the jury instructions the 
judge warns the jury that they are not “partisans.” During such a selection process in the case 
against Rod Coronado, the prosecutor asked the jurors about their attitude towards strict 
obedience of laws:  
 
In the present case, the court will instruct you as to the law and the elements of the crime. In some 
cases, jurors disagree with the law. For example, some jurors think that the drug laws should be 
changed. If that happens in the present case, and you disagree with the law as the judge describes it 
                                                      
142
Flies on the Wall (2007) reported the following position expressed by Judge Aiken in the sentencing hearing of 
Jonathan Paul:  
 
There's something that hasn't been understood. ‘Generally, I honor negotiations.’ Block, Zacher, 
McGowan and Paul decided to limit cooperation. ‘That was your choice’ and ‘choices have consequences.’ 
Others made their choice and face the detriment of being labeled as a ‘snitch.’ Non-cooperators decided 
to be hailed as heroes for keeping their integrity ‘so to speak.’ Non-cooperators face detriment of not 
getting the same sentence as cooperating defendants. Doesn't know what information Paul could have 
given. ‘Right or wrong, that's the system.’ ‘Don't put it back on me.’ Without the government offer, Aiken 
could not depart downward from the mandatory minimum. Doesn't like it when she keeps reading about 







to you, will any of you have any difficulty setting aside your personal feelings and following the 
judge’s instructions? (Government’s Trial Memorandum 2007:11) 
 
This question anticipates (and tries to avoid) the possibility of “nullification,” in which jurors can 
decide that even though the defendant violated the law they still judge that (under the specific 
circumstances) the conduct did not constitute a crime.  
 
The judge decides on the legal questions, such as which evidence is regarded admissable. 
During a significant part of the trial, the parts in which the lawyers and the judge argue about 
legal questions, case law, and interpretations of the law, the jury is not present. The judge gives 
the jury instructions about the way in which they should interpret the law. While the jury 
decides on the facts of the case, these legal decisions give the judge an influence on the framing 
of the case that should not be underestimated. For example, in one case, the judge could 
decide the timeframe in which the behavior of an FBI informant was legally relevant, thus 
influencing the (factual) determination of the existence of “entrapment.”143 The judge also 
plays a pivotal role in the admission of evidence, for example by denying any evidence that 
would reveal and explain the political motive of defendants. Asked whether defendants used a 
particular trial to expose their political cause, one prosecutor answered that the judge would 
not let them, for example by denying the defendants the possibility to let the jury vote whether 
animal testing is right or wrong (Interview US-13).  
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The jury system provides an interesting opening through which popular support for a cause and 
public opinion regarding the legitimacy of certain tactics is allowed to play a role in criminal 
proceedings. For example, in the early 1980s four Earth First! members were summoned to 
report to the police for removing signals that had been placed in the mountain of Little Granite 
Creek to mark a road that was to be built there. Referring explicitly to the local opposition to 
that road, a local lawyer told the activists that “there ain’t a jury in Teton County that will 
convict you” (Scarce 2006:65). During trials, prosecutors have to make sure that their 
arguments appeal to a jury. This might be the reason why the personal fear of individual victims 
is emphasized during trials, whereas economic costs resulting from protest activity is not given 
as much attention, even though this is a factor mentioned often in FBI reports and 
congressional hearings. One prosecutor acknowledged that juries do not necessarily care as 
much about all violations of the law, whereas some violations really move them. Thus, in one of 
the cases the fact that a company was affected was “less sexy,” whereas upon hearing a story 
about a seven-year-old kid that wanted to protect his mother the jury was “shocked,” and the 
prosecutor told that while hearing the witness some of the jurors were crying. On the other 
hand, the prosecutor admitted that charging people for “stealing seven beagles” was not a 
“viable prosecution” because jurors would not be moved by it (Interview US-13).  
 
Legislation 
The United States has a common law system. Though this system is known to be based on case 







example, the Model Penal Code is the basis upon which the federal government and most state 
governments base their criminal codes, and the Rules of Evidence provide the framework for 
the admissibility of evidence.Many different kinds of provisions have been the basis for 
prosecutions against environmental activists, such as property destruction, stalking, giving false 
statements, incitement of violence, arson, and various conspiracy charges.  
 
While in Spain and Chile people were charged as “members” of a criminal or a terrorist 
organization, in the United States there are no provisions criminalizing membership in an illegal 
organization. The relevant legislation for dealing with organized crime in the United States is 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). This act does not allow for 
prosecuting mere membership. Instead, it enables the prosecution of acts that are performed 
“as part of an ongoing criminal organization.” It also allows for the prosecution of leaders who 
ordered crimes or assisted in crimes. In a recent case, two activists were charged on the basis of 
the RICO statute (“Hugh and Tiga,” see next chapter for more details).  
 
Below I discuss the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act as well as the concept of “conspiracy,” 
which is frequently used in the proceedings against environmental activists. But first I describe 
briefly the “terrorism enhancements” which have been used during the past decade (USSG § 
3A1.4.). The enhancement can be applied when a defendant is convicted of an offense that 
involves or is intended to promote a “federal crime of terrorism” that is “calculated to influence 







government conduct.” While the enhancements were drawn up in 1994 in order to increase 
penalties in relation to international terrorism, McLoughlin (2010:51) argues that events such 
as the Oklahoma bombings have stretched its application beyond the terrain of international 
terrorism, “giving it far-reaching power and leading to devastating consequences,” making it 
into a “draconian” provision (2010:54).144 A defendant can be tried during a jury trial for a 
common crime, which can then turn into a terrorist offense for sentencing purposes when the 
judge decides to apply the enhancement.  
 
The enhancement has been a matter of continued contestation in the Green Scare cases. For 
example, in response to complaints from the defendants, during the hearing in the Operation 
Backfire case, the prosecutor addressed the history and applicability of the terrorism 
enhancement at length (Terrorism Enhancement Hearing 2007:20–26). In the next chapter I will 
discuss the case of Eric McDavid. He was convicted for a conspiracy to commit arson, which 
normally carries a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment. Because of the terrorism 
enhancement he was ordered to serve nearly twenty years in prison. In addition to increasing 
the sentence, the enhancement can have serious consequences for the prison security 
designation as well as life after jail.  
 
The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA)  
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The precursor of the AETA (enacted in 2006) is the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992. 
Remarkable about these laws is the fact that they turn specific conduct into “terrorism” when it 
is directed at “animal enterprises.” This locates the criminality of the conduct not only in the 
nature of the action but also in the specific target, which is deemed to deserve special 
protection. Thus, this act made animal rights protests into a category of their own.  
 
After the AEPA was enacted in 1992, it did not take long for calls to sharpen the law. Already in 
September 1993, the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Agriculture Report to 
Congress on the Extent and Effects of Domestic and International Terrorism on Animal 
Enterprises described a trend of attacks on individuals, researchers, and their property and 
threats towards their families (Gekas 1993). While the AEPA was only protecting the enterprise, 
this observation led to the proposal of an amendment to protect individuals engaging in an 
animal enterprise. But there was another problem with the AEPA. In the next chapter I will 
discuss in great detail the criminal case against the SHAC defendants, which was based on the 
AEPA. Under that statute it was difficult, however, to prosecute the defendants for the tactic of 
“secondary targeting” (protest tactics directed at corporations doing business with animal 
enterprises). Only animal enterprises were protected in the AEPA, not corporations that do 
business with animal enterprises. Targets of such protests called for attention to this gap in the 
legislation, which led to the AETA. In 2005 the FBI stated that one of their “greatest challenges” 







threats, and damage designed to shut down legitimate businesses” (Lewis 2005)145 and one 
prosecutor argued that animal rights activists “make these new laws necessary” (Interview US-
13). Interestingly, this would imply that the conduct of activists did not constitute any crime, 
but that significant sectors deemed the tactics to be criminal at the moment that activists 
invented these tactics.146 The AETA was introduced to the House of Representatives on 4 
November 2005. The law had been prepared by the American Legislative Exchange Council 
(ALEC), an organization with the mission to defend limited government, free markets, and 
federalism. Many food and pharmaceutical companies have representatives on the ALEC board. 
A year later the AETA was passed into a law. Many states in the U.S. have since used this federal 
law as a template for state laws against “animal enterprise terrorism” (Parker 2009). 
  
In Spain, representatives of victim organizations and prosecutors accused the left-nationalist 
movement of a conscious circumvention of the law. In the U.S. the Committee on the Judiciary 
similarly described environmental activists as “[a]rmed with a knowledge of existing law,” thus 
“avoid[ing] direct involvement with the animal enterprise” (Senate Report 2006). Also, during a 
hearing in the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Representative 
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 FBI deputy Assistant Director Lewis of the Counterterrorism Division stated in his testimony before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee: 
 
While it is a relatively simple matter to prosecute extremists who are identified as responsible for 
committing arsons or utilizing explosive devices, using existing federal statutes, it is often difficult if not 
impossible to address a campaign of low-level (but nevertheless organized and multi-national) criminal 
activity like that of SHAC in federal court. (Lewis 2004) 
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 It is important to note that government officials have discrepant views about the need for such new legislation. 
While the FBI and targeted corporations have argued in favor of a new statute, one of the prosecutors that I 
interviewed stated that he was satisfied with the common criminal legislation and did not need any new legislation 







Scott argued that activists “skilled at avoiding the laws” had “taken advantage” of what was 
perceived as a “loophole” in the law. Thus, whereas activists viewed secondary targeting as a 
legitimate tactic which was also used, for example, by anti-apartheid activists (Potter 2007:2), 
Scott called it a “loophole” in the AEPA. Brent McIntosh, deputy assistant attorney general of 
the Justice Department, argued that “animal rights extremists have tailored their campaigns to 
exploit limits and ambiguities in the [AEPA]” (2006). The AETA is thus a direct response to the 
notion that there were no adequate statutes to deal with campaigns like the SHAC campaign. 
One of the SHAC lawyers said about the use of the AEPA in that case: “they [prosecutors] were 
aware that they were trying to fit square pegs in round holes” (Interview US-14). Just as in Spain 
and in Chile, legislation in this instance thus clearly responded to the innovative tactics of 
activists.147 
 
In the next section on victim mobilization, I will go into more detail regarding the systematic 
lobby in which various actors engaged, pushing for an improved, harsher federal law which 
would be easier to apply than the AEPA (Walsh 2000).A long list of supporters of the AETA 
includes universities, agricultural organizations, and medical and biotechnology associations; to 
name a few: the Utah Pork Producers, Laboratory Animal Management Association, Minnesota 
Agri-Growth Council, Friends of Rodeo, University of California, and the National Animal 
Interest Alliance (Fur Commission 2011a). 
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 One criminal defense lawyer in the SHACcase pointed out that also the law on stalking had been amended as a 







The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act stipulates (Title 18, §43 (a)):  
`Sec. 43. Force, violence, and threats involving animal enterprises  
`(a) Offense- Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or uses or causes to be used the 
mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce-- 
`(1) for the purpose of damaging or interfering with the operations of an animal enterprise; and  
`(2) in connection with such purpose— 
 `(A) intentionally damages or causes the loss of any real or personal property (including animals 
or records) used by an animal enterprise, or any real or personal property of a person or entity 
having a connection to, relationship with, or transactions with an animal enterprise;  
 `(B) intentionally places a person in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to 
that person, a member of the immediate family (as defined in section 115) of that person, or a 
spouse or intimate partner of that person by a course of conduct involving threats, acts of 
vandalism, property damage, criminal trespass, harassment, or intimidation; or  
 `(C) conspires or attempts to do so;  
shall be punished as provided for in subsection (b). 
 
The AETA expands the scope of the AEPA in three important ways. Whereas the AEPA stated 
that one must have the “purpose of causing physical disruption to the functioning of an animal 
enterprise,” the AETA talks about the purpose of “damaging or interfering” with its operations, 
thus widening the potential scope (Potter 2007). Also, the AETA includes placing a person in 
“reasonable fear” in addition to damaging or causing the loss of property as the actus reus. 
Further, the AETA explicitly includes any “person or entity having a connection to, relationship 
with, or transactions with an animal enterprise.” This enables the prosecution of secondary 
targeting.   
 
The AETA sparked protest from groups who oppose the vague language and its over-inclusive 
scope. Opponents of the act include lawyers and activists organized in the National Lawyers 







Constitutional Rights (CCR), and many local activist groups that set up websites like 
www.noaeta.org and www.stopaeta.org. The CCR argued that the AETA is  
 
aimed at suppressing speech and advocacy by criminalizing First Amendment-protected activities 
such as protests, boycotts, picketing and whistleblowing. It targets animal rights activists, but 
includes language so broad and vague it could be used to prosecute labor activists who organize a 
successful boycott of Wal-Mart, or union folks who picket a university cafeteria. (Center for 
Constitutional Rights 2010b) 
 
The AETA does not only punish destructive behavior or conduct that instills reasonable fear of 
bodily injury. Indeed, punishment is also possible, even if the conduct does not result in 
economic damage or fear of bodily injury. In the paragraph on the penalties it reads that one 
can be punished for an attempt or conspiracy to violate the AETA with a fine or imprisonment 
not more than one year (or both): 
 
if the offense does not instill in another the reasonable fear of serious bodily injury or death and 
(A) the offense results in no economic damage or bodily injury; or (B) the offense results in 
economic damage that does not exceed $10,000. (AETA, § 43 (b), emphasis added by author)  
 
Activists therefore argue that the concern with eco-terrorism has nothing to do with a fear of 







for their company that may even result from non-destructive civil disobedience. For example, 
Potter (2007) argued that 
 
[the bill is] not about stopping “violence,” because violence hasn’t taken place. It’s about 
classifying “non-violent physical obstruction,” crimes that do not “instill in another the 
reasonable fear of serious bodily injury,” and property crimes as “terrorism,” in order to 
demonize and silence dissent. 
 
Activists not only criticized the content of the AETA, but also the procedures behind its 
enactment. They specifically condemned the fact that the act was voted upon during a session 
in which only six House representatives were present (Interview US-6/16). They argue that this 
fundamentally undermines the democratic quality of the law. Activists also criticized the lobby 
work by ALEC and the connections it facilitates between corporations and legislation.  
 
Conspiracy – the joy of every prosecutor 
Prosecutors in the United States frequently charge defendants with “conspiracy.” Not only in 
what activists label the “Green Scare cases” but in many criminal cases conspiracy plays an 
important role. Whereas continental criminal law has developed the possibility to prosecute 
preparatory activities, in the United States the conspiracy charge makes it possible to intervene 
in the early stages of alleged criminal conduct.148 The conspiracy clause thus offers prosecutors 
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 While I compare the conspiracy to the criminalization of preparatory activities, there are important dogmatic 
differences in the relation that is required in different jurisdictions between the early stages and the actual crimes. 







a way to deal with the dilemma, at which point they should intervene when there are 
indications that a crime may be about to be committed. Such efforts to criminalize early stages 
respond to the catch-22 of the criminal law, which with its reactive focus would require 
prosecutors to wait until a crime has been committed, while on the other hand there is the 
urge to prevent crimes once there is knowledge of an upcoming crime.  
 
A conspiracy is an illegal agreement. Several things are important to understand about 
conspiracy. First, conspiracy in itself is a crime. Second, conspiracy is considered to be more 
dangerous than other offenses. Third, conspiracy needs an overt act; otherwise it would 
amount to the prosecution of thoughts. I will discuss each of these elements in detail.  
 
Conspiracy is in itself a crime. This is diametrically opposed to the opinion of many activists that 
those convicted for conspiracy had “done nothing.” The support group of Eric McDavid wrote: 
 
Eric was imprisoned for what amounts to thought-crime – no actions were ever carried out, and 
Eric was charged with a single count of “conspiracy” – a powerful legal tool often used by the 
state to crush dissent. (Support Eric 2011b) 
 
Thus, at the core of a conspiracy, there are two crimes. The conspiracy is a crime in itself, and 
there is the crime that is the subject of the conspiracy. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the planned crime. The overt act does not, however, need to have a close relation to the crime which is the object 








Conspiracy is considered to be more dangerous than other offenses. A prosecuter might be the 
only person who could believe this. The theory is that because conspirators are with multiple 
people, there is a greater likelihood that they will not back down from the planned crime. 
During his closing arguments against defendant Eric McDavid the prosecutor cited co-defendant 
Lauren Weiner, who had said about their attempts to mix chemicals in preparation of an 
incendiary device: “we learned from that […] we slow down. We get a double-boiler...” He 
emphasized that she said: “we learned." And argued   
 
[t]hat's just the problem with a conspiracy. Since before this country was founded, conspiracy 
has been viewed as a more serious crime because it involves not one person but more people 
coming together. People who can all contribute their own knowledge to the issue at hand. 
People who, when other conspirator's [sic] attention is lagging, or their enthusiasm is waning, 
they can say, no, we got to keep moving. (Trial transcripts, Day 8, 25 September 2007, p.1337)   
 
Conspiracy needs an overt act. Prosecutors emphasize that they do not prosecute thoughts. A 
conspiracy is an agreement to commit a crime and an overt act in the execution of that crime. 
This overt act requirement does not enter into details regarding what kind of overt act it has to 
be. Pretty much anything that can be construed as a step towards the execution of the crime 
can be considered an overt act. The prosecution has to provide evidence of an overt act that 
demonstrates the person’s commitment to the conspiracy. The overt act need not be criminal 







that furthers or tends toward the accomplishment of the plan or scheme.149 The conspiracy 
charge thus always has to be distinguished from the “substantive” crime which was the subject 
of the conspiracy and which may or may not have been committed. I will come back to 
conspiracy charges in the next chapter in my discussion of the trial of Eric McDavid. The 
prosecutor in that case emphasized during her closing arguments: “Conspiracy isn’t just talking 
about a crime; it is an agreement and a step” (field notes, participant observation, 25 
September 2007).  
 
Defining the situation: How environmental protest became the #1 domestic terrorism threat 
Extreme environmental protest challenges the daily practices of pharmaceutical companies, 
logging companies, animal researchers, and the meat industry. Extremists also challenge the 
liberal democracy in their criticism of political negotiations, their refusal to accept 
compromises, and their commitment to their own guidelines and disregard for U.S. laws as they 
pursue their goals. While this challenge is far from existential and does not fundamentally 
threaten the legitimacy of the state, the concept “eco-terrorism” has become the major lens 
through which this “threat” is approached. In a CNN article on 24 August 2005, John Lewis, an 
FBI deputy assistant director and top official in charge of domestic terrorism, declared that “the 
No. 1 domestic terrorism threat is the eco-terrorism, animal-rights movement” (Schuster 2005). 
In this section I describe some of the main features of this image of “eco-terrorism.”   
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While I will focus on what labels government agencies such as the FBI and the Justice 
Department use, it is important to realize that such labeling by criminal justice agencies takes 
place within the general approach that the U.S. government has taken vis-à-vis the entire 
constellation of environmental demands (including the moderate and mainstream) challenging 
the status quo as well as the voices defending the status quo. This therefore would require 
looking beyond government agencies engaged in the definition, investigation, and prosecution 
of crimes. The framing of the whole situation also involves the agencies, members of Congress, 
and institutions that are engaged in environmental and animal welfare policies as well as the 
regulation and administration of all practices in which the earth and animals are used for 
human purposes. Taken together, the state inevitably consists of many and often contradictory 
practices and frames. It is outside the scope of this research, however, to sketch the range and 
development of environmental and animal welfare policies in the United States. As has been 
mentioned above, though, criminal prosecutions should be located in a complex mixture of 
interactions that include round tables, dialogues between companies and activists, negotiation 
between activists and the government, environmental impact assessments, the enactment of 
new laws regarding national parks or animals, administrative regulation of meat facilities or 
laboratories, civil lawsuits about the construction of roads, and the entire spectrum of protest 
actions.  
 
Defining the situation means that the government decides in which “box” to put the perceived 







a “criminal justice” approach. In Chile, the government keeps vacillating between a “political” 
approach and a “criminal justice” approach. In the United States, I argue that the state 
definition of the situation is based on the strong distinction between extremist “eco-terrorists” 
and moderate “environmentalists.” This distinction forms the basis for the continuous effort 
with which state actors emphasize and reproduce the boundary between the political and the 
criminal justice arena. The definition of the situation makes a strong separation between the 
accepted political goals and means on the one hand, while “extremist” actions are firmly 
relegated to the criminal justice arena as “eco-terrorism” on the other. In this way, the U.S. 
government has decided which groups can be ignored or excluded at no risk and which groups 
cannot be “barred from the magic circle” (Nieburg 1968:19),  
 
In 2002, the House Resources Committee, Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health, in 
Washington, DC, held a hearing on “The Threat of Eco-Terrorism” in which the FBI Domestic 
Terrorism Section Chief stated that there had been acts of “eco-terror” since 1977, the moment 
in which the Sea Shepherds were formed as a breakaway from Greenpeace: 
 
The FBI defines eco-terrorism as the use or threatened use of violence of a criminal nature 
against innocent victims or property by an environmentally-oriented, subnational group for 
environmental-political reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond the target, often of a symbolic 








Important to note here is that (1) the victims are “innocent,” and (2) “property” is explicitly 
included in this definition of terrorism. Jarboe further identified a clear emergence of a threat 
that previously did not exist (2002). 
 
The relevant classification of contentious events related to the environmental movement has 
been subject to governmental debate, for example in the hearing before the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary on 18 May 2004, where the chosen title of the hearing was “Animal Rights: 
Activism v. Criminality?” The political goals of the alleged perpetrators are generally recognized 
as such, and the difficulty is framed as one of distinguishing between lawful protest activity on 
the one hand and extremist protest that “crosses the line” on the other hand. It is worth it to 
quote Brent McIntosh, deputy assistant attorney general of the Justice Department:  
 
Before I conclude, let me spend a moment on people the Department does not prosecute. The 
Department is acutely aware of the importance of protecting the first amendment rights of 
those who lawfully protest the treatment of animals. Let me say this as clearly as I can: The 
Department does not prosecute and does not wish to prosecute those who lawfully seek to 
persuade others. (McIntosh 2006)  
 
Thus, McIntosh openly and explicitly addressed the “good” part of the environmentalist 
movement, which acts according to the logic of the political arena: the logic of persuasion. In 
drawing this line, the Justice Department explicitly allies with the animal rights organization 







with members of the Humane Society and the ACLU. […] We all agree that any tactic or strategy 
of involving violence or threats of violence is not to be tolerated.” This move to establish a line 
between kinds of conduct thus also draws a line between organizations, separating, for 
example, the Humane Society from SHAC. While the Humane Society is located in the “We” (all 
agree…), SHAC is marginalized. A similar move constructing alliances between organizations 
based on the law and lawful means (instead of alliances based on the underlying political issue) 
happened in Spain in the Pact of Ajuria Enea, where the traditional alliance of Basque 
nationalists versus Spanish unionists was transformed into an alliance of “constitutionalists” 
versus “terrorists.” I understand the U.S. prosecutorial narrative to construe, produce, or 
reaffirm this “line” between what is lawful and unlawful, marginalizing the extremist individuals 
from the moderate organizations that stick within the political arena.  
 
The chosen terrorism frame further distinguishes between an “international” and “domestic” 
form,150 and “special-interest terrorism” is defined as “groups seek[ing] to resolve specific 
issues, rather than effect widespread political change” (Jarboe 2002). Activists protest against 
this notion of a single issue as they perceive it as belittling. Indeed, they emphasize the relation 
of the seemingly “single” issue with the entire economic system, as well as the fact that there 
are “lives on the line” (Interview US-15). While environmental activists attempt to draw 
attention to the plight of animals and the earth, the United States government increasingly puts 
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the emphasis on the threat that extremist “eco-terrorists” pose. It is worth remembering that 
“environmental terrorism” also has (or had) a very different meaning, namely the kind of attack 
that uses biological weapons or aims to cause a natural disaster in order to terrorize a 
population. At this moment, however, the popular understanding of “eco-terrorism” as 
applicable to property destruction by environmental activists may have superseded this other 
meaning of the term.  
 
The threat: Economic costs, escalation, risk for human lives, decentralized network 
The dominant frame for “extremist” actions now is the “eco-terrorist” frame. Government 
actors highlight the following aspects: (1) the perceived economic impact of protest actions; (2) 
the risk of escalation; (3) the risk for human lives; and (4) the difficulty to deal with 
decentralized networks of “cells.” 
 
Increasingly throughout the past decade, government agencies emphasized that the economic 
cost inflicted by environmental activist affected not just single target companies, but the entire 
society. For example, the FBI claimed that the actions have a “huge economic impact” 
consisting of “losses of more than $110 million since 1979” (FBI 2008a). As many different 
actions are thus understood as one phenomenon affecting “the” economy, this harm is 
redefined from harm to individuals (or companies) to harm to society as a whole. This re-
definition then paves the way for the use of “terrorism” as the criminal offense. A bulletin to 







corporations by animal rights extremists and eco-terrorists are costly to the targeted company 
and, over time, can undermine confidence in the economy” (Department of Homeland Security 
2006). 
 
Since the early 1990s, government officials have predicted a growing trend of violence by 
environmental activists. Already in 1992, members of Congress spoke about a growing trend of 
violence by animal rights extremists, which led to the Animal Enterprise Protection Act. Such 
references to the “growing threat” of animal rights “extremists” have continued throughout the 
1990s and 2000s, such as in the Senate Committee on the Introduction of the Animal Enterprise 
Terrorism Act or in testimonies by the FBI that refer to an “escalation in violent rhetoric and 
tactics” (Senate Report 2006). For example the following incident provided ingredients for that 
perceived escalation. On 26 September 2003, an “improvised explosive device wrapped in 
nails” exploded at the headquarters of Shaklee, Incorporated, in Pleasanton, California” (Lewis 
2004). A claim of responsibility was issued via an anonymous communiqué by the 
“Revolutionary Cells of the Animal Liberation Brigade”: 
 
We gave all of the customers the chance, the choice, to withdraw their business from HLS 
(Huntingdon Life Sciences). Now you will all reap what you have sown. All customers and their 
families are considered legitimate targets… You never know when your house, your car even, 
might go boom… Or maybe it will be a shot in the dark… We will now be doubling the size of 







more than rubble. It is time for this war to truly have two sides. No more will all the killing be 
done by the oppressors, now the oppressed will strike back. (Lewis 2004) 
 
In a testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2004, the FBI presented this 
communiqué as an example of an “escalation in violent rhetoric,” noting threats of “potential 
assassinations of researchers,” and stressed that there may be a  
 
new willingness on the part of some in the movement to abandon the traditional and publicly 
stated code of nonviolence in favor of more confrontational and aggressive tactics designed to 
threaten and intimidate legitimate companies into abandoning entire projects or contracts. 
(Lewis 2004) 
 
In addition, the FBI observed that attacks were growing in frequency and size while 
simultaneously perceiving an expanding list of potential targets and an increasing willingness to 
use arson. Thus, the adopted eco-terrorism frame shifted the attention from actual harm to the 
potential injuries that may be caused in the future because of this perceived pattern of 
escalation.  
 
A feature of the eco-terrorist frame is thus the emphasis on the potential danger to human 
lives. Activists routinely claim that they are careful that their actions do not hurt “human or 
non-human” animals. Activist Rod Coronado, for example, has declared that he often 







the chief of the domestic terrorism section of the FBI, testified before the House Resources 
Committee that animal rights groups, including the ALF, “have generally adhered to this 
mandate” (Jarboe 2002). At the same time, however, FBI officials emphasized the potential 
danger that extremist environmental actions pose for human lives (FBI 2004). For example, 
while the FBI interpreted a failed explosive device as a potential danger to human lives, an 
activist argued that the failed device was intended as a warning, saying that “it is not brain 
surgery; if they had wanted to bomb the place, they’d have done so” (Interview US-16). The 
perceived risk to human lives is also visible when FBI officials expressed their fear of a “lone 
wolf” like the Unabomber, an individual held responsible for the death of three people and the 
injury of 23 others (Cook 2006).  
 
Thus, the FBI has created an image of a threat to society in which everyone is assumed to be 
affected by the economic damage. Further, the intensity and frequency of attacks are said to be 
increasing, and the rhetoric is interpreted as indicating that further escalation is likely. The FBI 
also perceives a potential threat to human lives. A final feature of the eco-terrorist narrative is 
the image of a dangerous underground network which makes it difficult to prosecute 
perpetrators because of their loose organization in “cells” in horizontal networks. The FBI 
argues that extremist activists who commit their actions in name of the ALF and the ELF present 
unique challenges, because there is little, if any, known hierarchical structure to such entities. 
The FBI further noted that the activists “exhibit remarkable levels of security awareness when 







techniques and the limitations imposed on law enforcement” (Lewis 2004). A prosecutor 
similarly said that “in theory the mafia isn’t that hard to wipe out” while asserting the difficulty 
to approach the horizontal network of the ALF and ELF as traditional methods to pressure local 
people to testify against those higher up the chain do not work (Interview US-1). In the 
government’s sentencing memorandum in the case against Rod Coronado in 1995, the 
prosecutor described this difficulty of prosecuting ALF members:  
 
The FBI has designated the ALF as a domestic terrorist organization. In terms of 
organization, this designation is particularly apt because the ALF has adopted the "cell" 
structure of such terrorist organizations as the Irish Republican Army, making investigation of 
the organization and identification of its members very difficult. As a result, until today, no 
known member of the ALF has ever been convicted of a felony. (Government’s Sentencing 
Memorandum, Western District of Michigan, 31 July 1995, page 1) 
 
While the FBI has thus adopted the concept of “eco-terrorism” as a key concept in the 
development of its policy and the organization of its investigative units, from within the U.S. 
Government there has been strong criticism of the FBI policy and its focus. In December 2003, 
the Audit Division of the U.S. Justice Department criticized the FBI and recommended it to focus 








the high risk of international terrorism and any domestic terrorist activities aimed at creating 
mass casualties or destroying critical infrastructure, rather than information on social protests 
and domestic radicals’ criminal activities. (Department of Homeland Security 2008:xi) 
 
The audit advised the FBI to stop investigating animal rights and environmental activists from 
its Counterterrorism Division and to shift these cases to the FBI’s criminal division, “except 
where a domestic group or individual uses or seeks to use explosives or weapons of mass 
destruction to cause mass casualties” (Department of Homeland Security 2008:x). The Justice 
Department criticized the broad definition the FBI employs and suggested that: “Although the 
activities of such groups fall under the FBI’s definition of domestic terrorism, a more focused 
definition may allow the FBI to more effectively target its counterterrorism 
resources”(Department of Homeland Security 2008:34; Potter 2011c). Further, while the FBI 
had declared that eco-terrorism constituted a major domestic terrorism threat, in its May 2008 
“Ecoterrorism Threat Assessment” the Department of Homeland Security wrote that 
“[c]urrently, ecoterrorist movement activities do not represent a serious threat to U.S. national 
security” (Department of Homeland Security 2008:34). Thus, whereas animal researchers and 
fur farmers demand government attention and label the harassment they suffer as terrorism, 
the Justice Department and Department of Homeland Security place more emphasis on the 
prevention of mass casualty attacks. Despite this internal criticism, the term “eco-terrorism” 
continues to be part of the FBI vocabulary.151 
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The definition of the situation in the eco-terrorism frame thus relies on the strict separation 
between the moderate mainstream and the extremist fringe. The application of this frame 
subsequently guides the selection of facts and the translation of specific events into criminal 
vocabulary.  
 
The “Transfer” – from animal rights to activists’ rights, from defending the earth to defending 
activists 
In Chapter 1 I described that in liberal democratic regimes the assumption is that ample 
political and legal avenues exist to solve political contention. Above I indicated that some 
environmentalist activists have lost faith that political and juridical avenues will satisfactorily 
respond to their concerns, partly because they feel a sense of urgency. Many activists who have 
engaged in more extreme tactics generally experienced that their previous participation in 
demonstrations, leafleting, and political dialogue had not gone anywhere. Also, whereas a 
lawsuit might be possible in the case of extreme proven animal cruelty, such a lawsuit would 
not work in the case of “mere” animal testing, as that is legal according to U.S. law. That sense 
of dissatisfaction made them search for other tactics that would be more effective. Depending 
upon the perspective, the clear illegality of some tactics, the disruptive or offensive character of 
others, or – as activists claim – their effectiveness in challenging to the status quo have led to 







prosecutions are the reaction to the increase in illegal attacks, activists argue that their 
effective challenge to economic and corporate interests is behind the “crackdown.” 
 
Either way, part of the contention about the use of animals and the earth has transferred into 
the criminal justice arena. This radically changes the logic as well as the significant actors who 
approach the issue and decide what is relevant. The transfer to the criminal justice arena 
means that disruptive events become translated into the language and logic of the criminal law. 
While activists continue to challenge the legitimacy of animal testing, the prosecutor takes for 
granted that animal testing is mandated by the Food and Drug Administration. When the 
prosecutor puts that issue beyond discussion and asserts the separation between means and 
ends, the move towards the criminal justice arena effectively de-politicizes the criminal 
proceedings.  
  
The huge law enforcement efforts of the past years have significantly shifted the attention of 
activists from the animals and the earth to themselves, their freedom, relations between 
activists, prisoner support, and legal proceedings. Activists came to place more emphasis on 
what they call “security culture,” which involves being careful with communication, exchanging 
personal data, and taking caution in relations with unknown people. More significant for my 
purposes is that criminal trials not only divert energy and money; the conversation among the 
different actors in and around such trials also changes substantially from a debate about animal 







versus the illegality of different tactics, and the attribution of specific criminal liability to 
individuals for their actions.  
 
To summarize, while moderate claims for animal welfare and conservation of nature have 
widespread popular support, radical notions such as animal rights and the struggle for 
wilderness are generally viewed skeptically and perceived as a fundamental threat to the 
current way (daily practices and businesses) of American life. While the government in the 
United States deals with the moderate mainstream in round tables and lawmaking initiatives, 
the extremist fringe is squarely located in the criminal justice arena. While the dispute about 
animal welfare and nature conservation is thus further continued within the logic of the 
political arena, the more radical demands for animal rights and wilderness do not really play a 
role in those conversations. Instead, the government subjects the tactics that extremist activists 
use to the logic of the criminal justice arena. In the FBI usage the label “animal rights activist” 
has tended to become synonymous with “extremist,” and the dominant frame for 
understanding the phenomenon has become “eco-terrorism.” 
 
3. Mobilization and discursive action in the criminal justice arena 
 
In the criminal justice arena, victim mobilization and prisoner support mobilization are two 
distinct forms of action that compete for dominance as they engage in definition-work 







attacking that order, claiming that order, and defending that order. Just like in Chile and in 
Spain, the competing actors in the episode claim victimhood. Some, however, receive official 
recognition for their account in the criminal justice arena and within the socially validated 
syntax that criminal law offers for condemnation (of perpetrators) and solicitude (for victims), 
whereas other claims are ignored. Victimhood is not an objective given. Instead, it has to be 
acquired. Environmental activists claim to speak for “those that have no voice.” Eco-activists 
claim that the animals and the earth are the “real” victims. They do not claim victimhood for 
themselves but claim to be fighting for the “voiceless.” 
 
Environmentalists thus try to push the behavior of their opponents into the criminal justice 
arena, employing the criminal law vocabulary to label their actions, for example when the 
former executive director of the Sierra Club talked about the “ecological grand larceny” (David 
Brower in: Scarce 2006:xi) in reference to what is happening to the earth. Animal rights activists 
say that meat is murder and call the owners of animal testing companies assassins. However, 
this account is seldom honored in criminal proceedings. Even though there have been a few 
cases in which, for example, the Department of Agriculture started a lawsuit alleging “animal 
cruelty,” such “victimhood” is not often acknowledged. Indeed, these trials rarely take place in 
the criminal justice arena as most of such cases tend to be civil lawsuits. In addition to such 
attempts to gain attention for the victimhood of animals and the earth, there have been several 
incidents where activists were injured, for example tree sitters because the tree was cut while 







logging company or logger has been prosecuted for such injuries (Scarce 2006:174). For 
example, activists called for a criminal investigation of the death of activist “Chain” after a tree 
sit and the removal by a logging company. However, no criminal case was opened. This lack of 
criminal prosecutions in the cases in which activists claim to be victimized contributes to their 
suspicion of the state. Targets of environmental protest, on the other hand, have been quite 
successful in claiming victimhood. In this section, therefore, I focus on the mobilization of 
targets of environmental protests as “victims.” Defendants in trials that are recognized as part 
of the “Green Scare” on the other hand tend to mobilize and receive support as “eco-
prisoners.” 
 
In each of these mobilizations, we can observe that people try to address the “larger public” 
and achieve the identification of that larger public with their position. A common way to 
achieve this is to generalize the danger of becoming a victim or being prosecuted. Thus, victim 
mobilizers claim that the bombs of activists can kill innocent bystanders. Prisoner supporters 
claim that the AETA can be used to prosecute “anyone having a blog.” Even though none of this 
has happened so far, the danger thus sketched is intended to appeal to the fear of the 
American people. The larger public is thus invited to either identify with the fear of becoming a 
victim or target of harassment by environmental activists or of being subjected to repression by 
being called before a grand jury, being spied upon by the FBI, and having overt political activism 
criminalized. Criminal proceedings thus induce an “identification split” as people identify either 







towards a polarization of society. This identification split is enacted visibly in courtroom 
proceedings. I could observe this, for example, in the trial against Eric McDavid, which I 
attended in September 2007. As is usual in trials, the courtroom was clearly divided into a 
group on the left and a group on the right. The supporters of the defendant sat on the right. 
Even when the right side was getting full, supporters preferred to squeeze in there rather than 
to sit on the left side behind the prosecutors, which was practically empty aside from a sole 
reporter from the local newspaper, the Sacramento Bee.  
 
Victim mobilization – appealing to government protection 
Potentially “punishable facts” happen all the time, but only a certain part of them are 
translated into the criminal justice lingo. “Victims” set this process of criminalization in motion 
when they actively translate their narrative into the criminal law framework, attempt to 
criminalize actions that were previously not regarded as criminal, or change the qualification of 
actions that were not taken seriously enough. The targets of environmental protest (i.e., 
pharmaceutical companies, animal researchers, logging companies, the meat industry, and 
others) have mobilized in order to appeal to government protection. As “victims” mobilize and 
become a single united actor, they can thus become effective “troublemakers,” propose an 
alternative narrative, and transform the way the prosecutor constructs a criminal case. I will 
analyze how these actors have claimed the victim label and taken steps towards creating these 








1. Self-identification as victim and the forging of alliances 
2. Declaration of a common problem: “eco-terrorism”  
3. Demanding protection from the state 
4. Defining actions as criminal: employing criminal law  
 
The claim of being a “victim” is part of the conversation that takes place in the criminal justice 
arena and such claims are invariably contested. For example, Newkirk of PETA disputed claims 
from scientists that they were being terrorized. According to her, scientists “learned a long time 
ago that the way to get the spotlight off their own bad deeds is to become the victim” (Kolata 
1998). 
  
1. Self-identification as victim and the forging of alliances 
Targets of environmental protest have been successful in claiming the status as victim. Indeed, 
they have been able to create a collective of actual or potential victims. I will limit myself here 
to a brief overview of the alliance of what have become labeled as “animal enterprises” in order 
to illustrate the impact of such collective identity and the resulting lobbying and claim-making.  
 
Targets of animal rights protests have allied to lobby for the enactment of laws and for 
congressional hearings on the subject of eco-terrorism. As the targets of environmental protest 
try to throw their weight around, they connect with key persons, create networks, and forge 







lobby work. The National Association for Biomedical Research, for example, played an 
important role in getting the AEPA through Congress. In 2000 a National Animal Interest 
Alliance (NAIA)-sponsored petition requested that the Senate Judiciary Committee convene 
hearings on the subject of animal rights terrorism. Various alliances have been active in the 
preparation of the AETA, which was enacted in 2006. The creation of alliances is promoted by 
the narrative that potentially all industries are at risk. Brian Cass, the managing director of 
Huntingdon Life Sciences, was reported to have claimed that “[t]he number of activists isn’t 
huge, but their impact has been incredible. [...] There needs to be an understanding that this is 
a threat to all industries. The tactics could be extended to any other sectors of the economy” 
(CrimethInc 2011b). 
 
Such alliances are at times constituted of weird bedfellows, such as hunters and lab-academics 
and veterinarians.152 Some actors have specifically called for such united actions, such as 
scientist Walsh, who describes himself as “a victim of animal rights terrorism.” He “challenges 
the lab animal community to unify in its response” (Walsh 2000). This call for unity among 
victims to struggle against their common enemy is characterized by an eagerness to 
demonstrate that they are what Charles Tilly called “wunc” – worthy, united, numerous, and 
committed. Walsh is explicit on the point of reminding politicians “just how many of us there 
are.” He asserts the existence of a “collective us,” which includes “the scientists, the farmers, 
the cattlemen, the rodeo and circus and motion picture entrepreneurs, the furriers, the hunters 
                                                      
152
 Indeed, representatives of a pharmaceutical company shared their doubts whether they really wanted to 
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and fishermen, the physicians, the conservationists.” He argues that all these groups together 
“constitute the vast majority of Americans.” Walsh calls on the “responsibility” to respond:   
 
It is the animal enterprise community that deserves criticism – it is us. We have failed to 
respond to the challenge of the animal rights community and to promote Congressional action 
to beef up the Act, and we have failed miserably. This, I believe, is a reflection of the state of our 
disarray and our confusion on this issue. (Walsh 2000)  
 
The very concept “animal enterprise,” which became a legal term with the enactment of the 
AEPA, constructs this “collective us” of different kinds of businesses and sectors. It thus creates 
the legal reality in which different entities are conceptualized as a coherent category. According 
to the AETA, an animal enterprise includes commercial or academic entities that use or sell 
animals or animal products for profit, food or fiber production, agriculture, education, research, 
or testing, as well as zoos, aquaria, animal shelters, pet stores, breeders, furriers, circuses, and 
other lawful competitive events between animals.  
  
2. Declaration of a common problem: “Eco-terrorism” 
In their declaration and construction of a common problem, the targets of protests coined the 
label eco-terrorism and insisted upon its use to label protest activity, thus emphasizing the 
gravity of the threat. They defined the harm that they suffer as something bigger than personal 







from the actual past harm to the risks in the future, from what has happened to that what has 
not happened yet.  
 
In networks and alliances, targets of environmental protest have made a concerted effort to 
make the problem known. For example, Teresa Platt, representing fur farmers, said: “We need 
to evaluate how big it is and put it into perspective. […] I don't think the government took it 
seriously or acted as quickly as they should have” (Hollenbeck 1999). When the FBI turned 
around and did announce the threat posed by animal rights and environmentalist activists, the 
Fur Commission claimed a role in the changed direction of the FBI’s priorities:  
 
In talking to FBI agents, the redirection of FBI manpower to include eco- and animal rights 
terrorism entailed a bottom-up educational process. Fur America’s Fur Netwatch, an Internet 
info distribution system, has been a vital component in that process. Over the last year, the 
people of the fur trade have been key players with other animal- and resource-based industries 
in a concerted effort to push eco- and animal rights terrorism up the government’s priority pole. 
These efforts have resulted in a strong statement of commitment from the FBI. (Fur Farm Letter 
March 1999) 
  
In each of the country cases victims’ advocates organized in the form of demonstrations, 
petitions, political lobby, and legislative proposals. Just as in Chile, industry groups in the U.S. 
have placed full-page ads in major newspapers in order to draw attention to the topic. Targets 







hearings and, for example, estimates of damage and destruction in the United States claimed 
by the Animal Liberation Front during the past ten years, as compiled by national organizations 
such as the Fur Commission and the National Association for Biomedical Research (NABR), put 
the fur industry and medical research losses at more than 45 million dollars, and this number 
found its way into the testimony of Domestic Terrorism Section Chief Jarboe before the House 
Resources Committee (Jarboe 2002). During the hearing on the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act 
before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives on 23 May 2006, tactics such as “secondary 
targeting” were discussed. Many organizations that were concerned about animal extremism 
prepared statements for that hearing.153  
 
Victim advocates often tried to drive home the severity of what they are suffering. Platt, for 
example, feared that attacks in the U.S. might escalate to the level that they had in Britain. She 
cited a London newspaper, the Independent, that called the ALF attacks, "the most sustained 
and sophisticated bombing campaign in mainland Britain since the IRA was at its height" 
(Hollenbeck 1999). Others have explicitly emphasized the personal and terrorizing element of 
the tactics they face. For example, in an article in the New York Times in 1998, Dr. Walsh was 
quoted as having reported one of the messages that he received: “We will kill you and every 
member of your family in the exact same way you killed the cats. No matter where you hide! 
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We will slice open your heads and cut the nerves in your brains while you are alive” (Kolata 
1998).  
 
Targets of environmentalist protests also emphasized the threat to human lives. While animal 
rights and environmentalist activists stressed time and again that their actions are not violent 
and will never hurt a living being, Teresa Platt aimed to demonstrate the opposite. To indicate 
the willingness to harm human beings, animal researchers have pointed out that activists have 
sent letters with razor blades.154 The construction of a narrative depicting the environmentalist 
activists as violent draws upon examples from across the world, for example including the 
murder of Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands (Platt 2008), even though (while the perpetrator in 
that case was known for his radical environmentalist ideas) it has not been demonstrated that 
his motive was indeed related to such environmental concerns. Teresa Platt also referred to 
Ted Kaczynski (alias the Unabomber) in order to emphasize the willingness of environmentalist 
activists to take lives. She explicitly mentioned that his writings were published in the Earth 
First! journal and that the ELF “has long considered Kaczynski one of their own” and included 
him in their list of political prisoners (Platt 2008), invoking the Unabomber to confirm the image 
of “eco-terrorism.” Thus, the targets of environmentalist protests created a narrative in which 
their individual problems became a shared problem of eco-terrorism with a common 
perpetrator.  
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3. Demanding protection from the state 
The eco-terrorism narrative claimed the existence of “impunity” regarding the harm 
perpetrated against the targets of such crimes. The victim advocates thus demanded better 
protection from the state while drawing upon the rule of law, the law as a tool, their right as 
citizens to government protection. This discourse was supported by government officials. For 
example, in a debate on the AETA in 2006, Representative Scott emphasized the responsibility 
of the state vis-à-vis citizens: “Citizens engaging in lawful activities […] are entitled to be 
protected from criminal acts and to be able to go about their lawful activities free from threats 
to their person or property and that of their family and associates” (Committee on the Judiciary 
2006). Indeed, sometimes even activists pointed to the disparity between their actions and the 
successes achieved by law enforcement agencies. In 2008, for example, an activist posted a 
long list on Indymedia with all the actions claimed by the ELF or the ALF and actions attributed 
to them. The list described at least eighty actions. His username was “ELF supporter,” and he 
wrote as an introduction to the long list: “Something like 12 ELF activists ever have been 
arrested. Look at this list. Then tell me who's winning, pig” (ELF Supporter 2008).  
 
A “victim of animal rights terrorism,” as he calls himself, Walsh complained about the sheer 
inactivity on the part of prosecutors and the fact that there were no prosecutions under the 
AEPA. I will quote at his criticisms at length:   
 
Unlike the Animal Welfare Act, a topic that yielded more than 1,600 hits on my global search of 







many just seven years ago. I immediately picked up the phone and began calling colleagues who 
I knew could help me understand how this potentially important piece of legislation, written to 
protect honest users of animals from animal rights terrorists, had suffered such undignified 
rejection at the hands of the federal prosecutors it was designed to energize. I was then stunned 
to learn that no one has been prosecuted under the provisions of the Act. No one. Not a single 
soul since the Animal Enterprise Protection Act became the law of the land. While there may be 
many explanations for the dormancy of prosecutors in the use of this legal tool, we can all be 
certain that the failure to exercise the Act in the courts is unrelated to the level of animal rights 
activity during the period since its enactment. On the contrary, a strong case can be made that 
the overall level of animal enterprise terrorism in the US has dramatically increased since 1992. 
Numerous laboratory break-ins have occurred during this time frame, violence and vandalism at 
fur farms are on the rise, as are animal releases from research and animal husbandry facilities 
around the world. During this period, death and bomb threats have continued to flow from 
activists as freely as small talk at the local tavern, and animal rights leaders continue to egg on 
their foot soldiers with inflammatory talk of revolution. (Walsh 2000) 
 
This citation expresses several recurring items of the narrative presented by the “victims.” First, 
it clearly expresses frustration about the fact that a law that was supposed to protect them was 
not used at all. Second, it states the perception of an actual increase of “animal enterprise 
terrorism” during the 1990s. This observation is supported, for example, by the Foundation for 
Biomedical Research (2006), which has recorded “illegal incidents” since 1981 and emphasized 
the “explosion” of animal rights and eco-terrorism after 1995, reaching especially high levels in 
the 2000s. Third, Walsh’ account creates a common identity of “honest users of animals” versus 
a common enemy of “animal rights terrorists” (who are divided into leaders and foot soldiers – 
a theme picked up later by prosecutors).   
 
In its demand for protection from the state, the Foundation for Biomedical Research has taken 
the effort to document the incidents experienced by their industry. They translate events into 







sending a message to the state. As an illustration I provide one of the tables which they 
included in their illegal incidents report below (FBR 2006:13).  
 
Table 6 Total illegal incidents reported by Foundation for Biomedical Research 1981–2005  
 
Year Arson Theft Bombing Vandalism Harassment 
1981 0 0 0 0 1 
1982 0 5 0 0 0 
1983 0 5 1 1 0 
1984 0 5 0 2 5 
1985 0 2 0 3 2 
1986 0 3 0 4 1 
1987 1 6 1 1 0 
1988 0 5 1 2 2 
1989 2 5 2 5 1 
1990 0 4 0 0 1 
1991 1 2 0 4 1 
1992 1 0 1 0 0 
1993 0 1 1 2 1 
1994 3 0 0 2 0 
1995 0 0 0 3 0 
1996 0 6 2 5 1 
1997 5 4 0 8 3 
1998 2 3 0 0 2 







2000 7 5 6 8 2 
2001 10 8 2 19 3 
2002 3 1 0 10 3 
2003 9 20 7 62 3 
2004 4 14 0 42 29 
2005 2 11 7 48 14 
Total 53 123 36 238 79 
 
Impunity is not necessarily the same as a lack of protection, because protection does not have 
to come through more punishment. Still, the two are strongly connected in the discourse of the 
victims, who complain that they are not being protected and demand criminal prosecutions. 
Walsh accuses Congress: “Our elected officials appear to be telling us that crimes committed 
against scientists and farmers and rodeo performers and all other honest animal users do not 
rise to a sufficiently high level of significance to warrant serious action” (2000). The prosecutor 
of the SHAC case drew upon this narrative of impunity when he told me that the victims felt 
that nobody was out there for them, that people were victimized and frustrated (Interview US-
13).  
 
4. Defining actions as criminal: Employing criminal law  
Having established a common identity as “animal enterprises” and portrayed actions against 
individuals as part of a larger pattern with a common perpetrator, victim advocates are ready to 







construe and blame a unified actor, organization, or identity group, which is held responsible 
for the harm they suffered. In addition, this narrative construes a legal interest that lies beyond 
the experience of an individual animal researcher, a single fur farmer, or a specific animal 
testing company. Instead, the protected good at stake becomes the national economy or the 
safety of millions of Americans.  
 
Innocence (a fundamental concept in the logic of criminal law) provides the link between those 
that are actually targeted and the rest of society. The innocence claimed by the victim 
advocates is part of the identity they establish for themselves, in opposition to the identity of 
the perpetrators. Walsh refers to people like him as “honest animal users.” He uses self-
descriptions such as “law-abiding citizens” and “compassionate, law-abiding user of animals” as 
opposed to those who commit their crimes “under the cover of darkness” (2000). In their self-
descriptions as innocent victims, the advocates do not ignore the criticisms from 
environmentalist activists and frequently defend their role in the status quo. Thus, the Fur 
Commission refers to fur farmers as “those who make their living in concert with the Earth” and 
“resource caretakers” (Fur Farm Letter March 1999) and Teresa Platt from the Fur Commission 
appears with a dog in her arms in one of their press releases (Fur Commission 1999).  
 
Victim advocates construe their narrative specifically in contestation to the existing de-
contextualized prosecutorial narrative. They resist the downplaying of incidents at the local 







was not able to obtain an interview with companies in the United States, but in an informal 
conversation with representatives of a pharmaceutical company in Europe, they told me of 
their frustration that the local police see “only graffiti” and thus think that it is “not such a big 
deal.” They, however, compared the tactic of secondary targeting to mafia-style extortion, thus 
presenting an alternative narrative about what is going on and about the gravity of that 
problem. They advocated the reassessment of the “polite” legal campaign of sending of letters 
to a company “asking” them to stop animal testing in light of the acts of vandalism and 
terrorizing. They emphasized that by just looking at individual attacks, one does not see the 
connection. Their narrative puts the focus on that connection and they pointed out that the 
context should be taken into account, arguing that statistics should indeed take account of the 
specific motive of animal rights extremism in order to be able to see the magnitude of the 
problem. They demanded that police should be aware that graffiti saying “Stop HLS” is not just 
harmless graffiti but should be reported. They wanted the local police to be aware of the 
existence of that larger problem in order to reveal that it is “not just a stupid boys joke” but 
“more organized” (Interview US-17).  
 
Based upon their narrative, it can be observed that, just as happened in Spain and in Chile, 
these victim advocates lobby collectively for the adoption or application of specific laws and 
engage in debates about the affected legal interests. They engage with the criminal law 
language and terminology as they identify harm, define actions as crimes, provide accounts for 







he calls upon the authorities to take the animal rights protests more seriously. He redefines 
acts, arguing the gravity of the offense (“dangerous to society”) if understood in its proper 
context:  
If an animal rights terrorist violates my right to privacy by protesting in front of my home, then 
punches me in the nose when I answer the doorbell and terrifies my five-year-old son in the 
process – all for the explicit purpose of either making a spectacle of me for the benefit of public 
relations, or to intimidate me into submission – the action constitutes something worse and far 
more dangerous to society than a simple punch in the nose. I claim that the act is actually a 
smack in the nose of all of us – to society – and thereby constitutes a significantly larger offense, 
one that warrants a proportionally larger penalty. Perhaps a ten-year sentence would be 
excessive in this scenario, but the hateful disposition of the crime combined with the 
perpetrator's global intent requires us to think more in terms of extended, rather than minimal, 
penalties when it comes to animal enterprise terrorism, as it does in cases of hate-inspired 
crimes generally. In this vacuum, the law becomes truly toothless. (Walsh 2000) 
 
As argued earlier in this chapter, the mobilization by targets of environmental protests has 
been highly successful as the FBI has adopted this narrative in which the phenomenon is 
defined as “eco-terrorism,” and Congress adopted the AETA. In the next chapter I will analyze 
how these factors provided the basis for discursive shifts in the criminal prosecutions.  
 
Prisoner support mobilization: Eco-warriors instead of eco-terrorists!  
Prisoner supporters challenge the liberal juridical institutions and refuse to act according to the 
scripts that construe them, thus denying their legitimating function. Instead they call upon 
people to “Honor the Fallen, Remember the Snitches, Resist the Greenscare!,” as was written in 
a public call for solidarity events and prisoner support (Potomac Earth First! 2007). Activists 
sympathizing with eco-defendants have refused to give criminal proceedings legitimacy, take 







Such refusal has been expressed in basic activities of support to those that faced investigation 
and prosecution, such as communication with prisoners, support for fugitives, vocal support for 
the continuation of protest actions, and financial support, thus condemning the state response.   
 
I will discuss several aspects of mobilization in support for the “eco-prisoners,” using the four 
elements described in Chapter 1. In their mobilization, activists construct reality from the 
perspective of a Green Scare in which “green” is as suspect as “red” once was and in which the 
government is thought to be overreaching in its attempt to squash that opposition.  
 
1. Creation of a prisoner support group: a call for solidarity  
2. Criticisms within the framework of liberal legalism: de-legitimization of the state 
3. Bringing the “political” back in: identification as a political prisoner 
4. Persuading the public of the political definition: changing the impact of criminal 
prosecutions  
 
1. Creation of a prisoner support group: A call for solidarity  
The infrastructure for prisoner support is often set up by prisoner support groups. Unlike 
prisoner support activity in Spain and Chile, prisoner support groups in the United States are 
usually organized around specific defendants. Thus, there is a specific website and a specific 
support group for Peter Young, for Eric McDavid, and for Briana Waters. Family members, close 







comparison to the other country studies, support in the United States is rather fragmented and 
decentralized, the core activities like visiting and writing prisoners, attending hearings, 
organizing benefit concerts, and publishing information on blogs and websites are very similar.  
 
While the cause if political, it should not be forgotten that prisoner support can be about 
practical things, such as this call for donations to pay for the gas in order to travel to prison:  
[Prisoner’s name] is currently being held in [location], CA – which is almost 7 hours from where I 
live. Renting a car and paying for gas is incredibly expensive, and it's a cost I just can't carry on 
my own. The support [prisoner’s name] has received from all of you over the last four years has 
been amazing, and we are more than thankful for all you have done. [Prisoner’s name] has 
shown a steadfast, unwavering commitment to do the right thing and fight the outrageous 
charges against him, despite facing severe repercussions for that decision. Please consider 
making a donation to support him, however small. Every tiny bit helps. (E-mail on a listserv on 
24 February 2010) 
 
The request for such support is often directed at an imagined collective of fellow activists and 
sympathizers. This is visible in messages in which activists invoke a collective “us,” such as when 
they argue that “[e]very conspiracy case directed against radicals sets a precedent for more of 
the same; defending one of us is literally defending all of us” (Conspiracy 2011). Support can 
come from individuals, but also from organizations and companies. For example, upon his 
release from prison, Peter Young received donations ranging from food home delivery to 
skateboards, provided by organizations such as Alternative Outfitters, Vegan Essentials, New 
Eden Records, and Vans (Support Peter 2007).  
 
Prisoner support can also become more substantive than providing gas to drive to the prison. 







that injured them, Greenpeace hired a private detective to find the real perpetrators (Scarce 
2006:85). Also, some activists showed a rather different kind of solidarity when on 29 April 
2006 activists identifying with the Animal Liberation Front raided a Minnesota fur farm and 
dedicated the raid to imprisoned “mink liberator” Peter Young.  
 
2. Criticisms within the liberal legalist framework: De-legitimization of the state 
An important strategy to criticize the state response, used by prisoner supporters in each of the 
country studies, is to demand that the state live up to its own rules. In this strategy activists 
claim the rule of law as the framework that puts restrictions on the state’s authority to limit the 
freedoms of citizens and the rule of law as the protection against arbitrary use of state violence 
(Note that this is a different claim to the rule of law than the claim by victims!). The attention is 
thus deflected from the defendant and the alleged crime, but shifted to the legitimacy and 
legality of the state’s prosecution and use of investigative authorities. Thus, activists have 
strongly criticized the use of undercover agents and informants, alleging that the state is not 
uncovering existing crimes but actively manufacturing crimes by entrapping activists. Typical 
allies in this kind of challenge to the state are criminal defense lawyers and organizations such 
as the National Lawyers Guild and the American Civil Liberties Union. In a clear reference to the 
rule of law framework, defendants and their supporters have claimed their constitutionally 
protected freedoms of speech and association, arguing that the criminal cases against them 








Activists have further crimitized conspiracy charges as “thought crime” and argued that this 
contradicts the very principles of a liberal state. Emphasizing this contradiction, they aim to 
discredit the state in its attempts to prosecute activists. With this strategy, activists specifically 
appeal to an audience that is broader than their fellow political activists:  
 
Many in our society – and not just radicals – are uncomfortable with the idea of people being 
persecuted for thoughtcrime. We need to find ways to address people outside our social and 
political circles about the prevalence of conspiracy charges, so as to utilize this opportunity to 
discredit the state and delegitimize conspiracy-based cases. The broader the range of people 
who disapprove of this tactic, the more the hands of the authorities will be tied. (Conspiracy 
2011:7)  
 
Such an appeal to a larger audience was also present when activists emphasized that SHAC 
activists were prosecuted only for “having a website.” Pointing to the potential danger of 
governmental overreach, activists argued that peaceful activism all over the U.S. was at stake 
and that not just environmentalist, but many social justice activists should be worried. Activists 
thus attempt to create awareness among the wider population of the existence of what they 
perceive as arbitrary or political repression. They argue that the larger public should be 
concerned about this repression, not only because it is unjust, but also because it might 







mail on a listserv calling on people to support a defendant charged with conspiracy regarding 
an ALF action in 2004 at the University of Iowa.155 He wrote:  
Over the last ten years, the government has led a campaign to smash radical environmental and 
animal liberation movements. This campaign is referred to as the "Green Scare" by activists and 
organizers involved in these movements. Some believe that these movements have been 
targeted because they are "bastard movements," often unsupported and unpopular within the 
broader left, and thus a place that the government can set precedent and normalize their tactics 
of repression, with passive consent from society and the larger left. These same tactics have 
been used to divide and repress social movements against oppression since the chicken & the 
egg, and this will continue as long as our movements remain divided. (Bold in original 
statement) 
 
The entrapment defense in the case of Eric McDavid 
The heavy involvement of undercover agents and informants constitutes another target of 
activists within the liberal legalist framework. For example, the defense in the trial of Eric 
McDavid relied entirely on this claim to the rule of law. His impeccable character, his entrance 
into the courtroom with a white shirt, and the attendance of mostly family members all 
communicated obedience to the state, a belonging to the American community and its rule of 
law. Alleged plans to bomb a dam were denied or at least not defended. The attention focused 
on the defense of “entrapment” and the message that the government was abusing its powers. 
The few fellow activists that attended the trial did not leaflet or protest. They did not spread a 
message of environmentalism. Nobody defended illegal actions. Nobody during the trial 
defended any actions in favor of environmental demands. The political ideas of the defendant 
were not explained. Indeed, family and friends on the witness stand showed surprise about that 
political side of the defendant. The message was that the defendant would “never hurt a fly” 
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 The charges came after the defendant had refused cooperation with a grand jury, for which he was jailed for 







and that the government’s informant had seduced him into and co-manufactured the 
conspiracy that he was charged with.  
 
In September 2007 I attended this trial against Eric McDavid in Sacramento, California. He was 
convicted for conspiracy of arson and, because of a terrorism enhancement, sentenced to 
almost twenty years in prison. “Anna” testified during the trial against McDavid. She was an FBI 
informant and part of the “cell” of which the defendant also was a part. She played a pivotal 
role in his arrest and prosecution. Activists would add that she also played a crucial role in 
manufacturing and funding his alleged crime. His supporters criticized the government for 
playing dirty and violating its own rules. 
 
During the trial the defendant, his two co-defendants, and the FBI informant were portrayed as 
a group of friends who were planning to do something “big.” They were frustrated with staging 
protests as they felt that they did not really work. Something “big” involved making a bomb. 
Armed with the book “The Poor Man’s James Bond,” “The Survival Chemist,” and some recipes 
that “Anna” provided them with, they started out mixing chemicals. They had not really 
decided yet on what they were going to bomb, but they were doing reconnaissance and there 
were some candidates, such as the governmental Institute of Forest Genetics, engaged in 
genetic modification. While they were in this process, they were arrested.  
 








In early 2006, eco-terrorist Eric McDavid and two associates met in a secluded cabin in Dutch 
Flat, California to discuss making improvised explosive devices and to choose targets to bomb. 
Soon after, they began casing the targeted facilities and buying supplies to make bombs. But 
before they started mixing the ingredients, we swooped in and arrested them. (FBI 2008a) 
 
Activists, on the other hand, present his arrest and subsequent conviction as entrapment: 
 
Eric McDavid is a political prisoner, currently serving a 20 year sentence in federal prison for 
“thought crime.” He was arrested in January 2006 (as part of the government's ongoing "Green 
Scare" campaign against environmental and animal rights activists) after being targeted by an 
undercover informant who formulated a crime and entrapped Eric in it. Eric was targeted by the 
state for his political beliefs, and his case is important for everyone who dares to stand up. 
(Support Eric 2011a) 
 
While this is a legal defense, the judge made it clear that the trial was not going to be an 
indictment of the FBI, the Justice Department, or confidential source (CS) Anna (field notes, 
September 2007). 
 
Unlike some of the other trials I had attended in Chile or Spain, this courtroom was not packed 
with supporters. There were no signs, no leaflets, nothing to rally for an environmentalist 







activist. The supporters that were present were dressed formally and behaved silently and 
obediently. The message was clear: this activist was being supported as a peaceful and ordinary 
person. His family and old friends – not the activist community – were the most important 
presence in the room. The defendant had a cheerful smile every morning when he entered the 
courtroom, wearing a decent dress shirt. The defendant did not use his right to a last word to 
reclaim or reinterpret the incident for which he was on trial; he did not address his fellow 
activists to urge them to continue the struggle. The defendant and his supporters kept politics 
and activism outside of the courtroom. The supporters sat silently throughout the trial and 
listened. The choice for this defense within the liberal legalist framework reflects the lack of 
popular support for actions that involve such alleged plans for bombing campaigns.  
  
3. Bringing the “political” back in: Identification as a political prisoner 
While in the case of Eric McDavid, the defense downplayed or ignored the political motivations 
of the defendant (at least during the trial), the criminlized actions of other defendants are 
openly embraced and defended as political. This means that the criminalized conduct is 
specifically placed within the context of the environmental demands of the challengers of the 
status quo. Calls for solidarity with prisoners are then not (only) based on a perceived arbitrary 
or unjust state response but on the shared political ideology between fellow activists and the 
defendant or prisoner. The Spring 2005 Earth First! journal thus called upon activists: 
“Remember, Peter is in there for the animals and the activist community should be there for 







eco-terrorists, priding themselves instead as “eco-warriors” (Foreman 1991) and referring to 
their targets as, for example, “animal abuse facility.” They thus resist imposed labels – a 
contestation that is also fought out in the courtroom. 
 
Some activists specifically highlight the importance of continuing this battle in the courtroom. 
For example, Earth First! activist Roselle criticized Greenpeace for not using trials as a method 
for creating more public awareness and publicity (Scarce 2006:169).156 He emphasized that for 
Earth First! the trial and jail time are as important as the initial action that led to the arrest. 
Claiming to be “political” prisoners, activists reject the courtroom as a legitimate venue for 
deciding the issue at hand, refusing to accept the rule of law. Unlike the strategy that de-
legitimizes the state by pointing at contradictions between that rule of law and the state 
response, “political” prisoners refuse to play the game that is expected from them as 
defendants. Thus, Peter Young said in his statement in court:   
 
I don't wish to validate this proceeding by begging for mercy or appealing to the conscience of 
the court, because I know if this system had a conscience I would not be here, and in my place 
would be all the butchers, vivisectors, and fur farmers of the world. […] It is to those animals I 
answer to, not you or this court. (Young 2005a) 
 
Claiming to be a “political” prisoner is a fundamental challenge to the state’s criminal justice 
system and its criminal prosecutions. It is noteworthy that while the Spanish and Chilean 
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governments explicitly rejected the label “political prisoners,” no government official in the 
United States seems to take any effort to publicly dispel notions of “political” prisoners. This is 
possibly an indication of the weakness of the challenge posed by environmental activists.  
 
In the face of crime definitions and the publicly ritualized condemnation of their actions, 
activists adamantly redefine their own conduct, often trying to turn the tables. Activist Rod 
Coronado, for example, defended the ALF:  
If truth and morality were the driving force behind mainstream journalism, the business 
practices and actions of animal and earth destroying industries, the world's militaries and police 
would be reported as the true acts of terrorism that they often are. And the actions – be they 
legal or illegal – of the animal rights movement would be presented for what they really are: 
actions that not only respect the sacredness of all life, but also alert the public and consumers to 
government and corporate fraud, the endangerment of human and environmental health; and 
economic policies that readily cater to big business at the expense of taxpayers, public lands and 
wildlife. (Coronado 1999)  
 
Activists sometimes employ a criminal law logic or vocabulary to defend their position, for 
example when they refer to the concept of “extensional self-defense” developed by 
philosopher Steven Best, which argues that it is acceptable to provide self-defense for those 
that cannot defend themselves, such as children and animals (Interview US-16).  
 
As activists aim to put alleged crimes in a different perspective, they often make comparisons 
with other crimes. For example, an activist pointed out that a man who killed a woman while 
driving drunk received a ten-year jail sentence, whereas activist Jeffrey Luers was sentenced to 







vehicles. The activist concluded that this “disparity” in sentencing can be expected from a 
“society whose values are so predominantly capital-centric” (Harper 2002a). 
  
Criminal defense lawyers play an important role in crafting the kind of challenge that is posed 
to the state’s prosecution. In the Basque Country defense lawyers are an integrated part of the 
nationalist left as they form the lawyer-collective for ETA defendants. In the case of the Green 
Scare there is not such a tightly knit lawyer community, but there are some important nodes. 
The Civil Liberties Defense Fund in Oregon does its share of Green Scare cases, and there are 
more “Green Scare lawyers” who have their fair share of these cases. Another legal support to 
animal rights and environmentalist activists is the “Green Scare hotline” operated by volunteers 
of the National Lawyers Guild in New York City. With the transfer to the criminal justice arena, 
legal support has become essential for activists, taking up a significant amount of their time and 
resources. There are, for example, grand jury trainings teaching activists about their rights in 
grand jury hearings.  
 
Lawyers and activists make a distinction between so-called “political lawyers” and “ordinary 
lawyers.” Political lawyers know how to deal with a political case. Political defendants usually 
do not want to plead out. They want to stick with their co-defendants, do nothing that is 
detrimental to an entire movement, and not compromise on their political beliefs. Unlike 
ordinary lawyers, political lawyers support these positions. Ordinary lawyers, on the contrary, 







evidence against them, which usually means being the first to plead guilty. A “political” defense 
lawyer I interviewed had given activists permission to tell FBI agents that he is their lawyer. He 
said that he was almost charged with “obstruction of justice” because of this, as FBI agents who 
knocked on doors “from Phoenix to Michigan” encountered activists claiming their right to be 
silent, telling them that he was their lawyer. When asked for his motivation to take up these 
“Green Scare” cases, the lawyer responded that “these kids are the only real dissent in this 
country” (Interview US-3).  
 
“Political” prisoners fight their criminal cases not just for their own liberty, but for the whole 
movement. Former SHAC prisoner Darius Fullmer, for example, claimed to be fighting his 
appeal not necessarily for his own freedom or justice but to create a better precedent for the 
movement, thus placing the collective goals of his activism above his individual justice:  
 
Right now I’m focused on the appeal because we have to get rid of this law, the Animal 
Enterprise Terrorism Act. It's a horrible precedent, not just for the animal rights movement, but 
for anybody who believes in freedom of speech, whether that's a labor union, environmentalist 
or anybody who values their right to speak their mind. (in: Barbi and Barbi 2008)  
 
Once these criminal prosecutions are labeled as “political,” they contribute to the “career” of 
activists, certifying their dedication to the struggle. Having been in jail thus can add to the 







grand jury also has this feature. In the activist discourse community “real” activists have been 
called before grand juries.  
 
4. Persuading the public of the political definition: Changing the impact of criminal 
prosecutions  
As prisoners and their supporters rally around the concept of “political” prisoners, they attempt 
to persuade their fellow activists and the larger public of the political nature of the situation, 
thus transforming the criminal degradation ceremony and the impact of the criminal 
prosecutions. Activists, for example, try to alleviate life in prison for their detained peers in 
order to reduce the fear of prison that the state uses to deter activists from their actions. They 
also make their interpretation of the “crimes” public through official press offices and 
communiqués. Crucially, they compete with law enforcement officers for the “hearts and 
minds” of the public, persuading people not to comply with criminal investigations. They try to 
dissuade fellow activists from falling for government cooperation; severely condemning 
“snitching” and cutting off contacts with those that do cooperate. Indeed, activists have not 
only condemned but also resisted grand juries, accepting time in jail for refusing to testify.  
 
As activists engage in the work of redefining criminalized conduct, providing support to 
prisoners, obstructing investigations, and trying to persuade the public of the political 
definition, they attempt to alter the effect of criminal prosecutions. They try to counter the 







of jail, arguing, for example, for lower sentences. Prison is an essential part of the penal 
experience and activists attempt to soften that. Indeed, Peter Young openly called for a 
“demystification” of the prison experience, arguing that it may not be as bad as one might fear. 
He reasoned that if activists lose their fear of prison, they may be bolder in their activism 
(Young 2008). Criminal prosecutions, the threat of a high sentence, and life in prison have 
different effects on different activists. As a consequence of criminal charges, some people turn 
against their former fellow activists. Some leave the path of activism entirely. Some renounce 
the use of violence or the use of specific means, such as arson. In other cases, activists are 
turned into heroes within the movement. They remain active, publicly, and speak at public 
conferences. Examples of such “heroes” within this discourse community are Peter Young and 
Rod Coronado. On 6 November 2010, Peter Young had 1,384 friends on Facebook, arguably not 
despite his conviction under the AETA, but because of it.      
 
There has been much “public relations” activity by and on behalf of the “political” prisoners. 
Apart from the specific websites dedicated to single prisoners, former prisoners and their 
lawyers have appeared on Democracy Now! and written articles on Indymedia and 
CounterPunch. In order to inform fellow activists and the larger public of the criminal 
prosecutions against eco-activists, defense lawyers, sympathizers, and defendants have 
traveled and given speeches on many occasions. An important aspect of prisoner support work 
is the redefining of the conduct or event that forms the basis for the criminal allegation. In the 







publish or even write the communiqués to announce and explain actions in name of the ALF or 
ELF.157 These offices function explicitly as a liaison between the public and underground animal 
rights or environmentalist activists. As an example of such definition-work, the press office of 
the ELF redefined the concept of eco-terrorists, designating as the “real” eco-terrorists the 
CEOs of Cargill and Halliburton.  
 
As a crucial link between the public and the underground actions, such communiqués have 
received attention from prosecutors. Already in the mid-1990s there were indications that 
prosecutors attach importance to these speech acts and view such acts as central to the 
activist’s actions. In the government’s sentencing memorandum in the case against Rod 
Coronado in 1995, the prosecutor specifically pointed out that the ALF operates with violent 
acts, and that publishing about such acts is a fundamental part of the ALF strategy, since 
“publicizing the attacks and threatening future violence also furthers this goal by 
intimidating potential victims into abandoning their activities.” It becomes obvious that the 
prosecutor attaches great importance to these publishing activities in a later statement in the 
memorandum to the effect that the plea agreement was not only significant because 
Coronado accepted full responsibility for the arson at Michigan University, but  
 
[e]ven more important is the fact that the defendant acknowledges that he directly engaged in 
the public dissemination of the arson attacks. As described previously, the threats Coronado 
circulated were at least as important as the arson attacks themselves since they furthered ALF's 









goal of threatening violence against other scientists, farmers and consumers if they did not bow 
to the ALF's demands. (Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, 1995, footnote 2, page 13)  
 
In the analysis of the SHAC case in the next chapter, I will show how the prosecutorial narrative 
construes criminal responsibility in that specific case, partly because the activists were 
publicizing underground attacks.    
 
Choosing sides: Supporting or obstructing law enforcement 
Popular support for extreme tactics is a key problem for law enforcement. Evidence is 
frequently difficult to collect without the cooperation of citizens. In the criminal justice arena, 
authorities and prisoner supporters therefore battle for the sympathy of the American public 
and for assistance, either in the investigation of crimes or the obstruction of such 
investigations. The FBI asks citizens for their cooperation in the search for “eco-terrorists.” For 
example, on their website they announced that “You can help. Have you seen Daniel Andreas 
San Diego, an animal rights activist wanted for his alleged involvement in two bombings in 
California in 2003? If so, contact us” (FBI 2005a). At the same time, animal rights activist Peter 
Young called upon fellow activists to reflect on their response to Daniel Andreas:  
 
It is impossible to know where Andres San Diego is hiding, but please ask yourself what you 
would do if he showed up at your door tonight, asking for help. San Diego faces a potential life 
sentence if arrested, and is out there somewhere right now literally running for his life. (Young 








These contradicting demands upon the American public illustrate the competition between 
moral judgments and the competition for authority that challenges the state and its “rule of 
law.” Moderate environmentalist activists and organizations are specifically called upon to 
choose sides. The Sierra Club, for example, “does not condone any acts of violence” (Sierra Club 
2003). As a consequence of its position, the Sierra Club actively supported law enforcement by 
offering a reward to anyone who could help to find the perpetrators in a specific case. While 
the Sierra Club actively contributed to law enforcement, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) suspected various animal rights groups of assisting “eco-terrorists”:  
 
PETA, the Fund for Animals, In Defense of Animals, the New Jersey Animal Rights Alliance, and 
certain individuals within the HSUS are known or suspected of having financial ties to individuals 
and groups associated with ecoterrorism. In addition to financial ties to ecomilitancy, both HSUS 
and PETA, or at least individuals within those organizations, have an established record of 
supporting individuals and/or groups commonly associated with ecoterrorism. (Department of 
Homeland Security 2008:9) 
 
In the same year that this DHS report came out, the Humane Society provided $2,500 as a 
reward for information leading to the resolution of the car bombing of an animal researcher in 
California (Brown 2008), clearly distancing itself from the tactics employed by more extremist 







the Department of Homeland Security had changed its assessment regarding the Fund for 
Animals and the HSUS.    
 
Cooperating defendants and FBI informants  
An important issue among activists in relation to criminal prosecutions is how to deal with 
informants or cooperating defendants: former or current activists who have decided to 
cooperate with the FBI and prosecutors in the prosecution of fellow activists, often as part of a 
plea bargain for criminal charges and the threat of high sentences against them. This has 
destroyed trust and solidarity within the activist community. One activist said: “The Anna-thing 
freaked everyone out” (Interview US-4), referring to the FBI informant in the case against Eric 
McDavid. Many activists had met her, as she had infiltrated the activist scene. As the activists 
do not trust each other anymore, collective action is strongly impeded. A journalist told me he 
observed a sadly high level of alcohol and drug use and a general disillusionment among the 
West Coast environmentalist community after a period in which many inside informers were 
revealed (Interview US-10). There also was mention of activists being prosecuted for retaliating 
against cooperating defendants (Rayburn 1999). 
 
Activists try to convince fellow activists not to give in to government pressure, for example by 
pointing out that compared to the cooperating defendants the non-cooperating defendants 
received proportionately shorter sentences (Conspiracy 2011).158 They emphasize that when 
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“nobody talks, everybody walks” (Conspiracy 2011:7). Many activists severely condemn what 
they call “snitching.” Those guilty of it are viewed with contempt. For example, Peter Young, 
whose co-defendant cooperated with the government, wrote: 
 
For the sake of clarity, let us be uncomfortably honest: to snitch is to take a life. By words and by 
weapons, each day lives are taken in the most egregious of crimes. When this happens in the 
courtroom, we call it "cooperation." I call it violence, and I call anything done to keep an 
informant out of the courtroom "self defense." – Peter Young, animal liberation prisoner (North 
American Animal Liberation Press Office 2011)  
  
Aware of the risk of losing the respect of their fellow activist community and thus losing their 
status as political prisoners, activists are careful in their communications when they announce 
plea agreements, often explicitly pointing out that the agreement does not involve cooperation 
with the government. Some prisoner support groups have explicitly distanced themselves from 
some prisoners that were labeled as traitors because of their cooperative plea bargains. 
Interestingly, this selective prisoner support work (only supporting prisoners who refuse to 
“name names”) even became an issue during the sentencing of eco-activist McGowan. An 
observer reported that the prosecutor and judge had emphasized that McGowan had been only 
willing to support those who had not cooperated with law enforcement and that his current 
support was filled with “like-minded people” (Anonymous 2007).  
 







Activists view grand juries as instruments of repression against aboveground activists (Rod 
Coronado in: Best & Nocella 2004:352–353). When Coronado was arrested in 1994, four people 
had spent between five and six months in jail for refusing to testify because of the investigation 
against him (ibid.:351). Grand juries can issue subpoenas that force people to testify without 
the presence of a lawyer. They can hold people in contempt when witnesses refuse to share 
information which may be “in the public interest to enforce the criminal laws of the United 
States.” Therefore, activists organize “grand jury” workshops in which lawyers explain to 
activists how to deal with grand jury subpoenas and what their rights are. Activist websites 
refer readers to materials with information about the grand jury proceedings.159 Co-
perpetrators who decide to cooperate with the grand jury proceedings waive their right to non-
incrimination when they testify before the grand jury.  
 
Various activists and also people at the margins of the movement have decided not to 
cooperate and refused to answer some of the questions. The judge can then hold the witness in 
civil or even criminal contempt. For example, in 1993 PhD student Rik Scarce was held in 
contempt of court after refusing to give access to the materials and sources that he had 
collected during the writing of his book Eco-Warriors (2006). The judge did not accept his claim 
to the importance of scholarly independence and the confidentiality of his sources (2005), and 
he was imprisoned for six months. In 2006, activist Jeff Hogg spent six months in jail for refusing 
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to answer grand jury questions regarding the arsons under investigation in Operation Backfire. 
Those that refuse to testify and are held in contempt often become “heroes” within the 
environmentalist movement. This occurred on 3 November 1992, when Jonathan Paul was 
jailed for civil contempt in Spokane, Washington, for refusing to testify in front of a federal 
grand jury. During his sentencing hearing in 2007, the prosecutor recalled this episode as he 
told the court that Paul had been held for five months and was a “hero” and “inspiration” to 
those who “resist legal prosecution” (Flies on the Wall 2007).   
 
Grand jury investigations can thus lead to subsequent imprisonment when witnesses refuse to 
testify. Thus the state does not only try to persuade citizens to voluntarily contribute to law 
enforcement. Indeed, activists have also been prosecuted for making false declarations before 
a grand jury, initiating another spiral of prosecution and imprisonment where citizens’ 
compliance with law enforcement efforts is at stake. For example, in November 2003 Robert 
Brooks and Hargit Singh Gill were indicted for making false declarations before the grand jury 
on 2 July 2003. In addition, they were charged with making false statements to FBI agents.  
  
Grand jury subpoenas and subsequent cases of civil and criminal contempt thus form a clear 
example of how the conflict dynamic after transferring into the criminal justice arena leads to 
renewed contestation and litigation. This even led SHAC activist Kevin Kjonaas to call the grand 
juries “one of the best things that ever happens to animal rights movements” since they make 








Just as in Spain and Chile, challengers of the status quo, and sometimes also their family and 
friends, become disillusioned with the court system – if they ever had any confidence at all in 
the promise of the rule of law. This is illustrated, for example, in the following reflection by 
supporters of Eric McDavid after his request for an appeal was denied:  
For some of us, our biggest mistake was believing that we ever had any options in the first place. 
It became all too easy to fall into their trap of successive illusory next-chances. Every time we 
lost bail, or a motion, or trial, or at sentencing, or at the appeal... there was always something 
waiting in the queue that could possibly save us from our imminent hell. But the state created 
that queue – not us. […] If anything, the court's decision is an affirmation of what we have 
known to be true all along. The “justice system” works only for the interests of it's [sic] creators. 
If it starts to falter in it's [sic] mission, it gets fine tuned (i.e. laws and rules get rewritten) to put 
it back on the proper trajectory. (Support Eric 2010) 
 
Contested truths – the problem with evidence – credibility of undercover activists 
I look at the criminal justice arena as a site of contestation about definitions and interpretation 
of conduct, labels, identities, and events. Criminal trials pretend to construct an officially 
honored version of the truth of what happened during one or a series of events. Criminal 
proceedings claim to offer a truth that could be accepted by society and thus contribute to 
social peace. In fact, in the context of environmental protest, it is incapable of creating such 
shared truths. The lack of consensus about the meaning of evidence is one important factor. I 
will illustrate this contestation with the debates about undercover videos provided by animal 
rights activists.  
 
Documentation unearthed in undercover investigations forms the basis for animal rights 







are illegal. As such, activists often try to have such material allowed in the courtroom when 
they defend themselves against criminal allegations. However, these materials are equally 
often denied such access. Given the impact materials from undercover investigations can have 
on the public, activists had warned that the AETA could be used against undercover 
investigators (Potter 2007:4). And indeed, only five years after the enactment of the AETA, the 
very act of undercover investigations has become the explicit object of legislative efforts as 
several states started considering penalizing such conduct, thus bringing it into the criminal 
justice arena as a crime (Potter 2011d). Indeed, a state lawmaker in Florida called the very act 
of conducting such undercover investigations “terrorism” (Potter 2011e) and the European law 
enforcement agency EUROPOL issued the warning that animal rights activists “use 
disinformation methods in order to discredit their targets and weaken their public acceptance. 
Images of sick and abused animals are embedded in video footage and made public” (Potter 
2011e).  
 
Materials collected by undercover activists have been subjected to lawsuits on several 
occasions. In some of these cases, targets accused of animal abuse argued that materials were 
selectively edited (Carnell 2000; Carnell 2004). For example, in 1997, PETA activist Michelle 
Rokke worked undercover at Huntingdon Life Sciences as an employee while documenting and 
collecting video material of the way in which the animals were treated. In response, 
Huntingdon filed a civil lawsuit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 







and trying to put HLS out of business. According to PETA, the material showed, for example, 
how scientists performed surgery on a monkey, removing its organs while the monkey was still 
able to feel what happened.  
 
Huntingdon, however, maintained that the video material was cut and pasted in such a way 
that it only seemed as though the monkey were being tortured, while in fact it was 
anesthetized. While Huntingdon argued that an independent agency regularly inspected 
Huntingdon and did not find evidence to support the allegations made by PETA, it did fear the 
negative publicity that might result from the videos. Indeed, while Procter & Gamble 
investigated Huntingdon and did not find any evidence that the Animal Welfare Act had been 
violated, Procter still stopped working with Huntingdon because the videotape showed “lab 
technicians behaving in an uncaring manner” (Kolata 1998). Eventually, this lawsuit was settled 
out of court and PETA agreed to destroy all of the materials it had collected as well as to not 
conduct any undercover investigations for five years. In return, Huntingdon dropped the RICO 
charges (Kolata 1998). Michelle Rokke was under court order to refrain from commenting in 
public about HLS.  
 
The contestation about the credibility of materials collected by undercover activists shows 
similar features as the contestation about specific sources of evidence in Spain and Chile. First, 
the dispute about the interpretation of evidence leads to a cycle of lawsuits (civil lawsuits in the 







purposefully fabricating harmful evidence (Carnell 2000; Carnell 2004). Second, the assessment 
whether the evidence is credible or not seems to rely entirely on previously held beliefs about 
the core issue, that is in this case the treatment of animals, the existence of animal cruelty, the 
definition and interpretation of animal cruelty, and enemy images of the opponent. Thus, the 
contestation about the evidence produces more legal activity, while the evidence remains 
disputed. Instead of contributing to a shared truth, such contested evidence becomes part of 




In this chapter I sketched the dynamics of the contention around the usage of animals and the 
earth, describing the various actors involved in challenging the status quo or defending the 
status quo, the ways in which tactics are justified, and how tactics challenge the U.S. democracy 
and its rule of law as activists consciously break the law for their beliefs. The U.S. government 
and particularly the FBI have come to define the situation as “eco-terrorism.” With this label, 
the situation transfers to the criminal justice arena, excluding the underlying demands 
regarding destruction of the earth or animal cruelty. In the criminal justice arena “victims” and 
“prisoner supporters” form alliances as criminal cases unfold, and these polarized identities 
obtain institutional meaning. Victim alliances and their push for the eco-terrorism narrative and 
definition of the facts are important factors in the creation of the prosecutorial narrative. 







the definition of protest activity as crimes. In the next chapter I will analyze the development of 
the prosecutorial narrative and the way in which it responds to the different voices in the 









VII. Marginalizing Criminalization in the 
United States 
 
The previous chapter introduced the environmentalist movement and its tactics for driving 
companies out of business, stopping construction of roads or dams, or stopping scientific 
animal experimentation. Thus, it challenges the status quo. The government has labeled some 
of these tactics as crimes and, more specifically, as “eco-terrorism.” Crime is, however, not a 
pre-given fact of reality but socially constructed and disputed, and indeed, victim groups and 
prisoner support groups have mobilized to present and contest definitions of crime in an 
attempt to influence the prosecutor, the larger public, or both. Thus, in and around criminal 
proceedings a “conversation” ensues in which I zoom in on the different collective “voices” of 
victim groups, prisoner support groups, and the prosecutors. In the previous chapter it was 
shown how specific targets of environmentalist activism ally to claim victimhood and push the 
state for more effective protection and punishment of perpetrators. At the same time, 
defendants and their sympathizers are dissatisfied with the state’s definitions and 
condemnation of their protest actions. They continue to mobilize and draw attention to their 








This chapter analyzes the prosecutorial narrative as it responds to the different voices in the 
criminal justice arena. I will show how the state changes old images and creates or adopts new 
images, crime definitions, and categories. This analysis is based on an overview of criminal 
prosecutions during the past thirty years and draws upon press releases from attorney’s offices, 
indictments, opening statements, and closing arguments in trials and other trial transcripts as 
well as in-depth interviews with two prosecutors.  
 
I examine how the state constructs its courtrooms as the correct place to deal with the charges 
that they level against defendants. I trace the construction of criminal cases, by observing how 
the different actors, the prosecutors, the jury, the judges, and even the stenographers 
participate in imagining and producing this space, in which a certain logic, framework, and 
discourse is accepted as the correct vocabulary to communicate and interact, in which the roles 
and identities are given form. Upon receiving a criminal complaint, the prosecutor will define 
the situation to decide whether, how, and against whom to build up a criminal case. What 
information is deemed relevant to define the nature of the event? What information is 
excluded from consideration? What kinds of questions are asked to determine what happened? 
In this exploration, I ask how the prosecutorial narrative institutionalizes certain “truths” while 
“marginaliz[ing] other ways of looking at the world” (Lacey and Wells 1998:10).  
 
In the United States I interviewed two prosecutors. In these conversations, both adhered 







claimed that “as a general rule and one I certainly practiced in this case, I do not look at the 
political motivations of defendants. I look to their intent (not to be confused with motive) and 
their actions” (personal e-mail communication with author). Just as in Spain and in Chile, both 
prosecutors emphasized their concern for individual victims. Again, in the words of this 
prosecutor:  
 
I also look to the victims. That the defendants believed in their cause is of no moment if they are 
breaking the law and causing victims harm. In this case, the defendants terrorized the victims, 
made them move from their homes, put them in constant fear and altered the manner in which 
they raised their families. Given that, and the fact that I believed (and the jury agreed) that the 
activities of the defendants were violative of the laws, the case was brought. I have no doubt 
that the defendants believe in their cause but belief in one's cause does not excuse violation of 
the laws. (ibid.)  
 
By emphasizing the existence of “victims,” prosecutors legitimize the practice of dealing with 
the disruptive and contentious actions in the criminal justice arena. This then requires a 
separation between the political issue on the one hand and the criminal activity on the other. 
Thus, also during trials, prosecutors continue to address and erect the boundary between the 
different arenas, indicating what “belongs” where. This boundary between the two arenas is 
often referred to spatially as “crossing the line.” Thus, the prosecutor in the SHAC case argued 
before the jury that animal testing is not “the issue in this case”:  
The defendants in this case are against animal testing of any kind. They don’t believe that it 







the FDA requires the testing be done. That is where the line is. But the defendants in this case 
convinced themselves that they have a monopoly on what was right; and that that monopoly 
gave them a license to victimize others without regard to the law. They believe their monopoly 
gave them the right to cross the line so rather than an attempt to change the system through 
lawful means, the defendants decided they were going to shut down this company, this 
company that gauges in wholly lawful activity at any cost. (Trial transcripts, Case SHAC, volume 
VI, p. 41, 7 February 2006, emphasis added by author) 
 
Challengers of the status quo systematically question this exclusion of their primary grievance 
from the trials, thus challenging the separation of law and politics.  
 
The criminal proceedings lead the political mobilization to shift from the political arena to the 
criminal justice arena, and the government criminal justice agents inevitably become an actor in 
the political contention. The state works with a criminal justice system that is premised on the 
liberal notion that it stays out of politics by formalizing categories and excluding context. This 
framework is built, however, on assumptions of abstract individuals and a society in consensus 
(Norrie 1993:57). The existence of social and political conflicts has been ignored from its 
conception in the ideology of liberal legalism, in which crime was stripped of its context. 
Instead of excluding context systematically, in the criminal cases discussed below events are re-
contextualized in the context of “eco-terrorism,” and the prosecutorial narrative inevitably tells 
a story which becomes part of the contention and subject to mobilization. I explore how this 
narrative shifts from de-contextualization to a re-contextualized narrative and explore the 
consequences of this re-contextualization in the actual criminal prosecutions. What is the 
chosen context? How can this re-contextualization be observed? What are the concrete 








Given the independence and decentralized operation of different prosecutors it is not possible 
to speak of one prosecutorial narrative. Instead, it would be more accurate to talk about 
multiple prosecutorial narratives. Still, as I am studying exclusively federal cases and to a large 
extent also the involvement of the FBI in shaping the prosecutorial narrative, it is possible to 
observe general tendencies. Indeed, the prosecutorial narrative should not be understood as 
the narrative of a specific prosecutor, but the narrative of the prosecution. It is the narrative 
that guides the entire process of investigating, charging, prosecuting, and accusing a defendant 
by building a case and constructing a narrative of good and bad, of guilt and criminal 
responsibility, of criminal conduct and the relevant facts of the case. As such, it is never only 
the narrative of a single prosecutor, but a construction that has many authors and draws upon 
an available grammar and repertoire.  
 
For this chapter I selected a few criminal cases which I discuss in depth to demonstrate the 
typical competing discourses that contest each other in these criminal prosecutions. In the 
course of this analysis I highlight three specific discursive shifts in the prosecutorial narrative 
that characterize its intervention regarding contentious environmentalist activity which has 
become labeled “eco-terrorism.” As a first discursive development I trace the introduction and 
use of this label through various prosecutions over the course of the past decades. The other 
shift in the prosecutorial narrative is the move towards proactive investigations, infiltrations, 







anarchists, environmentalists, and other groups of activists is highly controversial.160 I further 
discuss the shift towards the prosecution of certain aboveground (i.e., overt) activities, which 
can be understood as a result of the difficulty to find the activists that engage in covert 
activities. This shift provokes debates and questions similar to those in Spain, where speech 
acts and symbolic expressions have become the target of various criminal prosecutions. The 
criminal case against the activists of Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) is exemplary for 
this shift to the prosecution of aboveground activity, and I will analyze this case in great detail.  
 
I argue that the prosecutorial narrative in the United States is engaged in boundary drawing by 
forging the exclusion and marginalization of “extremist” actions and activists from the terrain of 
legitimate agency. As the narrative communicates with the larger public, and specifically those 
that are engaged in “legitimate” environmental protest, it encourages “moderate” and 
“mainstream” organizations to distance themselves from all actions and actors that have been 
labeled “eco-terrorist.”  
 
1. First classification: Dying earth and animals or eco-terrorism?  
 
I understand re-contextualization as a dynamic set of multiple shifts in the prosecutorial 
narrative on a possibly broad range of elements. These shifts can include the audience that is 
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addressed, the kind of criminal liability that is chosen, the time frame, the legal interest, the 
image of the perpetrator, and all the other elements described in more depth in Chapter 1. 
These many possible shifts together constitute a re-contextualization, while at the same time 
describing or constructing that context as the relevant or even “natural” context that should be 
taken into account. It is the very description of that context which is often deeply contested by 
the various actors in the contentious episode. The basic description of that context, which is 
often considered as “background,” can color or influence the interpretation of everything that 
happens on the screen. Indeed, that “background” can be responsible for filters and selective 
recognition of relevant elements, actors, or events that determine what “really” happened. 
Which context is chosen and how that context is described is thus highly relevant. Although this 
context can be constantly changing or modified in the narratives of different actors, specific 
labels tend to receive a meaning that is shared and understood once it is drawn upon. When an 
event is thus classified as a “case of” eco-terrorism, this can lead to a series of choices in 
criminal proceedings which would not have been available had that classification been lacking. 
Over time, and drawing upon the narrative proposed by targets of environmentalist protests, 
the prosecutorial narrative has constructed the context of “eco-terrorism” while 
environmentalist activists have advocated a broader context which includes the “crimes” of 
animal cruelty and destruction of the earth as the relevant background against which their 
actions should be interpreted. Indeed, activists would argue that the earth is not just dying: it is 








While prosecutors always can choose to de-contextualize an event and ignore “the” context, 
they can also choose to address the context and thus co-create the collective interpretation of 
that context. At different stages in criminal investigations and prosecutions, I have traced the 
way in which prosecutors either keep context out, or bring it in. In this section I address some 
of the instances where prosecutors have re-contextualized events and framed a criminal case as 
a “case of” eco-terrorism, showing how this affects their choices in the presentation of that 
case before juries and judges. The effort to put a specific incident into a larger context is 
explicitly visible in trials that start with expert witnesses who explain the “relevant” context, for 
example the background of the Earth Liberation Front and its ideology. One prosecutor 
explained the pragmatic reason for such a witness, arguing that the motive should be explained 
and “the jury should have some background or frame of reference” (Interview US-1).161 While a 
motive is not required for a conviction, according to this prosecutor a motive helps the jury to 
understand why a defendant did something, which can add to their conviction that he or she is 
guilty. This “context” can also color the severity of a crime. In this case of “conspiracy to 
commit arson” the prosecutor labeled the defendant a “kid” while simultaneously stating that 
“it [the alleged arson] is a big problem.” To support that assertion he referred to the arson in 
the UC Davis veterinary school and the arson in the ski resort in Vail, Colorado. The conspiracy 
to arson in this particularly case was thus linked to arsons that had occurred ten or even twenty 
years before in name of the ELF, even though the defendant was not alleged to have 
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participated in those earlier arsons. The motive can thus be used to construe a “pattern” and 
this “category” of cases thus colored the perception of the threat posed by this defendant.  
 
Just as in Chile, there have been incidents in which the classification of events has been 
explicitly disputed. For example, on 3 March 2008, buildings under construction in Seattle were 
set on fire. Spray-paint on the scene declared Built green? Nope black. McMansions in RCDs r 
not green. It was signed “ELF.” While the FBI and the Seattle Joint Terrorism Task Force 
declared it a case of eco-terrorism, activists argued that this was probably not the ELF or 
anyone else with environmental motives, but that the real motive was to claim insurance. Also, 
journalist John Vidal wrote in the Guardian that the action probably had more to do with “fraud 
or political smearing and dirty tricks than with terrorism” (Vidal 2008).  
 
The context of “eco-terrorism” also seemed to play a role in the case of Kevin Olliff, a SHAC 
activist who was prosecuted for the theft of a USB stick. While defendants can generally be 
released on bail in order to ensure that they will appear before the court, in the case of flight 
risk or danger to the community, a judge can deny bail. Some activists have spent their pre-trial 
time in prison for exactly these reasons. Olliff’s bail was initially set at $10,000, which is the 
standard for one count of commercial burglary.162 After serving eight months in jail, the district 
attorney sought a bail increase, however, and after a hearing the bail was raised to $500,000. 
Kevin Olliff reported of this hearing that the arguments were not related to the shoplifting but 
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to his activities of “terrorizing families” in the campaign against Huntingdon Life Sciences 
(2008). Indeed, he mentioned that actions by others in that campaign had also been discussed 
in relation to his bail, which clearly illustrates the classification of his person within a particular 
context. 
 
Thus, at various stages of criminal proceedings a case can be categorized as “eco-terrorism.” 
Such re-contextualization can start a script in which activists are induced to take a position in 
relation to that context of environmental protest, cut off contact with fellow activists, or 
denounce violence. For example, prisoner Kevin Olliff (2008) reported that the prosecutor 
offered a plea bargain that involved requiring him to to ask the government specific permission 
to be in contact with any known “anarchist” or “activist” until five years after his release. The 
prohibition from interacting with environmentalist groups or individuals is a frequent part of 
plea deals. The government showed it was serious about such provisions when on 3 August 
2010 Rod Coronado was sentenced to four months in federal prison for allegedly violating the 
terms of his probation (of a case in Arizona in 2004), for “associating” with Earth First! 
cofounder and former Greenpeace U.S.A. Director Mike Roselle by accepting his “friendship” on 
Facebook and for accessing an unauthorized computer outside his home (Rosenfeld 2010). 
  
More defendants have reported such offers from prosecutors, in which the goal seemed to be 
to keep defendants from engaging in (extremist) activism or to publicly denounce the use of 







hearings is that defendants have to apologize, renounce their violent past, send a good 
message to young people, provide the right example, change their perspective on the use of 
violence, and in the future only work within the boundaries of the law. Thus, the guilty plea is 
not just about retribution of past actions, it is also about the opinions of activists, the message 
they send, and what they plan to do in the future. In the case of William Viehl (accused of 
raiding a mink farm) the judge only reduced the sentence after Viehl showed remorse (Young 
2010).  
 
Jury trials involve a “voir dire” in which prosecutors and defense lawyers are allowed to ask 
potential jurors questions in order to assess whether they are able to maintain objectivity and 
neutrality. Often in these questions, the prosecutor determines whether jurors have strong 
views regarding animal rights or environmentalism. For example, in the 2007 trial against Rod 
Coronado, the prosecutor proposed to tell the jurors that the case would likely involve evidence 
that the defendant had attempted to convince others that they should commit arson to protect 
the earth and the environment and to then ask the jurors whether they could not be fair either 
to the defendant or to the United States in this type of case.  
 
Thus, at every stage of criminal proceedings de-contextualization or re-contextualization plays a 
role in the questions that are asked and the conditions that are placed. Once a case is re-
contextualized as a case of “eco-terrorism,” the case is connected to other “eco-terror” cases, 







its attitudes towards environmentalism. The communication of the prosecutorial narrative 
emphasizes the “line” between lawful activism and eco-terrorism, pushing or cajoling 
defendants to “return” to lawful activism.  
 
2. Identity politics on trial: The identity of defendants 
 
A political identity is the public collective answer to the questions “Who are you?,” “Who are 
we?,” and “Who are they”? (Tilly 2003:32). Just as in Chile, identity politics forms an integral 
part of the criminal prosecutions in the United States and is evident in the labels used in press 
releases, indictments, during the trial, and in the communications of “victim” and “prisoner 
support” groups. Such politics is about the placement of boundaries between different identity 
categories and about the stories that “us” and “them” tell about the identities. The labels 
chosen by prosecutors to describe the defendants can be significant in construing the image of 
the perpetrator of a “crime.” In this section I describe the different images that prosecutors 
produce to describe the defendants. I show how prosecutors often tend to emphasize anarchist 
ideology over environmentalist motives. The narrative further construes a distinction between 
“kids” on the one hand and “leaders” on the other. While prosecutions aim to imprison the 
leaders, they also serve to communicate to the white middle-class “kids” not to go down that 
path. These labels say something about the role of defendants, their dangerousness, or their 








Identity politics in the courtroom challenges liberal criminal law ideology because it tends to 
become intertwined with political motives and because social identities reference a collective 
and thus move away from the abstract individual that is the subject of criminal law. Social 
identities not only assume the existence of a category or group of people but also a 
continuance of that identity through time. This is contrary to the de-contextualization of 
specific criminal conduct taken out of and separated from such historical continuities.  
 
Anarchist identity as dominant 
Subjects always have multiple identities. However, one identity can be chosen as the “relevant” 
or “dominant” identity. Tilly argues that the government sorts political identities into 
legitimate/illegitimate and recognized/unrecognized. As prosecutors “separate law and 
politics,” they often emphasize the anarchist credentials of defendants while downplaying 
environmental motives.163 Anarchist ideology, and specifically its call for “direct action,” is then 
taken to provide the justification for the use of methods that are illegal or violent and thus 
relevant in the criminal justice arena, while environmental motives are referred back to the 
political arena and ignored in the context of criminal proceedings. Thus, we can observe 
prosecutors focusing their attention on the anarchist ideology of defendants.  
 
During the trial of defendant Eric McDavid, the “anarchist” lifestyle of the defendant was 
discussed at length: the fact that he traveled by hitchhiking, engaged in shoplifting, and 
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attended anarchist conventions organized by the organization CrimethInc. His co-defendant 
explained how they would panhandle or steal in order to feed themselves. They did train 
hopping and dumpster diving. It was pointed out that Eric had read the book Evasion, in which 
an anarchist describes her lifestyle (this led a supporter to comment that if such books were 
suspicious her bookshelves would certainly bring her into trouble as well, Interview US-4). The 
focus on anarchism is already clear in the affidavit, in which special FBI agent Walker stated that 
“Eric McDavid, age 28, is an anarchist” (p. 3).164 The affidavit further described the protest 
activities that McDavid was involved in and how McDavid was introduced to anarchist thinking 
by his friend Ryan Lewis, who was later convicted for an ELF arson attempt of a building under 
construction. The affidavit also described co-defendant Zachary Jenson and the fact that one of 
his favorite books was Days of War, Nights of Love by CrimethInc. “This book contains a 
chapter-by-chapter description of anarchist values and objectives,” commented the affidavit. 
During the trial, environmentalism was not ignored, but it did not play a primary role. The focus 
of the trial was on the alleged violent plans. The message is clear: whereas many groups may be 
environmentalist, only the dangerous ALF and ELF combine environmentalist ideology with 
anarchism.     
  
Activists similarly play with identities by representing themselves as the victims of government 
repression. For example, Scott DeMuth specifically foregrounded his identity as a “PhD 
student” when he refused to testify before a grand jury about an alleged ALF action at the 
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University of Iowa where he was studying, turning the fact that he was held in contempt into a 
repression of “academics” and “researchers.”  
 
Young middle-class kids  
The construction of “eco-terror” as a single phenomenon is supported by the image of a 
coherent collective of actors with comparable motives and backgrounds.  
 
The image painted of many of the defendants is that they are young, idealist, carried away. The 
people “down the chain” are manipulated by some ideologues. A certain paternalistic attitude 
appeared in the interviews with the prosecutors, as they referred to “preventing these kids 
from doing stuff they later regret” (Interview US-1). The younger eco-activists were often 
perceived as middle-class kids who somewhere had taken a different turn and should just be 
brought back to the right path, which given their identity, background, and socio-cultural-
economic environment should not be too difficult. They were thus portrayed as well-thinking 
intelligent individuals, engaged in youthful experimentation. The danger of their actions was 
seen as being more a consequence of naïveté than of bad nature. One prosecutor viewed 
young activists as “victims” of the ideology and older “cell” members to which they were 
attracted (Interview US-1). Given this image of, for example, the SHAC defendants, the 
prosecutor expressed his hope that the prosecution would discourage others who might be 







The prosecutor thought that these defendants could engage in activity that “in retrospect” they 
would not be “happy” with (ibid.).  
 
The intended audience of the prosecutorial narrative in these trials consisted thus of other 
“kids” who were potentially attracted by websites or books that explain them how to turn their 
beliefs into action and give their lives meaning. Indeed, in a conversation with one prosecutor it 
seemed almost as if he was more concerned with those future kids than with victims of the 
protest activity: “I don’t want to see these people sent to prison for stupid stuff” (Interview US-
1). He expressed that the problem is that “the people that I have to prosecute are all babies.” 
He hoped that one of the public “eco-terror” trials would function as a deterrent to other “kids” 
who might get swooped away by romantic ideals and the incisive writing of figures like Derrick 
Jenson. He said that he hoped that this trial would make them think twice before they walk 
down this dangerous path (Interview US-1).  
 
In my conversation with a younger activist, he expressed what he called a feeling of 
“invincibility,” admittedly due to the fact that he and his fellow activists were predominantly 
white and upper middle class. They simply felt that they would not be prosecuted. He 
commented on an experience he had when he was arrested during a protest. He said that it 
was the first time that he really realized his privilege. He was the only white person; the others 
on the police bus were black, female, and transgender. The policemen were genuinely nice to 







future before him. The other people “didn’t have anything going for them.” Then he felt that 
even if he wanted to be equal to them that would be impossible. He was singled out because of 
his skin color and his college attendance. The other people did not have jobs and were black. He 
said that he experienced a feeling of “invincibility” which meant an “absence of fear.” He 
believed that the Green Scare “crackdown” was supposed to instill such fear in the white 
middleclass activists that dominated the radical environmentalist protests (Interview US-5).  
 
The righteous attitude of these middleclass “kids” probably made people angry. According to 
one of the defense lawyers, their disrespectful attitude during home demonstrations absolutely 
“pissed off” the judge in the SHAC prosecution (Interview US-14). This lawyer also described a 
scene where Laura Gazzola, one of the SHAC defendants, did a pirouette on the stairs of the 
courthouse after a day of trial. All the journalists were outside waiting to interview people. She 
described that people were looking at Gazzola as if she were still in another world, not really 
understanding that she was on trial for a federal crime, maybe going to jail for a long time. 
Indeed, a fellow activist commented that she had never thought that she would be caught 
(Interview US-5).  
 
Big fish, leaders, and ideologues – members of “criminal” organizations 
In opposition to those who are identified as “babies” or “kids” are the so-called “big fish.” These 
are the “masterminds,” manipulators or, as one prosecutor said, the “sheep slaughterers” 







“ideologues in the movement” are the real danger and bear the responsibility for the crimes 
committed. These masterminds, he said, are the authors of inciting books and films, such as 
Derrick Jensen and Craig Rosebraugh. The prosecutor remarked that it was problematic that 
those enticing those young and naïve kids into the crimes were not serving any time. He 
pictured them “behind the screens” and argued that “those people know what they are doing: 
they are sending the sheep to the slaughter.” As will be discussed below, in the SHAC case the 
prosecutors specifically decided to go after those higher up in the hierarchy, charging the 
defendants with a campaign to “enlist” animal rights activists in activity that would harm the 
business of HLS (SHAC Indictment 2004, #4). The prosecutor in the SHAC case recurred to a war 
metaphor to describe the relationship between “generals” who are planning and coordinating 
the actions and “foot soldiers” who are executing them. 
 
In another case the prosecutor accused two organizers of a home demonstration against 
Huntingdon Life Sciences of “corruption of minors” because two of the demonstrators were 
under age. A state police agent commented to a local newspaper that “[i]t was indeed a 
corruption of minors. These kids were led to believe they were doing something in the city and 
ended up on private property in suburban Chester County” (Nawrocki 2004). Here again, a 
distinction is made between “kids” who can be manipulated and organizers who are held 
responsible. The judge later threw the charge out, arguing that the state had failed to prove 








Sometimes, criminal justice agents describe activists as “leaders.” For example, SHAC activist 
Andy Stepanian was labeled a “leader of the Animal Liberation Front” when he entered prison 
(Stepanian 2009). Also, McDavid was positioned as the leader of his “cell,” and therefore as a 
danger for the others. The prosecutors pictured him as having drawn in the other co-
defendants, as a hard-liner who was prepared to do anything for his ideals (Field notes, Trial, 
September 2007). Also, Jonathan Paul was portrayed as a “leader” in animal rights circles, 
making it so important that he renounce the use of fire (Flies on the Wall 2007). Such alleged 
role of “leadership” is relevant because federal sentencing guidelines provide for an “upward 
departure” in the guidelines if the defendant occupied a leadership role in the planning and 
execution of the crime (see §3B1.1, “aggravating role”).   
 
“Big fish,” “ideologues,” and “leaders” can only play a role when single events are re-
contextualized into a bigger picture. Just like the prosecutorial emphasis on anarchism at the 
expense of environmentalism, I understand the efforts to distinguish between middle class 
“kids” on the one hand and long-time “leaders” or “ideologues” on the other hand as one of the 
tools with which the prosecutorial narrative engages in the process that I call marginalization. 
The prosecutorial narrative distinguishes between those who actually do not properly “belong” 
in the criminal justice arena and should be prevented from “crossing the line” and those who 
should be dealt with in the criminal justice arena and held criminally responsible for the harm 








3. Changing the image: From sabotage and vandalism to “eco-terrorism”  
 
Since the 2000s terrorism enhancements and the AEPA/AETA have been used more and more 
in trials against environmentalist activists. Underlying this usage is a changing image of 
environmentalist actions which increasingly stresses their alleged “terroristic” nature. In this 
section, I trace the usage and meaning of the emerging “terrorism” image in the prosecutorial 
narrative, identifying the transition of environmentalist actions from “sabotage” and 
“vandalism” to “eco-terrorism.” The label “terrorism” has become a central topic of dispute in 
the meta-conflict, and both victim advocates and prisoner supporters work towards 
establishing the “correct” meaning of actions as well as the boundary between what is 
terrorism and what is not, employing analogies, metaphors, and examples in order to defend 
their positions. In tracing the development of the application of the term “eco-terrorism” I look 
at the example of how releasing animals turned from theft or destruction of property into a 
terrorist offense. As the word terrorism came to be attached to such cases, it changed the 
meaning of such conduct while simultaneously the concept “terrorism” received a new 
connotation as “eco-terrorism” obtained its own more specific meaning vis-à-vis “terrorism.”  
 
The image of eco-terrorism in the prosecutorial narrative 
The previous chapter already described the changing definition of the situation by government 
actors, such as the FBI, and the emergence of the eco-terrorism narrative as pushed by targets 







guiding prosecutorial arguments and decisions. Thus, during sentencing hearings, prosecutors 
have drawn on the eco-terrorism narrative to emphasize the fear of the targets of 
environmentalist actions. For example, in the sentencing memorandum of Coronado in 1995 
the prosecutor specifically referred to the fear and intimidation experienced by victims, who 
were “so afraid of the defendant and others like him” that they would not speak with the 
court’s pre-sentence investigator unless anonymity was guaranteed. The victims in the 
prosecutorial narrative are “ordinary citizens” who now live in fear: 
 
Scientists, business owners and farmers around the United States still live in fear that a bomb will 
be waiting for them the next time they go to their offices, farms or laboratories. The defendant's 
actions on behalf of the ALF may not have ended scientific research, but they have succeeded in 
making ordinary citizens of this country afraid to respond the ALF's claims that there exist no 
legitimate reasons to use animals in scientific research. (Government Sentencing Memorandum, 
31 July 1995, p.19–20) 
 
Environmentalist activists have contested this prosecutorial claim that victims are living in fear, 
dismissing that fear as a construct. Journalist Will Potter, for example, argued that the eco-
terrorism “threat” has been manufactured since the 1980s (Potter 2007).165  
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 “They [industry groups] are doing everything they can to create this fear through scare-mongering: that’s the 
point. In light of this political climate, it’s impossible to discuss ‘reasonable fear,’ because industry groups are 
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In their construction and justification of the terrorism label, prosecutors have further stressed 
the danger of the extreme tactics used by environmentalist activists. One prosecutor pointed 
out that with tactics like arson and bombing it is never possible to guarantee total safety and 
said that it was a “grace of God that people have not been killed” (Interview US-1).166 Just as 
other U.S. Attorneys and FBI officials, he thus does not the credit the precautionary measures 
of activists, but simple luck (Costanzo 1998). “It was pure luck that no one was killed or injured 
by their actions,” said the U.S. Attorney from Oregon in the Operation Backfire case (Terrorism 
Enhancement Hearing 2007:12). Activists and their lawyers dispute this “luck” attribution. “We 
are all glad no one was hurt. But in our view, that was not luck. That was design” (defense 
lawyer, Terrorism Enhancement Hearing 2007:80). This contention even led the defense 
lawyers to bring a witness who had done a statistical study to measure “how likely it was that 
all of the arsons committed by the ELF and ALF over the course of its history, as tracked by the 
FBI, have never resulted in a single injury or death” (Terrorism Enhancement Hearing 
2007:104). Thus, whereas the activists emphasize that their actions only result in material 
damage, the prosecutorial narrative proclaims otherwise. The prosecutor argued, for example, 
in the case against the “cell” known as the “Family”: 
Defendants' acts spanned five years, five western states, and were wholly intended to 
intimidate, coerce, frighten, punish, and demoralize people, not buildings. People. People in 
government, people in business, people in private and public life. Directed at people, not 
buildings, for the purpose of changing or paying for, in the sense of retaliation, lawful public 
policy by government and lawful activity by business. This is a classic case of terrorism, despite 
their proclamation of lofty humane goals. They attempt to soft-pedal their criminal conduct as 
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Eric McDavid, when the prosecutor emphasized that the defendant was about to start a “bombing campaign” in 
California. The term “bombing campaign,” however, contrasts starkly with the term “sabotage,” which was used in 







somehow admirable because it was aimed at property, not people. They are wrong. It was 
aimed directly at people. (Terrorism Enhancement Hearing 2007:9–10)  
 
In addition to the emphasis on the fear of victims and the danger of physical injury, the eco-
terrorism narrative emphasizes the motive of defendants in order to justify the terrorism label 
and the application of the terrorism enhancement. While motives are traditionally excluded 
from the criminal justice arena, the terrorism label brings the motive back, though frequently 
ignoring the ecological concerns and instead construing the motive narrowly as coercion of the 
government. Thus, in the case against the Family, the prosecutor used activist communiqués to 
argue that their motive was to “retaliate against the government for rounding up wild horses 
and sending them to slaughter,” which then legitimated the application of the terrorism 
enhancement (Terrorism Enhancement Hearing 2007:29).  
 
The successful application of the terrorism label often leads to increased sentences and more 
severe prison condictions. Not only can terrorism enhancements result in prison sentences of 
nearly 20 or 22 years imprisonment (Eric McDavid and Marie Mason, respectively), it also 
influences the jail time itself. Prisoners are transported under maximum security conditions, 
and some environmentalist activists have been imprisoned in so-called Communication 
Management Units (CMU), which are prisons for those whose cases are either very political or 
media-sensitive. In such special prisons, incoming and outgoing communication is monitored 
more intensively than in ordinary prisons. All communications are controlled. Prisoners are 
allowed visits only four hours per month and a fifteen-minute phone call per day (Stepanian 







can already have an impact. For example, Will Potter reported that after a SHAC-related 
leafleting action the FBI had threatened to put him on the domestic terrorist list, that he (a 
journalist) would never work at a newspaper again, and that his girlfriend would lose her 
scholarships, because “scholarship committees don’t want terrorists as recipients” (2011a:13). 
 
Underlying the meta-conflict about the appropriateness of the terrorism label is the implicit or 
explicit comparison with other crimes that are deemed to be graver or other criminals who are 
deemed to be more dangerous than environmentalist activists. Comparisons are a major device 
in the conversation in which the meaning of terrorism is disputed and boundaries between 
what is terrorism and what is not are drawn. Activists frequently invoked the fact that anti-
abortionists were not labeled “terrorists” even though anti-abortionists engaged in the killing of 
doctors (Potter 2007).167 Defense lawyer Lee argued in the Backfire case that 
 
[i]t's about who these defendants are. It's about what the concept of terrorism means in these 
troubled times, about whether we still know the difference between […] Osama bin Laden, 
Timothy McVeigh, and the people sitting in this room who adhered firmly to a credo of not 
killing and injuring people. (Terrorism Enhancement Hearing 2007:64) 
 
Comparisons with other crimes are employed by all voices in the meta-conflict in order to 
create a seemingly “objective” scale of graveness and thus infer a “just” label and 
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long list with other crimes committed in Oregon in order to demonstrate the discrepancy between his sentence 
(22 years and 8 months for burning three sport utility vehicles) and the lower sentences in other cases (attempted 







corresponding sentence. During the sentencing hearing of the “Family,” the prosecutor made a 
comparison with the Ku Klux Klan:  
 
The defendants' argument is there was no injury to human beings, no danger to humans, and 
therefore, there was no terrorism. If that's the standard, the Ku Klux Klan didnot commit 
terrorism when they traveled in the dark of night, three, four o'clock in the morning, burning 
black churches in Mississippi. No one was inside the churches, noone was there to be injured. 
They may not have wanted to injure anybody. They just burned buildings. So according to the 
defense theory, that's not a terroristic act. (Terrorism Enhancement Hearing 2007:12) 
 
This comparison personally upset the African-American lawyer of McGowan, who perceived the 
comparison as an insult. In a media interview the lawyer emphasized that the Ku Klux Klan was 
about murder and that therefore the comparison could not be made so lightly (Stepanian 
2009). Indeed, driving home the significance of re-contextualization and the interpretation of 
events, the creation of patterns, and the use of a broad or narrow timeframe, the defense 
counsel Lee argued that the fact that the KKK sometimes burnt empty churches cannot be 
viewed in isolation from the fact that at other times people were killed inside those churches, 
such as four girls in a Birmingham church (Terrorism Enhancement Hearing 2007:58). However, 
the prosecutor argued that  
 
[t]hey compare themselves to the wrong people, frankly. They should be comparing themselves 







one building, the IRS building in Colorado Springs, Colorado […] Serving as a lookout. No one was 
injured. Just property damage. That's who they should be comparing themselves with. 
(Terrorism Enhancement Hearing 2007:13-14).  
 
The emergence of “terrorism” as a label for environmental action 
By 2009, the term “eco-terrorism” had become normal currency within the criminal justice 
system, as it is, for example, used in affidavits written by FBI agents, who refer to eco-terrorism 
without any additional explanation (e.g., the criminal complaint against Steve Murphy, 
California 2009). While the concept “eco-terrorism” is new and its systematic and broadened 
use in criminal investigations and prosecutions a recent phenomenon, the terrorism label in 
relation to environmental activity has been around in public discourse at least since the 1980s, 
for example when the tactic of treespiking led opponents to brand it as “terrorism” (Scarce 
2006:77). It took a while, however, for such public discourse to be translated into courtroom 
discourse and measures.168 For example, even though during the sentencing hearing of Rod 
Coronado in 1995 his actions were framed as part of a “terrorist” campaign169, he pled guilty for 
common arson, and was sentenced to four years in prison – nothing like the nearly twenty 
years defendants received ten years later for arson attacks for which the terrorism 
enhancement was requested.  
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 While the majority of “terrorism” prosecutions took place during the 2000s, there were also some earlier 
incidents where activists were investigated because of alleged “terrorist” activities. For example, around 1990 Judi 
Bari and Darryl Cherney were under investigation for alleged terrorist activity (Scarce 2006:280).  
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 “A terrorist combines violence and threats so that those that disagree with him are silenced, either because they 
have been victimized by violence or because they fear being victimized” (Government Sentencing Memorandum, 31 







In order to trace the development of the terrorist label in relation to environmentalist activity, 
it is instructive to take a closer look at one of the documents in which the FBI made a 
“chronological summary of terrorist incidents in the United States 1980–2005” on an Excel 
worksheet, including codes describing the “terrorist” action, the (alleged) perpetrators, and 
whether the action involved killings or injuries. In this document, the FBI qualified as 
“terrorism” acts committed by a wide variety of groups fighting for an even wider variety of 
goals, ranging from the Jewish Defense League to the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation 
of Armenia, and from the Justice Knights of the Ku Klux Klan to the Red Guerrilla Resistance (FBI 
2006). In the 1980s, these different militant organizations seem to have flourished, engaging 
primarily in bombings or shootings.  
 
The first environmental action listed by the FBI in this document is an act on 14 May 1986 in 
Phoenix, Arizona, attributed to Earth First!. The FBI coded that action as “sabotage” and noted 
that nobody got killed or injured (FBI 2006). The second environmental incident qualified as 
“terrorism” on this FBI list occurred in 1987 in California and was attributed to the ALF. It was 
the first ALF arson in the United States, and this arson of the veterinary building under 
construction at the University of California at Davis was investigated by the FBI because of the 
“terroristic” nature of the attack (Scarce 2006:223).  
 
During the 1980s, a total of seven environmental actions were qualified as “terrorist incidents”: 







1990s there are only three actions of “eco-terror” on the list: one incident of malicious 
destruction of property, one action of fire bombing, and one arson. A surge in environmental 
“terrorist” actions, however, is visible after 1999. For 1999–2005 the list includes four 
bombings, seven incidents of malicious destruction of property (a few of them with theft), 24 
arsons (some multiple, some attempted), one burglary, one tree-spiking incident, and two 
incendiary attacks. Thus, while the 1980s and 1990s paint a quiet picture on the 
environmentalist front as far as the “terrorist” variants are concerned, after 1999 the FBI noted 
a total of 49 eco-terrorist actions in only seven years.  
 
The FBI chronology requires a little “decoding” to understand what some of the actions were. 
For example, the charge “vandalism/destruction of property” (such as in Harborcreek in 2002) 
refers to two actions of mink releases (200 and 50 minks, respectively). The action in West 
Covina in 2003 (coded as “vandalism and destruction of property”) refers to the destruction of 
more than 125 SUV’s and Hummers at several car dealerships. “Vandalism” in July 2000 in 
Rhinelander consisted of the hacking down of experimental trees.170 As the list only reports acts 
of “terrorism,” the list is not comprehensive of all eco-protest actions. As mentioned, the Excel 
worksheet also lists two columns indicating the number of people killed or injured. In some of 
the other terrorist incidents there were casualties (for example, the bombing of an abortion 
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 This explicatory information is based on a list of events posted by an “ELF supporter” on the independent media 
website Indymedia Seattle (ELF supporter 2008). Interestingly, even though the list posted by the activist is 
considerably longer, some events listed by the FBI are not mentioned by the activist. I have not been able to come 








clinic by Eric Robert Rudolph led to eight injured). For all the environmentalist actions, both 
columns are empty.  
 
So, during the 1980s and 1990s “terrorist” actions were attributed only sporadically to 
environmentalist activists or groups. It is only since 1999 that environmentalist actions have 
literally taken up the majority of the listed actions.171 This raises the important question 
whether the government “crackdown” perceived as the Green Scare is a simple response to an 
increase in extreme actions by environmentalist activists, or whether the FBI recognition and 
“count” of terrorist attacks is an artifact of the Green Scare. An indication of the latter is that 
since 1999 the FBI started to list as “terrorist incidents” the kinds of actions that in the 1980s 
and the 1990s did not appear on this list. For example, the mink releases done by Peter Young 
in 1997 are not listed on the FBI list, while mink releases are in fact listed in later years (such as 
the mink release in Harborcreek in 2002). This indicates that in 1997 mink releases were not 
officially considered “terrorism” yet, and therefore did not make it to this FBI list on terrorist 
incidents.  
 
Indeed, overviews of the extreme environmental protest in the 1980s show that already during 
that decade bombs were placed and animal releases occurred – actions that were listed as 
“terrorism” after 1999. Although these incidents might have increased in frequency in later 
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 Non-environmental actions listed by the FBI after 2000 are only two attacks by anti-abortionist activists, the 
9/11 Al Qaeda attack, the anthrax mailings, a shooting involving an Egyptian immigrant, and one arson on behalf of 
the “Aryan Nations.” The other 47 actions are attributed to the ELF or ALF (and two actions to Daniel Andreas San 







years, the fact that such actions occurred makes it possible to observe that at that time they 
were labeled differently, as many of these actions do not turn up in the FBI terrorism 
chronology. Between 1980 and 1987, apart from animal releases, other covert acts consisted of 
threats and (fire)bombs, arson, paint bombs, or fake bombs, and there were spray painting, 
gluing of locks, damaging of windows, stealing of research data in a break-in, and some 
undercover investigations. For example, there was a bomb threat to an animal laboratory 
veterinarian in Chicago, Illinois, in the fall of 1982. Then on 20 March 1983, a bomb was placed 
outside the home of a researcher, the bomb was later found by a family member. In 1985, 
activists hurled an ax into the front door of an animal researcher and left a threatening letter 
(Guither 1998:221–224). None of these incidents in the early 1980s turn up in the FBI 
chronology.  
 
Some of the actions in the 1980s also led to considerable damage. For example, on 9 December 
1984 at the City of Hope Research Institute in Duarte, California, $500,000 in damage was 
registered when the ALF organized a break-in, stealing dogs, cats, rabbits, mice, and rats. On 20 
April 1985 at the University of California, Riverside, there was an ALF break-in leading to 
estimated damages of $600,000 for stealing rats, mice, pigeons, monkeys, cats, rabbits, 
opossum, and gerbils. And on 2 June 1987, a fur store in St. Louis, Missouri, was firebombed, 
with an alleged one million dollars in damage (Guither 1998:221–224). These incidents do not, 
however, appear on the FBI chronology. Indeed, the FBI’s notation of environmentalist 







Such discrepancies in labeling continue in the 1990s when, for example, a firebomb in a fur 
store, reportedly resulting in more than $2 million in damage, does not turn up on the FBI 
chronology (12 November 1996, Bloomington, Minnesota, Fur Commission 2011c).172 I thus 
conclude that since 1999 the FBI categorizes as terrorism a broader range of actions than it had 
previously.  
  
Understanding incidents as a common phenomenon: Creating a pattern 
The FBI chronology shows that the actions that are collectively imagined as “eco-terrorism” are 
attributed to or claimed by different actors or networks173, are coded with a wide variety of 
labels174, and occur across the United States, from Arizona, Washington, and California to 
Illinois, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. Thus, while the range of actions and their geographical 
spread indicate wide variation, the FBI makes claims about “eco-terror,” thus construing it as a 
single phenomenon that can be analyzed as a coherent category. Construing this phenomenon, 
in 2008, the FBI commented on  
 
The sheer volume of their crimes (over 2,000 since 1979);  
The huge economic impact (losses of more than $110 million since 1979);  
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 It is also noteworthy that whereas today the FBI mainly portrays the ALF and the ELF as a threat, during the 
1980s and 1990s many other organizations were involved in animal releases, such as the Urban Gorillas, Band for 
Mercy, the Farm Freedom Fighters, True Friends, the Animal Rights Militia, the Justice Department, and the 
Straight Edge Gang (see, for example, Guither 1998:221–233).  
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 Actions are attributed to or claimed by Earth First, the Earth Liberation Front, the Animal Liberation Front, and 
the Evan Mecham Eco-Terrorist International Conspiracy, in addition to actions which were apparently not claimed 
but for which “animal rights extremists” were “suspected.” 
174
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The wide range of victims (from international corporations to lumber companies to animal 
testing facilities to genetic research firms);  
Their increasingly violent rhetoric and tactics (one recent communiqué sent to a California 
product testing company said: “You might be able to protect your buildings, but can you protect 
the homes of every employee?”). (FBI 2008a)  
 
These observations then led the FBI to conclude that eco-terrorists and animal rights extremists 
are “one of the most serious domestic terrorism threats in the U.S. today” (FBI 2008a). Having 
established eco-terrorism as a category, the FBI claimed that the economic impact is “huge” 
and that “over 2,000 crimes since 1979” (on average about 66 per year) is a lot. Such 
statements only gain meaning in comparison with other categories of crime, but what are 
meaningful comparisons? For example, there were 15,241 murders in 2009; there were 89,000 
incidents of forcible rape and 408,217 incidents of robbery in 2009 (Disaster Center 2011). FBI 
crime statistics can tell us that in 2006, 2,105 law enforcement agencies reported 7,722 hate 
crime incidents involving 9,080 offenses (FBI 2006). Does it make sense to compare the 
phenomenon of environmentalist actions to such categories of crimes in order to compare their 
volume or economic impact? As illustrated above, the very issue of adequate comparisons and 
analogies is a topic of debate in the meta-conflict.  
 
The coining of the term “eco-terrorism” has led to the perception of a “pattern” and a relation 
between single “events.” By bringing a set of actions under one term, different actors, targets, 







classification is the creation of a specific category of crimes that can be counted, understood as 
a pattern, and to which specific motives or a modus operandi can be attributed. Thus, having 
classified specific events as “eco-terrorism,” in 2008 the FBI reported that “[o]ur efforts have 
paid off,” as it claimed that the investigations regarding “eco-terror” since 2005 had resulted in 
indictments against thirty individuals (FBI 2008a). These thirty individuals, who may be charged 
with separate and different crimes, are thus understood as belonging together in a meaningful 
category. This common phenomenon was also invoked, for example, when a prosecutor 
referred to the first ALF arson at the University of California at Davis in 1987 as a “proto-arson” 
and Jonathan Paul as a “proto-arsonist,” as this attack supposedly encouraged others to engage 
in arson (Flies on the Wall 2007).     
 
Thus, the FBI and prosecutors create a narrative that connects actions of environmentalist and 
animal rights activists into a pattern. This narrative is reproduced in courtrooms. For example, 
during the sentencing hearing against William Viehl, who had released mink in Utah, the 
prosecutor showed a slideshow that displayed images from arsons attributed to or claimed by 
the ALF, as well as communiqués for actions of which Viehl was not accused (Young 2010). This 
prosecutorial strategy was also employed in Chile, where in the trial against the “Lonkos of 
Traiguén” victims from a wide range of attacks were called upon to testify about their 
experiences, even though those attacks were not attributed to the defendants. This is a typical 
example of how prosecutors draw upon and enact re-contextualized narratives in concrete 







the defendant for a single event (alleging direct involvement and criminal responsibility for that 
incident), the prosecutor re-contextualized that event in a pattern of ALF actions, implying that 
only in that context the jury and judge could achieve proper understanding and interpretation 
of the meaning of the case. Activists dispute this way in which the terrorism label is used to 
reinforce a pattern and a connection between separate events. They, in turn, have taken this 
linguistic and representational battle into the courtroom. For example, the defense lawyer of 
Scott DeMuth filed a motion to bar the prosecutor from talking about other ALF actions (which 
would reinforce the “pattern”) and using the words “terrorism” or “terrorist” to describe the 
actions DeMuth was charged with (Supportcarrie 2010).175  
 
The creation of a pattern was at the core of the case against the “cell” called the “Family,” also 
known as the Operation Backfire case. Seventeen defendants were implicated in seventeen 
attacks, including the $12 million arson of the Vail Ski Resort in Vail, Colorado, in 1998 and the 
sabotage of a high-tension power line near Bend, Oregon, in 1999. The defendants were 
accused of attacks on federal land and animal management sites, private meat packing plants, 
lumber facilities, and a car dealership with damages reaching $80 million. The exact conspiracy 
as in the indictment of the “Family” was as follows: 
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 DeMuth was initially indicted for conspiracy under the AETA for the 2004 raid on the University of Iowa, which 
was attributed to the ALF evn though, according to his supporters, the prosecutors did not present much evidence 
that would connect him to that event. In April 2010 DeMuth was re-indicted and the new indictment contained a 
new allegation, this one of involvement in a different ALF action (a ferret release at a farm that occurred in 
Minnesota in the spring of 2006). His supporters commented that “though the prosecutor seemed poised to make 
an argument connecting all ALF actions across the years and across the country under a single conspiracy, there 







The general purposes of the conspiracy were to influence and affect the conduct of government, 
commerce, private business, and others in the civilian population, by means of force, violence, 
sabotage, mass destruction, intimidation, and coercion, and, by similar means, to retaliate 
against the conduct of government, commerce, and private business. To achieve these 
purposes, the conspirators committed and attempted to commit acts dangerous to human life 
and property that constituted violations of the criminal laws of the United States and of 
individual states. (Terrorism Enhancement Hearing 2007:9)   
 
Significant and reminiscent of the Kale Borroka allegations in Chapter 3, is that not all 
defendants in this case were accused of participating in all of the crimes that were allegedly 
committed as part of the conspiracy. They allegedly committed the crimes in changing 
combinations of participation. In most of the suspected crimes three or four of the defendants 
were involved, “family members” as the prosecutor called them. The government chose not to 
prosecute the defendants for the separate crimes in the concrete constellations in which they 
allegedly had committed the various acts. Instead, the members of the “cell” were prosecuted 
for the conspiracy to commit those various crimes, a clear move of re-contextualization of each 
of the separate incidents into a larger pattern, involving a larger group of co-conspirators, a 
larger collective of targets and victims, and a specific shared motive. At the same time, and 
stressing their adherence to the core values of liberal legalism, both the prosecutor and the 








The creation of the common phenomenon of “eco-terrorism” thus involves the construction of 
a pattern between separate incidents, the creation of a collective of perpetrators with certain 
traits or linkages with specific organizations, the creation of a collective of victims, and the 
attribution of a motive. This then enables the prosecution of a “cell” such as “the Family.” 
 
Releasing animals: From theft or destruction of property to terrorism  
As an example of the changing label regarding environmentalist tactics, in this section I show 
two things. First, I show that the prosecutorial narrative about the release of animals has 
changed from “theft” or “destruction of property” to (animal enterprise) “terrorism.” Of course, 
the development of the AEPA and later the AETA form a central part of this transformation. I 
further show how society is polarized between voices that view the release of animals as the 
“liberation” of “victims” that are held in dire conditions and maltreated on the one hand and 
voices that view such releases of animals as an attack on legitimate animal enterprises that 
provide society with the necessary production of food and clothes on the other hand. These 
voices enter into the meta-conflict in the criminal justice arena as they promote or dispute the 
charges leveled by the state.  
 
The first act of “animal liberation” occurred in March 1979, when activists broke into a lab of 
the New York University Medical Center in the name of the Animal Liberation front, “liberating” 
two dogs, two guinea pigs, and a cat (Jasper & Nelkin 1992:33; ALF 2011b). After years of such 







might want to enter them for “animal liberation” purposes. Research laboratories using animals 
have come to be equipped with security cameras and other surveillance and security measures. 
In the early 1980s this was not the case yet (Scarce 2006:215). Since then, raids have been 
conducted at fur farms, laboratories, and factory farms.  
 
During the 1980s, the FBI did not label such “animal liberations” as terrorism. For example, on 
26 October 1986, activists released 264 animals from the University of Oregon and inflicted 
$120,000 worth of damage on the laboratory (ALF 2011b). This incident did not make it onto 
the FBI’s “chronology of terrorist incidents” (FBI 2006). One of the “big fish” in animal 
liberation, Jonathan Paul, was prosecuted for this “burglary”; however, the charges were 
dismissed on 1 May 1991 (Flies on the Wall 2007).176 By 2009, however, the release of animals 
had been transformed into a terrorist offense. In that year, two activists were convicted to 21 
and 24 months under the Animal Enterprise Terrorist Act for the release of 650 mink from a fur 
farm in Utah in August 2008 (“AETA 2 case”), the first time that the AETA led to prison 
sentences (Young 2010).  
 
The Fur Commission claims to have played an important role in redefining the nature of such 
actions of releasing animals. Peter Young raided six mink farms in the American Midwest in 
1997. He released between 8,000 and 12,000 mink, and two fur farms went out of business. Fur 
farmers reported that “1997 was a dark time for U.S. fur farmers as eco-terrorists struck 
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repeatedly” and lamented the lack of government attention to their plight (Fur Commission 
2009). Teresa Platt, director of the Fur Commission, an association representing mink-farming 
families, described how they proceeded to “engag[e] political will” (Platt 1999a). In 1998, on a 
tour in Europe, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) Louis Freeh said that 
“[e]co- and animal rights terrorism […] was not an issue, not a priority and not on the agency’s 
‘radar screen.’” The fur farmers were outraged by this lack of serious attention to the raids they 
experienced. Therefore, they allied with many other “animal- and resource-based industries” 
and engaged FBI agents in what they called a “bottom-up educational process” to achieve the 
“redirection of FBI manpower to include eco- and animal rights terrorism” and “push eco- and 
animal rights terrorism up the government’s priority pole.” They prided themselves on the fact 
that these efforts have resulted in a strong commitment from the FBI (Platt 1999a).     
 
In this meta-conflict about the adequate definition of the release of animals, different voices 
rely on different understandings of animals and their relation to human beings. Viewing animals 
as property enables a charge like “property destruction.” Deliberately employing criminal law 
language, animal rights activists claim that meat or fur is the same as “murder.” They describe 
animal enterprises as “torture facilities” and “hell.” Teresa Platt from the Fur Commission, on 
the other hand, described “animal enterprises” as “those who feed, clothe and shelter the 
Earth's inhabitants” (Platt 1999a). In a press release, the Fur Commission emphasized the “vital 







practical and beautiful, but is also natural, sustainable and environment-friendly” (Fur 
Commission 1998).  
 
In this section I traced the development of the concept “eco-terrorism” and its increasing 
application in cases of environmentalist action. This changing image of various forms of 
environmentalist activism means that there are concrete discursive shifts in the prosecutorial 
narrative. In the following sections I will identify two important discursive shifts which are a 
consequence of the re-contextualization of events into a pattern of “eco-terrorism.” First, I 
explore the move from reactive prosecution of past harm to the proactive investigation of 
potential future danger. Second, I explore the shift from the prosecution of underground 
(covert) activities towards the prosecution of aboveground activities, which activists often had 
deemed to be legal.  
 
4. Future danger instead of past harm: The shift towards proactive 
prosecution 
 
The prosecutorial narrative has shifted from a reactive focus on past harm to a proactive 
approach to deal with future danger. Indeed, in 2004 the FBI publicly announced its 
commitment to a proactive approach. Proactive investigations occur before a criminal event 
has occurred and to a great extent these investigations are focused on specific individuals, 







criticized the investment of time and resources in such proactive investigations. For example, 
lawyer Amanda Lee argued that “FBI domestic terrorism investigations […] are frequently out of 
proportion to the danger of the crime involved” (Bloom 2011). The proactive shift is visible in 
conspiracy charges designed to punish preparatory activities before a planned crime has taken 
place. It is further observable in the use of undercover FBI agents who monitor activists and 
meetings, a practice which has initiated a debate about the precise nature of such undercover 
activity and even raised the question of when it amounts to entrapment. The shift is lastly 
expressed in an increasing preoccupation with perceived processes of radicalization.  
  
There is no clear turning point in which proactive investigations became more common. 
However, throughout the years, and especially with the increased talk about “eco-terrorism,” 
proactive involvement of the FBI has become more institutionalized and frequent. In 2004, 
Deputy Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division of the FBI John E. Lewis announced 
the proactive approach of the FBI regarding the “threat posed by animal rights extremists and 
eco-terrorists in this country”:  
 
The FBI’s commitment to address the threat can be seen in the proactive approach that we have 
taken regarding the dissemination of information. Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) are 
used as a vehicle for delivering FBI intelligence information to members of the Intelligence, 








Lewis described that since March 2003, the FBI had established a Domestic Collection, 
Evaluation, and Dissemination Unit which in one year issued twenty Intelligence Information 
Reports related to animals rights/eco-terrorism activity. These reports are part of the FBI’s 
“proactive information campaign”:  
 
This campaign has included ongoing liaison with federal, state, and local law enforcement and 
prosecutors, relevant trade associations and targeted companies and industries. The FBI has 
established a National Task Force and Intelligence Center at FBIHQ to coordinate this 
information campaign, and develop and implement a nationwide, strategic investigative 
approach to addressing the animal rights/eco-terrorism threat in the United States. (Statement 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 18 May 2004)  
 
The proactive approach was visible, for example, in the early intervention and the conspiracy 
charge in the case of Eric McDavid. His case was taken to trial before the allegedly planned 
arson had taken place. Thus, the defendant was charged with conspiracy. In his closing 
arguments, the prosecutor emphasized that the defendant was about to start a “bombing 
campaign” in California. Justifying the proactive approach, the prosecutor sketched the 
dilemma the FBI faces:  
 
But does the FBI make the risk assessment at that point that, well, these people, they are talking 
about the White House, and they are talking about the Pentagon, and they are talking about the 







we don't have a conspiracy. That's not what the conspiracy law requires. […] We don't have to 
wait until the conspirators are crawling under the fence with bomb in hand or taking any closer 
steps, lighting the match. We just have to make sure we have a fully-formed conspiracy. (Closing 
arguments, 25 September 2007)   
 
The trial was a “conspiracy trial,” which meant in the words of supporters that the defendant 
“hadn’t done anything.” The prosecutor disagreed: “What if they had met a real chemistry 
student?” (FBI informant “Anna” had presented herself as a chemistry student). “There were no 
signs of them calling the mission off. At what point do you intervene?” (Interview US-1). Recall 
that a conspiracy consists of the following elements: (1) agreement to commit a crime; (2) overt 
act in execution of that agreement. A big chunk of the trial against McDavid was devoted to 
detailing the overt acts that the “kids” undertook in executing their plans. The prosecutor 
forcefully argued his case that these “kids” were playing a dangerous game. Activists, on the 
other hand, have pointed out that the recipe the FBI had provided them with was wrong, and 
that “Anna” did not have a small role in the group dynamic that led to their experimentations in 
the first place. Journalist Will Potter said that “[t]he guy didn’t do anything, […] At the worst, he 
hung around with a group of people who talked tough. In court, Anna actually complained that 
the group spent too much time hanging around and smoking pot” (Bloom 2011). 
 








Conspiracy charges are convenient for police and federal agents in that they do not require 
authorities to prove that any actual illegal activity took place, only shared intent. In that regard, 
they are an ideal weapon to wield against ideologically-based communities; they also lend 
themselves to government agents’ efforts to entrap naïve activists. (Conspiracy 2011) 
 
In addition to conspiracy charges and such early intervention, the proactive approach to “eco-
terrorism” is further characterized by the use of undercover agents. This is not new in relation 
to environmentalist protests. Already in the 1980s, the FBI focused its energy on the 
surveillance of “radical” environmentalist groups. Earth First!, for example, was infiltrated and 
spied upon almost from its founding in 1980 (Scarce 2006:280).177 While FBI informants are thus 
not a unique feature of the 2000s, they are an important characteristic of the proactive 
approach. Given the importance of these undercover investigations in providing evidence, it is 
not surprising that in the trial against Rod Coronado in 2007 the prosecutor proposed the 
following question in the voir dire: 
 
In order to investigate suspected criminal activity, law enforcement agents sometimes go 
undercover and pretend to be someone they are not. Does anyone have strong feelings, for or 
against, the use of undercover agents? Would your views prevent you from being fair and 
impartial in this case? (Government’s Trial Memorandum, 5 September 2007, p. 11) 
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accusations against them in 1990 after their car exploded. Also, in 1989, FBI undercover agent Mark Fain played a 
crucial role in a “cell” of Earth First! in the case of the “Arizona Five” (Scarce 2006:85–86). Scarce reported that 








Activists have criticized this reliance on such undercover agents, claiming that FBI infiltrators act 
as “agents provocateurs.” As mentioned in Chapter 6, in the case of Eric McDavid activists 
claimed that the prosecution was invalid because of “entrapment.” The defense argued that if 
McDavid was radicalizing, this was only under the influence of Anna, with whom he was deeply 
in love. The defense lawyer argued that without “Anna” there would have been no conspiracy, 
no get-together in California to start preparing a bomb, and no action in order to make it 
happen.178 A major question during the trial, therefore, was whether or not the defendants 
would have gone along with their plans if it had not been for “Anna.”179 While activists called 
this trial a prosecution of “thought crime” and “Orwellian” (Interview US-16; Support Eric 
2011b), the prosecutor argued during the closing arguments that the purpose of the 
entrapment defense is to protect the unwary innocent, not the unwary criminal.180 Merely 
providing an opportunity is not entrapment (Interview US-1). The prosecutor emphasized in his 
closing arguments:   
 
And, yes, it's true that Anna did some things at the FBI direction to facilitate that meeting. […] All 
the FBI did was bring these four co-conspirators together in one location to find out if they were 
serious about what Eric McDavid had talked about. […] if they had gotten together that 
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 The prosecutor disagreed: “The crime is the agreement. It doesn't have to be successful. [The defense lawyer] 
tries to show that they could never have succeeded. We know that they would not have succeeded. The FBI would 
never have let them succeed. It was important to know whether they were serious about this” (Interview US-1).    
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 This means that once the defense raised this defense, the prosecution had to prove that (1) there was no 
inducement by the government, or, if that could not be proven, that (2) the defendant had a predisposition to 
commit the crime that was the subject of the conspiracy.  
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 “To determine whether entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn between the trap for the 








weekend, and if they had gone hiking, and there had been no discussion of any conspiracy or 
any bombing campaign, game over. […] But that's not what happened. And fortunately, you 
have that on tape. (25 September 2007). 
 
The case of McDavid also exemplifies the third feature of the shift towards proactive 
investigation, which is the change in the object of investigation from past crimes to current 
processes of radicalization. Confidential source Anna was deployed initially with a focus on 
(anarchist) gatherings, spaces, and events where it was suspected that crimes might occur or be 
prepared. “Anna” met McDavid during protests and an anarchist convention in Des Moines and 
it was his observed radicalization (after “Anna” had initially described him as “harmless”) that 
led the FBI to provide opportunities to see how “serious” he was. This concern with 
radicalization was also visible in the proposed “Violent Radicalization and Homegrown 
Terrorism Prevention Act” of 2007. This law proposed to establish a national commission that 
would  
  
[e]xamine and report upon the facts and causes of violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, 
and ideologically based violence in the United States, including United States connections to 
non-United States persons and networks, violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and 
ideologically based violence in prison, individual or “lone wolf” violent radicalization, 
homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence, and other faces of the phenomena of 
violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence that the 








This draft law illustrates this shift in attention to radicalization processes. The proposed law 
provoked much criticism from activists and was never enacted.  
 
Having explored this shift in the prosecutorial narrative from a focus on past harm to the 
investigation of current radicalization or future crime, in the next section I explore instances of 
another discursive shift in the re-contextualized prosecutorial narrative: the shift towards the 
prosecution of certain aboveground activities.  
 
5. Prosecution of “aboveground” activities: Distinguishing the “political” 
from the “criminal”  
 
The prosecutorial narrative draws the boundary between the political and the criminal. In 
interviews with activists, they often expressed that indeed there are certain acts that are 
“unambiguously illegal,” such as the release of animals. However, they maintained that in other 
criminal cases “people hadn’t done anything” or that their “legal actions” were charged as 
crimes. Covert activity is often generally understood to be criminal (undercover investigations 
being an important exception). Aboveground activity, however, is generally far from 







In this section, I describe competing voices in the meta-conflict and how the prosecutorial 
narrative draws a line between aboveground activities that are the proper domain of the 
political arena and aboveground activities that “cross the line” and should be considered to be 
criminal. First I discuss the prosecution of certain aboveground activities which were not 
prosecuted before, and which activists had considered to be legal (and still argue that they 
should be). Here I focus on cases of public speech in which the prosecutorial narrative re-
contextualizes these speech acts in order to connect them to covert criminal activity. In this 
way, criminal responsibility is established, holding aboveground activists responsible for 
(directing and inciting) underground actions. In the second part, I explore the process of 
boundary drawing between what is criminal and political in aboveground activity in a case of 
civil disobedience. The conduct was clearly illegal, but DeChristopher and his supporters 
claimed to be justified in resorting to the actions given specific special circumstances. In this 
case, the prosecutorial narrative purposefully excluded context in order to de-politicize the 
offense.  
 
Each of the cases discussed in this section have created social mobilization outside of the 
courtroom, stirring up emotions and turning the names of some of the defendants into 
metaphors for those debates. The themes resonated with a larger public, seen in the fact that 
many voices have taken up positions and thoughts, thus engaging in the meta-conflict, debating 









Public expressions as inciting or directing criminal activity  
 
Generally, extremist groups engage in much activity that is protected by constitutional 
guarantees of free speech and assembly. Law enforcement only becomes involved when the 
volatile talk of these groups transgresses into unlawful action. (Lewis 2004) 
 
In this section, I explore the way in which the prosecutorial narrative describes this 
“transgression into unlawful action” in relation to public speech. I explore the criminal 
prosecution of two specific kinds of speech: (1) publishing addresses of potential “targets”; and 
(2) providing information about incendiary devices or other “weapons.” In both of these cases, 
the prosecutorial narrative links these public expressions to illegal underground activity and the 
speech is construed as incitement or inspiration for such activity. This involves a re-
contextualization of the speech acts to create a pattern and a causal link.   
 
Publishing addresses of potential targets 
In 1996 some activists for the ALF produced the first hardcopy publication of “The Final Nail,” 
which was a list of targets for animal “liberation” activities, including laboratory animal 
suppliers, trappings, slaughter houses, and fur farmers. Young openly emphasized the power of 








What I believe would see the greatest surge of direct action is providing people with more 
names and addresses. This is what made The Final Nail so successful in the 90s, and it’s what has 
made the anti-HLS campaign so successful today. It is something that would make animal abuse 
no longer an abstraction but something with an exact physical location, erasing most people’s 
excuse for turning away. Knowledge bears responsibility. I would like to see a Final Nail for labs. 
This, I think, would really set things off. (Young 2005b) 
  
Law enforcement officials have long been aware of such documents and how they facilitate, for 
example, mink farm raids (Justin Grand Jury Transcripts 2000). A prosecutor called “The Final 
Nail” the “Bible” for animal rights extremists (Cascadia 2007).  
 
Victim advocates have engaged in serious efforts to label such “hit lists” as incitement. Already 
in 1999, Teresa Platt from the Fur Commission spoke out against this tactic of making “hit lists.” 
She referred to a decision in another case in which similar hit lists for abortion doctors were put 
on the web. In February 1991, a jury in Portland, Oregon, ruled that materials produced by the 
defendants constituted a “true threat” to the lives and safety of abortion providers (Platt 
1999b). While the American Farm Bureau Foundation initiated a civil lawsuit to stop the 
government from releasing private information from farmers, at the time no criminal 
prosecutions were initiated against the authors of “The Final Nail.” In 2002 the Fur Commission 
pointed out that “terrorists” had used the addresses in “The Final Nail” to coordinate raids and 
send razor blades and other threats to fur farms. They also asserted that the Unabomber used 







such publications and argued that Young “set up Voice of the Voiceless to disseminate hit lists 
for use by violent vegan extremists and help raise money for those caught breaking the law. It is 
a matter of opinion whether his rhetoric should be viewed as ‘educational’ or incitement” 
(2009).  
 
In 2004 the government indicted six SHAC activists who kept a website on which they published 
the addresses of employees of Huntingdon Life Sciences and the home addresses of CEOs and 
employees from companies doing business with HLS. The case exemplifies the shift towards 
aboveground activity, as the prosecutors in that case deliberately shifted their attention from 
what one of the prosecutors called the “foot soldiers” who engaged in acts of vandalism that 
were experienced as threatening, terrorizing, and stalking. Instead, the prosecutors decided to 
focus on the “generals” who allegedly coordinated and incited such protest by publishing 
addresses on the Internet and calling upon people to demonstrate. The SHAC activists were 
convicted in 2006, and their sentences were confirmed on appeal in 2009. I will explore this 
case in much more detail in the next section as an example of the various discursive shifts in the 
re-contextualized prosecutorial narrative.  
 
Despite the SHAC prosecution and the possible implications for the redefinition of such activity 
as criminal, activists have continued to publish names and addresses of potential targets. In 
2009 Peter Young made a compilation of all the information about fur farms in the United 







boundary-drawing, the site has a disclaimer stating that “[a]ny names and addresses on 
FinalNail.com are published solely for educational, research or other lawful purposes. We do 
not encourage illegal activity or behavior” (Final Nail 2011).  
 
There have been more attempts by prosecutors to draw the publishing of addresses within the 
criminal justice arena. For example, in 2009 Kevin Olliff and ALF Press Officer Linda Greene 
were indicted for conspiracy to stalk and threaten a public officer or school employee. As the 
first of the overt acts, the prosecutor listed that  
  
unnamed and/or unidentified co-conspirators listed University of California at Los Angeles 
(UCLA) Professor Lynn Fairbanks as the “target” on the uclaprimatefreedom.com website, 
publishing her photograph, date of birth, personal contact information and a statement about 
her alleged animal experimentation at UCLA. (Indictment 2009) 
 
Instead of directly defining such activity as criminal, the prosecutorial narrative thus brought 
the publishing of information about a “target” under the purview of criminal conduct as an 
“overt act” in a conspiracy. It is significant that this overt act was, however, not even executed 
by the defendants, but by unnamed or unidentified co-conspirators.  
 
Providing information about incendiary devices or other “weapons”  
The publishing of addresses as “targets” has thus become a contentious practice which has 







activity is the publication or public explanation of aggressive tactics and the manufacture of 
potential weapons.  
 
Already in the 1980s and 1990s, activists engaged in the publishing of aggressive protest tactics. 
For example, in the 1980s Earth First! published a journal with a column on “eco-tactics” that 
were “unconventional,” including, for example, suggestions on how to destroy a helicopter 
(Scarce 2006:74). Earth First! founder Foreman published Ecodefense, which Scarce compares 
to the Anarchist Cookbook, including instructions for manufacturing explosives. As far as I am 
aware, the authors were never prosecuted for these publications.  
 
In 2006, however, a criminal case brought such speech acts into the criminal justice arena. In 
February 2006, Rod Coronado was indicted for a speaking engagement on 1 August 2003, 
where he allegedly did “teach and demonstrate the making and use of a destructive device […] 
with the intent that the teaching, demonstration and information be used for, and in 
furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a federal crime of violence, to wit, arson” 
(Indictment 2006).   
 
The government described the facts of the case as follows:  
 
On August 1, 2003, Defendant Rodney Coronado gave a lecture and demonstration a few hours 
after and a few miles away from the most expensive politically motivated arson in the history of 







incendiary device. His actions, statements and writings will prove that he gave this 
demonstration with the hope and intent that his listeners would follow in his footsteps and 
commit arson on behalf of environmental causes. (Government’s Trial Memorandum 2007:3)  
 
The government argued that Coronado had the intention that listeners would commit arson. In 
order to back this argument, the government specifically referred to one incident of arson that 
occurred on 1 August, fifteen hours before Coronado’s speaking engagement. This arson 
destroyed a 200-unit condominium complex in San Diego. The government pointed out that 
when Coronado was introduced as a speaker, a local activist reminded the audience that 
Coronado’s speech was particularly timely because the “Earth Liberation Front paid San Diego a 
visit last night.” The prosecutor also emphasized that in his speech Coronado spoke approvingly 
of the San Diego arson and that he talked about fire as a “cleansing force” (Government’s Trial 
Memorandum 2007:5).   
 
The U.S. Attorney’s press release in 2006 immediately re-contextualized the event, connecting 
the speech to the ALF and the ELF, and thus imbued it with the meaning that eco-terrorist cases 
have received over the years. Special Agent Torres from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and Explosives commented: “When organizations such as ELF/ALF engage in these 
senseless acts of violence, it threatens us all. ATF will continue to aggressively pursue these 
types of cases and bring this type of criminal activity to a halt” (emphasis added by author). This 
citation employs the narrative device of target-generalization, as he emphasizes that “it 







category of crimes (“this type of”). In calling the acts of violence “senseless,” he rejects and 
refuses to recognize proposed political motives as valid.  
 
Different narratives exist about what exactly happened during this speaking engagement. 
Prosecutors argued that the explanation of the incendiary device followed the concrete 
question of an unidentified woman who had asked how she could make a “bomb for an action” 
(Government’s Trial Memorandum 2007:6). Coronado disputed this and described that he was 
simply asked “what he had done in Michigan” (Defendant’s Memorandum, 24 March 2006), a 
statement that was supported by an audiotape presented by defense lawyer Tony Serra during 
the trial.  
 
The very fact, however, that the narratives dispute what exactly provoked Coronado to explain 
the “device” shows the fine line that currently separates the political arena from the criminal 
justice arena. In this way the prosecutorial narrative communicates that there is such a line and 
that in some cases the line is crossed. The jury instructions framed the issue as a line between 
free speech and incitement, stating that while the Constitution does guarantee the freedom of 
speech, it “does not protect speech or advocacy that is directed to solicit or produce imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action” (Jury Instructions 2007, No. 11). 
The prosecutorial narrative thus emphasizes the limits of free speech, for example when Special 
Agent Dzwilewski commented that “America will not tolerate terrorists. Whether you were 







the guise of free speech” (U.S. Attorney California 2006, emphasis added by author). The 
recurring theme is that activists are suspected to manipulate the law for their own purposes 
and abuse the rights they have.  
 
While activists believe that the government specifically targeted Coronado because he has been 
an important figure in the animal rights movement and declined to testify before a grand jury in 
another case,181 they clearly interpreted the prosecution as a message that the government is 
prepared to prosecute speech acts. The initial trial resulted in a hung jury. The prosecutor 
decided to re-try Coronado and seek an additional indictment in Washington, D.C., for a speech 
Coronado had delivered at the American University in January 2003. In the ensuing 
negotiations, Coronado decided to plead guilty in return for a one-year prison sentence.  
 
Civil disobedience  
In this section I continue to explore the way in which prosecutors draw the boundary between 
what is political and what is criminal in relation to aboveground activity. Above I explored the 
meta-conflict and the prosecutorial narrative regarding conduct which was not prosecuted 
before and which activists assumed to be legal and protected by free speech. Here I explore the 
prosecutorial narrative about conduct that is clearly illegal, but which activists have claimed as 
legitimate civil disobedience (defined as overt and nonviolent law breaking) given the special 
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circumstances. I thus explore the competing claims about civil disobedience and its potential to 
confer legitimacy to law-breaking.  
 
Tree sits and other kinds of public blockades have been a common protest tactic since the early 
1980s. Some environmentalist activists have argued that such tactics used to be more accepted 
and did not lead to harsh criminal prosecutions (Interview US-16). Few people were arrested or 
prosecuted for such protest. This may indicate that prosecutors accepted assertions that such 
actions were indeed civil disobedience. If activists were prosecuted, it seems that the 
convictions did not result in long sentences.182 Indeed, different sources report that if there 
were arrests for overt protest activity (such as the occupation of an office) this mostly led to the 
charge of trespassing (Guither 1998:221–233). In contrast, recently there has been a case 
where prosecutors specifically rejected the notion that tactics could be considered “civil 
disobedience” and prosecuted accordingly, rejecting the claims to “political” activity, explicitly 
arguing the “criminal” nature of the tactics.  
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 I have not been able to find much data regarding such prosecutions. That is why I tentatively concluded that 
there were not major or harsh prosecutions, or that at least they did not result in long sentences. Scarce mentions 
some of the arrests and convictions during the 1980s. In 1983, 44 Earth First! activists were arrested for 
“peacefully blockading the Bald Mountain Road” in North Kalmiopsis (2006:68). In 1987 the Sapphire Six spent 15–
20 days in jail for locking their bodies to a truck. In 1988 Mike Roselle was prosecuted for an action with 
Greenpeace for hanging banners. He pled guilty and got four months, with three on suspension; however, in the 
end he had to stay in jail the other three as well. Scarce described tree sits in 1989 where only three tree sitters 
were arrested who had turned themselves in to the authorities (2006:183). This was in Montana. It was during the 
National Tree Sit Week. Darryl Cherney of Earth First! spent ten days in jail for sitting in a tree that belonged to a 







The case against Tim DeChristopher: Classic de-contextualization  
On 19 December 2008, Tim DeChristopher participated as a bidder in an auction and increased 
the bids on 22,000 acres of land in Utah national parks. In addition, he acquired parcels worth 
$1.7 million for an action claimed by himself and his supporters as a nonviolent act of civil 
disobedience. He was charged with “two violations of federal law in connection with a scheme 
to interfere with the competitive bidding process during the sale of Bureau of Land 
Management oil and gas leases in Utah in December 2008” (U.S. Attorney District of Utah 
2011). After his arrest, DeChristopher actually raised money for a first payment that he owed 
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for the parcels that he bought during the auction.183 The 
payment was rejected by the BLM, however, as it was “too little, too late” (Riccardi 2009). In 
March 2011, a jury found him guilty on both charges. On 26 July 2011, Tim DeChristopher was 
sentenced to two years in prison, a three-year probation, and a $10,000 fine. DeChristopher 
announced that he would appeal his conviction and sentence. Online commentaries publicly 
hailed him as a “hero.”184 
 
In the competing narratives that vied for dominance in this trial, disagreement was expressed 
at different levels. First, the contestation revolved around the question of the harm that had 
been done or prevented, including the question of which “public” was either served by 
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2011).  
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DeChristopher’s action or needed to be protected from such “criminal” acts. Second, the 
different voices disputed the role of criminal proceedings in maintaining the rule of law and, 
alternatively, the role of acts of law breaking (civil disobedience) in demanding the rule of law 
and holding the government accountable to its own laws.  
 
In the sentencing recommendations, the prosecutor described the seriousness of the offense 
and the particular harm that was inflicted, specifically reproducing the value assumption of the 
hegemonic discourse by emphasizing corporate financial losses: 
The defendant derailed the oil and gas lease auction in one afternoon. The auction was the 
culmination of months, if not years of BLM and other agency preparation. Of course, that work 
was funded by United States taxpayers. Investors and businesses, too, expended considerable 
resources in preparation for and participation in the auction. The various money loss 
calculations probably give only symbolic illustrations of the seriousness of the defendant’s 
crimes, whether those losses are for the $139,000 cost of the auction, the $1.8 million price of 
the successful fake bids, or the $600,000 estimated loss by one businessman at the auction. 
Nonetheless, they are all accurate examples of how the defendant’s conduct greatly impacted 
others. (Prosecution sentencing recommendations 2011)  
 
The prosecutorial narrative thus produces a harm assessment with references to corporate loss 
calculations, taxpayers as a legitimate beneficiary, and the price of the parcels. This narrative is 
supported by an oil executive who stated that parcels on which DeChristopher did not bid went 
for an average of $12 per acre, whereas those on which he did bid averaged $125. Challenging 
that narrative on its own ground, DeChristopher pointed out that as companies were still willing 
to pay that price, that price far more resembled the real worth, and that paying anything less 







was paid to the Bureau of Land Management, a government agency, thus directly benefiting 
the taxpaying public that the prosecutor claimed to protect in the prosecution.  
 
DeChristopher, however, did not only challenge the prosecutorial narrative on its own terms, 
but also wanted to shift the terms of the debate. The question of what harm was at stake 
would have been addressed publicly if the defense lawyers had been able to use the 
“necessity” defense (claiming that his actions prevented a greater harm). This would have 
allowed addressing the motivations of DeChristopher and his concern with climate change and 
global warming as well as the alleged governmental actors’ violations of federal law and 
administrative regulations prior to and during the auction. These concerns were at the core of a 
civil lawsuit against the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) that aimed to force the government 
to re-evaluate the parcels up for auction and was only decided upon after the auction had 
already taken place.185 Acknowledging the merits of the complaints of the environmentalist 
organizations that the BLM was making an “irreversible and irretrievable commitment of 
resources” including the “likelihood of permanent damage to public land,” the judge in that civil 
case granted a temporary restraining order. After being re-evaluated by Interior Secretary 
Salazar, only 29 of the 116 parcels up for auction actually went through (Proffer 2009). 
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The judge ruled, however, that this necessity defense was not available,186 which meant that 
DeChristopher was not permitted to argue that he was acting in order to prevent greater 
environmental damage. The prosecutor thus managed to de-contextualize and de-politicize the 
case, excluding the legitimacy or legality of the auction from the trial: 
 
Whether the BLM was correct in its decision to offer these parcels for oil and gas lease sales was 
not the question which this jury was asked to resolve. The jury was asked to determine whether 
Mr. DeChristopher’s disruption of the BLM’s auction of oil and gas leases violated federal law. 
We believe that the jury properly found that it did. (U.S. Attorney District of Utah 2011) 
 
DeChristopher argued that his actions were necessary because at the time of the auction, 
several investigations had revealed the level of corruption and bribery in the BLM’s preparation 
of such auctions (Official statement 2011). The prosecutor, however, argued that the civil 
lawsuit proved the existence of lawful means to resist the auction. “The SUWA lawsuit 
exemplifies everything that the defendant’s random, spur-of-the-moment, criminal protest 
efforts in this matter were not” (written response to proffer 2009:2).  
 
Thus, the conversation shifted from the question about harm to the meaning of the rule of law 
and the meaning and legitimacy of civil disobedience. The prosecutor de-contextualized the 
action of DeChristopher and explicitly addressed the distinction between legitimate political 
                                                      
186
 In order to be able to resort to a necessity defense (and thus in this case effectively shift the terms of debate 
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action and illegitimate criminal action. In the press release, the U.S. Attorney specifically 
indicated that DeChristopher could have engaged in lawful action instead of civil 
disobedience.187 Elaborating on the range of possibilities in the political arena, the prosecutor 
specifically mentioned the actions that would have been admissible:  
 
For example, he did not take the time to articulate reasoning in a filed formal protest within the 
BLM proceedings. He did not initiate or join a lawsuit to bring to light perceived impropriety in a 
court of law. Nor did he focus creativity and sacrifice as others did in freely voicing their 
objections to the auction in the public forum. (Prosecution sentencing recommendation 2011) 
 
The prosecutor thus emphasizes this boundary between the political arena and the criminal 
justice arena as he said that “[t]he public square is the proper stage for the defendant’s 
message, not criminal proceedings in federal court” (ibid.). 
 
Ultimately, the dispute thus addressed fundamental questions about the way in which the rule 
of law was threatened, by whom it was threatened, and how that rule of law should be 
protected. DeChristopher criticized the state of the rule of law in the United States, stating that 
“the rule of law is dependent upon a government that is willing to abide by the law. Disrespect 
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 “We recognize that individuals have deeply held opinions when it comes to the use and management of our 
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processes, and causing financial harm to the government and to other individuals, […] Mr. DeChristopher had 
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for the rule of law begins when the government believes itself and its corporate sponsors to be 
above the law.” He defended his resort to civil disobedience in reference to the rule of law: 
 
The rule of law was created through acts of civil disobedience. Since those bedrock acts of civil 
disobedience by our founding fathers, the rule of law in this country has continued to grow 
closer to our shared higher moral code through the civil disobedience that drew attention to 
legalized injustice. The authority of the government exists to the degree that the rule of law 
reflects the higher moral code of the citizens, and throughout American history, it has been civil 
disobedience that has bound them together. (Official statement, 26 July 2011)  
 
The prosecutor took the criminaliation of speech acts a step further when his defense of his 
action was construed as “unapologetic” and therefore as one of the grounds for demanding a 
strict sentence (Prosecution sentencing recommendations 2011). The prosecutor criticized that 
the defendant had “championed and marketed his course of criminal conduct as successful, 
necessary and all-American” and “encouraged and invited others to follow his path, and literally 
join him in jail by committing criminal acts in the name of a movement” (ibid.). Indeed, calling 
the act of civil disobedience “courageous,” his supporters had claimed that “[a]n outbreak of 
jury trials (and willingness to serve time if necessary) could create a political atmosphere that 
allows a reasonable governmental response to climate change – while bringing the damaging 
injustices of our current system into the spotlight” (Peaceful Uprising 2011). The prosecution 
therefore argued for a “significant term of imprisonment” in this case, in order to send the 







disobedience’ committed in the name of the cause of the day. A significant term of 
imprisonment will underscore this truth for the defendant and the community” (ibid., emphasis 
added by author).  
 
The competing narratives surrounding this trial thus addressed not only the legality of the 
auction or the legitimacy of DeChristopher’s participation in the bidding process. Digging 
deeper into the competing visions of the rule of law, the space for civil disobedience, and the 
proper role of criminal proceedings, the legal questions about the accessibility of the necessity 
defense and the admission of evidence before the jury subsequently also turned into a debate 
about the proper role of the jury in criminal proceedings. With a reference to the founding 
fathers, DeChristopher had argued that “juries should be the conscience of the community and 
a defense against legislative tyranny” (Official statement 2011) and organized a book study 
group that read about the history of jury nullification. Some of the participants in that book 
group later began passing out leaflets to the public about jury rights, which led the prosecutor 
to argue that DeChristopher was trying to influence the jury, “persuading them to abandon or 
ignore rules and laws governing their service” (Prosecution sentencing recommendations 
2011).  
 
The prosecutor explicitly reaffirmed some of the central premises of a society based on the rule 
of law, in particular strict obedience to the law as a central tenet of liberal legalism, and some 







promotes respect for the law, and justifies law-abiding society’s reliance on the rule of law for 
protection and order” (Prosecution sentencing recommendations, 19 July 2011). Indeed, the 
prosecutor specifically emphasized the communicative aspects of such a sentence, stating that 
given the level of media attention to the case, many were watching the eventual sentence. The 
prosecutor specifically considered that “[a]mong the many listening to the Court’s sentence” 
there are those that consider “the defendant’s invitation and encouragement to join him 
outside the bounds of law, and inside jail. Accordingly, the defendant’s sentence should 
effectively communicate that similar acts will have definite consequences” (ibid.). This strong 
emphasis on deterrence reflects a concern with future crimes over past harm.  
 
Ultimately, the competing narratives specifically addressed the very notions of legitimacy of the 
courts and criminal proceedings that are at the core of all the criminal cases discussed in this 
dissertation. It is clear that what was at stake in this case was far more than a single auction 
that was disrupted. Instead, what was at stake was DeChristopher’s public advocacy of the 
legitimacy of such disruptive action that intentionally broke the letter of the law.188 The 
prosecutorial narrative clearly spoke out to deny that legitimacy, relying on a classic de-
contextualized narrative to keep the political demands out of the courtroom.    
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These criminal prosecutions of aboveground activity, whether speech acts or civil disobedience, 
have thus put the very line between criminal and political conduct at the center of the 
interpretive battle between defendants, their supporters, victim advocates, and the 
prosecutors. In the previous sections I have explored the three important discursive shifts that 
can be observed in the prosecutorial narrative in so-called “eco-terrorism” cases: the 
emergence of the concept “eco-terrorism”, the shift towards proactive investigation, and the 
focus on aboveground activity. In the next section, I will analyze in detail the development of 
the prosecutorial narrative in the SHAC case. This case exemplifies these discursive shifts.  
 
6. Penal response to the SHAC model, or when does the offensive, 
obnoxious or threatening become terrorism?  
 
In this section I analyze in detail the emergence of the “SHAC model” and the criminal justice 
response to it. Within the activist community, this is one of the best-known cases against 
animal rights activists. In brief, at the end of the 1990s, vivisection activists started to take a 
different approach to their protests. They chose Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS) as the focus of 
their campaign and turned to secondary targeting, home visits, and economic sabotage. These 
new tactics were highly effective in driving companies away from doing business with HLS.189 
Companies were concerned about the SHAC model and the effect it was having on their 
                                                      
189
 The SHAC campaign has been an international effort, with activists in Britain, the Netherlands, and various 
other countries involved. In 2007, a police campaign in Britain, Amsterdam, and Belgium led to the arrest of 32 
people. The international campaign and the subsequent prosecutions outside of the United States are relevant for 
understanding the impact of the campaign on Huntingdon Life Sciences. In this section I focus, however, on the 







business operations and their employees. Prosecutors were unable to find and prosecute the 
perpetrators of illegal actions that occurred during this campaign, such as the flipping over of a 
car or the spray-painting of a house. And when they prosecuted such actions on vandalism 
charges, the sentences were low.   
 
Prosecutors shifted their perspective from a focus on isolated cases of vandalism and 
investigated the people that ran the SHAC website, which was at the core of organizing this 
campaign. In 2004, six activists were indicted for conspiracy to violate the Animal Enterprise 
Protection Act in addition to several counts of violating the Interstate Stalking Statute and 
conspiracy to use a telecommunications device to abuse, threaten, and harass persons. It is 
quite uncontroversial to state that the SHAC tactics were offensive and obnoxious.190 There is 
considerable disagreement, however, on the point of whether this offensive and obnoxious 
behavior, and especially the roles of the people running the website, should be considered 
criminal. The prosecutorial narrative in the SHAC case puts the illegal actions into the context of 
the SHAC campaign to change the definition of the crime and allot criminal responsibility to 
those behind the website. The SHAC activists were judged guilty by a jury and convicted to 
sentences ranging from one to six years. The convictions were confirmed on appeal.   
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The SHAC model: “There should be a law against this”  
Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) was originally founded in the United Kingdom in 1999. 
Their goal is to close down Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS). In the UK the SHAC campaign proved 
highly successful, and Huntingdon Life Sciences moved its office to the United States. 
Huntingdon was founded in 1952 and tests pharmaceuticals, industrial chemicals, food 
additives, and other substances on animals. It is a contract research organization, generally 
conducting its experiments on behalf of the company that wants to sell the product. Such 
research is often a legal requirement in order to bring drugs and chemicals to the market. After 
the experiments in which such products are applied or injected, the animals are killed and 
dissected. Sometimes, animals are anesthetized and dissected while they are still alive. This 
practice is called vivisection. Since 1995, Huntingdon has had an experimental facility in New 
Jersey (Cook 2006). 
 
The indictment against the SHAC activists describes HLS as “one of the leading pharmaceutical 
testing companies. As part of its drug testing procedures, many of which are mandated by law, 
HLS uses animals for, among other things, testing the safety of drugs and chemicals that various 
manufacturers seek to bring to market.” The SHAC activists present a different narrative when 
they describe that in the HLS facilities  
animals are forced to inhale and ingest excessive amounts of chemicals such as pesticides, 
coffee sweeteners, diet pills and genetically modified organisms (GMO’s), for weeks or months 
on end. Then they are killed and dissected. Products known to have been tested at HLS include 
Splenda, Viagra, Olestra, and Baycol. Every day an average of 500 animals – including dogs, cats, 
mice, primates and rabbits – die inside HLS. HLS has been exposed in five undercover 
investigations revealing vicious animal cruelty and sloppy, fraudulent science. Among other 







live monkey, falsifying scientific data, and violating Good Laboratory Practice laws over 600 
times. (SHAC7 2008)  
 
SHAC USA was founded in 2000. Based in New Jersey, they put up a website which listed the 
home addresses of chief executive officers of the companies that make use of HLS test results 
or have shares in HLS (“secondary targets”). SHAC USA called for the closure of HLS and, among 
other things, urged activists to write letters to HLS shareholders. SHAC also posted addresses of 
CEO’s and other employees working at customers and investors of HLS and called on activists to 
protest. At the same time, animal rights activists conducted “home visits” in front of the 
residence of an HLS employee or the CEO of suppliers or affiliates of HLS. In several instances, 
unknown activists would visit at night, spray-painting the house, throwing rocks through 
windows, or damaging a car.  
 
I will discuss in more depth three elements of the SHAC model: secondary targeting, home 
visits, and nuisance campaigning. The question at the core of the criminal proceedings against 
SHAC is how to understand the SHAC model. Specifically, where is the line between the criminal 
justice arena and the political arena and how should define the events and different 
responsibilities be defined? The website Activist Cash191 described the SHAC method as 
extortion: “SHAC extorts U.S. companies into severing their business relationships with firms 
that it doesn’t like” (Activist Cash 2011c). Activists, on the other hand, were excited that they 
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had finally found a model that actually works. In the case against SHAC USA, the prosecutorial 
narrative drew those in charge of the website into the criminal justice arena.    
 
Home visits, nuisance campaigning, and secondary targeting 
In order to get a better grasp on “home visits” and the legal restraints that are now in place to 
control such demonstrations, and also to obtain access to people in the animal rights 
community, I was active for two months as a “legal observer”192 with one of the animal rights 
groups in New York City. I was open to them about my research and the fact that I was not an 
animal rights activist. Home visits consist of chanting and leafleting. During these protests the 
activists would show vivisection pictures and shout messages through a megaphone, such as 
“puppy killer” and “your neighbor is a murderer.”193 As such, these visits are based on the 
principle of naming and shaming. One of the questions raised by the criminal prosecution of the 
SHAC model is whether and at what point such demonstrations become intimidating and 
threatening.   
 
Home visits challenge some of the unwritten rules of the freedom of speech in the political 
arena. Home visits turn the politics of animal testing into a personal matter. Working at HLS or 
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being affiliated with HLS is not “business” anymore, but redefined by activists as a personal 
moral decision. “Companies hide behind their corporate logo,” said one activist (Harper 2002b). 
Thus, activists challenge the boundary between “private” and “public” which is so central to 
liberalism. They go after “people who are just flesh and blood, like you and me and we target 
them in a manner that we know is going to cause them discomfort and force them to make that 
decision” (ibid.). As the activists make it personal, they disregard business hours, business 
locations, or pure business arguments. Instead, they do a home visit on Christmas Day and 
make “jokes” about the alleged mistress of a CEO.  
 
One of the SHAC defendants, Josh Harper, called the SHAC tactics “nuisance campaigning.” In 
his words, the SHAC campaign “was people like all of us making that phone call every day. It 
was people like us setting [sic] at home on our computer, and maybe we’ve got a graphic design 
program, so we make up a poster that says anything, bike for sale, something like that, and it 
has Stevens’ phone number on it” (Harper 2002b:2550). The “nuisance campaign” would lead 
companies to incur enormous costs, for example due to the time spent answering the phone 
while facing a “phone blockade” or a website that is unavailable due to an e-mail blockade. 
Another important tactic in the nuisance campaign is the so-called black fax, which makes the 
fax machine of a company unreachable and exhausts the cartridge. In another instance, a stink 
bomb thrown into an office prompted people to leave the building, and as they did not work for 
a day, the company had 750,000 dollars in damage.194 
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The SHAC model contains another significant and contested ingredient: the shift from targeting 
HLS directly to pressuring HLS by targeting its customers and suppliers. This strategy is known 
as “secondary” or “tertiary” targeting. Protesting in front of an “animal abuse facility” is useless 
according to the vast majority of activists, as “those people know that what they do is wrong.” 
The logic behind secondary targeting is simple: HLS does need its shareholders, but the 
shareholders do not need HLS. This logic is explained, for example, in this e-mail by an animal 
rights activist group calling for a demonstration at the house of the CEO of the office supply 
company Staples:  
 
Staples might not seem to be an important part of the equation, but try running a business or a 
laboratory without paper, pens, paperclips and printer ink. Will Huntingdon Life Sciences simply 
switch to another vendor for their supplies? Probably so, but first they have to find a company 
that is not only willing to partner with animal abusers, but equally important they will need to 
find a supplier that is willing to deal with the aggressive attention of a relentless global 
campaign by animal activists. (Win Animal Rights mailing list, 19 June 2008)  
 
Activists accuse such secondary targets of “condoning” the animal cruelty of HLS,195 calling them 
“collaborators in torture.” Secondary targets include banks, cage suppliers, lawyers that sign 
contracts, investment banks, auditing companies, shareholders, and its clients or customers 
(companies commissioning testing research to be done at HLS), which are often pharmaceutical 
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companies, biotech companies, or companies selling household products such as Colgate 
toothpaste.196     
 
The SHAC model departs from the liberal logic of achieving change in the political 
arena 
The SHAC model openly complemented “old” tactics focused on education and persuasion with 
bolder and more confrontational tactics. They were disillusioned with the battle in the political 
arena. SHAC defendant Gazzola said: “we’re tired of protesting outside of empty buildings. 
We’re tired of writing letters. This campaign is about economic sabotage.” The prosecutor 
criticized that the SHAC campaign was not about persuasion and education. He quoted Lauren 
Gazzola after insurance provider Marsh pulled out of HLS. “We fucked them up and then they 
pulled out.” The prosecutor emphasized: “Her words. Not we educated them. Not we appealed 
to their conscience” (trial transcripts SHAC case). He thus criticized the way in which the 
defendants departed from the logic of political liberalism. What happens when a company is 
designated as a “SHAC target”? The prosecutor described the past experiences, such as 
“smashing windows in your home, vandalizing your car, threatening calls at all hours of the 
night, e-mail bombs to crash computers, and ordering goods and services in other people’s 
names” (ibid.). It should be noted here how the prosecutor “personalizes” his description by 
using the colloquial “your” home, “your” car, etcetera, reproducing the notion that this can 
happen to anyone.  
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A journalist once asked a SHAC activist what gives them the mandate to employ a campaign of 
harassment and intimidation. Their answer was that “our knowledge of the suffering animals 
endure at HLS is all the mandate we need to rescue them using any means at our disposal.”197 
The SHAC activists do not expect much from the available routes for change in the U.S. liberal 
democracy. Defendant Harper said that if they “wait around for permission from the police or 
other people who’ve held themselves up as alleged leaders” then “nothing is going to change” 
(Harper 2002b:2561). He argued that only when individuals take action and “make life hell on 
these abusers, that is when we see results” (Harper 2002b:2563). While the question of the 
journalist seems to refer to the liberal democratic notions of a valid representation and a 
majority backing such action, the SHAC activists pride themselves on employing tactics with a 
very different logic, as they claim that the strength of this model is that with only five people 
they can be very effective and drive companies away from supporting HLS. SHAC activists also 
criticized the problem that the legal and democratic avenues exclude many people from direct 
participation, as you need lawyers and specialization (“you don’t need a PhD to throw [a] rock 
through a window”) (Harper 2002b).  
 
SHAC activists argued that disillusionment with the available routes in the political arena had 
profoundly incapacitated animal rights activists. The asymmetry of power that dominates the 
arena made them believe that they were not going to win against “big corporations and mighty 
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 Video “The Mandate,” uploaded by Netverkett on 13 November 2007, available at 







capitalism,” and therefore they were not even really trying. Indeed, Harper said that when 
investor Charles Schwab pulled out of HLS, even “Financial Times called us when they heard 
that, to verify and the guy on the phone was just stunned. People in the business world are like 
‘Charles Schwab dropped a stock?!’” (Harper 2002b). The SHAC campaign, however, inspired 
activists to really go for it and believe in winning.  
 
The SHAC tactics did not have full support in the activist community. Indeed, they led to 
internal discussion. SHAC activists were aware that what they were asking activists to do (for 
example to make phone calls to employees at their home addresses) was controversial. During 
a speaking engagement in 2002 in which a SHAC activist called upon animal rights activists to 
participate in the campaign, one activist criticized the methods, saying “I wouldn’t want these 
things to happen to me.” SHAC activist Harper, however, was brief and responded “well, you 
are not a puppy killer” and considered that a few annoying phone calls do not weigh up against 
what it is those employees are supporting (trial transcripts SHAC case). These internal 
discussions illustrate the profound way in which these activists had stepped outside of the 
liberal logic that rules the political arena. The liberal logic promotes the use of political 
engagement which should apply across the board. Thus, when an activist brought up the topic 
of whether the SHAC tactics would be considered appropriate if they were applied by anti-
abortion activists, Harper does not accept that line of thinking. He rejects the argument that 
“methods” are something that you justify without looking at the ends. On the contrary, he 







righteousness of the cause. Resisting the liberal dichotomy between means and ends, Harper 
thus rejected the assumption that the tactics would only be justifiable if they were justifiable in 
anybody’s hands. 
 
The tactics employed by SHAC were thus also considered to be extreme within the activist 
community even before the criminal prosecution had started against them. A lawyer of their 
case expressed: “SHAC decided to leave the ranks, to be unpopular, be aggressive, and be 
offensive. They were unaware though that what they were doing might be considered illegal. In 
their view PETA did not go far enough and was in bed with corporations” (Interview US-14). 
Still, even though many of the activists were not at ease with the tactics employed by SHAC, 
they did not agree with the criminal prosecution against them. It is exactly this line between 
what we are not comfortable with and what we criminalize that is explored at length in this 
dissertation. 
 
Subjects in the political arena are supposed to be open for dialogue and arguments in order to 
engage in a meaningful political debate. The SHAC activists, however, explicitly portrayed most 
of their opponents as beyond the point of being reasonable partners of a dialogue in which 
they could be persuaded. During that speaking engagement in 2002 already mentioned above, 
one activist voiced the criticism that it is hard to change people’s minds by intimidation. Harper 
responded that it would be alright if people could be reached and made aware of the harm that 







SHAC activists thus portrayed an image of the CEOs of companies who just work for profit and 
do not care about the cruelty against animals. Therefore they would not respond to appeals to 
their conscience and only act due to pressure. Similarly, the employees at Huntingdon Life 
Sciences were believed to be beyond their reach for educational efforts, as “they know what 
they are doing,” considering the cruelty shown on undercover videos (2002b). At the same 
time, the SHAC activists have benefited from individuals working inside other companies who 
did not think it was right to support HLS and who had come forward sharing information with 
SHAC. Therefore, SHAC activists advocated a dual mode of education and direct action. Thus, 
they spent their time by making literature and videos that are informative and support tables in 
the streets of New York City in order to pass out information. However, in the meantime, 
activists were also called upon to put pressure on HLS and its affiliates.  
 
This departure from the liberal logic of the political arena does not mean that the SHAC activists 
embraced everything. For example, Harper criticized an incident in Britain in which Andrew 
Gay, marketing and public relations director at HLS, was thrown ammonia in his face. At the 
same time, he expressed to appreciate the “diversity of tactics” as a method that creates 








The SHAC model was very effective 
The SHAC model has been incredibly effective in driving investors, shareholders, and customers 
away from HLS.198 In Britain, Huntingdon was unable to receive any loans from banks. The 
British government had to step in and provide loans. In 2003 Huntingdon moved its 
headquarters to the United States, as U.S. laws provide greater anonymity for shareholders, 
thinking that this would make it harder for SHAC to identify and target shareholders (Cook 
2006). SHAC activists were still able to reduce Huntingdon’s worth on the stock market by 
pushing it out of the more exclusive “Over the Counter Bulletin Board” into the lower-rated 
“Pink Sheets,” which meant that the stock could no longer be purchased by many institutional 
investors and hedge funds. The stock dropped from $15 in 1999 to $1 in 2004 (Cook 2006). In 
2007, this led Managing Director Brian Cass to call upon the financial community to stop 
treating Huntingdon as “radio-active” (Jack 2007). 
  
Also the prosecutor in the SHAC case asserted that the SHAC tactics were “absolutely” effective. 
Other companies saw what had happened to Marsh and they “didn’t want any part of that. 
That’s why [they] got out.” During the trial, the prosecutor described that the companies pulled 
out because of the disruption of their business and the fact that the lives of their employees are 
“turned upside down” (trial transcripts SHAC case).   
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The SHAC campaign was successful and provided the activists with a model that could be 
applied to any target. This is the reason the SHAC activists were so excited.199 Harper (2002b) 
said:   
 
[W]e are with this campaign for the first time in a long time, developing an actual model, an 
actual way to confront these companies successful [sic] … I care very much about the animals 
inside of HLS […] but I’m – I’m even more excited at the idea that once we beat them, on this 
battlefield, you know, then all the skills that we’ve learned, everything that we’ve taken from 
this, all the contacts we’ve made, having this international movement, all of that structure is still 
gonna be in place.  
 
It was exactly this prospect of a spread of this model that worried many corporations.200 The 
Foundation for Biomedical Research pointed out why they were so concerned with the SHAC 
model:  
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 Many activists have therefore been convinced that the SHAC case was just a test case, and that similar law 
enforcement efforts would be launched against other social justice movements. They viewed the repression as an 
indication of the effectiveness of the tactics developed by SHAC, and the fear by corporations and the government 
that these tactics would be replicated by other activists in other struggles.  
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 The website “Activist Cash” has a profile on SHAC and makes explicit what threat is posed by the SHAC 
campaign:  
SHAC’s obvious purpose is the extermination of Huntingdon Life Sciences, but there’s more to this group 
than just forcing a single company out of business. The group’s leaders have made it clear that once HLS is 
closed (“and it will close,” they insist), every other lab in the Western world that engages in animal testing 
will be on their radar screen. The bigger picture, though, extends beyond the world of medical research to 
the larger world of animal rights. Whether or not SHAC’s outward confidence is largely bluster, its real 
purpose is to incubate new and ever more frightful tactics for the rest of the animal rights movement to 








Beyond the issue of research and the debate surrounding animal rights, there is a larger and 
more troubling message surrounding this regrettable pattern of capitulating to activist attacks. 
This is because those who seek to attack any corporation for any reason have, thanks to SHAC, 
now been provided with an effective model to gain publicity for their cause, seriously harm the 
company with which it has any complaint, as well as its employees, customers and vendors. 
(Foundation for Biomedical Research 2006)   
 
Despite the impact on Huntingdon’s worth on the stock market, the prosecutor emphasized 
that for him the SHAC prosecution was about the individual victims and their right to a secure 
life (Interview US-13). “Their lives will never be the same again.” Activists, on the other hand, 
were convinced that the problem they posed was not about individual victims but about the 
enormous economic threat their demands and tactics posed to HLS and other companies. The 
SHAC president argued in 2006 that it was SHAC’s message, not its methods that troubled 
authorities: 
 
Americans are totally in support of firebombing and killing and blowing little kids apart in Iraq. 
It's not the tactics. It's the belief that's controversial. The tactics – Americans, they love that shit. 
[…] SHAC USA supports what all Americans would support if their children were locked up, being 
experimented on, with their limbs being severed, with their eyes being burned out. That's what 









Civil lawsuits against SHAC USA preceded the criminal indictment. On 1 April 2005 a court found 
SHAC to be responsible for the violence in the SHAC campaign.  
 
The court would have to turn a blind eye to find that there is no causal nexus between the SHAC 
website and the violence thereafter produced. The court need also be concerned about what 
appears to be an escalation of the level and intensity of criminal behavior. (Decision in TEVA 
PHARMACEUTICALS USA v STOP HUNTINGDON ANIMAL CRUELTY USA, 1 April 2005) 
 
The court decided that what SHAC did was “ratify” the illegal activity.  
 
Accordingly, this court is satisfied, at least at this stage, that a prima facie showing has been 
made that SHAC ratifies the illegal activity every time it publicizes, and implicitly encourages, the 
activities on the website after the fact. (ibid)  
 
Even though the court thus ruled against SHAC, the activists did not have much money, so there 
was not much to get from them out of such civil lawsuits.  
 
The indictment 
In May 2004, John Lewis, deputy assistant director of the FBI, explained before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee in Washington, D.C., how the FBI approached their investigation of the 
SHAC campaign (Lewis 2004). Lewis testified that in 2001 the FBI offices that had experienced 







Department of Justice explored other “[i]nvestigative and prosecutive strategies” to address 
the “problem presented by SHAC and to prevent it from engaging in actions intending to shut 
down a legitimate business enterprise.” This again demonstrates the proactive attitude of the 
FBI and U.S. Attorney offices. The nationwide coordination and federal investigation, in which 
more than a hundred FBI and Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agents participated, indicates that 
the issue was allotted priority and the status of a national problem, as opposed to a private or 
local problem of a single company.  
 
Lewis indicated in his testimony that the SHAC members “appear to engage in conduct that, 
while criminal (such as trespassing, vandalism or other property damage), would not result in a 
significant, particularly federal, prosecution.” Thus, Lewis addressed the difficulty of achieving 
“results” by following the standard de-contextualizing approach in dealing with the SHAC 
model. However, “given SHAC's pattern of harassing and oftentimes criminal conduct, and its 
stated goal of shutting down a company,” they searched for other options. The next section, 
analyzes in more depth how this “pattern” was constructed and how the “goal of shutting down 
a company” was criminalized. The FBI response also reflects the attitude that characterized the 
approach to the SHAC model: Departing from the conviction that the SHAC tactics “crossed a 
line,” the conclusion was that if the SHAC activists go around established legal means new legal 
means had to be made. “There should be a law against this,” expressed the prosecutor this 








The indictment contained six counts. The first count charged the SHAC defendants with a 
conspiracy to violate the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA). The second count was a 
conspiracy charge under the Interstate Stalking Statute (Title 18, United States Code, Section 
2261A). The third to fifth counts were substantial charges under the Interstate Stalking Statute, 
alleging that victims were in a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury. The sixth count 
was again a conspiracy charge under Title 47, United States Code, Section 223(a)(1)(C), which 
prohibits making phone calls in order to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.   
  
This is not a case where the facts are disputed, or where responsibility for those facts is 
disputed. In this case, the very qualification of those facts as a “crime” is disputed. And the 
attribution of criminal responsibility is disputed. The way in which facts are connected into a 
pattern and the way in which criminal responsibility for the behavior of others is attributed – 
that is what is at stake here. The behavior that is turned into a crime here was done overtly. 
The SHAC activists have explained their tactics in detail over and over again in public speeches. 
This is not a case about hidden or underground behavior. The government exhibits included 
pictures of the SHAC offices and their computers. These activists were not fugitive.   
 
The Animal Enterprise Protection Act had been used in the guilty plea against Peter Young, who 
had “liberated” minks. The act had never been put before juries and judges in a trial, however. 
That means that there was no jurisprudence that could determine the interpretation of the 







(Interview US-13). The Animal Enterprise Protection Act, however, could not be used in relation 
to incidents in which the “targets” were not “animal enterprises.” This posed a problem 
because of the SHAC strategy of secondary targeting.  
 
In addition to violation of the AEPA, therefore, the SHAC defendants were charged under the 
stalking statute (McIntosh 2006). The prosecutor was aware of the fact that the common crime 
image of stalking does not coincide with what the SHAC people were doing. But, as he argued, 
“we interviewed a lot of people, and these people were truly stalking-victims. They were so 
scared, so victimized,” and thus the crime was stalking (Interview US-13). As the prosecutor 
thus created the “image” of a “stalking victim,” this approach begs some questions: What is a 
“stalking victim,” i.e., what are the typical characteristics or conditions? What does it mean 
when the existence of a crime is argued on the basis of the kind of victim that was “created” 
instead of the actions that were done? Was SHAC’s activity criminal because it fitted the 
stalking statute? Or was the activity considered to be outside of legal boundaries, and was a 
statute sought that could be made to fit the facts?  
 
Re-contextualizing events into the SHAC campaign 
Here I review the law enforcement response and the way in which the issue got framed through 
the criminal justice lens. This section shows how the actors and their behavior got translated 
into criminal law terminology, how the labels of “victim” and “perpetrator” were assigned, how 







this way, I analyze closely the narrative that the prosecutor (and FBI) has constructed in this 
case, the way in which this narrative drew on criminal law logic, and what evidence it relied on. 
I also analyze how this institutional narrative has been received and contested in the activist 
community. I will specifically describe in more depth how the prosecutorial narrative is re-
contextualized and how that re-contextualization is constituted in criminal doctrine in four 
specific shifts:   
 
1. Blurring the line between law and politics, between means and ends  
2. From isolated incidents to a pattern 
3. Construction of a collective of co-conspirators and a collective of victims 
4. From direct criminal responsibility to indirect responsibility 
 
Blurring the line between law and politics? 
The SHAC prosecutor claimed to distinguish between law and politics by distinguishing between 
the political motive of animal rights and the criminal intent to cause damage. This line between 
law and politics was addressed explicitly when the prosecutor took the time to explain what the 
trial was about and what the trial was not about. Thus, the prosecutor emphasized that it was 
not Huntingdon that was on trial. Indeed, he pointed out that animal testing is actually 
mandated by the government. The separation between law and politics was thus formally 
maintained through a distinction between means and ends. The trial was about the SHAC 







animal experimentation. At the same time, however, and blurring this line, in the jury selection 
and the examination of witnesses, the prosecutor also addressed or responded to issues related 
to animal testing and the various arguments defending and challenging it.  
 
Sometimes the defense lawyers pushed to have the broader context of the case taken into 
account, while the prosecutor resisted a broader view. For example, the defense attorneys 
wanted to strike a juror who works for Merrill Lynch. The SHAC campaign had been targeting 
Merrill Lynch in the past and had succeeded in having them stop doing business with HLS. In the 
specific indictment, however, the case of Merrill Lynch was not mentioned and the prosecutor 
argued that he could not “be responsible for all the companies they’ve targeted” (Trial 
transcripts SHAC case, Jury Selection, p. 205). The court agreed with the prosecutor and denied 
the challenge because the defendants were “not being charged in this trial by the Government 
as taking actions against that company.” This is an example where restricting the reading of the 
facts allowed a juror that was viewed as a “former target” by the defendants. The narrow 
definition of who was in the indictment provided the court with the basis for denying a 
challenge for cause. In other instances, however, the prosecutor agreed to strike jurors because 
of their strong views on animal testing or because a juror had close relations to people involved 
in animal testing. The prosecutor agreed that those jurors “may find themselves in the middle 
of a trial in a position they may not be able to be objective and the safest thing to do, and fair 
thing to do would be to excuse them both, now.”201   
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When I spoke with the prosecutor of the SHAC case, he told me of victim Marinn McLennan 
from an insurance company in Texas and remarked that she “had nothing to do with HLS.” She 
had never heard of it and was “never involved.” The prosecutor described the harassment she 
suffered from animal rights activists and in explaining the prosecution against the SHAC 
defendants he said that “people shouldn't have to live their lives like that, especially people 
who don't have anything to do with animal testing” (Interview US-13). In this little added 
reasoning the context of the conflict enters the ordinary liberal reasoning. From a criminal law 
perspective a crime is a crime, and it should not matter whether or not the victim is involved 
with animal testing or not. It seems that the prosecutor is arguing that the victim was somehow 
more “innocent” than if she actually had engaged in animal testing. By therefore condemning 
the tactic of secondary or tertiary targeting, the prosecutor engaged in a subtle assessment of 
the political issue and the “suitability” of the target.   
 
Undercover investigations at HLS: Defining what the trial is about  
The issue of animal cruelty was also effectively excluded from the trial by excluding evidence 
from undercover investigations at HLS in order to expose the ongoing “cruelty” inside the 
company. The best known of these investigations was conducted by PETA activist Michelle 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
While this case I don’t think involves the efficacy of animal testing, certainly the allegations re the 
defendants are, again, it’s what drove the defendants. If someone is that close in their family, or with the 
business relationship they may find that they cannot be objective, and frankly I think everyone would like 
an objective jury in the first instance, so I think that really both juror 1 and the gentleman, a contractor 
who has a silent partner may be very involved in this, both of them may find themselves in the middle of a 
trial in a position they may not be able to be objective and the safest thing to do, and fair thing to do 







Rokke. She was employed there as an associate technician from September 1996 until May 
1997. She secretly videotaped behavior of her co-workers, took documents from desks, and 
copied documents from computers. In the previous chapter, I already described in more detail 
the subsequent lawsuit, in which Huntingdon claimed that PETA and Rokke had engaged in 
stealing trade secrets and trying to put HLS out of business.  
 
Animal rights activists tend to view these investigations as heroic individual actions and among 
the most effective. The prosecutor referred to these investigations as “those five, quote, 
unquote, undercover investigations,” which he argued were “nothing more than trespassing or 
being on the Huntingdon Life Sciences’ property under false pretenses” and “hearsay” (Trial 
transcripts, 7 February 2006, p. 7–8). Thus, “undercover investigations” were redefined in legal 
terminology as “trespassing” and “hearsay.” Indeed, the prosecutor claimed that “these things 
never happened, the undercover investigations, and to start to allude to them as if real and had 
a basis, would be improper” (p. 11–12).  
 
The prosecutor thus argued that it would be improper to relate any of these investigations in 
the trial, pointing out that there was already a civil lawsuit filed against HLS on that very issue.  
 
It’s our position Huntingdon Life Sciences is not on trial here, and understanding a certain 
amount of this information is going to leak in, we don’t think that the defense should be 
permitted to open on, or cross-examine on either this civil complaint that is in its early stages, or 








The assertion that “Huntingdon is not on trial here” is familiar in each of the country studies. In 
Spain, for example, it was the Audiencia Nacional that was not on trial. Here it is HLS that is not 
on trial. The compartmentalization of civil lawsuits and criminal lawsuits serves here to exclude 
the alleged cruelty at HLS from the trial, just as the division of a Spanish National Court and 
local courts served to exclude the torture issue from the trial against Gestoras pro Amnistía. 
The court:  
 
In general, we do not allude to other litigation in a criminal or a civil suit. This is a trial about the 
allegations in this Indictment, and the offenses to, the charges in this Indictment, and not any 
other litigation. Period. I can’t imagine when I would permit it. (Trial transcripts, SHAC case, p. 
13)  
 
Not only is the separation between the different lawsuits relevant, so is the separation between 
what is on the SHAC website, which is the subject of the trial, and the information from the 
undercover investigations which is on the SHAC website. The SHAC website is the centerpiece 
of the indictment and the allegation of criminal responsibility. While the prosecutor excluded 
the undercover investigations from the discussion, the defense attorney argued that “you can’t 
look at the website without looking at the entire context of the website, including the 
educational stuff” (Trial transcripts, SHAC case, p. 11). Here we see the game of determining 








Is it allowed to campaign to drive Huntingdon out of business?  
The discourse of formal rationality maintains that any political end can be pursued as long as 
the democratic and legal procedures are followed. In the case of SHAC, however, activists have 
wondered whether the very goal to put HLS out of business was already sufficient for criminal 
prosecution. While animal rights activists reject the notion that HLS is a “legitimate” business, 
the FBI takes it as its task to prevent its closure. In May 2004, John Lewis, deputy assistant 
director of the FBI, explained before the Senate Judiciary Committee in Washington, D.C., that 
the FBI had started the investigation in 2001 in order to address the “problem presented by 
SHAC and to prevent it from engaging in actions intending to shut down a legitimate business 
enterprise” (Lewis 2004). In my interview, the SHAC prosecutor said that SHAC was “pushing 
around” a company (Interview US-13). It is the question whether that in itself was already the 
crime that they were committing as in the criminal proceedings against SHAC, it was ambiguous 
whether the goal of putting HLS out of business in itself is an illegal goal, and whether just the 
agreement to that goal is therefore an illegal agreement and a conspiracy. Count 1 of the 
indictment seems to indicate this. The government contended that the SHAC defendants were 
conspiring to physically disrupt the operations of HLS and drive it out of business, with the 
intent to cause a loss of property to HLS in an amount exceeding $10,000.  
 








for the purposes of causing physical disruption to the functioning of an animal enterprise [...] 
intentionally damages or causes loss of any property, including animals, or records used by the 
animal enterprise, or conspires to do so, commits an offense under the statute. (Jury 
instructions, Volume VI, p. 23/2697)  
 
The jury instruction clarified that physical disruption as a consequence of lawful action is 
excluded from this offense, which may be intended to exclude legitimate boycotts from 
criminalization. Activists have, however, become suspicious of the perceived blurring between 
legitimate ends and illegal means (Interview US-16).   
 
From isolated incidents to a pattern – from vandalism to terrorism 
In my interview with the prosecutor in the SHAC case, he described that a policeman in a small 
town couldn’t make the connection between the incidents at that small-town level, explaining 
the need for a federal investigation and prosecution (Interview US-13). Also, Brent McIntosh, 
deputy assistant attorney general of the Justice Department, addressed the shift from the local 
level to federal jurisdiction during the hearing of the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 
and Homeland Security on the proposed bill of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 23 May 
2006, Washington. He argued that “considered individually,” the various actions are “State 
crimes.” However, local police lack investigative resources and a “nationwide perspective” to 
“put these local offenses into context as a multijurisdictional campaign of violence.” Thus the 








Only when the case was taken to the federal level could the case be turned into the big case it 
was. Actions were committed in California, Boston, and Illinois. “Three acts of vandalism are not 
that bad” said the SHAC prosecutor. Indeed, the “individual acts of vandalism are not so bad.” 
“The magnitude of the separate incidents, the combination of all these acts of vandalism turned 
it into something that can properly be called ‘terrorism.’” He also emphasized the damage done 
to the lives of affected individuals: “Their lives will never be the same again” (Interview US-13).  
 
Agirre has argued that the key to constructing a series of offenses as one consistent crime is the 
concept of a “pattern,” i.e., the existence of sufficient elements in common among individual 
offences to consider them as a whole, like a single and greater entity.202 Agirre argues that “the 
problem is that the ‘pattern’ is a procedural construct, a concept shaped by the process, often 
of fuzzy boundaries” (2004:19). This can have consequences for the kind of story that the 
prosecutor tells. For example, Agirre speculates that “the prosecution will tend to highlight the 
most dramatic, the gravest aspects of a purported overall picture, even if they are not central 
to the pattern” (2004:19). The construction of a “pattern” in the SHAC case transformed the 
prosecutorial narrative. Instead of focusing on the isolated incidents of vandalism, the 
prosecutor extended the time frame (Kelman 1981) and argued that many incidents together 
constitute the offenses of terrorism and stalking as charged in the indictment. How did the 
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 For example, in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, a crime against humanity is defined as 
“any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” Among other offenses, the list mentions murder, torture, and 
rape. In order to link distinct incidents of murder, rape, and torture and argue that they constitute a “crime against 
humanity,” the prosecutor has to show a “pattern.” Common indicators that can show the existence of a pattern 
may refer to the victims, the geographical area of commission, the chronology, or the purpose and modus 







prosecutorial narrative choose the relevant facts and connect the different incidents that 
occurred in different states and at different times? It is this perceived and constructed pattern 
that explains that HLS Director Brian Cass from England was invited to testify about an attack on 
his person in England, even though the SHAC defendants were not accused of any events in 
England.  
 
Regarding many crimes there is little doubt at what moment it is committed: “you know it 
when you see it” and it is either committed or not committed, without any space in between. 
There are crimes that are less clear when they are committed. I call these crimes “threshold 
crimes.” It means that a certain action is not a crime when it is only done a few times. It 
becomes a crime, however, when it is done many times. The difference between a few and 
many is obviously not so clear.203 Stalking is a perfect example of a threshold crime. A home visit 
one time is not stalking. A home visit four times may be stalking, but probably not. But 
somewhere along the way, when the acts multiply, the acts together may become the crime of 
stalking.   
 
Blurring legal and illegal actions 
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 Similar reflections have been made regarding “status crimes” (such as homelessness or being a drug addict) 
which became regarded as unconstitutional in the United States. “What the statute attempts to proscribe is not 
the commission of some act or acts, as is usually the case in most crimes. Rather it seeks to punish a person 
because of his status. The offense consists of being a certain kind of person, that is, an idle person...” (Supreme 








As the prosecutor connects the dots and puts separate events into a bigger picture, he 
describes many actions, both “underground” activity and overt actions that are “merely” 
offensive. This makes it difficult to tease out what exactly was illegal and which actions still 
continue to be legal. While in a typical de-contextualized narrative only those facts are selected 
that lead directly to the qualification of the crime, in a re-contextualized account many more 
activities and events are included and considered “relevant” in the description of the crime, 
while maybe not necessarily illegal on their own. Thus, the prosecutor described how the car of 
an HLS employee was flipped over and the home of an investor was “ransacked” – both in and 
of themselves clearly illegal actions of property destruction. In that same list, he described how 
people had gone to the house of a female senior executive on Mother’s Day, and that she was 
“spit at” and told to “get the F out of our neighborhood.” While these last actions of “spitting” 
and telling someone “to get the F out of the neighborhood” are certainly offensive, as isolated 
acts they are certainly not in the same category as ransacking a house, and probably not even 
illegal. However, as part of the pattern, activists worry that this pushes actions such as 
“spitting” and offensive language too far into the criminal spectrum.      
 
In another example, the prosecutor argued that SHAC gave instructions on their website and 
that among them was the announcement that every week there would be a week-long phone 
or e-mail blockade against an HLS investor. It is not clear whether the prosecutor only 
mentioned this example to demonstrate the “control” that the SHAC website exerted over 







It is this uncertainty that is worrying other activists who consider their work to be restricted 
through this sentence. This blurring of legal and illegal activities is very similar process to the 
cases in Spain, where the prosecutorial narrative constructed the ETA network as the basis for 
multiple prosecutions. In both country studies activists started to worry at which point their 
(previously) legal activities become illegal. There is no clarity as to when exactly otherwise legal 
activities become illegal because of the combination and mix or alleged relation with 
underground illegal actions.  
 
Construction of collectives of co-conspirators and victims 
The prosecutorial narrative in the SHAC case also exemplifies the shift from individual 
perpetrators and victims to larger collectives. During the trial, the defense lawyer of defendant 
Harper argued that “the government has a theory. The government is making the entire 
universe of animal rights activism and activists unindicted co-conspirators” (Trial transcripts 
SHAC case). Indeed, the prosecutor argued that the SHAC defendants entered into a conspiracy 
not only with each other, but also with unknown others who would read an act upon the calls 
and information posted on the SHAC website. Regardless of the unknown and unindicted co-
conspirators, the prosecutor had construed a group out of the six defendants and the SHAC 
organization.204 At the same time, the prosecutorial narrative described a collective of victims – 
often referred to as “law-abiding employees” or “law-abiding citizens” (McIntosh 2006) – that 
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 One other activist McGee had initially also been indicted; however, his charges were subsequently dropped. 
Because McGee was alleged to have actually engaged in an act of vandalism, activists speculated he had only been 
indicted to strengthen the link between the coordinators of the website and actual vandalism (Interview S-5). The 







consisted of all the targets of SHAC and every employee or associate that had been targeted in 
any of the tactics that were used, or maybe also those that felt threatened due to what 
happened to others. Only count 4 and count 5 identify two specific individual victims. These 
individual victims, however, explicitly represented many more families and were meant as 
illustrations. This was apparent, for example, when the prosecutor started the opening 
statement with the story of S.D. and her little son who had fear of the “animal people.” “And 
that fear, ladies and gentlemen, is why we are here today, because what was happening to S.D. 
and her family was happening to families all across America.” Thus, the prosecutor construed a 
collective of victims that consisted of “families all across America” (trial transcripts SHAC case).  
 
Criminal responsibility: Generals and foot soldiers  
In combination with the construction of a “pattern,” these collectives of co-conspirators and 
victims lead directly to the next issue: the determination of criminal responsibility. Were SHAC 
activists to be held responsible for actions of others? Were they “generals in a war” in which 
others were foot soldiers? That is the view the prosecutor in the SHAC case put forward. The 
prosecutor anticipated in his opening statement that the defense would claim that the SHAC 
defendants were responsible for the entire campaign, but not for the “illegal stuff.” He 
expected that they would say: “We ran a legal campaign.” The prosecutor, on the contrary, 
created an image in which the SHAC defendants were directing their “foot soldiers.” He claimed 
that the defendants could not exempt themselves for the illegal actions that happened as part 







trying to push the boundaries of the law or circumvent the law in order to pursue aggressive 
tactics while claiming a purely “legal” campaign. He asserted, however, that the law cannot be 
circumvented so easily (Interview S-13). While the defendants claimed to be squarely within the 
political arena, the prosecutor pushed their actions into the criminal justice arena.   
 
During the SHAC trial a young student testified that he had been engaged in the tactics 
described on the SHAC website. For example, he sent black faxes to the investment bank 
Stephens because it was announced as a SHAC tactic. He was a witness for the government and 
the prosecutor specifically re-contextualized the black faxes and put them into the context of 
the alleged conspiracy by making it clear that this student “of his own free will knowingly and 
willingly participated in this conspiracy.” Thus, the prosecutor decided not to define this single 
action of sending black faxes as a separate crime and prosecute the perpetrator accordingly. 
Instead, the re-contextualized prosecutorial narrative turned this witness into a co-conspirator 
(although he was not indicted as such). The choice of the U.S. Attorney to focus on the people 
running the website makes this a case in which the “big fish” are prosecuted while these “foot 
soldiers” are let go. This choice contributes to the uncertainty among activists about what 
exactly is illegal: coordinating a collective action of sending black faxes or actually sending the 
black faxes?  
 







19. On or about February 15, 2001, the SHAC Website posted an announcement which stated in 
part: “we’ll be at their offices, at their doorsteps, on their phones or in their computers. There 
will be no rest for the wicked.”  
20. On or about March 6, 2001, the SHAC Website listed the “top 20 terror tactics” that could be 
used against organizations and individuals in order to harm HLS and ultimately cause it to shut 
down. 
21. On or about March 31, 2001, after the SHAC Website postings described above, protesters 
appeared at the New Jersey residence of HJ, an HLS employee, and banged on the windows and 
doors at his home. 
22. On or about April 2, 2001, after the SHAC Website postings described above, rocks were 
thrown through windows of HJ’s home; one of the cars in HJ’s driveway was overturned and 
vandalized; and a second car in HJ’s driveway was also vandalized. (SHAC indictment, 2004)  
 
Nowhere in the SHAC case did the prosecutor prove or even argue that the SHAC defendants 
were themselves present on 31 March or 2 April. He claimed that that was not necessary: “The 
charge is not that they did this, only the conspiracy to do it. Sometimes they were there: that 
was not necessary, but made it easier” (Interview US-13).  
 
In order to demonstrate that the defendants were indeed criminally responsible for the alleged 
acts, the prosecutor described that the SHAC website listed actions such as smashing windows 
in your home, vandalizing your car, threatening calls at all hours of the night, sending e-mail 
bombs to crash computers, and ordering goods and services in other people’s names. He 
pointed out that above this list the SHAC website read: “don’t read this as an extensive list of 
accomplishments to be proud of, which is it, but a list that can be outdone and surpassed” (p. 
26). The prosecutor emphasized that the SHAC website specifically called for such illegal actions 
and described that the website called upon activists to “make your home visits count” and 
posted three pictures: one of a home demo, one of the HLS worker’s car flipped, and one of an 







does it say, write a letter to these people? It certainly doesn’t say that, and those pictures 
certainly don’t suggest it” (Trial transcripts, SHAC case).   
 
The defendants were charged because they were responsible for their own actions. They were 
not charged because of some sort indirect responsibility, although actions of others did play a 
role in the story. The prosecutor claimed that SHAC defendants were responsible for directing 
and organizing the activities executed by the “foot soldiers.” The criminal responsibility of the 
SHAC activists was based solely upon their postings on the website. It was not alleged or proven 
that they actually participated in the vandalizing actions. The prosecutor explained why the 
information on the SHAC website made the defendants criminally liable:  
The first time I can claim that I didn’t know that you were really going to do that. The second 
and third time I know that you are actually going to do it. And every time I announce the success 
of the organization. At some point during the continuum, you become complicit. We indicted 
the people in the leadership roles. […] If you fight a war, they were generals sitting at their 
desks, planning. The generals are guiltier than the foot soldiers: they provide information and 
they were the ones that took the credit. These defendants were on the phone saying: "we did 
it." These defendants decided that the targets were going to be Deloitte & Touche. That person 
is to me as guilty as the foot soldier. (Interview US-13) 
  
Thus, as one piece of evidence, the prosecutor presented an ALF poster (government exhibit 
8048) that was on the SHAC website and also found on a computer in the house where three of 
the defendants lived. The poster claimed several actions that were committed against HLS and 








100 windows smashed, 44 beagles liberated, 15 office attacks, 10 ferrets liberated, 8 ATMs 
attacked, 8 web attacks, 7 paint attacks, 4 stink bomb attacks, 4 house attacks, 1 smashed car, 1 
flipped car, 1 sunk yacht.  
 
What exactly was the argumentation that linked the SHAC defendants to these actions and 
made them criminally responsible for them? The SHAC defendants were not charged as 
perpetrators of these specific crimes and it is not clear whether they could have been charged 
as such. Instead, the prosecutor argued that these actions were part and parcel of the bigger 
scheme and conspiracy of “terrorizing” and “stalking” the SHAC targets. The prosecutor argued 
that defendants went on to the next target “knowing that in the past when they had identified 
targets, violent acts and illegal acts followed” (trial transcripts, SHAC case).   
 
The construction underlying this type of criminal responsibility is the “conspiracy.” It is 
important to be clear on the point that in this case, it was not (only) about “incitement,” which 
would leave open when and how someone does an illegal act. Instead, it was about 
“coordinating and directing,” including when exactly, for example, an e-mail blockade would 
occur. Prosecutors argued that the SHAC defendants conspired among each other and with all 
the people participating in the SHAC campaign, specifically those that committed the illegal 
acts. The prosecutor pointed out specifically that it was legally possible to conspire without 
knowing all of your co-conspirators. What was required was that everyone be aware of the 







making the SHAC website into the sine qua non of the campaign, the prosecutor established the 
causal story.   
 
Activists, on the other hand, are left with many questions: Are the SHAC defendants directly 
criminally liable for the illegal actions which were on an ALF poster? Is it because they had the 
poster on their computer or website? What was alleged to be the relation between the ALF and 
SHAC? Does it matter for the conviction whether or not the SHAC defendants agreed with these 
tactics? Does it matter for the conviction whether or not the SHAC people said that they agreed 
with these tactics? In this regard, activists wonder whether it is of any use that they put 
disclaimers on their website, disavowing any responsibility for illegal actions (Interview US-16). 
An e-mail by SHAC UK containing a sample letter and the e-mail addresses of employees of a 
secondary company, for example, also contained the following disclaimer:  
 
DISCLAIMER AND INFORMATION - All details in this action alert are provided for informational 
purposes only, and should not be used for any illegal activities as defined by the jurisdiction you 
live in. SHAC are not involved in, and do not encourage, any form of harassment or illegal action. 
Nothing in this action alert has the purpose of inciting such behaviour. Please keep all 
communications polite.  
 
The prosecutor, however, argued forcefully that the disclaimers on the SHAC website should be 







the while wear a sign saying I’m not robbing this bank. But you are robbing that bank” (trial 
transcripts, SHAC case). In this way, the prosecutor dismissed the value of the disclaimer.  
 
Tensions around the boundary between the political arena and the criminal justice 
arena 
The prosecution of the SHAC defendants has raised various questions that all address the 
position of the SHAC tactics and the conduct of the defendants in relation to the political arena 
and the criminal justice arena. I will discuss some of these issues that have been debated inside 
as well as outside the courtroom: What is the difference between education and intimidation? 
What is the domain of protected speech and peaceful assembly, and when does speech turn 
into the crime of “threats”? Activism and (free) speech are often closely related.  
 
At the beginning of his opening statement against the SHAC defendants, the prosecutor 
addressed the “line” between permitted and even stimulated political engagement on the one 
hand and illegal action on the other:  
 
We all encourage our young people to be involved in the social issues of the day, but always 
within a framework of what is just and what is fair. What we don’t encourage and where we 
draw the line is that lawless behavior that steps on the rights of others, because we don’t want 
people involved in causing what happened to Sally Dillenback and her family. In this case, the 







concern for animal welfare something that is worthwhile and praiseworthy to a campaign of 
thuggery and intimidation. (Trial transcripts, SHAC case) 
 
The prosecutor employs the plural, asserting that “we all encourage” and “we don’t 
encourage.” He makes normative statements and draws a line between what “we” find 
desirable and what “we” consider to cross that line. Who is the “we” that is drawing this line? 
For whom does the prosecutor legitimately speak? How do actors in society organize and move 
in order to co-determine that “line” and maybe even move the line a little bit? The prosecutor 
addresses not only what is permitted as tactics, but even ventures into the terrain of the goals 
that are considered “worthwhile and praiseworthy,” thus blurring the distinction between 
means and ends. He specifically praises a concern for “animal welfare,” whereas the SHAC 
defendants have explicitly distanced themselves from animal welfare organizations and taken a 
firm position as animal rights advocates.  
 
The prosecutor often draws on this distinction between tactics that are permissible and those 
that are illegal. He asked the jury rhetorically whether the SHAC defendants were only 
intending to be involved in letter writing, standing outside a building and “simply protesting” or 
“calling and complaining” (trial transcripts, SHAC case). As the prosecutor thus expresses the 
boundary between the political arena and the criminal justice arena, he asserts more than 
specifies the exact difference between “simply protesting” and “stalking” or “illegal action.” He 







country is about; this country is about protesting legally. It is well within their right to write 
letters” (Interview US-13).  
 
What SHAC did was offensive and obnoxious. Many people I have spoken to agreed with that, 
also animal rights activists, also some of the lawyers involved in Green Scare cases. The dispute 
therefore is not about whether what SHAC did was offensive or obnoxious. The dispute is also 
not about whether or not they should not be doing this kind of offensive and obnoxious protest 
activity because it is offensive and obnoxious. The question in the meta-conflict about this 
criminal case is whether this offensive and obnoxious protest activity is criminal or even 
terrorist activity.  
 
The “chilling effect” 
Various lawyers and activists consistently portray the SHAC case as an attack on free speech 
(Boghosian 2007). They fear the case may have a “chilling effect” on other activists as the line 
between legal political speech and illegal speech has been blurred. Matthew Strugar, 
cooperating counsel with the Center for Constitutional Rights on the SHAC case, claimed that 
the court’s decision gives the government a “carte blanche to prosecute organizers of internet-
based social justice campaigns that involve any hint of intimidation by rouge third parties. That 








In my interview with one animal rights activist who organizes home demonstrations focused on 
closing down HLS, she expressed her concern that a lawyer had told her that despite 
disclaimers she might be held responsible for the information she publishes on the Internet, 
even though that information may be publicly available. She is at a loss regarding how to 
determine the boundary between what is legal and what is illegal. She ends every e-mail with 
the following disclaimer:  
 
[Name animal rights group] is an independent non-profit organization not affiliated or 
associated with SHAC, SHAC USA or any other group or organization and does not conduct or 
incite any illegal activity. The above information is not meant to incite or request any illegal 
actions or illegal activities of any kind. If you have any questions about the legality of any act, we 
encourage everyone receiving this (or the) action alert(s) to check your local laws and 
ordinances before proceeding to do anything.  
 
Indeed, she reported to me that she was being more careful with public statements, fearful 
that her declarations would be misconstrued. She also had fear of experiencing a raid by the FBI 
(Interview US-16).  
 
Threats, fear, and protected speech 
In the chapter on Spain, I devoted an entire section to the criminalization of speech acts as 
“glorification” of terrorism, briefly discussing the case of Iñaki de Juana, who was tried for the 







debate about the political or criminal nature of speech. When does speech depart from the 
political arena and the protection of the First Amendment? Not all speech is protected. Legal 
scholar Holmes famously held that falsely shouting “fire” in a theater is not protected speech, 
as it can cause havoc and damage.205  
 
The rules for this debate were brought into the courtroom through the jury instructions. They 
provided the jury with a concise summary of the meaning of the right to free speech and to 
peaceful assembly (the First Amendment). The instructions clarified that the constitutional right 
to freedom of speech protects symbolic or expressed conduct as well as actual speech. The jury 
instructions described this fundamental right as embodying the profound national commitment 
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. This 
commitment to public debate is typical of liberal democracy. The instructions further asserted 
that people have the right to make their voices heard on public issues. This means that people 
must have the opportunity to have their voices heard collectively, if individually they would be 
too faint or lost. This then clarifies the right to association. However, speech is not protected 
when it constitutes a “true threat” in order to protect individuals from the fear of violence.206 
The instructions explained that intimidation is a type of true threat that exists when an actor or 
speaker directs a threat to a person with the intent of placing that person in fear of bodily harm 
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 “The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theater and 
causing a panic. [...] The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are 
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent.” Holmes in: Schenck v United States, Supreme Court, 249 U.S. 47, 1919.  
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or death. According to these instructions, however, only fear of bodily injury is recognized as 
intimidation; fear of property damage was not mentioned.207  
 
Count 2 of the indictment clearly indicates that the defendants were charged with inspiring 
“reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to that person, or a member of the 
immediate family, or a spouse, or partner, or intimate partner of that person.” The defendants 
and many animal rights activists question whether there was a “reasonable fear” of death or 
bodily injury, given that the tactics had never included such things. The prosecutor, however, 
argued that telling “targets” that “we know where you live” and telling Marsh employees “we 
will treat you no different than we would treat Brian Cass” (which, the prosecutor added, one 
of the witnesses testified to have clearly understood as a reference to the beating of the British 
HLS director Brian Cass), is not protected speech, but a threat.208  
 
An important aspect of the fear of the SHAC tactics was the intrusion of privacy. Activists 
participating in the SHAC campaign have used tactics that they call “satire.” Much of this satire 
is not really funny, however, by most standards. They posted the underwear of a woman on the 
Internet with her menstruation blood. They had found this in the garbage. Funny? Probably not. 
Terrorism? Probably not. The general feeling was, as the prosecutor told me, that there should 
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 In the SHAC case the issue was whether there was a reasonable fear of physical harm. The AETA actually already 
criminalizes once emotional distress occurs; see chapter 6.  
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 Fear is thus only possible if a “target” interprets the actions in a certain way. It is this interpretation that can be 
more or less “reasonable.” These considerations are not new to criminal doctrine. Indeed, there are many cases in 
which it has come up, for example in the Goetz case, where the defendant argued to have acted out of self-







be a law prohibiting this. Different communities have different standards with which they 
interpret “jokes” and “satire,” and in this case, that debate became a key part of the criminal 
prosecution.    
 
The difference between educating and stalking  
The political arena is dominated by two logics: persuasion and negotiation. While persuasion is 
about changing the hearts and minds of the opponent, negotiation is a power-based logic.209 
Persuasion thus entails informing, educating, and providing arguments in favor of a certain 
position. This is, for example, the modus advocated in the following citation from one of the e-
mails from the group Win Animal Rights in their campaign against HLS: “As always, please keep 
all correspondence, with the above, polite and informative. A picture is worth a thousand 
words. You can find pictures at: http://www.shac.net/HLS/photos.html” (4 January 2008). The 
defense lawyers argued that the objective of SHAC defendants also was to educate people 
about animal testing.  
 
As the prosecutor addressed these arguments and described what education is and what the 
difference is between education and intimidation, the debate turned to the shifting boundaries 
and logic of the political arena and the criminal justice arena. The prosecutor was very specific 
about what the defendants should have done: “If this is a campaign about education you might 
go to the decision makers and want to talk to them about what animal testing is all about” (trial 
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transcripts, SHAC case). The prosecutor emphasized that in the standardized “form letter” on 
the SHAC website there was no word about animal testing and no attempt to appeal to the 
conscience of the companies. The prosecutor argued that the information that was put up on 
the website (where employees live, what they look like, and where their kids go to school or 
where they go to church) could only have been obtained by “stalking” someone. Further, this 
information could not be understood to have been intended to “educate” that employee, but 
instead, in combination with the twenty terror tactics and the knowledge of what happened to 
other “targets,” the purpose of this information could only be understood to have been 
threatening.  
 
The prosecutor thus established a “line” between “advocating your beliefs” (the logic of 
persuasion) and “threatening someone to get them to do what you want” (the logic of 
coercion). The prosecutor talked about this line as if it were clear-cut, arguing that the SHAC 
defendants “crossed the line.” The prosecutor gave examples of other organizations that were 
also protesting against HLS and they “knew about that line, and they stayed on the right side.” 
He described that these organizations did not list the home addresses of employees on their 
websites. They did not tell someone else to throw a brick through somebody’s window.  
  
The prosecutor also dismissed the argument that the defendants were only reporting “news,” 







that the New York Times does not applaud those actions.210 The prosecutor argued that the New 
York Times did not say, “here are ten other churches you can go after.” And the New York Times 
did not publish a matchbook with the church addresses.  
 
The difference between “organizing” and “conspiracy” 
As mentioned above, some activists argued that the SHAC case can have a chilling effect on 
other campaign organizers. Some prosecutorial arguments and uses of evidence can easily 
hamper legitimate organizing, they argued. For example, Josh Harper was held responsible, 
among other things, for speeches he held across the country. Why? The prosecutor argued that 
during these speeches he would tell people how not to get caught. The prosecutor was explicit 
about the move towards putting the events into a context. He was frank about the fact that 
none of the defendants was charged with any individual speech. Instead he said that “you 
should consider them in the context of deciding what was Josh Harper’s intent and his state of 
mind when participating in this campaign” (trial transcripts, SHAC case). Thus, the speeches 
were re-contextualized as it was argued that they should be seen as part of the campaign.  
 
The central medium in the SHAC campaign was the SHAC website. This has created questions in 
the activist community about the criminalization of internet-based activism. The prosecutor 
argued in his closing argument that a website is the ideal medium for a conspiracy, because a 
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selected. It will mostly be a gradual than a categorical difference between reporting news on the one hand and 







conspiracy is an illegal agreement in which you want to communicate with your co-conspirators 
without it being found out that you are a part of the agreement. In this regard, activists were 
concerned about a further argument the prosecutor made. He claimed that communicating 
without divulging “who is part of the illegal agreement” could be helped with encrypted 
communication, such as PGP (trial transcripts, SHAC case). The prosecutor thus linked the use 
of PGP by the SHAC defendants to the intent to communicate this illegal agreement: the 
conspiracy. The prosecutor argued that activists said things on the phone like “I can’t talk about 
that. I’ll send you something over PGP.” Activists were outraged about the fact that using PGP 
could thus be construed as evidence for participating in a conspiracy. Similarly, the prosecutor 
argued that the criminal conspiracy was also the reason why Lauren Gazzola called herself 
Angela Jackson during an interview with the radio. Activists argued that the prosecutor here 
turned the case on its head. They argued that it was precisely the awareness that effective 
activism could launch a criminal investigation that motivated Gazzola to take on an assumed 
name and that they needed to protect themselves against such repression.  
 
Beyond the SHAC case: The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act 
As described in the previous chapter, the SHAC campaign and its strategy of secondary 
targeting led to the enactment of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act. Representative Scott 
brought up his concern that the law might lead to the prosecution of activists engaging in 








If a group’s intention were to stage a sit-down, lie-down or to block traffic to a targeted facility, 
they certainly run the risk of arrest for whatever traffic, trespass or other laws they are breaking, 
but they should not be held any more accountable for business losses due to delivery trucks 
being delayed any more than anyone else guilty of such activities. (Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 23 May 2006, Washington) 
 
Brent McIntosh, deputy assistant attorney general of the Justice Department, testified during 
the same hearing. He asserted that while federal prosecutors were “well equipped” to 
prosecute activists that use arson or explosives, “not all animal rights extremists use arson and 
explosives.” This indicates a clear move towards proactively focusing on the aboveground 
activities of the activists that are considered to organize and direct protests.   
 
It did not take long for other activists to be charged for “home visits” under the new AETA. In 
2010, the first case charged under this new law came before a judge. The indictment described 
the behavior of the four defendants as “criminal trespass, harassment, and intimidation at a 
bio-medical researcher’s residence in the East Bay,” which was construed as an overt act in the 
conspiracy. Defense lawyers from the CCR claimed that the only thing that the activists were 
doing was “chanting, leafleting and chalking on public sidewalks in front of University of 
California researchers’ homes, and using the Internet to conduct research on the activities of 
the protested company” (CCR 2010b). Others, however, did not see innocent chanting and 
leafleting, but threats and intimidation. “Any reasonable person would see it as threats,” said J. 







2010). On 12 July 2010, a judge dismissed the indictment of the AETA4, arguing that the 
indictment did not specify the criminal conduct alleged to have been committed by the four 
defendants: 
 
In order for an indictment to fulfill its constitutional purposes, it must allege facts that 
sufficiently inform each defendant of what it is that he or she is alleged to have done that 
constitutes a crime. This is particularly important where the species of behavior in question 
spans a wide spectrum from criminal conduct to constitutionally protected political protest. 
While “true threats” enjoy no First Amendment protection, picketing and political protest are at 
the very core of what is protected by the First Amendment. (Order dismissing indictment against 
AETA4 without prejudice) 
 
While the case did not result in a conviction, it does demonstrate a continued attempt to 
categorize these activities (which are known as “home visits”) under the label of terrorism. It 
thus responds to the mobilization by scientists and employees in animal enterprises who, like 
Walsh of the National Animal Interest Alliance, view the animal rights activists as “small-time 
terrorists” (Walsh 2000).  
 
Not only at the federal level, but also in state prosecutions home demonstrations have been 
the subject of prosecutions, for example in the case against Kevin Olliff, who was accused of 
stalking and a conspiracy to commit stalking after participating in home demonstrations. Olliff 







an improvised incendiary device at the house of one of the targets. The only thing that Olliff 
was alleged to have done as an overt act was to participate in home demonstrations in which 
they chanted, for example, “free the animals A-L-F” and mentioned the name of the target. The 
prosecution also requested to have a gang enhancement applied, arguing that the ALF is a 
“criminal street gang” and that Olliff’s expressions during home demonstrations showed his 
affiliation with the ALF (Indictment 2009). The judge, however, ruled that the ALF cannot be 
qualified as a gang.  
  
The detailed analysis of the prosecution of the SHAC defendants should serve as an in-depth 
example of the impact of a re-contextualized narrative on the prosecutorial choices in a 
criminal case and the multiple debates that emerged with it. It is clear that the prosecutorial 
narrative re-contextualized a series of events into a pattern, construing a conspiracy, a 
collective of co-conspirators, and a collective of victims, igniting intense debate about the exact 
nature of the role and activities of the SHAC defendants and whether that should be 
categorized and dealt with in the political arena or in the criminal justice arena. The case served 
to marginalize SHAC activists from the broader animal rights community, severing links of 
solidarity, and sending a strong message to the more moderate groups and individuals to 









When I introduced the eco-conflict in the United States at the beginning of the previous 
chapter, I juxtaposed the twin concepts Green Scare and eco-terrorism. In the past two 
chapters I traced these concepts and their development as well as the actors behind these two 
different frames that claim to capture reality. Who are the real eco-terrorists? And when does 
the offensive, obnoxious, or dangerous become illegal or even terrorism? Those are the central 
contentious questions in the criminal justice arena. I analyzed the prosecutorial narrative as a 
voice in the conversation with various other voices in society that challenge the government to 
take a position. Some images are adopted in the narrative of the prosecutors, others are 
rejected.  
 
Radically different images exist regarding the status quo that protesters confront: animal 
torture versus legal animal testing; meat as murder versus a profitable and necessary meat 
industry; unnecessary killing of animals versus a legitimate fur industry providing people with 
clothes; unnecessary destruction of nature versus construction projects to fulfill human needs; 
destruction of pristine lands versus the legitimate drilling for oil to deliver energy. The images 
proposed by activists are generally ignored in criminal prosecutions, relegated to the political 
arena. There are no prosecutions of Huntingdon Life Sciences for the “murder” of four hundred 
animals every day. Instead, prosecutors proclaim the legality of the work of HLS as prescribed 








Both environmentalist activists and the targets of their demands employ the language of 
criminal law. In their efforts to seek justice, change, or punishment they call upon the 
government to adopt their perspective and invest time and resources in criminal prosecutions 
or lawsuits in order to redress wrongs. I paid attention to the way in which the state has 
responded to environmentalist protest activity and distinguished between what it deemed 
legitimate and political and what has to be prosecuted as illegal and criminal. Dickson points 
out that there are “cases and investigations that do not have to be initiated and that could be 
ignored with little or no serious consequences” (in: Holden Jr. 2006:19). By not taking up certain 
cases, the government marginalizes the voices of those that felt victimized. This happened 
initially with fur farmers and animal scientists. They, however, were able to mobilize 
successfully as victims in the criminal justice arena, drawing attention from the government. 
This is not the case for many of the environmentalist demands, which even when they are 
framed in the language of criminal law – if only as a provoking slogan such as “meat is murder” 
– are hardly adopted by the state, and are ignored in prosecutorial narratives.  
 
While the prosecutor claims to act in name of “the” public interest, I presented the different 
voices in the meta-conflict that contests that concept. Activists challenge prosecutorial claims 
to speak in name of a particular “public,” such as the “law-abiding citizens.” Animal enterprises 
allied with other environmentalist targets to push the government to adopt eco-terrorism as 
the proper label for extremist environmentalist protest. “Prisoner supporters” resist 







competing narratives in the criminal justice arena always include a construction of good and 
bad. Criminal justice concepts lend themselves perfectly to this in the form of justifications, 
excuses, the “necessity” defense, principles of proportionality, attenuating circumstances, or 
duress in order to defend the morality and legitimacy of their position. Analogies with other 
criminal cases or metaphors are another tool with which demarcations are made between good 
and bad. The vocabulary chosen by activists to talk about their tactics is often explicitly 
disputed in criminal prosecutions: animal liberations versus property destruction or animal 
enterprise terrorism; the successful pressure on secondary targets versus the coordination of a 
terror campaign; legitimate civil disobedience versus criminal obstruction of lawful government 
proceedings.  
 
Describing the way in which the prosecutorial narrative claims control over conduct and 
mobilizes criminal law vocabulary to translate events into categories operable in criminal 
proceedings, I have presented it as a “marginalizing” discourse. Thus, I contrast it with the 
dominant developments that I identified in Spain and Chile. The prosecutorial narrative in Spain 
is largely expansive, pushing the boundaries of the criminal justice arena into the political arena 
and claiming authority over conduct that was previously left untouched by criminal law 
categories. The prosecutorial narrative in Chile during the past twenty years has been 
profoundly ambivalent, as it keeps going back and forth in its usage of criminal proceedings to 








Prosecutorial narratives separate the political and legitimate from the criminal and illegitimate. 
In doing so, the prosecutorial narrative in the eco-conflict in the United States identifies a 
specific category of actions as “eco-terrorism” and draws a strict boundary between those 
engaging in lawful political action and those that “crossed the line.” The narrative affirms the 
boundary between what is criminal and what is political. It gives signals to potential 
lawbreakers that they better stay away from that fine line where permitted protest turns into 
law breaking. I interpret the prosecutorial narrative in the United States as a balancing act as it 
navigates between fringe and mainstream, between extremists and moderates, between 
radicals and compromisers. In this navigation process the prosecutorial narrative actively 
contributes to producing those boundaries between the extreme and the moderate and 
pressures actors to take a stand. Mainstream organizations, for example, are pressured to 
distance themselves from “extremist” actions, and “extremists” are pressured into leaving 
activist circles and denouncing the use of “violence.” The animal rights and environmentalist 
movement has become increasingly split over the use of radical versus moderate means in the 
struggle for animal rights and the conservation of nature. Moderate organizations are 
distancing themselves from extremist activists. I understand this to be a mutually reinforcing 
process. The mainstream rejection of extremism provides more leeway for the government for 
harsher prosecutions, and at the same time the distance sought by moderate organizations is a 








In return, the prosecutorial narrative ensures that moderate (“welfare”) demands are squarely 
located in the political arena. Given the widespread support for moderate environmentalist 
demands, it is imperative that mainstream environmentalists not be lumped into the category 
of “eco-terrorists.” For example, the SHAC prosecutor made it a point during the trial to point 
out the “glaring difference” between SHAC and other [animal rights] organizations, who would 
not go “to the extremes,” because “they did not want to break the law.” Indeed, while activists 
attribute widespread paranoia to the Green Scare, the prosecutor holds the activists 
themselves responsible for creating a “paranoia” and making “legitimate animal rights activists” 
scared of the government. Thus, the SHAC prosecutor specifically isolated the SHAC campaign 
from other animal rights activity, also emphasizing that he would have “no desire to go after 
them if they alter their modus operandi” and he emphasized that out of thousands of people 
who are involved in animal rights activism, only six had been indicted (Interview US-13).  
 
The increased adoption throughout the 1990s and 2000s of the term “eco-terrorism” in the 
prosecutorial narrative, and most importantly within the FBI, has led to a diversion of energy 
and resources in these prosecutions. The political “ecological” motive which is at the core of the 
concept of “eco-terrorism” is essential in (a) the creation of a link between distinct actions and 
actors and (b) the perception of heightened danger. More than the specific harm in each of the 
cases, it seems to be the superior attitude of activists that challenges the status quo. Their 







problematic and indeed, the attitude of the defendants in the SHAC case enraged the jury and 
the judge (Interview US-14).  
 
The eco-terrorism narrative further involved a shift towards proactive investigations and the 
construction of criminal liability for aboveground activity through concepts such as 
“coordination” or “incitement.” The shift to proactive investigations as well as the emphasis on 
deterrence reflects the concern of prosecutors with potential future victims and the fear of an 
escalation of tactics. To a large extent, the intended audience of the prosecutorial narrative 
consisted of potential future lawbreakers, “kids” that might get carried away by ideologues or 
the encouragement of “heroes” like Rod Coronado or Tim DeChristopher. This concern shifts 
the focus from the prosecution of individuals for past harm to the attempt to investigate and 
prevent the radicalization of a specific sector of a political movement as well as the 









Conclusion: A Critical Analysis of the 
Production of Criminal Justice 
 
In the introduction I wrote that this dissertation can be seen as a long response to prosecutor 
Ms. Vidal in Chile, who told me that she was “just applying” the law (Interview C-10). While it 
would be easy to dismiss her comment as mere rhetoric, I have taken her position seriously. My 
analysis may therefore read as a litany against the straw man that I built of prosecutors 
claiming they are “just applying the law,” while most would concede that politics can never be 
entirely excluded or ignored. Still I find it important to address that rhetoric, because it is used 
over and over again in the practices and language of criminal justice agents, the government, 
and the media. Indeed, the proposed “solution” to experienced problems is still often more law 
and better law. 
 
My criticism of the view that law is autonomous (and just a matter of application) does not 
mean that I adopt the view that law is just an instrument in the hands of the elite and simply 
politics by other means. Academic debate has largely moved on from that dichotomous 
representation as it is has turned out to be far more complicated than that. If the so-called 
“elites” had had their way, criminal prosecutions in the countries in the episodes in this study 







example, would not complain about the lack of convictions and sentences. Indeed, most 
surprising is the outcome that often even the actors whose account of victimhood is honored in 
criminal proceedings continue to be dissatisfied, even if the prosecutorial narrative has made a 
shift in their direction, such as through the adoption of their proposed “context” for 
reconstructing events. One might have expected that either the victim or the defendant (and 
their respective supporters) would be content with the criminal prosecutions. The pervasive 
discontent, however, is the most persuasive piece of evidence suggesting that criminal 
prosecutions and the “rule of law” should not be expected to “solve” perceived injustices. 
Instead, prosecutions continually produce images that are deeply contested and are thus 
unable to create an authoritative narrative.  
 
Ms. Vidal was certainly aware of the fact that criminal prosecutions involve much more than 
just applying the law, especially in the “hot” context of the Chilean-Mapuche territorial conflict. 
Her statement, however, expresses an ideal that is very much alive. Her words reflect the 
ambition of the prosecutor’s offices not only in Chile, but also in Spain and the United States, 
not to get involved with the politics of a case. Her refusal to acknowledge the complexity of 
“just applying the law” communicates the promise of benefits that come with faithful 
adherence to the rule of law. As I have argued in Chapter 4 and 5, her speech was the 
uncomfortable counterpart of the ambivalent tensions in the prosecutorial narrative in the 
courtroom. My dissertation is a call to bring these tensions out in the open, instead of denying 







narrative play a role in criminal prosecutions. Specifically, I have shown how such changes often 
expand criminal responsibility and turn courtrooms into the central sites of contention and 
prosecutors into major actors in the larger conflicts. My ethnographic analysis has shed light on 
the micro-encounters and micro-mechanisms behind such broad terms as “criminalization” and 
the “rule of law.”  
 
I will start this concluding chapter with a brief recap of my central argument. Liberal 
democracies claim legitimate power and a liberal criminal justice system that can adequately 
deal with challenges to state order. Major contentious episodes, however, pose a dual 
challenge to liberal democracies. First, the state has to respond to the challenges to the status 
quo and – with or without reforming the status quo – effectively restore order while facing 
claim-makers or defenders of the status quo with grievances that are shared by a larger group 
in society; and second, in responding to disruptive protest activity the state has to act in such a 
way that it upholds its claim to liberal legalism. This is the dilemma of the short-term interest in 
order and the longer term interest in legitimacy.  
 
In the scholarly literature, this puzzle about the challenges of state legitimacy goes back to 
Weber. In order to understand and enable analysis of variations in the state response, several 
scholars have developed ideal types of different modalities of law as the state negotiates its 
own legitimacy vis-à-vis challenges to order. Drawing inspiration from the available scholarly 







Nonet and Selznick (1978), I developed the modalities of de-contextualization versus re-
contextualization. My dissertation provides data from real situations where the variation 
between such modalities is explored in actual criminal prosecutions. I argue that in the context 
of a contentious episode, despite the claim of liberal legalism to bracket political ideologies, 
criminal proceedings can become the arena in which the political contention is played out. I 
provided three case studies of criminal proceedings in distinct contentious episodes to show 
what this looks like.  
 
I thus set out to explore the puzzle of what the criminal justice arena looks like when the 
government is prosecuting people in a major contentious episode, i.e., people with political 
claims representing a larger constituency. Describing a common pattern of what I have called 
“contentious criminalization” in Spain, Chile, and the United States, I argue that the meta-
conflict about the criminal proceedings contributes to a shift of the political mobilization from 
the political arena into the criminal justice arena. This means that the criminal justice agents 
inevitably become an actor in the political contention. Thus, although the liberal state works 
with a criminal justice system that is based on “formal rationality,” which is premised on the 
notion that it stays out of the political contention by formalizing categories and excluding 
context, in the previous chapters I have demonstrated how this comes to be increasingly 
difficult and the prosecutor will inevitably tell a story which becomes part of the contention and 








My study has been “semiotic” in the sense that I take the criminal law to be a language. I 
studied it as if it were a language that communicates and has a standard grammar and can 
develop local slang. Criminal law and the social practice of criminal prosecutions thus constitute 
a system of signification. Understanding the prosecutorial narrative as a semiological 
phenomenon means asking how the signs receive their meaning and how and what they signify. 
In my analysis, the relation between prosecutorial narrative and criminal law was viewed as 
loosely equivalent to that between “parole” and “langue” á la Saussure, i.e., the criminal law is 
that which is codified and not used, whereas the prosecutorial narrative is the application and 
use of that language. As such, the chosen medium of criminal law and criminal proceedings 
contributes to the message it sends. For example, use of the “terrorism” label triggers more 
resources, but the use of this code word tends to undermine the claim of manageability which 
is the underlying message when a state labels conduct as “merely” criminal. Using this lens of 
meaningmaking does not mean ignoring material aspects. On the contrary, linguistic categories 
and images have material consequences when, for example, terrorism enhancements and 
CMU’s (special prisons) turn activists, defendants, and prisoners into “terrorists,” which can 
deeply affect their treatment, the length of the prison sentence, and even life after prison.  
 
The prosecutorial narrative is the account that has the officially recognized judicial status of 
charging, indicting, and arguing the guilt of a defendant for an alleged crime. Criminal 
prosecutions can trigger a meta-conflict, which is expressed in the collective action of different 







narrative. I have shown not only that the prosecutorial narrative engages with these competing 
voices that enter the criminal justice arena, but also how we can usefully conceptualize the 
changes that result from such engagement.  
 
Processes of victim mobilization and prisoner support mobilization take the narratives and 
meaning of criminal prosecutions out of the courtroom and bring the features of the political 
contention into the courtroom. Thus, new actors and identifications are created and 
“interpretive communities” whose members share the same codes emerge (Chandler 
2002:230). The different interpretive communities of prisoner supporters and victim mobilizers 
engage in signifying practices in order to communicate the “preferred reading” of an indictment 
or verdict, for example, when prisoner supporters invert the meaning of a prison sentence from 
condemnation into heroic resistance. The conventions within the codes employed by such 
communities become naturalized among its members and different interpretive communities 
“decode” the criminal justice messages in different ways, fomenting further polarization. The 
claim of liberal criminal justice that it applies equally to everyone loses traction once the roles 
of victims and perpetrators become systematically allocated to competing actors. In the 
interaction with different interpretive communities and their competing narratives, prosecutors 
frequently replace the default prosecutorial strategy of de-contextualization with re-
contextualization. This dissertation has shown how in each of the country studies the choices of 







narrative, leading to the use of different laws, a choice of different defendants, and demands 
for higher or lower sentences than under the de-contextualized representation of events.    
 
In these processes of contentious criminalization, the battles in the meta-conflict surrounding 
criminal prosecutions address questions that impinge on the political contention. Interventions 
in that “conversation” are therefore both deeply morally charged and at the same time 
fundamentally dispute the prosecutorial representation of reality. Examples of these questions 
are: What is ETA? Who is the real eco-terrorist? Do the defendants represent the Mapuche 
people? The answers to these questions do not only determine prosecutorial choices in criminal 
indictments but also perpetuate or challenge a certain perspective on the political contention. 
The answers to these questions are therefore inevitably partial and political, instead of neutral 
and objective as advocates of liberal legalism would claim them to be.  
 
While I thus claim that the prosecutorial narratives are partial and political, my analysis was not 
about specific prosecutors and their biases. Indeed, while every prosecutor has biases, the 
point of law is not that the people executing it do not have biases. Law is there to ensure that 
these human biases do not determine the legal decisions. Instead of pointing fingers at 
individual prosecutors, this dissertation explores structural tweaks in the criminal justice 
system. My research question was straightforward: in the course of a contentious episode, will 
a shift in the prosecutorial narrative occur, and if so, when (as a result of which processes?), 







does the prosecutor then choose? In these last pages I want to reflect briefly on the findings 
presented in this study. What is their significance? What do the findings tell us about law? 
What do the findings tell us about democracy and liberal legalism? How is “justice” performed 
in the institutions of the liberal democracy?  
 
What happens in the criminal justice arena is much more than just the meting out of 
punishment. Hulsman (1997) claimed that if you look closely at what happens in the criminal 
justice system, it is a myth that it is about punishment. He asserts that punishment is something 
that we all know and understand, for example within the context of a family in which parents 
sometimes punish children. In his understanding, what happens in criminal proceedings, a 
conviction and the subsequent execution of the sentence, is something else.  
 
So I do not consider criminal justice as a system that dispenses punishment but as a system that 
uses the language of punishment in a way which hides the real processes going on and 
generates support by presenting those processes uncorrectly [sic] as similar to processes known 
and accepted by the public. (1997:1) 
 
I have put a spotlight on the voice of the state as it engages in criminal prosecutions. I have 
shown that such prosecutions are not just about formal rules, bureaucratic proceedings, and 
invisible movements of defendants, detainees, and prisoners. Instead, I emphasized that we 
can study what the state is communicating in these proceedings in a conversation with 







control the meaning and interpretation of their words as they are understood, translated, and 
transformed in that conversation. The data presented in this ethnographic study, with a 
perspective rooted in the daily reality of criminal proceedings, show how the dynamics of the 
political contention move into the criminal justice arena and reveal the subsequent limitations 
of liberal legalism as the founding ideology of the criminal justice system. In his piece on liberal 
legalism, Bhuta emphasizes the hoped-for legitimating function of criminal law:   
 
Criminal law as a social institution derives its efficacy from its ability to euphemise and authorise 
coercion (in the name of the Community, the People, the King). Instrumental to this successful 
authentication is the potential of the trial medium to elevate events and conduct from the realm 
of private happenings and partisan constructions into “an official, authoritative and quasi-
neutral sphere.” (Bhuta 2005) 
 
At stake, then, is nothing less than the battle about the legitimate use of the state’s coercive 
power and the establishment of legal order. The competing voices of “victims” and “prisoner 
supporters” in the meta-conflict transform the “official, authoritative and quasi-neutral sphere” 
of trials, exposing the multiple possible constructions of reality.  
 
The prosecutorial narrative may often seem a seductively objective description of what 
happened. Without suggesting that such a narrative is somehow untrue, in each of the three 
country studies I have shown that meaning-making is an inherent part of building a criminal 







visible the competing narratives has shown how the prosecutorial narrative is not a natural 
statement of fact. A comparison of these narratives can thus lead to a “de-naturalization” or 
“de-familiarization” (Chandler 2002) of that prosecutorial narrative, uncovering the choices and 
assumptions that it takes for granted. It might seem like stating the obvious that in criminal 
trials against animal rights activists the prosecutor does not adopt their notion that animal 
testing companies are the “real eco-criminals” just as it may be taken for granted that ethical 
questions about animal testing and voices about animal cruelty are excluded from their trial 
and the issue of land claims is excluded from trials against Mapuche activists. It might seem 
natural that federal prosecutors in the United States do not prosecute Huntingdon Life Sciences 
for “animal cruelty” or for “murdering” four hundred animals per day. These prosecutorial 
decisions are indeed taken for granted as natural, which betrays an essential feature of the 
hegemonic discourse which is reflected and reproduced in the prosecutorial narrative and 
choices.  
  
My work is primarily empirical, focusing on the description and explanation of the phenomenon 
of contentious criminalization, studying the criminal justice system as a medium or channel of 
state communication with citizens. Law is, however, at the same time a normative system, the 
legitimation for the application of force and a symbolic system. The moral aspects of 
criminalization have been the subject of debate by scholars in law and philosophy. Especially 
relevant here is the debate about the state’s justification to punish offenders “whose offences 







Gargarella 2011:23). In an article published in Criminal Law and Philosophy, Gargarella 
challenges the state’s authority for such punishment (2011). That debate mirrors many of the 
issues that have been explored empirically in the past pages, addressing similar aspects such as 
the limits of contractualism (the imagined social contract between citizens and the state) and 
democracy. For example, Gargarella describes, in contrast to an ideal situation of democratic 
decision-making, the situation in which  
 
some people listening to the discourse of the law are no longer able to identify their voice at all 
[…]. What they hear instead is another voice, one that is illegitimate, foreign, incomprehensible, 
and distant. This strange voice, however, is backed by state force, which enables it to impose its 
will on those who do not understand it, do not adhere to it, or directly reject it. (2011:24)  
 
Indeed, my data show that in each contentious episode there are people who “are no longer 
able to identify their voices at all” and they express fundamental criticism on the liberal 
democracy, complaining about their exclusion from the political process and the law-making 
procedures.  
  
As philosophical and ethical discussions, these arguments need a translation to actual 
situations. I hope that my in-depth analysis of actual cases in which people express such 
alienation of democratic decision-making and the subsequent battle for interpretation in 
criminal prosecutions against them can advance these debates about the state’s legitimate use 







situations in which there is “marked, unjustified social inequality” (2011:21). That begs the 
question of where that line is drawn (he refers, for example, to apartheid South Africa) and who 
gets to decide that. Of course, these very questions become disputed in the meta-conflict about 
the contentious criminal prosecutions.   
 
In providing a detailed ethnographic analysis of three cases of contentious criminalization, I 
aimed to offer the descriptions where more abstract theoretical treatments lack such an 
empirical basis. An example of such a theory is the typology of a “criminal law of the enemy” in 
the work of Jakobs (Jakobs and Meliá 2006) which begs an empirical analysis of the social 
process in which people are converted into enemies as well as the actual features of such 
criminal law in practice. I hope that my study provides the needed empirical data for rethinking 
the applicability and usefulness of such theoretical concepts.   
 
The voice and story of the prosecutor  
 
In processes of contentious criminalization, much of what the prosecutor does will be 
contested. However, some approaches are likely to be more contentious than others. What is 
more, the kind of contestation is likely to be different. A de-contextualized prosecutorial 
narrative is likely to be criticized for not being effective enough and for not giving due credit to 
the “real” nature of the event (which depending on perspective is argued to be either political 







a sure way to fuel and complicate contention. These narratives not only are more likely to be 
criticized as partial. In addition, with re-contextualization the contention shifts from narrow 
criminal questions about who did what to broader questions of identity, ideology, and politics.  
 
Criminal proceedings are always a site of contestation. Prosecutors and defense lawyers always 
face each other in a battle for the interpretation of events and the determination of good and 
bad. I have shown, however, that the battle for interpretation in the cases of contentious 
criminalization is different. Instead of – or in addition to – a dispute about the role and conduct 
of the defendant (which is the routine material of contestation in the courtroom), the various 
voices in the meta-conflicts in the cases of contentious criminalization engage in a struggle 
about (1) the very conception of the events as a matter that should be dealt with in the criminal 
justice arena and (2) the relevant context in order to interpret the disputed events.  
 
The empirical chapters describe how in the process of contentious criminalization victims and 
prisoner supporters propose a highly different and competing reading of the relevant context 
that should be taken into account, as alternatives to the default de-contextualized 
representation of events. The alternative interpretations lead to an often radically different 
representation and valuation of what happened. Because of their context-based meaning, 
these new images and definitions of crime in the re-contextualized prosecutorial narrative and 







based on a unified public interest, abstract individualism, legal determinism, formal rationality, 
and a separation between law and politics.  
 
In the detailed analysis of several of the criminal prosecutions in these contentious episodes, I 
have shown the tension between liberal legalist premises and the re-contextualized 
prosecutorial narratives in terms of the scope of the legal interest, the scope of criminal 
liability, the scope of the legally relevant context, and the weakening of the separation between 
law and politics. Liberal legalism is not exactly what it claims to be when it operates in this 
murky business of dealing with challenges to order in contentious episodes. This does not mean 
that by deviating from liberal legalism the state necessarily violates the requirements of due 
process or is prosecuting otherwise innocent people. The argument is that the political 
contention challenges liberal legalism and the framework that it has constructed for criminal 
proceedings at the roots.  
 
The picture that emerged in these ethnographies is that of a searching state, shifting vocabulary 
in the definitions of the situation and the conceptualization of the “crimes” that become the 
subject of criminal prosecutions. Prosecutors shifted their focus from the charging of individuals 
to the prosecution of groups and organizations, in the process creating or drawing upon 
collective identities. Whereas politics was excluded, people were persuaded to drop their 
radical ideology. History far beyond concrete times and places of specific and isolated criminal 







were linked to underground acts of sabotage or vandalism. The meaning and validity of the rule 
of law became contested in the meta-conflict that surrounded each of these discursive shifts.  
 
Most interesting in my findings are the discursive shifts that could be identified in the 
prosecutorial narrative. For example, in Spain, prosecutors redefined acts of street violence 
from public disorder into terrorism. In the United States, alleged responsibility for vandalism of 
cars and houses in the SHAC campaign became prosecuted as stalking and terrorism. Also, acts 
that were previously not regarded as illegal came within the reach of the criminal justice arena, 
such as pictures of imprisoned ETA militants in the streets of the Basque Country. Some might 
be skeptical and argue that such shifts are not the result of meaningmaking processes and 
interpretive changes but simply the consequence of changed facts on the ground. Of course, 
this would be a possibility in the case of which it would still be justified to ask what these 
changed facts are, why these changes are considered to be legally relevant, and why these 
changes warrant the qualification of terrorism, whereas this qualification is deeply disputed by 
a significant number of people. However, in many of the cases described in this dissertation, 
not even the prosecutors argued that their discursive shifts were due to actual changes in facts 
on the ground. For example, investigative judge Garzón deliberately advocated in favor of such 
a discursive shift, proposing a different vocabulary to describe ETA. Not only are novel images 
an attempt to better reflect the allegedly “real” nature of an act, they also often represent 








Of course, discursive shifts can be a consequence of new laws, as is the case with the Animal 
Enterprise Terrorism Act in the United States, or the consequence of new evidence, such as 
when prosecutors in Spain argued that seized documents finally proved connections between 
ETA and some left-nationalist sociopolitical organizations. I am not arguing that discursive shifts 
are somehow illegal, even though it is important to note that legislative changes often are 
preceded by experimental prosecutions in which the new images and interpretations are 
already tested or in which legal boundaries are pushed. While changes in legislation can enable 
the discursive shifts, this does not take away the basic fact that such shifts reflect, reproduce, 
or create different understandings of crimes and criminal actors. Irrespective of the legal 
operations behind it, mink releases in the United States are represented radically differently in 
the prosecutorial narrative now than they were twenty years ago.  
 
Prosecutors sometimes excplicitly acknowledged the importance of “context” in explaining 
discursive shifts, for example when the chief prosecutor in Spain argued that certain conduct 
should be qualified differently in times of an ETA truce than in times when ETA continues its 
deadly operations (Interview S-21). The importance of context in the qualification of events was 
also visible in the analogies that interviewees relied on to make their point, for example when 
they emphasized the difference between burning an ATM in Andalusia or in the Basque Country 
or the difference between arson in the national park Torres del Paine in Chile or the burning of 
a plantation by a Mapuche activist. This battle about such analogies is so significant because it 







signifies gravity and simultaneously puts different events on a single scale. The examples show 
how context is crucial for the interpretation of events and subsequent penal decisions.  
 
The relevance of understanding this process of re-contextualization and its potential 
consequences increases when it can be applied to other contentious episodes. I think that it 
can. Re-contextualization occurred, for example, during what was labeled the “riots” in London 
in August 2011. The newspaper Economist reported that one man was given 18 months in 
custody for handling a stolen television. Context played a significant role in this judicial decision 
as “[j]udges point to the widespread fear caused by the riots as an aggravating factor. In 
ordinary circumstances similar crimes would probably result in community sentences” 
(Economist 2011). Such severe punishment was supported by the general public according to a 
survey that stated that 70% of voters thought that sentences should be more severe for crimes 
committed during the riots (ICM Poll, ibid.).   
  
(De-)criminalization and (de-)politicization 
 
During the trial against the Lonkos of Traiguén I approached one of the Chilean prosecutors and 
asked whether the opening statement of the lead prosecutor had not been somewhat political. 
“Not at all!” he replied, arguing instead that the opening statement had “technically” addressed 
all the elements that would be necessary to prove that the conduct constituted “terroristic” 







competing meanings of political and technical modalities of criminal prosecution and to 
develop useful conceptualizations of processes of politicization, de-politicization, 
criminalization, and de-criminalization.  
 
In my analysis, and drawing upon available scholarship, I have developed two distinct ways to 
think about politicization and de-politicization in relation to criminal proceedings, and they are 
dependent on the unit of analysis: the contentious episode or the criminal prosecution. First, I 
have visualized spatially the tension between what in liberal democracies is imagined as the 
“political arena,” in which it is stipulated that what happens inside is about “persuasion” of 
“political opponents” and the public as “citizens” of a given “polity.” In addition, a “criminal 
justice arena” is imagined in which “prosecutors” are engaged in the response to “crime” 
(mostly conceptualized as harming a “victim”) and the meting out of “punishment” to the 
alleged “perpetrators.” The interaction, overlap, and shifts between these two arenas is 
complex, which is insufficiently addressed in the concept of a simple “transfer” of issues, actors, 
and arguments from one arena to the other. Complexity can be introduced into the linear 
metaphor by constant awareness that this transfer can be partial, repeated, reversed, 
contested, intended, or unintended, and that modifications (of issues, actors, and arguments) 
can and do occur in that very process.  
 
The analytical boundary between the political arena and the criminal justice arena, as well as 







way to think about the many possible modalities of criminalization, conceptualized as the 
expansion of the boundary of the criminal justice arena at the expense of the political arena. 
This means that conduct, events, or actors which were previously understood in political terms 
are translated into the logic and vocabulary of criminal justice, acted upon by criminal justice 
agents. The opposite process, de-criminalization, is then – in line with common understanding 
by criminologists – a “process that refers to the removal of labelling social problems or deviant 
behaviours as crimes” (Lee in: Sage dictionary of criminology 2006:114). In similar terms, de-
politicization can – as described by David Held – be viewed as treating an issue as if it were not 
a proper subject of politics (1996:130). This conceptualizes (de-)politicization and (de-
)criminalization as locating an episode and the events and disputes that constitute it inside or 
outside the political arena respectively the criminal justice arena.     
 
In the analysis of the chosen country studies of contentious criminalization I have identified 
three different modalities of boundary constitution/moving/modification which were possible 
to observe over the course of two decades of contention and criminal prosecutions: expansion, 
ambivalence, and marginalization. The unit of analysis of these processes is ultimately the 
entire contentious episode. Of course, it is also possible to identify such processes at the micro-
level of single proceedings, trials, or even at the level of single documents such as an 
indictment. These micro-level processes collectively constitute the process at the level of the 
contentious episode. Important is that these modalities address the way in which the imagined 







describe the complementary processes of criminalization and de-criminalization and the way in 
which content is given to the meaning of the “political” and the “criminal” in a given society. It 
should of course be kept in mind that the imagined boundary between the criminal justice 
arena and the political arena is not only produced by the prosecutorial narrative and my focus 
excluded many actors (such as judges, police, prison guards, the press) that are involved in the 
actual labeling of events, conduct, and actors as criminal.  
 
Second, in order to conceptualize the role of politics in criminal proceedings I have not only 
looked at the drawing and performing of the boundary between the political arena and the 
criminal justice arena, but also at processes within the imagined criminal justice arena. Once 
placed inside the vocabulary and logic of this arena, criminal prosecutions and the construction 
of the criminal definition of events can be performed in many different ways. Instead of asking 
whether politics plays a role in these cases, I have focused on how it plays a role and what that 
means for the “law” and its claims to objectivity and authority behind criminal prosecutions. 
How are political elements consciously brought into proceedings, consciously ignored or 
rejected? How do political elements inevitably come to play a role because of certain 
prosecutorial choices, such as the prosecution of a collective and the production of a collective 
identity? How do the structure and vocabulary of criminal law sometimes favor de-
contextualization and at other times require re-contextualization of the harm resulting from 
problematic events? The particular way in which politics plays a role within the criminal justice 







and re-contextualized prosecutorial narrative. Using these terms, I move away from a 
dichotomic understanding of politicization versus de-politicization and instead focus on the 
different ways in which the prosecutorial narrative deals with the political context of crimes.  
 
The distinction between these two modalities of the prosecutorial narrative addresses the 
multiple ways in which the prosecutor can represent problematic events as crimes. “The menu 
is not the meal,” writes Hulsman in this respect (1997:3). The representation of reality by the 
prosecutor in the courtroom is always a reconstruction, and as such always partial and 
selective. The conceptualization of discursive shifts between two ideal types addresses the 
different ways in which cases can be framed and the underlying interplay of legal choices of 
criminal law and theory and images of reality. The prosecutorial representation of reality is 
enabled and constrained by the vocabulary and logic of criminal law. Prosecutorial choices like 
the choice of defendants, the criminal offense, and the argumentation for guilt and a sentence 
are thus an inherent part of the representation. In reality, the relation between the two ideal-
typical modalities is far more complex than a simple binary categorization can reveal. 
Complexity should be introduced by an awareness of the many possibilities of deviations and 
mixtures of as well as switches between these modalities.  
 
Thus, I have developed concepts that can describe the formulation and changes of the 
prosecutorial narrative over time as it reconstructs contentious events in order to subject them 







between the political arena and the criminal justice arena. There are thus multiple moments in 
this process that determine how politics play a role in criminal cases. Bringing events into the 
criminal justice arena is in itself an act of de-politicization. Such de-politicization is, however, 
performed differently under the modality of de-contextualization than under the modality of 
re-contextualization. The chosen context in the re-contextualized modality is further pivotal for 
the way in which political elements are either recognized or excluded.  
 
While I have focused on the commonalities between the country studies in order to sketch the 
characteristic features and shared mechanisms of contentious criminalization processes in 
liberal democracies, it has also been instructive to note some of the differences. For example, 
criminal defense lawyers in the United States generally adhered strictly to the discourse of 
liberal legalism as they professed that they do think that their clients should be punished for 
their crimes, just not for the terrorist enhancements that are requested. This contrasts starkly 
with the criminal defense lawyers in Spain, who remained silent and refused to recognize the 
courts as legitimate, while their clients, ETA militants, requested them to refuse any legal 
defense. Some of the differences between the countries illustrate the local construction of 
crime, and the importance of context for the interpretation of conduct. For example, while the 
housing of fugitives is harshly prosecuted in Spain as collaboration with terrorism, no such acts 








The complexity and unintended consequences of criminal prosecutions were the reason for me 
to start this research. In order to provide a better understanding I have tried to simplify reality 
through visual models and typologies while identifying common mechanisms and processes. At 
the same time, I have aimed to provide in-depth description and analysis of the many different 
cases, actors, and voices on the ground in order to show the complex reality behind abstract 
terms and generalization. I hope that in the interaction and balancing of simple abstraction and 
detailed ethnography the reader has been able to gain more understanding of the interplay 
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Appendix – Methodology  
 
In this appendix I discuss in some more detail the specific choices that I made in each of the 
country studies regarding the people that I interviewed and the criminal cases that I selected 
for further analysis. I will also address my approach to analyzing the collected data. Tilly argued 
that in any empirical research you always need two theories (2007:47): one theory to explain 
the phenomenon under investigation and one theory embodying explanations of the evidence 
concerning that phenomenon. The phenomenon is contentious criminalization, and while the 
dissertation has dealt with my analysis of that process in its various forms, this appendix is 
devoted to the second kind of theory.211  
 
I do not here address the research design or the choice of the contentious episodes and the 
countries that I studied, because I have explained that in the introduction. I specifically focus on 
explaining the choice for and the reliability of the data that I collected as the evidence on which 
my analysis is based and I discuss the validity of the claims I draw from that evidence.   
                                                      
211
 “Three questions clamor for attention: First, how does the phenomenon under investigation leave traces? 
Second, how can analysts elicit or observe those traces? Third, using those traces, how can analysts reconstruct 









I address the following questions: 
- How did I select criminal prosecutions? 
- How did I identify and construct the competing narratives? 
- How did I construct the prosecutorial narrative?  
- How did I gauge the development over time?  
  
It is important to emphasize that my research had a strong exploratory character. This means 
that many of the concepts that now occupy a core position within my analysis only formed 
during or even after my fieldwork. Key examples of such concepts are “victim mobilization” and 
“prisoner support mobilization.” The concepts “political arena” and “criminal justice arena” also 
grew out of my research.  This means that my search for data was adjusted to such emerging 
concepts as my analysis progressed. I will clarify how the research developed as I was doing it.  
 
1. Choosing relevant criminal prosecutions 
 
In each of the contentious episodes I have studied the prosecutorial narrative throughout the 
criminal cases that are related to that contention. The criminal cases are the instantiation of the 
prosecutorial narrative as well as the lens through which I could study that narrative. Without 
indictments, opening arguments, and prosecutorial press releases I would not have been able 







voices in the criminal justice arena, its material impact on the demanded sentence, or its 
development. Of course, the sheer volume of those criminal cases, especially in relation to the 
Spanish-Basque episode, made it important to make a selection. However, the important first 
step in this process was in itself highly contentious: which criminal cases are “related” to the 
contentious episode? Before making a selection, in each case I started with collecting the 
different definitions of the contentious episode as such and the different perspectives 
regarding criminal cases that were considered to be a part of that.   
 
This exploration of the different available definitions of the contentious episode and the 
criminal cases in it turned into the conceptualization of the meta-conflict and the processes of 
victim mobilization and prisoner support mobilization. The voices of “victims” and “prisoner 
supporters” make claims about the relevant criminal cases as well as about events that they 
deem to be the material for criminal cases. The collection of these voices in lists of “political 
prisoners” and declarations of victimhood resulted in a broad notion of the kinds of offenses, 
targets, victims, perpetrators, or laws that would indicate that a criminal case was considered 
part of the “population of cases” that would constitute the pool out of which my selection 
would come. In each of the country chapters I have addressed this contentious definitional 
process.  
 
The methodological problem is that while it is relatively easy to determine the “connection” 







criminal cases, it is far more difficult to get an overview of the relevant criminal cases before 
they were re-contextualized. As is visible in the country chapters, I have often categorized 
criminal cases according to the conduct that was the subject of the charge. Thus, in the Spanish-
Basque contentious episode, for example, I distinguished between “street violence,” 
“murders,” and “speech and symbolic expressions.” Such initial categories can be subsequently 
problematized given potential contention around them. Indeed, those categories offered just a 
starting point for collecting the competing narratives about them. In the Chilean-Mapuche 
episode, for example, I distinguished between “land occupations” (symbolic or productive) and 
“arson in plantations.” This means that in each episode I took the underlying complex of 
contentious events as my starting point for categorizing the criminal cases. This enabled me to 
ask whether such events had or had not been prosecuted before, and if so under what laws and 
guided by which narrative.  
 
At the core of my inquiry is, therefore, the very moment at which incidents of street violence in 
the Basque Country became defined, perceived, and interpreted as being “linked” to the 
Spanish-Basque contention. Similarly, the questions that have driven my research are what 
exactly the features of incidents of theft of wood that become understood as a “Mapuche-
conflict case” are, how this changed over time, which voices participated in the meta-conflict, 
and how the prosecutorial narrative engaged with these voices. At the same time, these 
questions posed methodological difficulties. I have generally not been able to use ordinary 







2004 in the 9th region in Chile. These are the de-contextualized formal categories in the 
language of criminal law and did not provide the information I needed. Such statistics either 
provided far more thefts or arsons than those I was interested in or left out conduct because it 
was sometimes recorded as one crime, sometimes as another or not at all. In the country-
specific sections below I provide more details about the sources I used to find the criminal cases 
that I was interested in.   
 
Conceptually, however, the emic categories of conduct (Kale Borroka or “street violence”) and 
the criminal cases dealing with that conduct provided the opportunity to study the macro-
development of the prosecutorial narrative over a period of two or three decades. Starting with 
such emic concepts of conflict-related-crimes and despite the frequent mismatch with official 
crime statistics, I have collected data about the incidence of such conduct and its 
criminalization. For example, I collected overviews of specific kinds of actions of animal rights 
activism, such as the “liberation” of animals, and information about the criminal justice 
response. It is important to note, however, that these overviews are always already based upon 
a conceptualization of that conduct as animal rights activism, and that the information is 
dependent on the fact that an animal enterprise reported the incident to the police or the 
media. Due to these methodological problems, my analyses of the discursive shifts in the 
prosecutorial narrative rely more on a qualitative tracing of the argumentation within specific 
cases than on a quantitative change in the actual prosecution and transfer of events into the 








While my initial focus in Chile and the United States had been on the micro-analysis of the 
prosecutorial narrative in several particular trials that had met with a strong response among 
many different actors, it was my fieldwork in Spain and the Basque Country that drew my 
attention to the macro-level. Taking the long duration of the conflict into account, I developed 
the analysis that in the prosecution of conduct such as street violence (Kale Borroka) or the 
public expression of support for ETA or its militants the prosecutorial narrative had undergone 
a shift over the course of one or two decades. The purpose of my return visits to Chile and the 
United States was thus to use the same method of developing categories of conduct and 
comparing and analyzing criminal cases over time in order to complement micro-analysis of 
single trials with an understanding of changes on that macro-level. In each episode I conducted 
cross-case comparison and analyses in order to make claims about macro-level changes in the 
prosecutorial narrative, whereas within-case analysis served to make sense of the micro-level 
content of and meaning-making by the prosecutorial narrative.  
 
I further used my in-depth analysis of single cases in order to illuminate the broader macro-
level analysis. Through cross-case comparison, it is possible to argue that activities previously 
prosecuted as “collaboration with ETA” currently are classified as “membership in ETA.” Only 
from this macro-perspective it is visible that both the macro-trials and the revolutionary tax 
prosecutions are means to impede ETA from getting access to money. Obviously, however, 







thus inevitably constitutes the material for the macro-level. I connected the micro- and the 
macro-level through the concept of “categories” of criminalized conduct, for which I draw upon 
the ways in which actors within the episodes categorized disruptive events and criminalized 
conduct. The term street violence (Kale Borroka, as everyone calls it) is widespread and used by 
people from every political signature, including prosecutors and judges. The meaning of the 
term and the perspectives regarding criminal prosecution of street violence differ widely 
though, as demonstrated in Chapter 2 and 3.   
 
By taking these conduct-based categories as a starting point, I interrogated the competing 
narratives about their framing of the events that were subjected to criminal charges. These 
narratives would not necessarily always address specific events or criminal cases. Indeed, 
narratives about, for example, land occupations in Chile, often addressed such events in general 
without discussing particular occupations. At other times, “famous” land occupations would 
serve frequently to make an argument and thus gain mythical proportions. I collected 
information about these narratives, relying on a variety of sources. Books, websites, 
newspapers, and interviews all contributed to the construction of these macro-narratives about 
contentious conduct, such as the release of animals from research labs and fur farms in the 
United States or street violence in the Basque Country. Competing narratives about such 
conduct would translate the events into the criminal law framework in different ways. I 
analyzed such alternative translation operations with questions like: What is the territory and 







actors that were involved? What is the label given to the criminalized conduct? What is the 
sentence that is demanded?  
 
I facilitated a quick and cursory reading of many criminal cases at this level of categories by 
simply boiling them down to a few questions that constitute the core of the criminal charge, 
which are generally presented in the indictment:  
 
WHAT (Act) – Which conduct is subject to the penal system?  
WHAT (Harm) – What is the harm that has been done?  
WHO (Perpetrator) – Who is subject to the penal system? 
WHO (Victim) – Who is perceived as victim?  
  CHARGE (Offense) – What is the offense that fits this action?  
 
The indictment reflects most concisely the choices the prosecutor made in terms of the “who-
what-and-why” of the prosecution. I thus used the template of an indictment as a starting point 
to analyze more broadly what the prosecutor was doing. A prosecutor “brings a case,” which 
means that he or she takes certain facts out of the flow of history and starts labeling them, 
indicating a specific relation between certain acts and actors, pointing out a specific harm or 
danger because of these actors, and asking for a trial in which facts can be adjudicated and the 
guilty can be “condemned.” It is this process in which my analysis aims to dig a little deeper, 








I thus first attempted to form an overview of the different categories of criminal cases, and 
then I proceeded by selecting some specific criminal cases from each category, drawing up the 
development of the prosecutorial narrative about that category of cases. In order to do so, I 
attempted to diversify the selected cases, for example by looking for cases from early years and 
cases from later years, cases that received a lot of media attention and cases that received less 
media attention, cases before and after major legislative changes, or cases before and after 
major contentious events that received nationwide attention. In addition, I made an effort in 
each episode to look at cases in which challengers of the status quo were defendants as well as 
criminal cases in which defenders of the status quo or targets or political opponents of the 
challengers were defendants. Thus, after having identified “arson in plantations” as a relevant 
category of criminal events in the Chilean-Mapuche contentious episode, I searched for specific 
criminal cases over a period of time in order to analyze the competing narratives and the 
development and possible transformation of the prosecutorial narrative in relation to such 
arsons.  
 
The selection of criminal cases for in-depth analysis then facilitated an analysis at the micro-
level of linguistic construction of the narrative and its arguments of criminal responsibility as 
well as a detailed representation of legally relevant facts. In each of the episodes I selected 
some criminal cases in which I invested the time to attend the trial and/or interview the 







such micro-analysis, I would not analyze a shift over time regarding a category of conduct. 
Instead, I would delve into the specific details of a case, for example the case in which Julen was 
accused of throwing a Molotov cocktail in a train station in Bilbao in 1992. In such a case, I 
would go beyond and behind the narratives about general categories of conduct and ask 
specific questions in order to construct the competing narratives about that particular event, 
probing what that specific action meant to the perpetrator, to the target, or to the prosecutor. 
How did different actors label that specific event, and how did they locate it in a broader 
context or select the legally relevant facts? Which aspects were taken for granted? How were 
relevant identities constructed? What meaning, for example, did in that case the train station 
have for the different actors?    
 
While I make this separation between the macro-level and the micro-level for the purpose of 
explanation and as a guideline during my analysis, in reality my actual analysis often blurred 
these lines. Sometimes I spent more time on a single case of which I initially had only wanted to 
give a cursory reading. The analysis of many cases was thus somewhere between cursory 
reading and in-depth analysis. This was also related to practical issues such as the accessibility 
of trial transcripts and the possibility to interview relevant actors in the criminal case. In each of 
the episodes I attended one or two criminal trials, while all of these trials lasted several days or 








Contentious events and contentious protest tactics thus formed the basis for my categorization 
of criminal cases. However, not all contentious action led to criminal prosecutions. Thus I was 
also interested in the absence of criminal prosecutions. For example, offering housing to 
fugitives in Chile has not led to any criminal prosecutions, as it has in Spain. I also wanted to 
know, for example, when the prosecutions of speech acts started in Spain and I wanted to know 
whether there were successful de-contextualized prosecutions of small-scale eco-vandalism in 
the United States. I have tried to answer such questions through legal databases. For example, 
in Spain I had access to an overview of all the investigations started at the Audiencia Nacional. 
This, however, as pointed out above, was not always a sufficient means of answering such 
questions because of the de-contextualized categories used there. The Audiencia Nacional data 
only coded the charge and, as has become clear in Chapter 3, one of the interesting findings of 
my research is that the kinds of conduct covered by charges (such as “membership in a terrorist 
organization”) can change dramatically over time. This is only visible, however, in an analysis 
that goes into more depth than the simple crime statistics. I therefore tried to gauge the 
answers to these questions by asking lawyers, prosecutors, activists, or longtime targets about 




Biases are systematic and structural errors which thus skew the conclusions that can be drawn 







Mistakes could, for example, arise from translation errors, because neither Spanish nor English 
is my first language. In order to overcome the impact of such translation mistakes I have often 
given the original quote in Spanish and the English translation only in parentheses. 
Furthermore, I tried to deal with the issue of translations by providing a glossary in the 
appendix. More important than such or other kinds of mistakes, however, in this appendix I 
reflect on how my method of data collection, my research design, and data analysis have 
possibly produced biases in my findings.  
 
My approach relies on the continuous tension between two different units: the contentious 
episode on the one hand and the criminalized event on the other. When taking contentious 
episodes as the starting point for understanding the dynamics in and around criminal 
proceedings, one is directly at odds with perspectives that negate the political context and 
conflict, for example the voices in Spain that refuse to talk about a “conflict.” When taking 
criminalized events as the starting point for criminal proceedings, however, one immediately 
accepts the ability of the state prosecutions to select and determine which events are criminal. 
In my analysis, I have attempted to go back and forth between these different starting points.  
 
When I take criminal prosecutions as my starting point, the relevant actors are inevitably 
always already divided into “victims” and “defendants.” My ability to construe their competing 
narratives about the criminalized events then also depends on whether the defendant 







starting point for inquiry, on the other hand, the actors are divided into challengers of the 
status quo or defenders of the status quo, with some actors who may simply define themselves 
in opposition to violence, such as anti-ETA organizations in the Basque Country.  
 
The choice of my criminal cases inevitably influenced my characterization of the prosecutorial 
narrative. For example, in Chile I frequently used the prosecutorial narrative in the trial lonkos 
of Traiguén in my analysis. Some have argued that this was a particularly “bad” trial (Interview 
C-47). If that is so, it might have skewed my analysis. Still, while it may be true that it was a 
particularly bad trial, as such it had an enormous impact, for example on the dynamics of 
prisoner support mobilization. Thus, cases were not always selected in order to be 
representative of many more criminal cases, but because they are part of the development of 
the prosecutorial narrative. The trial against the lonkos of Traiguén is a good illustration of the 
ambivalence that I observed in the Chilean prosecutorial narrative, constituting as it did one of 
the attempts to experiment with criminal prosecutions and apply a new law and the many new 
possibilities offered by the Penal Reform.  
 
A further methodological challenge is that criminal prosecutions often take a long time and are 
difficult to put in direct relation to the climate at the moment that the disputed events 
occurred. This makes an interpretation of relations between what happens inside and outside 








Lastly, in each of my cases I have presented the analysis of the criminalization of protest activity 
of the challengers of the status quo. This does not mean, however, that this is necessarily 
always the case. While it might seem theoretically logical, it remains an open empirical question 
whether the tables could have been turned and under what conditions that would occur.  
 
Collecting data in three different countries  
 
I would like to mention some of the methodological implications of the fact that my data 
collection took place in three different countries. I have argued that theoretically the liberal 
ideology underlying the different criminal justice systems is more relevant than the specific 
codification and implementation in the different countries. Methodologically, however, the 
different legal systems influenced my choices in data collection. For example, in the United 
States, I was able to use the voir dire process and jury instructions as a way to gauge the 
prosecutorial discourse, whereas this was not possible in the Chilean and Spanish systems. Also, 
the massive amount of plea bargains in the United States has the implication that cases rarely 
go to trial, even if political cases tend to go to trial more often than ordinary cases. This meant 
that often I only had the possibility to use arguments from a sentencing hearing, but not 
transcripts from trials. In Spain, there is an active investigative judge, which means that the 
prosecutor only enters actively into the proceedings once the investigative judge has closed the 
investigation and written the “summary.” This “summary” is an important part of my data in 







prosecutorial narrative, just as I consider the FBI an important contributing actor in the United 
States.   
 
Doing the research in different countries and on different episodes also meant that in each 
country I had access to different sources. For example, in Spain I had no access to current 
clandestine ETA members, and no easy access to former ETA members. In Chile, however, I 
talked extensively with more radical activists. On the other hand, in Chile I could not lay my 
hand on many trial transcripts due to a lack of digitalization and difficult archiving restrictions, 
whereas in Spain I had access to a great digital judicial database with all the verdicts of many 
different trials. In the United States, I had digital access not only to verdicts but also to trial 
transcripts, although only in the cases that there had been a trial. Due to these differences, in 
each of the countries I had to find the appropriate ways to trace the production and 
construction of the prosecutorial narrative.  
 
2. The construction of competing narratives 
 
In the introduction I already mentioned that as data I collected meanings defined as “the 
linguistic categories that make up the participants’ view of reality and with which they define 
their own and others’ actions” (Lofland and Lofland 1984:71). My data collection was guided by 
the construction of competing narratives. In each episode I started out with the sketch of an 







broadly divided actors into “challengers” on the one hand and “defenders” or “targets” on the 
other, I was careful to be attentive to an existing spectrum of stances among these two broad 
sides to avoid a simplified dichotomy. In each of the country cases I then turned to the state in 
order to gather how different state agents defined the contentious episode and the challenge 
to its authority, the rule of law, or democratic proceedings.  
 
From an analysis of the competing narratives around the demands for changing the status quo, 
I moved to the specific actors mobilizing in and around the criminal justice arena. The 
categories of “victim mobilization” and “prisoner support mobilization” grew out of my initial 
fieldwork. Once I had developed these categories, I used them in order to collect further data 
about their activities and the narratives they presented. In each country I thus ended up 
constructing six distinct narratives:  
 
- The narrative challenging the status quo 
- The narrative defending the status quo 
- The state’s definition of the situation  
- The narrative of victim mobilization 
- The narrative of prisoner support mobilization 








Each of these narratives is constructed by many different actors. The narratives are thus 
defined by what they do more than by who is doing it. Below I provide details on the sources I 
used to construct these narratives in each country, also explaining how I gauged the changes of 
the narratives over time. Before doing so I will say a bit more in general about the way in which 
I used interviews, documents, and particularly legal documents to construe the narratives.  
 
Given the importance of interpreting data and its meaning in its local context (Chabal and Daloz 
2006), I have taken considerable time in each country to understand that context and spent at 
least seven months in each of the countries. Generally, I based my analysis of the narratives 
challenging and defending the status quo on a combination of primary and secondary sources, 
including books, newspaper articles, press releases, websites, and interviews. I further relied on 
witness testimonies during trials to obtain access to the construction of events and their 
translation into the criminal law vocabulary. Such testimonies were also available from hearings 
in Congress or in investigations from parliamentary subcommittees. I also conducted many 
interviews. I interviewed several lawyers in order to gain access to trial transcripts or relied on 
their expertise in order to determine the relevant population of criminal cases. Apart from such 










My interviews were highly non-standardized. That is not to say that they were not prepared. On 
the contrary, every single interview was prepared in depth. I had a general structure with topics 
and themes that could be adapted to the type of interviewee (challenger or defender of the 
status quo, defendant, victim, prisoner supporter, or prosecutor). I did in-depth research on the 
person that I was about to interview and composed the many specific questions that I wanted 
to ask him or her about a specific criminal case or specific events that led to a criminal case. In 
each interview I explored the meaning-making regarding contentious events that led to criminal 
prosecutions, examining the use or rejection of criminal law vocabulary to describe, condemn, 
defend, justify, or prosecute such events and the reasons to place or withhold blame. In 
preparation for the interviews, I selected specific events or categories of conduct and collected 
competing narratives. Comparisons of such narratives revealed that people routinely 
exaggerate or tend to leave things out, thus providing a skewed representation of reality. 
Because of my interest in meaning-making, however, these representations of reality – skewed 
or not – were exactly what I needed. Given the explorative nature of the research, I gave 
interviewees the space to provide input they thought was important and some interviews thus 
moved beyond the questions that I was asking.  
 
Talking about illegal conduct and the risk of self-incrimination made interviews with defendants 
difficult. In the Spanish-Basque case I spoke with people who were experienced and knew for 
themselves what they wanted to say. In the Chilean-Mapuche case it was not that simple: I 







criminal prosecution can have, or I talked with people from the countryside for whom the 
government and its rules is another world that, in their minds, does not operate with any logic 
or rules. In such cases I spent more time clarifying their choice to speak with me about possibily 
illegal tactics. I have always taken various measures to ensure confidentiality as decribed below.   
 
Interviews were not necessarily the main source to collect information about the competing 
narratives. Some actors routinely published press declarations in which they presented their 
narrative about events and their translation into criminal law. Indeed, some actors have 
published entire books on these themes. I relied heavily on these written records. Interviews, 
however, had several complementary advantages. First, I could ask questions about their 
narratives, pushing actors to reflect deeper or challenging them to respond to a “devil’s 
advocate” by confronting them with the competing narrative. Interviews also enabled actors to 
correct my understanding of their narrative. Second, interviews enabled me to obtain 
information that was not in writing, either because I could ask questions about events or 
prosecutions that they had not commented on in writing or because I could explore meaning-
making by actors who were not the press release writers but, for example, family members. A 
last important function of my interviews was to infuse my research and writing with personal 
accountability, that is to say, I wanted to make myself personally accountable to the individuals 
that I interviewed, whether they were landowners or Mapuche activists, whether they 
belonged to Gestoras pro Amnistía or to the Spanish rightwing political party La Falange. Not 







to understand where they were coming from in order to make my writing accountable to them. 
Whatever I wrote was to be intelligible to these interviewees.  
 
It is tempting to want to know whether people really believe or mean what they say. In this 
dissertation, however, I describe what people do and what they talk about. I describe the vocal 
and physical confrontations as they take place. Even though it is interesting, and for other 
purposes definitely relevant, whether the rhetoric of actors is genuine or instrumental, for the 
purposes of this research I decided to leave that out of the equation. So, for example, in Spain 
the victim organizations refuse to recognize a political conflict behind the violence. I focused on 
their position, the way in which they pronounce this position, when and how that position 
came to be formulated, and how they use it to justify their forms of action. It is a different kind 
of research to examine whether that position is just a propaganda technique or sincerely their 
belief. Similarly, despite allegations that Mapuche activists simply cut down trees to make more 
money, I do not examine their “real” motives and just describe the narrative in which Mapuche 
activists express that they want to live in harmony with nature as my analysis focuses on the 
ways in which such competing images enter the courtroom and are possibly adopted by the 
prosecutorial narrative.  
 
While I always made clear that I was researching the different perspectives, in order to open 
the conversation I did adapt my presentation to the vocabulary used by person whom I 







present my research as being about the struggle against terrorism, whereas in conversation 
with Basque prisoner support groups I would present it as being about legal repression or the 
criminalization of social movements.  
 
In many of my interviews I used a recording device. I do, however, agree with anthropologists 
who maintain that having these technological gadgets should not detract from the task at hand. 
As Bohannan put it so expressively: “Anthropology provides an artistic impression of the 
original, not a photographic one. I am not a camera” (in: Conley and O’Barr 1990:196). I only 
selectively transcribed my interviews from the audio recordings. Mostly I relied on my written 
interview notes in order to analyze the interviews.  
 
For all formal interviews I received full consent. Given the sensitivity of the subject, however, I 
have decided to maintain confidentiality for every person I have interviewed, especially also 
where I draw on informal conversations. Some specifically asked me not to mention their name. 
Others, such as a landowner in Chile, expressed concern that information would land in the 
wrong hands or be abused. Whenever I have used publicly available information such as from 
books or the Internet I do refer to the name under which it was published, whereas I describe 










In some instances I observed protest tactics or political meetings. While interviews are about 
what people say, participant observation is about what people do in real time and space such as 
in institutionalized routines. One of the functions of participant observation is to get access to 
people. Another function is to use observations as data to contrast with data from other 
sources (triangulation). I further attended several criminal trials. Criminal prosecutions tend to 
be long. They can last days and even several weeks. My observational analysis of criminal 
proceedings is therefore inevitably a very small selection of all these dynamics and everything 
that is going on during and around trials. 
 
Biases in the collection and interpretation of data 
 
Biases in my interpretation of data can arise from my personal background as Dutch, female, 
academically schooled, and politically left-leaning. Of course, just like my interviewees, I am 
also a member of multiple interpretive communities. I have my own ways to code and decode 
communication. Therefore, I have always tried to play the devil’s advocate in interviews and 
challenge my own assumptions. Some of these personal characteristics also offered advantages 
in my fieldwork. In Spain, for example, people frequently remarked that the research that I did 









Frequently, there was a significant and structural difference between the kinds of contact that I 
was able to develop with different actors in the contentious episodes. For example, in Chile, in 
order to interview rural Mapuche activists I had to visit their homes and often had to stay at 
their places for multiple days because of the lack of daily buses and the long travel time to get 
there. In contrast, I interviewed forestry representatives in their offices. This difference 
reflected the fact that Mapuche activists were personally deeply involved with their cause and 
demands, whereas forestry representatives were only involved because of their work. The 
relations that I developed were therefore very different. Some Mapuche activists became 
friends, whereas my contact with landowners, forestry employees, and prosecutors never went 
beyond good contacts. I struggled with these differences because they seemed to turn me into 
a partial presence; and besides, a more personal relationship offers much more information, 
the possibility to see the world behind the propaganda talks, and therefore often also a 
different kind of understanding. I tried to correct this potential imbalance by arranging, where 
possible, multiple interviews with some of the forestry employees and prosecutors. Similar 
imbalances occurred in the United States because of the refusals from pharmaceutical 
companies and Huntingdon Life Sciences to grant me the possibility for an interview.  
 
3. Data collection in Spain, Chile, and the United States 
 
The first step in each of the country cases was to get an overview of the narratives challenging 







tactics that formed the basis for subsequent criminal cases. A broad reading of secondary 
literature and surveys provided the initial mapping of the conflict, its actors, the various 
positions, the development of events, and the contentious behavior.  
 
The second step was to turn to the criminal justice arena and explore the population of criminal 
cases as well as the various actors active in this arena. In order to achieve a comprehensive map 
of this arena and unearth the multiple ways in which events are translated into the criminal 
justice arena, I took a dialectical approach between the possible data sources and the 
information I was looking for, going back and forth between six alternative points of departure 
for the exploration of meaning-making and contestation. My points of departure were actors, 
events, situations, cases, laws, and chronology:  
 
- Actors (victim organizations or prisoner support organizations) 
- Events (specific incidents or categories of criminalized activity, such as arson at a 
plantation) 
- Situations (the local context within which struggles developed, such as the land 
demands of Mapuche community Temulemu vis-à-vis forestry company Mininco)  
- Cases (a specific criminal case against particular defendants) 
- Laws (Law on State Security or anti-terrorism laws) 








I broadly identified the actors that enacted a certain narrative and searched for data with those 
actors as a starting point (thus, for example, approaching victim organizations). Jumping off a 
different starting point, I selected contentious events or categories of conduct which were the 
basis for criminal prosecutions and explored available data widely in order to identify the 
different ways in which such events were labeled, defined, and translated into the criminal 
justice arena. Thus, in an event-oriented way I searched for information about a category such 
as “Kale Borroka” or “land occupations” in all kinds of sources (newspapers, secondary 
literature and questions in interviews) or information about a particular event such as the ETA 
attack on supermarket Hipercor in Barcelona. Third, I took “situations” as my starting point for 
inquiry. This was mainly relevant in Chile, where specific struggles between specific Mapuche 
communities about specific pieces of land provided the context for mobilization, protest, 
arrests, and trials. Thus I took such situations as the starting point for a mapping of events, 
analyzing some of them in more depth. Fourth, I took criminal cases as a starting point to go 
back to the underlying facts that led to the criminal case (for example the case against Gestoras 
pro Amnistía) and explored in this way how different actors had defined and interpreted a 
sequence of events. How did victim organizations represent the role of Gestoras pro Amnistía 
and its relation to ETA? How did the defendants of Gestoras describe their work? Fifth, I 
explored the usage of particular laws within the context of the contentious episode, such as the 
prosecutions under the Anti-Terrorism Law in Chile or the prosecutions under the AETA in the 
United States. How has the AETA been used? What kind of conduct has been construed as 







chronology. What happened in the 1980s? What happened before the ELF was on the scene? 
What happened before Ron Arnold coined the term “eco-terrorism”? When did a certain tactic 
become used, notorious, or prosecuted? And what happened before that? This triangulation of 
six starting points for my inquiries enabled me to find more actors, cases, and perspectives than 
I might have previously been aware of.  
 
Through qualitative analysis using software to analyze qualitative data (Atlas.ti) I analyzed the 
different interpretations and definitions of contentious behavior and the use of criminal law 
terminology by the different actors. For example, I identified categories and the construction of 
meanings in the prosecutorial narrative and compared the use of categories and the meanings 
given to actors or behavior in trials over time in order to identify the development and 
discursive shifts, thus tracing, for example, the changed interpretations of Kale Borroka in 
Spain.    
 
For the purpose of detailing my data collection I present below a description of the sources that 
I used to construct the various narratives. While I thus focus here on a description of the data 
that I used to construct narratives that I have identified for analytical purposes as separate, I 
engaged in many activities that enabled me to observe the interaction and often confrontation 
between narratives. For example, attending criminal cases enabled me to observe the hostile 
attitudes between prisoner supporters and victims. Similarly, I was able to observe the 










My fieldwork in Spain took place from January 2008 until June 2008. I had a return visit in 
January 2010.  
  
Narrative challenging the status quo  
For this narrative I mainly focused on the discourse of the left-nationalist movement (izquierda 
abertzale) and the narrative produced by ETA demanding a “free and socialist Euskal Herria.” I 
collected documents produced by ETA, such as Oldartzen and Karramarro I and II, which were 
also frequently mentioned in the criminal trials against the “ETA network.” I conducted several 
interviews with people self-identifying as belonging to the left-nationalist movement. One of 
them belonged to the youth organization Segi, another belonged to the internationalist 
organization Askapena, and one was the family member of an incarcerated high-level ETA 
member. Some came from small villages, whereas others lived in Bilbao or San Sebastián. I also 
interviewed an active member of the Basque political party Eusko Alkartasuna, which does not 
really belong to the left-nationalist movement, but is not far removed from it. Further, during 
my fieldwork I was present at some of the major nationalist mobilization efforts throughout the 
Basque Country. I also attended several activities organized by the left-independentist 
movement, such as speeches and a youth conference. In addition, I relied on the many books, 







encyclopedia of ETA as developed by Txalaparta in the early 1990s. Interestingly, this CD has 
since been prohibited by Judge Garzón.  
   
Narrative defending the status quo  
For the narrative defending the status quo I mainly looked at the particular defense of Spain as 
united country, specifically rejecting separatism. This narrative may to some extent be shared 
by a much larger share of the Spanish population. For the most explicit construction of this 
narrative, however, I turned for example, to the website of the small right-wing political party 
Democracia Nacional, which states in its party program that it is against separatists and 
independentists. I also interviewed a spokesperson of the right-wing political party La Falange 
and further relied on secondary literature and press releases produced by these actors.   
 
State definition of the situation 
For the state definition of the situation I relied heavily on the annual reports from the Office of 
the Attorney General. In addition, I collected documents from the Guardia Civil that analyze 
terrorism and ETA.   
 
The prosecutorial narrative 
In order to trace the general development of the prosecutorial narrative since the end of the 
1970s I collected the yearly reports (Memoria Anual) of the Office of the Attorney General 







until 2008. From these reports I systematically selected the following parts: the introduction, in 
which the prosecutor presents an overview of the year; the parts dedicated to the Audiencia 
Nacional, to the tribunals of the Basque Country and Navarra (only since 1990 subdivided), to 
the “evolution of delinquency,” and to the “terrorist delinquency,” in later editions specifically 
referred to as “terrorism by ETA” and “terrorism by the environment of ETA”; and the statistical 
data in the end listing the number of proceedings, trials, and the kinds of crimes. These reports 
provide a unique series of documents that enables the researcher to trace the changes in 
perception and definition. One can, for example, clearly see how the perception of street 
violence has changed over time and how the idea that it was orchestrated from above came up 
in the course of the 1990s. 
 
For the specific analysis of the construction of criminal cases I collected “dossiers” from the 
instruction judges, writs of the prosecutor, and many verdicts. In addition I interviewed an 
instruction judge and the chief prosecutor of the Audiencia Nacional and read various books 
written by prosecutors or instruction judges (e.g., Mestre Delgado 1987; Moral de la Rosa 2005; 
Garzón 2006). I further observed arguments and behavior during two ongoing criminal trials in 
the Audiencia Nacional.  
 
Victim mobilization narrative  
I explored the victim mobilization narrative in various interviews with members and 







used materials produced by such organizations. For example, the director of the main victim 
organization has published a book on all his experiences throughout the criminal trials he has 
attended and his communications with the government as a victims’ representative. Further, I 
used the victims’ testimonies as collected in a variety of projects, such as the “Pelota Vasca” 
(Medem 2003), and in other journalistic projects. In addition, I used press releases and other 
information on the websites of victim organizations.  
 
Prisoner support narrative 
I explored the prisoner support narrative in interviews with people from prisoner support 
organizations, their press releases, an interview with a lawyer of the Basque lawyers collective, 
an interview with a representative of an organization against torture, and various reports from 
human rights organizations. In addition, I attended events organized by prisoner support groups 
where defendants explained their criminal cases or where prisoners were honored.  
 
Selection of criminal cases  
At Deusto University in Bilbao, I had access to the digital library of all judicial verdicts in Spain. 
Using the search function in the database I collected verdicts from the Audiencia Nacional in 
cases regarding the different kinds of criminalized conduct in relation to ETA and the Basque 
struggle for independence, such as street violence, revolutionary tax, collaboration, 
membership, and glorification between 1975 and 2008. For example, I used the database in 







Nacional. I further searched for the use of the criminal offense of endorsement (apologia) 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. And I searched for what kinds of behaviors were considered 
“collaboration” throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In addition to mining this large volume of 
criminal cases, I searched for the verdicts in specific cases which came to my attention through 
the secondary literature or in interviews. For example, I used the database to find the verdict in 
the case of the illegalization of the political party Batasuna, the case of Iñaki de Juana, and the 
case dealing with the murder of Miguel Ángel Blanco. In addition to collecting verdicts from the 
database, I collected prosecution statements and indictments, either from lawyers or from 
news sources (often newspapers would provide a link to judicial documents when they 
reported on a case). I acquired the entire trial transcripts and expert documents of the two 
macro-trials that had taken place by 2008: Sumario 18/98 and the case against 
Jarrai/Haika/Segi. These documents include, for example, analyses by the Guardia Civil and the 
Centro Nacional de Inteligencia.  
 
Apart from obtaining insight in criminal trials through the documents that such trials produce, I 
attended several trials in person. I attended the trial against Gestoras Pro Amnistia (April–June 
2008, Audiencia Nacional, Madrid). I chose this trial because it was underway while I was doing 
my fieldwork in Spain and was one of the so-called “macro-trials” in which the Spanish 
prosecution is engaged in dealing with the whole ETA network of organizations. In this specific 
trial I interviewed two defendants, a lawyer of the popular accusation, the spokesperson of the 







victim organization who attended the trial for several days. I also attended a trial against ETA 
members of the armed organization who were tried for the abduction of a businessman. In 
addition, I attended one day of trials at the other section of the Audiencia Nacional, which does 
not deal with terrorism cases, to gain a broader perspective on this specialized and contested 
court. I also attended one trial day at the Supreme Court of the proceedings to illegalize 
successors of the political party Batasuna (the Acción Nacionalista Vasca (ANV) and the Partido 




This case is characterized by the fact that I conducted research for my Master’s thesis on the 
conflict in 2002–2003. I was able to use many of the documents and interviews that I collected 
back then in this dissertation. In March–May 2009 I went back to the south of Chile in order to 
update my materials and find additional material, specifically on the criminal justice system, 
which I had not explored in depth before. It should be kept in mind that my analysis in this 
episode is until mid-2009. Since then, a new wave of mobilizations led to a large number of 
detentions and new prosecutions under the anti-terrorism laws. I hardly covered this new 
wave.  
 







In order to understand the narrative challenging the status quo I spent time in Mapuche 
communities that demanded land from adjacent landowners. In addition, I conducted many 
interviews with activists from a variety of backgrounds: young and old, male and female 
(although mostly male), urban and rural, university students and people without primary 
education, leaders and community members, and those that were identified as “real” 
Mapuches as well as “mestizos” or “Chileans.” In order to understand the local dynamics of 
specific land demands I spent more time in and collected more in-depth information about the 
community Choin Lafkenche near Collipulli and their demands vis-à-vis the forestry company 
Mininco, community Temulemu and their demands vis-à-vis Mininco and Juan Agustín 
Figueroa, community Juan Paillalef and their demands vis-à-vis local private landowners, and 
community Temucuicui and their demands in relation to the property of landowner René 
Urban. I further interviewed activists from the Mapuche organization Consejo de Todas las 
Tierras (CTT), activists from the Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM), and also activists from 
Mapuche organizations that have not experienced criminal prosecutions since 1990, such as 
Konapewman, Aukinko Zomo, and Ad Mapu. I also engaged in participant observation in several 
cultural and political events, such as religious ceremonies, demonstrations, and political 
meetings. I further visited several activists in prison. In addition, I collected written information 
in the form of pamphlets, books, public declarations, and webzines and followed some e-mail 
lists. In this way, I attempted to understand the voice and variety of the Mapuche movement.  
 







In 2003 I interviewed representatives from a variety of larger and smaller forestry companies as 
well as one private landowner. In these conversations we talked at length about the Mapuche 
land claims, the history of those claims, and the role and position of forestry companies and 
private landowners. On my return visit in 2009 I chose not to pursue interviews with private 
landowners. It was made clear to me that they were suspicious of what would happen with the 
information that they shared. Past experiences have shown them that their appearance in, for 
example, video documentaries can be negative. This has led them to be cautious. In addition, it 
was not my intention to add to their suffering of harassment and have them talk about it more 
than necessary. I collected their testimonies in Senate reports, Senate hearings, and their 
testimonies during various criminal trials. I did, however, want to meet with the forestry 
company that owns most of the land in the 9th region and files complaints in many instances. 
Unfortunately, they refused to share their information on these complaints and what happened 
with them. The reason they gave for this refusal is interesting: They claimed that the 
information was sensitive and could potentially create problems for them with the office of the 
prosecutor. I did talk at some length with an employee at a private security company working 
for a big forestry company as well as the managers of forestry and agricultural alliances. In 
addition to these interviews, I collected information to construct the narrative defending the 
status quo from the websites of forestry companies, their magazines, and reports that they 
published. I also had access to the local archive of the forestry alliance CORMA in Temuco, 
where they kept newspaper clippings, research results, position statements, public 







companies and I also attended a meeting on FSC certification and a national seminar on 
forestry where several forestry representatives were present and I received an organized tour 
of several plantations. In 2009 I also attended a cultural event for Mapuche communities 
organized by a forestry company. Lastly, I made use of public statements in interviews with 
landowners in Chilean newspapers.  
 
State definition of the situation 
I constructed the state’s definition of the situation from a variety of congressional reports and 
statements in interviews in the press by government officials. I further relied on the criminal 
complaints that regional and provincial governors filed in several of the cases against Mapuche 
activists. I spoke with the relevant lawyers for these governors, who, however, could only speak 
in a private capacity, not as representatives of the government. Both made clear in their 
answers, though, that the decision to file official complaints were taken in Santiago, not in the 
south. I also interviewed the mayor of Collipulli.   
 
The prosecutorial narrative 
Just as in Spain, in Chile I conceptualized the prosecutorial narrative as the narrative that enters 
the courtroom in the official quality of presenting before the judge a story that defines a crime 
and identifies a perpetrator. This means that both the prosecutor and private accusers can 
present that narrative. Thus, because of the similar function that private accusers fulfill during 







narratives of the prosecutor and private accusers were highly similar and complementary. It is 
possible, however, for private accusers and prosecutors to present different charges and a 
different argumentation. It is up to the judges to form their judgment. My construction of the 
prosecutorial narrative is based on the analysis of prosecutorial statements in many verdicts, 
oral recordings of several trials, and police transcripts, such as witness declarations. Only since 
2004 has more digital information on criminal trials become available, and also statistics on the 
results of criminal prosecutions. In addition, in 2003 I interviewed various lawyers at the 
regional prosecutor’s office as well as the chief regional prosecutor in Temuco and a local 
prosecutor in one of the conflict areas (Collipulli). In addition, I interviewed the police chief of 
the most problematic area (Ercilla and Collipulli).  
 
In 2009, my attempts to interview prosecutors fell flat. Interestingly, I was told that if an 
interview would be granted I was not supposed to ask any questions related to the “Mapuche 
conflict.” A befriended lawyer approached the regional prosecutor to request an interview for 
me. “As long as you are not going to ask questions about the Mapuche conflict, he is OK with 
it,” reported the friend. I will never know whether he was really OK with it, or where his limit of 
“questions on the Mapuche conflict” lay, because subsequently the prosecutor never 
responded to my reiterated calls, e-mails, or visits to his office. The message was clear though: 
talk law with legal actors and politics with the political actors. Both in 2003 and in 2009 I 







collected written materials such as an opinion piece written by one of the prosecutors, the 
website from the prosecutorial office, and audiotapes from various trials.  
  
Victim mobilization narrative  
When I announced to landowners that I wanted to know more about how the criminal justice 
system works regarding cases that arise in the context of the Mapuche conflict, I invariably got 
transferred to the lawyer administrating the cases. This would have been helpful if the lawyer 
actually had the authority to give me information. Thus, instead of talking about law and 
criminal justice with landowners, I got to talk with their lawyers, who as soon as I touched on 
more political subjects referred me to their bosses, who subsequently refused to talk to me. 
The superficial separation but intimate connectedness between law and politics was hardly 
ever more obvious than in this play of sending me around and avoiding the subject. I 
interviewed the lawyers for one of the bigger forestry companies and the lawyer for the 
agricultural alliance. In addition, in order to construct the voice that claims victimhood, I relied 
on written documentation, such as press declarations, testimonies during criminal trials, and 
testimonies with congressional committees.   
 
Prisoner support narrative 
In order to understand the specific narrative that challenges the criminal definitions proposed 
by the state, I selected the major criminal cases of the past twenty years and set out to 







following criminal cases: CTT 1992, Lumaco 1997, Temulemu 1999, attempted homicide private 
security guard 2001, Ancalaf 2002, Lonkos of Traiguén 2003, CAM 2004, Poluco Pidenco 2004, 
Chamichaco 2009. In order to research the different meanings assigned to protest activity, it is, 
however, indispensable that an actor has actually done the action and also acknowledges 
participation. The Mapuche conflict offered a specific challenge here, as most if not all people 
accused of “underground” crimes publicly denied their participation. In some cases, other 
sources confirmed that innocence. In most cases, however, I had no way to independently 
check such assertions. I also interviewed five lawyers that regularly defended Mapuche activists 
in court. This was significant because often defendants had misunderstood central elements in 
their case. For example, one defendant said that he was sentenced with anti-terrorism laws, 
whereas his lawyer claimed that he was sentenced under the Law on State Security (Interview 
S-53). This example illustrates, on the one hand, the lack of knowledge and understanding that 
often exists and, on the other hand, the pervasiveness of the discourse that the anti-terrorism 
legislation is used in “Mapuche trials.” Further, I visited prisons and attended benefit events to 
raise support for prisoners. I also spoke with various activists that self-identified as prisoner 
supporters. In addition, I collected written documents such as lists with the “political prisoners” 
and public declarations.  
 
Selection of criminal cases  
I have tried hard to collect quantitative data, for example on the number of criminal complaints 







number of criminal cases that went to trial. I asked the forestry company Mininco and the 
governor of Malleco for their data on the criminal complaints they had filed and the result of 
these complaints (investigations, prosecutions, trials, convictions). They confirmed that they 
possessed these data, but in both cases I was denied access. The reason given by the forestry 
company Mininco was that it was too sensitive and could have a deteriorating effect on their 
relations with the Public Ministry. The governor did not give an explanation, but his lawyer told 
me that he was unwilling to cooperate. Unfortunately, I have therefore not been able to collect 
much quantitative information regarding criminal cases that could provide an indication of the 
relevant population of cases. How many land takeovers were there in each year since 1990? 
How many of these ended in a criminal trial? How many of these ended in a removal? How 
many in detentions? It turned out to be virtually impossible to find the answers to these 
questions. Landowners did not want to give any numbers that they had, and the office of the 
prosecutor simply did not respond.  
 
For my data collection on criminal cases I again turned to the method of “case collection” and 
“situation collection.” I collected in-depth information on the following criminal cases: Consejo 
de Todas las Tierras 1992; Lumaco 1997; Temulemu 1999; Lonkos of Traiguén 2003; CAM 2004; 
Chamichaco 2009. In each of these cases I collected the following: 
- interviews with defendants 
- trial transcripts 







- victim statements about the event in newspapers or other sources (judicial records, 
documentary)  
 
In addition to the in-depth analysis of these key cases, I wanted to collect the transcripts of 
several other cases from different years and with different kinds of criminal offenses. I wanted 
to obtain at least one sentence for every year and at least one sentence for each of the 
frequently imputed criminal offenses: usurpación [usurpation], robo [theft], hurto [petty theft], 
daño [damages], desórdenes públicos [public disorder], incendio [arson]. But people kept telling 
me that what I was looking for was “not relevant.” Anthropologists learn, however, that this in 
itself is an important entry point for information. Interestingly, it turned out that while the 
narrative of prisoner supporters and the talk of “criminalization of a social movement” makes it 
seem that criminal cases on usurpation and theft are initiated frequently, there actually were 
not that many of such criminal cases that were pursued until a trial. As there were in fact less of 
those smaller criminal cases than I had expected, and because of the difficulty to obtain 
transcripts, I ended up with considerably less transcripts and less of a systematic selection 
principle than in Spain and the United States.  
 
My aim was to collect trial transcripts from criminal cases that were related to the Mapuche 
conflict from 1990 to 2009, just like I had collected trial transcripts in Spain and the U.S., where 
many transcripts are available digitally. There were, however, several challenges. Lacking access 







virtually impossible to find any specific opening statements or indictments or other speech acts 
by the prosecutor. Even verdicts, which are supposed to be public, were a hassle to obtain. Only 
since the Penal Reform of 2001 have there been an attorney general and public oral trials. Only 
since 2004 have trial verdicts been published on Internet databases. For hardcopy transcripts 
from trials before 2003 I went directly to the Court of Appeals in Temuco or to criminal defense 
lawyers. Through one of the lawyers I obtained many police documents that were used in the 
case against the CAM and several of the other cases that he had defended since 2000. Also, 
through one of the lawyers I obtained some of the complaints that were filed by victims. For 
cases after 2003 I found digital trial transcripts on databases of LexisNexis, V-Lex, and the 
website www.poderjudicial.cl. A severe limitation of these websites, however, is that they only 
give sentences from the Appeals Court or the Supreme Court. Sentences from the first courts, 
and thus the sentences that relate the course of events, were not possible to acquire, for which 
I could not use these websites in order to identify the prosecutorial narrative. In addition, these 
websites depended on the digitalization of the various tribunals. For example, it was not 
possible to access any of the sentences of the tribunal in the village of Collipulli or the village of 
Nueva Imperial through these websites. This severely limited their use as a way to retrieve 
quantitative data on the number of cases on a certain criminal offense or the number of cases 
with the use of a certain law. Further, trial transcripts have to be divided into those that belong 
to the old system and those that belong to the new system. The new system has oral trials that 
can be obtained in audio. I collected several of these oral trials through lawyers. In this way I 







cases tried in the old system I have been able to recuperate in addition to the verdicts some of 
the other documents such as the defense statement through the courts and the lawyers.  
 
I was present at two trials. In 2003, I attended the trial against the lonkos of Traiguén. In 2009, I 
attended the trial against three Chilean supporters of the Mapuche cause, the Chamichaco 
case. Both trials consisted of one week-long phase of opening statements, witness statements, 
and concluding arguments. I “selected” these trials simply because they were the trials that 




My fieldwork in the United States took place from September 2007 until November 2007 and in 
October 2008 and November 2008. Just as in Spain, after having mapped the conflict, I 
collected different overviews of events and analyzed how the events are described. I selected 
some (categories) of the events and explored in more depth how different actors labeled them 
at the time. I traced at which point the terrorism label came into the discourse, which actors 
introduced it, and at which point it played a role in the criminal proceedings.  
 
Narrative challenging of the status quo 
In order to gain access to the existing range of perspectives in the animal rights and 







I collected data in several different ways. I interviewed activists with whom I had come in touch 
by attending specific events (an animal rights conference in Boston and a trial against an 
environmental activist). These interviews provided me with the relevant websites, 
organizations, and books to look into and contacts for further research. Subsequently, for 
several months I did weekly participant observation during various demonstrations organized 
by an animal rights group in the New York area. This gave me the insight of an animal rights 
group in action and the conversations and practices within the group. I also attended various 
talks by animal rights activists, for example at universities in New York – often gathering places 
for the animal rights community. I conducted in-depth interviews with animal rights activists 
about their protest activities and their experiences with criminal prosecutions. In addition to 
interviewing activists I also interviewed several lawyers who have represented activists about 
their cases. In addition to these experiences and the field notes and interview transcripts I 
gained from them, I followed a variety of animal rights and environmentalist websites with 
frequency, subscribed to various mailing lists, and surfed the web extensively, viewing material 
on YouTube on SHAC protests and videos exposing animal cruelty. Finally, I read various books 
written by activists about their protest activity. While focusing on the groups that faced 
criminal prosecution, in this exploration of the range of perspectives available in the activist 
movement, through websites and news reports I also explored the position and views of the so-
called “mainstream” organizations, such as the Sierra Club and the Humane Society. It became 
apparent that it is relevant to understand how different categories of groups interact to 








Narrative defending the status quo 
For the discourse defending the status quo I relied on the written documents produced by 
organizations such as the Fur Commission and the Center for the Defense of Free Enterprise 
available on the Web or in book form. Furthermore, I used testimonies provided before 
congressional committees. Unfortunately, the companies Huntingdon Life Sciences, Novartis, 
and Life Sciences Research refused to grant me an interview (Telephone conversation, 
September 2008).  
 
State definition of the situation 
For the state definition of the situation I collected data from proceedings in Congress and 
subcommittee hearings related to environmental protest or “eco-terrorism.” Testimonies by 
government experts in such hearings provide insight into the threat assessment the 
government makes. In addition, I collected data from the website of the FBI.  
 
Prosecutorial narrative 
In order to gain access to the perspective and discourse of prosecutors I used several bodies of 
data. I attended one trial against an environmentalist activist and interviewed the prosecutor in 
this trial. In addition, I interviewed the prosecutor of another well-known trial against animal 
rights activists. Further, I collected various press releases, indictments, and available trial 







a request for an interview after having considered that “they would not be able to disclose 
much information” (Telephone conversation, October 2008). A promise to answer a written 
questionnaire which I sent them per e-mail was not fulfilled.  
   
In order to analyze what happened in courts I used the digital system “Pacer,” in which all trials 
in federal courts are registered and their documents are uploaded. The system Pacer enabled 
me to perform searches as long as I had the name of the defendant. This allowed me to, for 
example, get access to the trial transcripts in the case of Rod Coronado. Especially the opening 
and closing statements offered an opportunity to tease out the way in which the prosecutor 
presents the relevant context, and which parts are excluded as not relevant. Thus, I could 
analyze how the prosecutor translates the facts of the case, elements of the offense, and the 
arguments regarding causation, liability, and sentencing into legally relevant terminology. 
Unfortunately, if a trial ended in a plea bargain, Pacer shows the different dates of court 
appearances and motions, but content is not disclosed. Many activists, however, uploaded legal 
materials on their support websites, including plea agreements and written notes from 
sentencing hearings. U.S. Attorney websites often publish indictments online, as well as press 
releases about trials.  
 
Victim mobilization narrative 
In order to gain understanding of the perspective of the targets and victims of activist protest 







extreme animal rights and environmentalist activities. Some victims declared during trials, such 
as in the SHAC trial, so I could rely on their testimonies to analyze their discourse. In addition, I 
used their testimonies in congressional hearings. I tried to organize interviews with some of the 
companies that have been targeted by activists. Unfortunately, pharmaceutical companies 
either explicitly refused to give interviews or did not return my calls. The reason they gave for 
their refusal was security concerns, illustrating the seriousness of the matter. I had an informal 
conversation with representatives from a European pharmaceutical company which confirmed 
the perspectives that I had already gleaned from written documents.  
 
Prisoner support narrative 
For my analysis of the discourse of prisoner supporters, I mostly relied on the information 
provided on websites from support groups. In addition, I interviewed a prisoner supporter 
during one of the trials, an activist of the ALF Press Office, and a former prisoner. I also visited 
an action by prisoner supporters who were handing out leaflets and providing food on the 
streets of New York.  
 
Selection of criminal cases 
I attended one trial in the United States, the jury trial against Eric McDavid, which took place 
during my fieldwork period. Further, I chose the SHAC case as one of the cases to study in more 
depth as it emerged as one of the most important criminal cases, for both activists and targets 







further used a variety of sources to get an overview of the development of extreme 
environmental protest activity. Most of these overviews start in 1980 (FBI 2006; Guither 
1998:221–233; Foundation for Biomedical Research 2006; Fur Commission 2011c, 2011d; ELF 
supporter 2008). I used such overviews to trace the criminal prosecutions that were initiated at 































Appendix – Abbreviations and acronyms 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 
ANV    Acción Nacionalista Vasca 
AVT    Asociación Víctimas del Terrorismo  
BVE    Batallón Vasco Español 
ECHR    European Court for Human Rights 
EPPK Euskal Preso Politikoen Kolektiboa, Basque Collective of Political 
Prisoners  
ETA    Euskadi Ta Askatasuna  
ETAm    ETA-militar 
ETApm    ETA-político-militar 
GAL    Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación  
GRAPO   Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre 
MLNV    Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Vasco  
MPAIAC Movimiento por la Autodeterminación e Independencia del 
Archipiélago Canario  
PCTV    Partido Comunista de Tierras Vascas 
Plan ZEN   Plan de Zona Especial Norte  
PNV    Partido Nacional Vasco 







PSOE    Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
TOP    Tribunal del Orden Público  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 
CAM    Coordinadora Arauco Malleco  
CONADI   Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena 
CORMA   Corporación de Madera  
CTT    Consejo de Todas las Tierras 
FARC    Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
FIDH    International Federation for Human Rights 
IACHR    Inter-American Court for Human Rights  
ILO    International Labor Organization 
Mideplan   Ministerio de Planificación 
MIR    Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria 
SNA    Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura 
SOFO    Sociedad de Fomento Agrícola de Temuco 
 
Mapuzugun (Mapuche language): 
Lamngen   Sister    
Lof    Mapuche community 







Machi    Community healer 
Nguillatún   Religious ceremony 
Palin    Specific sport played by Mapuche communities 
Peñi    Brother 
Werken   Spokesperson for a Mapuche community 
Winka/huinca   Pejorative word for “Chilean” – literally: thief 
 
Chapters 7 and 8 
ALF   Animal Liberation Front 
CMU   Communication Management Unit 
ELF   Earth Liberation Front 
FBI   Federal Bureau of Investigation 
JTTF   Joint Terrorism Task Force 
PETA   People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 











Appendix – Schematic illustration of indicators of the modalities in the 
prosecutorial narrative  
 









The prosecutor construes 
the case, selecting legally 
relevant facts and 
excluding the context, 
claiming to be politically 
neutral  
 RE-CONTEXTUALIZATION 
The prosecutor re-contextualizes the 
criminalized events against the 
background of a broader context that 








Legal interest Concrete and narrowly 
defined legal interest 




Individual as perpetrator Individual as member of an identity 
group or organization 
Time frame Narrow time frame Broad time frame  
Guilt  Guilt for past harm Future danger, status crimes 
Harm 
principle I 
Clear demonstrated harm Consensus about immorality 
becomes sufficient 














Conduct I Actions at one time and 
place constitute the crime 
 Continuous sequence of acts which 
alone are not criminal constitute a 
“pattern” which constitutes a crime 
or which together constitute a more 
severe crime than each separate 
incident alone  
Conduct II Crime is autonomous Criminal conduct is dependent, i.e., 
refers to other actual or potential 
crimes, and the conduct would not 
be criminal without (the possibility 
of) those other crimes, for example 
“threat” or “glorification”  
Evidence Every element of the crime 
has to be proven. Burden 
of proof squarely on 
prosecutor 
Strategies to exclude elements from 
the need to prove it. Shift of the 
burden of proof to the defendant  
Punishing 
results 
Results of an action only 
count into the crime when 
you intended and foresaw 
the result: knowing and 
willing is required 
In certain positions you are supposed 
to have known and wanted the 
results. At the very extreme, strict 







Causality Responsibility is direct Responsibility for the actions of 
others through hierarchical control 
(“command” responsibility), financial 
support for or membership in an 
organization, actions of solidarity, or 
acts of incitement and glorification 
(“speech acts”)  




Meaning of organization becomes 
thin: it does not correspond anymore 
to what is ordinarily understood as 


















 Setting an example, destruction of 
leaders, fuelling internal conflicts, 
information gathering, destruction of 
an organization, restriction of a 
movement’s resources, prevention of 
an action 
Motive No political motives are 
discussed 
Overlap between motive and intent 






Effectiveness in yielding convictions, 











Clear separation of powers Pushing off of responsibility, disputed 
jurisdiction and competence 
Investigation Reactive and offense-
driven as a response to a 
criminal report or 
complaint 
Proactive and suspect-driven on the 




Exclusion of the identity Explicit discussion of the identity of 
the defendant, victim or both as 
relevant to determining the crime  
Legislative 
justification 
Use of the ordinary, 
routine instrumentarium of 
laws  
Use of special measures, special laws, 







Last resort First response 
Presumption 
of innocence 
Strict protection of the 
defendant as potentially 
innocent 
Long pre-trial detention, the identity 
of the defendant as well-known 
leader or spokesperson becomes the 







Role of the 
prosecutor 
The prosecutor represents 
the generalized public 
interest 
The prosecutor represents the 
interests of a particular group or 






















Appendix – Overview of interviews  
 
Due to the informal character of some of my fieldwork activities, not all communications were 
in the form of official interviews. Therefore, in this list of interviews I also include long informal 
conversations, even though I still refer to them in the text as “Interview”. Interviews and 
conversations lasted anywhere between one and four hours. With some informants I had 
multiple conversations.  
 
This table does not include the “gatekeeper” or “expert” interviews that I conducted with people in 
order to obtain access to informants or a better understanding of, for example, the Spanish 
criminal justice system and legal databases. In Spain, such interviews included conversations with 
the dean of the law faculty in Bilbao, a law professor, the director of the Institute for Criminology in 
San Sebastián, and other researchers in the field of ETA, terrorism, and Kale Borroka.  
 
Unfortunately, my request for an interview was not always granted. The difference between access 
and a refusal was generally related to my ability to find some personal recommendation from other 







me, generally referring to “security concerns.” In Chile I was unable to interview some of the actors 
whom I had interviewed in 2003. Multiple attempts did not lead to an interview with the 
prosecutor in Temuco, Chile, in 2009. Similarly, spokespersons from the Chilean forestry company 
Mininco refused to talk to me in 2009. In the United States, I received rejections from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations (FBI), the pharmaceutical company Novartis, and the controversial 
company involved in animal experimentation, Huntingdon Life Sciences. In Spain, while having 
interviewed the chief prosecutor from the Audiencia Nacional, the prosecutor in the case against 
Gestoras pro Amnistía refused an interview, while expressing ostensible depreciation and suspicion 
that I was somehow related to the defendants.  
 









Number of Place and date of interview   Short description of interviewee 




1 Bilbo-Bilbao, Jan./April 2008 Lawyer with Gestoras pro Amnistía and Basque human  
rights organization Behatokia, defendant in Case Gestoras  
pro Amnistía 
2 Andoain, Feb. 2008  Director newspaper Egunkaria, defendant in case  
Egunkaria 
3 Hernani, Feb./Mar./Jun. 2008 Lawyer of the Basque lawyer’s collective in the case  
18/98, Jarrai/Haika/Segi and many others  
4 Gernika, March 2008  Participant in anti-Falange demonstration 
5 Bilbo-Bilbao, March 2008 Lawyer at Basque human rights organization Behatokia 
6 Donostia-San Sebastián, March 2008   
Previous member of Gestoras pro Amnistía, law professor  
in San Sebastián-Donostia 
7 Bilbao, March/ June 2008 Left-nationalist activist from Algorta 
8 Madrid, April 2008  Lawyer for the victim organization Asociación de Víctimas  
del Terrorismo 







10 Gasteiz-Vitoria, April 2008 Two lawyers at the Basque Government in Gasteiz-Vitoria 
11 Madrid, April 2008  Lawyer with the Anti-Torture Coordinator in Madrid 
12 Bilbo-Bilbao, April 2008 Left-nationalist activist, previous participant in Kale  
Borroka 
13 Madrid, April and May 2008 Director of the right-wing political party La Falange, victim  
of attack by ETA and threatened by ETA 
14 Madrid, April 2008  Director of Victim Organization Dignidad y Justicia 
15 Gasteiz-Vitoria, April 2008 Spokesperson for Victim Organization Fundación Fernando  
Buesa 
16 Madrid, May 2008  Spokesperson of Victim Organization Asociación de  
Víctimas del Terrorismo 
17 Bilbo-Bilbao, May 2008 Lawyer for victim organization Dignidad y Justicia,  
threatened by ETA 
18 Madrid, May 2008  Journalist at newspaper Gara 
19 Bilbo-Bilbao, May 2008 Member of the left-nationalist internationalist  
organization Askapena 
20 Madrid, May 2008  Director Manos Limpias 
21 Madrid, May 2008  Chief Prosecutor of the Audiencia Nacional  
22 Madrid, May 2008  Instruction Judge at the Audiencia Nacional 
23 Bilbo-Bilbao, May/June 2008 Defendant in trial Gestoras pro Amnistía and previous  







24 Elorrio, June 2008  Leader of left-nationalist youth organization Segi,  
acquitted after a trial for collaboration with ETA 
25 Bilbo-Bilbao, June 2008 Left-nationalist activist, previous participant in Kale  
Borroka 
26 Hernani, June 2008  Lawyer for Gurasoak, an organization of family members  
of prisoners and defendants charged for actions of Kale  
Borroka 
27 Madrid, June 2008  Lawyer for victim organization Dignidad y Justicia 
28 Oñati, June 2008  Member of Etxerat, family member of imprisoned ETA  
militant  
29 Madrid, June 2008  Defendant trial Gestoras pro Amnistía  
30 Madrid, June 2008  Active member of political party Eusko Alkartasuna 
31 Madrid, June 2008  Victim of failed ETA attack, threatened by ETA and paying 
“revolutionary tax” 
32 Bilbo-Bilbao, June 2008 Activist with Gesto por la Paz  
33 Madrid, June 2008  Swiss sympathizer with the left-nationalist movement  
34 Bilbo-Bilbao, June 2008 Apolitical youth from a small village in Gipuzkoa- 
Guipuzcoa  











1 Santiago, Oct. 2002  Lawyer for Mapuche community in case Ralco 
2 Mapuche community in the Alto Bío Bío, November 2002 
     Community member 
3 Temuco, Dec. 2002  Employee at the National Forestry Corporation (CONAF) 
4 Temuco, Jan. 2003  Vice-regional governor of the 9th region  
5 Temuco, Jan. 2003  Director of Programa Orígenes, providing programs for  
indigenous communities 
6 Temuco, Jan. 2003  General director at forestry company Millalemu 
7 Temuco, Jan. 2003  Commercial manager at forestry company Magasa, ex- 
director of the CORMA 
8 Temuco, Jan. 2003  Chief of the department of the administration of land at  
forestry company Mininco 
9 Temuco, Jan. 2003  Lawyer for forestry company Mininco (junior) 
10 Temuco, Jan. 2003  Head prosecutor regional public ministry of the 9th region 
11 Temuco, Jan. 2003  Spokesperson public ministry in the 9th region 
12 Temuco, Jan. 2003  Lawyer public ministry 9th region 
13 Temuco, Jan. 2003  Lawyer public ministry 9th region 
14 Collipulli, Feb. 2003  Police chief in Collipulli 







16 Temuco, Feb. 2003  Lawyer for forestry company Mininco (senior) 
17  Temuco, Feb. 2003  Chief of public relations, forestry company Mininco 
18 Collipulli, Feb. 2003  Private security guard for forestry company Mininco 
19 Collipulli, Feb. 2003  Mayor of Collipulli 
20 Concepción, Feb. 2003 Mapuche activist, convicted for arson of trucks 
21 Mapuche community near Collipulli, Feb. 2003 
     Family members of a convicted Mapuche activist:  
brothers, sister, parents, wife, children  
22 Collipulli, Feb. 2003  Member of Mapuche community 
23 Temuco, Feb./Mar./Apr. 2003 Convicted for arson of a truck, member of the CAM  
(in prison) 
24 Temuco, Mar. 2003  Member of Mapuche organization Ad Mapu  
25 Temuco, Mar. 2003  Defense lawyer in many “Mapuche conflict” cases 
26 Mapuche community near Traiguén, Mar. 2003 
     Community member 
27 Mapuche community near Los Laureles, Mar. 2003 
     President of her community, charged with attacking  
authority 
28 Nueva Imperial, Mar. 2003 Mapuche student leader, former CAM member 
29 Temuco, Mar. 2003  Member of Mapuche organization CTT  







community, defendant in a case of arson of a plantation 
31 Temuco, Mar. 2003  Employee at CONADI 
32 Temuco, Mar. 2003  Director of Corps Araucaria 
33 Temuco, Mar. 2003  Forestry engineer at forestry company Bosques Cautín 
34 Temuco, Mar. 2003  Forestry engineer at forestry company Forestal Valdívia,  
subsidiary of Arauco 
35 Temuco, Mar. 2003  General manager of the CORMA in the 9th region  
36 Temuco, Mar. 2003  Judge in Temuco  
37 Temuco, April 2003  Private landowner with property around Collipulli  
38 Angol, April 2003  Son and grandson of a private landowner near Traiguén 
39 Osorno, March 2009  Defendant on charges under the Anti-Terrorist Law 
40 Temuco, March 2009  Daughter of a Mapuche activist  
41 Temuco, April 2009  Mapuche activist organizing a benefit concert for prisoners 
42 Temuco, April 2009  Lawyer with SOFO for private landowners 
43 Temuco, April 2009  Researcher on the “Mapuche conflict” hired by several  
forestry and agricultural associations  
44 Temuco, April 2009  Senior lawyer for forestry company Mininco 
45 Temuco, April 2009  Lawyer for the regional governor of the 9th region 
46 Temuco, April/May 2009 Defendant in the case against the CAM, former member 
47 Temuco, April 2009  Defense lawyer with the public defenders, experience as  







48 Temuco, April 2009  Defense lawyer with the Public Defense Office for  
Mapuches 
49 Temuco, April 2009  Grandson of former farmers whose lands were  
expropriated during the Salvador Allende regime  
50 Temuco, April 2009  Defense lawyer with the public defenders 
51 Temuco, April 2009  Prosecutor at the regional office of the 9th region  
52 Mapuche community near Ercilla, April 2009 
     Mapuche activist, spokesperson of his community 
53 Temuco, May 2009  Defendant in the case against Consejo de Todas las Tierras 
54 Temuco, May 2009  Director of the Corporación de la Madera (CORMA),  
forestry council 
55 Temuco, May 2009  Director of the Sociedad de Fomento Agrícola (SOFO),  
association for farmers 
56 Angol, May 2009  Lawyer for the Provincial Governor of the province of  
Malleco 
57 Temuco, May 2009 (2x) Defendant in a case of attempted homicide, former  
member of the Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM) 
58 Victoria, May 2009  Prisoner convicted for the Poluco Pidenco case 
59 Labranza, May 2009  Defendant in the case for the productive occupation by  
community Temulemu, former member of the CAM 







     Four defendants in the “Lumaco” case 
61 Collipulli, May 2009  Mapuche activist, spokesperson (werkén) of his  
community 
62 Collipulli, May 2009  Defendant in a case of arson of a truck 
63 Temuco, May 2009  Defendant in the “Chamichaco” case 
64 Temuco, May 2009  Private defense lawyer in many cases related to the  
“Mapuche conflict”  
65 Angol, May 2009  Mapuche activist from a community near Traiguén,  
defendant  
in a case of arson of a truck 
66  Temuco, May 2009  Husband of the chief of a Mapuche community, defendant  
in a case of “attack against authority”  
67  Victoria, May 2009  Prisoner supporter, visiting Mapuche activists in prison 
68 Mapuche community near Ercilla, June 2009 
     Mapuche activist, spokesperson of his community 
69 Temuco, May 2009  Employee of Observatorio Ciudadano 
70 Temuco, May 2009  Son of a Mapuche activist  
71 Angol, May 2009  Supporter of defendants in the “Chamichaco” case  
72 Los Angeles, June 2009 Defendant in the “Chamichaco” case 
 








1 Sacramento, CA, Sept. 2007  U.S. Attorney (senior) 
2 Sacramento, CA, Sept. 2007  U.S. Attorney (junior) 
3 Sacramento, CA, Sept. 2007  Defense lawyer in “Green Scare” cases  
4 Sacramento, CA, Sept. 2007  Prisoner supporter attending a trial 
5 New York City, NY, Oct. 2007  Animal rights activist for PETA2 and Win Animal  
Rights  
6 New York City, NY, Oct. 2007  Lawyer and anti-AETA activist 
7 New York City, NY, Oct. 2007  Social justice activist  
8  Washington D.C., Oct. 2007  Defense lawyer in Operation Backfire case 
9 Washington D.C., Oct. 2007  Defense lawyer from Maine 
10 Washington D.C., Oct. 2007  Journalist and environmentalist activist 
11 New York City, NY, Nov. 2007  Executive director of National Lawyers Guild 
12 New York City, NY, Nov. 2007  Defense lawyer with National Lawyers Guild 
13 Trenton, NJ, Nov. 2007  U.S. Attorney 
14 Trenton, NJ, Nov. 2007  Defense lawyer SHAC case 
15 New York City, NY, Oct. 2008  Animal rights activist, convicted under the AEPA  
16 New York City, NY, Nov. 2008  Animal rights activist and press officer ALF 
















Appendix – Criminal cases overview 
 
This list is far from a complete overview of all the criminal cases that are related to these 
contentious episodes in Spain, Chile, and the United States. It is not intended to be 
comprehensive. Instead, the cases described here are all mentioned in the text and serve as a 
clarification for the reader in order to provide some background to the arguments made in the 
relevant chapters and as a quick reference in order not to get lost in the many criminal cases 
presented along the way. After experimentation with a standard table to fill in information per 
case, I have chosen to write one vignette per case, as it turned out that the particularistic 
information was often the most relevant. I ordered the cases chronologically under the year in 
which the first trial or sentencing hearing took place.  
 
These cases are a purposive selection out of all past and ongoing criminal prosecutions in the 
three selected contentious episodes. As discussed in the methodology appendix, the cases 
mentioned here have been selected using the following criteria: (1) the cases that have 
received the most attention as they have been widely reported on in news sources or 
distributed on activist websites by prisoner support groups and websites reporting about 
“political prisoners,” (2) cases regarding different kinds (categories) of conduct illustrating the 
prosecutorial narrative about that conduct, (3) cases that illustrate particularly well some of the 
discursive shifts in the prosecutorial narrative or features of the re-contextualization of events, 








1. Selection of criminal cases in the Spanish-Basque separatist conflict  
 
The information for the overview of the 13 cases below is based on a variety of sources, most 
importantly indictments, press releases, information from prisoner supporters, online news 
sources, reports from human rights organizations, and trial transcripts. I have tried to cross-
check information but was not always able to.  
 
 
1992 Julen Larrinaga 
1993 Five council members of San Sebastián 
2003 Illegalization Batasuna 
2005 Baker in Iruñea 
2005 Jarrai/Haika/Segi 
2006 Otegi honoring ceremony 
2007 Fundación Joxemi Zumalabe 
2007 Flag waving 
2008 Mayor Hernani 
2008 TAV and Beasain 
2008 Gestoras Pro Amnistía and Askatasuna  







2011 Revolutionary tax 
 
 
1992 Julen Larrinaga 
Larrinaga was accused in 1992 of throwing a Molotov cocktail into a railway station in Bilbao. 
His case was the first of its kind (street violence) that was taken to the Audiencia Nacional in 
Madrid and qualified as a “terrorism” case. He was convicted to ten years and six months 
imprisonment on 14 October 1993. This sentence was confirmed on appeal at the Tribunal 
Supremo on 8 July 1994.  
 
1993 Five council members of San Sebastián 
Five council members of San Sebastián were charged with “endorsement” of terrorism 
(apologia, of Article 268 in relation to Article 174-3 of the Penal Code) in abbreviated procedure 
356/92. On 17 November 1993 the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Bilbao acquitted them. The 
prosecutor appealed, but on 4 July 2001 the Tribunal Supremo rejected the cassation 
arguments of the prosecutor.  
 
2003 Illegalization Batasuna 
On 26 August 2002, Judge Garzón suspended the political party Batasuna. On 27 March 2003, 
the Special Chamber of the Tribunal Supremo declared Batasuna illegal under the new “Law of 







30 June 2009 the European Court for Human Rights (ECHR) rejected the complaint filed by 
Batasuna and confirmed that the illegalization had been a “necessity,” which was confirmed in 
a final decision on 11 November 2009 by the ECHR in Strasbourg.  
 
2005 Baker in Iruñea 
On 13 March 2004, a neighbor killed a baker in Iruñea-Pamplona. On 8 July 2005 he was 
convicted to twenty years in prison. His mother and father were also convicted due to their role 
in the incident. His mother was acquitted on appeal. The dispute about this case is whether it 
was a fight between neighbors or whether the political context of the Al Qaeda attack in 
Madrid and the initial attribution of those attacks to ETA should be taken into account in this 




Jarrai was a left-nationalist Basque youth organization. In 2000 it fused with Gasteriak, a similar 
organization on the French side of the border. The new organization was called Haika.  
On 6 March 2001, Judge Garzón ordered the arrest of fifteen members of Haika and charged 
them with membership in a terrorist organization. Later, more people suspected of links with 
the youth organization were arrested. On 1 May 2001 Garzón declared Jarrai/Haika to be illegal. 
The youth responded by founding a youth organization called Segi, which was declared illegal 







others of collaboration with a terrorist organization. On 20 June 2005, the Audiencia Nacional 
judged the organizations Jarrai-Haika-Segi to be illegal, but not terrorist organizations. On 19 
January 2007, the Tribunal Supremo reversed that verdict and judged that the organization is a 
terrorist organization. 42 defendants were prosecuted and 23 members of Jarrai-Haika-Segi 
were ultimately convicted to six years imprisonment.  
 
2006 Otegi honoring ceremony 
In 2006 Batasuna leader Arnaldo Otegi was convicted to 15 months imprisonment for 
glorification of terrorism for a speech he held during an honoring ceremony commemorating 
the 25th anniversary of the death of ETA militant “Argala.”  
  
2007 Fundación Joxemi Zumalabe 
In the Sumario 18/98, the Basque sociopolitical organization Fundación Joxemi Zumalabe was 
alleged to be part of the ETA network. The Fundación was active as an organization engaging in 
overt actions of civil disobedience. One of the actions which were debated during the trial was 
the project in which the Fundación made Basque ID-cards. In the verdict of the Audiencia 
Nacional in the Sumario 18/98 on 19 December 2007, eight members of the Fundación were 
convicted, with sentences up to ten years imprisonment. On 22 may 2009, the Tribunal 
Supremo acquitted the members of the Fundación Joxemi Zumalabe.  
 







On 15 November 2007, the Audiencia Nacional convicted two youth for the glorification of 
terrorism to one year in prison. They were proven guilty for waving a flag with ETA symbols 
during a soccer match. Judge Ramón Sáez Valcárcel wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that the 
defendants did not have the required intent to glorify ETA. Instead, he argued, they were 
indifferent to what was on the flag.  
 
2008 Mayor Hernani 
The mayor of Hernani, Marian Beitialarrangoitia, was accused of glorification of terrorism for a 
speech she held on 12 January 2008 after the detention of two alleged ETA militants. During a 
hearing at the Audiencia Nacional on 25 January 2008, the judge dropped the case. The 
prosecutor, however, appealed this decision to drop the case. During a second hearing on 3 
April 2008 another judge ordered that the case be reopened. On 5 June 2009, the Audiencia 
Nacional convicted the mayor, and she was sentenced to one year in prison. On 19 March 2010, 
she was finally acquitted by the Tribunal Supremo.   
 
2008 TAV and Beasain 
During a protest against the High Speed Train on 3 November 2006, two protesters from 
Beasain were arrested and charged for “public disorder.” On 5 January 2008, the newspaper 
Gara published an interview with ETA in which ETA pronounced itself against the High Speed 
Train. Now, with this information, the protests in 2006 were viewed in a new light and the 







scheduled to come before the court of Tolosa on 15 January 2008, the Audiencia Nacional 
intervened and the case was transferred from the local courthouse to Madrid.  
 
2008 Gestoras Pro Amnistía and Askatasuna  
Gestoras pro Amnistía (its successor is called Askatasuna) was a Basque prisoner support group 
alleged to be part of the ETA network. Members of the organization were charged with 
“membership” in a terrorist organization. In 2001, Judge Garzón declared Gestoras pro 
Amnistía an illegal organization. The trial took place in the Spring of 2008, and on 17 September 
2008 the majority of the defendants were convicted. The Tribunal Supremo confirmed the 
verdict of the Audiencia Nacional on 16 October 2009.  
 
2010 Egunkaria  
Egunkaria is a Basque newspaper which was alleged to be part of the ETA network. Its director 
and various others were charged with “membership” in a terrorist organization. The newspaper 
was closed on 20 February 2003 as a measure within the criminal investigation. On 22 February 
2006, an investigative judge of the Audiencia Nacional decided in a resolution that there was a 
relation between ETA and Egunkaria, so the case moved forward. On 6 June 2007 the state 
prosecutor of the Audiencia Nacional dropped the charges. The private party to the trial leading 
the Popular Accusation, the organization Dignidad y Justicia, moved forward with the case and 








2011 Revolutionary tax 
The two Bruño sisters were accused of paying the “revolutionary tax” to ETA after receiving 
letters in 2003 and 2006. They were arrested on 12 June 2008. The trial took place on 2 
February 2011. On 30 June 2011, the Audiencia Nacional convicted the two sisters to one year 








2. Selection of criminal cases in the Chilean-Mapuche territorial conflict 
 
The information for the overview of the 18 cases below is based on a variety of sources, most 
importantly indictments, press releases, information from prisoner supporters, online news 
sources, reports from human rights organizations, and trial transcripts. I have tried to cross-
check information but was not always able to.  
 
1992 Consejo de Todas las Tierras 
1997 Lumaco 
1999 Temulemu 
2001 Attempted homicide private security guard 
2001 Case Fundo Ginebra 
2001 José Nain & Marcello Catrillanca 
2001 José Nain & Manuel Santander 
2003 Lonkos of Traiguén 
2003 Chequenco 
2003 Víctor Ancalaf 
2004 CAM 
2004 Poluco Pidenco 








2009 Cayupe  
2009 Chamichaco 
2009 Matías Catrileo 
2011 Case Cañete 
 
1992 Consejo de Todas las Tierras 
In 1992, 144 members of the Mapuche organization Consejo de Todas las Tierras (CTT) were 
indicted for membership in a criminal organization. On 11 March 1993, 141 of the defendants 
were convicted. This was confirmed by the Appeals Court in Temuco on 6 September 1994. The 
Supreme Court rejected the cassation. Having lost in all domestic courts, the CTT applied for 
admission to the Inter-American Court for Human Rights on 18 September 1996. The IACHR in 
Washington decided to recommend the possibility of a “solución amistosa” [amicable 
settlement]. In 2001 the Chilean state proposed a settlement including provisions about lands, 
elimination of penal antecedents, and symbolic reparation. The defendants decided to reject 
the proposal as “insufficient and unacceptable.” When the settlement failed, the IACHR 
admitted the complaints for further judicial consideration. The case is still pending before the 
court. None of the defendants has served time in prison.  
 
1997 Lumaco  
On 1 December 1997 three trucks were set on fire at a plantation of forestry company Arauco 







people were indicted under the Law for State Security, because the action counted as the 
destruction of means or elements that are used in public service or for industrial activities, such 
as mines, agriculture, or transport, as described in the Law on State Security (Art. 6 sub c of the 
Law 12.927 about State Security). One person decided to flee and became a fugitive. He was 
judged later in 2000 and had to serve three years in prison. None of the other defendants 
served time as they could fulfill their sentence by regularly reporting at the court.  
 
1999 Temulemu 
In the summer of 1998–1999, the Mapuche community “Temulemu” engaged in a so-called 
“productive occupation” of the plantation Santa Rosa de Colpi of forestry company Mininco. 
The investigative judge Archibaldo Loyola took up the case, and in May 2002 a total of sixteen 
defendants were convicted. Twelve were convicted of usurpation and theft of wood in Fundo 
Santa Rosa de Colpi and Fundo Chorrillos, respectively. They received sentences between eight 
hundred days and four years and one day in addition to a fine. Two students, the wife of Lonko 
Pichún, and another community member were convicted for “encubrimiento” [obstruction of 
justice]. Another defendant was charged and convicted for “injuries” after a forestry guard filed 
a complaint that he had been hit with a fist, which caused him injuries in addition to making 
him lose his glasses. He received a sentence of 61 days. A lawyer, José Lincoqueo, was 
convicted for inciting people to commit a crime as he had convinced some Mapuche 
community members that entering the land of the forestry company was legal according to the 








2001 Jose Nain & Marcello Catrillanca 
Two leaders of Mapuche community “Temucuicui” were prosecuted for incidents that occurred 
on 2 December 1999 during confrontations between the Mapuche community and the police 
and firefighters at the estate Alaska, property of forestry company Mininco. On 6 April 2001 
they were convicted to five years and one day in the court of Collipulli in the 9th region. On 4 
January 2002, the Appeals Court in Temuco judged that the defendants were not the “direct” 
authors of the crime, but the “indirect” authors. The court considered it proven that defendant 
José Nain had participated in the group that was throwing stones and branches to prevent the 
plantation personnel from putting out the fire, forcing them to call the help of carabineros, who 
also faced opposition. The judges therefore convicted the defendants as “indirect authors” 
according to the Chilean Penal Code, Art. 15 No. 1, which penalizes hindering the prevention of 
a crime. On 29 July 2003, the Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the Appeals Court, and 
the sentence remained five years and one day. Defendant José Nain spent five years in prison, 
whereas in 2010 Marcelo Catrillanca was still a fugitive.  
 
2001 Attempted homicide private security guard 
In February 2000, private security guards working for the forestry company Mininco were 
attacked. The car was set on fire after an ambush at a plantation. Three members of Mapuche 
community “Catrío Ñancul,” the lonko of Mapuche community “Antonio Paillacoi,” and several 







day for violation of Article 6 of the Law on State Security (crimes against the public order) and 
for attempted homicide. One of them was sentenced to four years. In March 2003 the Court of 
Appeals confirmed the sentence. One of the defendants, Julio Marileo, served only three 
months in prison.  
 
2001 Case Fundo Ginebra 
Mapuche community “Juan Ahilla Varela” demanded forty hectares of Fundo Ginebra, and a 
part of the community engaged in a “productive occupation” of the land. During the night of 20 
January 2001, the private security guard and one of the landowners were injured. In June 2001, 
three members of Mapuche community “Juan Ahilla Varela” were accused of homicidio 
frustrado [attempted homicide], lesiones graves [severe injuries], and robo con fuerza [theft 
with force]. Two fled from the proceedings and went fugitive. One defendant was convicted to 
818 days in prison.  
 
2001 José Nain & Manuel Santander 
On 11 July 2001, José Nain and Manuel Santander from the Mapuche organization Consejo de 
Todas las Tierras (CTT) were in a hearing in the Juzgado de Garantía of Victoria for an alleged 
crime. The judge decided to maintain their pre-trial detention. The subsequent reaction of the 
defendants led to a charge of “atentados y desacatos contra la autoridad” [contempt of court]. 
The case was heard on 2 October 2002 in the court in Angol. The prosecutor asked for 540 days 







imprisonment. Defense lawyers argued that what the judges had interpreted as “violent” and 
“threatening” could be explained as a misunderstanding of the Mapuche culture, language, and 
their musical instruments. The Mapuche motto Marrichiweu, for example, was understood as a 
“cry for war” (Proceedings Angol 2 October 2002, #3). 
 
2003 Víctor Ancalaf 
In November 2002, Víctor Ancalaf was arrested by the Chilean police. Ancalaf was a former 
spokesperson of the CAM and a known resister of the hydroelectric dam Ralco in the Alto Bío 
Bío. He was accused of “terrorist” arsons after the governor of the Bío Bío Province presented a 
legal request for proceedings for three “terrorist” arsons of trucks in 2001 and 2002 in the Alto 
Bío Bío. He was convicted in the first instance in November 2003 for the three “terrorist” arsons 
and sentenced to ten years and one day. On appeal in June 2004 he was acquitted of 
participation in two of the arsons. With only one arson regarded proven he was re-sentenced to 
five years and one day.  
 
2003 Lonkos of Traiguén  
In 2001, two Lonkos of Mapuche communities near the village Traiguén in the 9th region were 
arrested and indicted for “terrorist” arson of the house and threats made to a private 
landowner, Agustín Figueroa, former State Secretary for Agriculture and member of the 
Constitutional Court, with a property of 1,800 hectares (Richards 2010:80). Later, a female 







April 2003 the trial took place. Among the evidence were the testimonies of anonymous 
witnesses. On 14 April 2003, the defendants were acquitted. Unhappy with this result, Agustín 
Figueroa and the prosecutors took the case to the Supreme Court, where the verdict was 
nullified and a new trial was ordered. During the re-trial in September 2003, Patricia Troncoso 
was acquitted of all charges. The two Lonkos were acquitted of the arsons. They were, 
however, convicted for “terrorist threats.”212  They were convicted to five years and one day 
and served the time in prison.   
 
Table 7 Trials in the case “Lonkos of Traiguén” against Pascual Pichún, Aniceto Norín, and Patricia 
Troncoso 
Date Tribunal Charges Decision 
14 April 2003 Penal Tribunal 
Angol 
Terrorist arson of a house in 
Nancahue, 12 December 
2001; terrorist arson of pine 
plantation in San Gregorio, 
16 December 2001; threats 
of terrorist arson against 
owners and administrators 
of forestry predio Nancahue 
and San Gregorio. 
Acquitted 




Different judges Pichún and Norín are convicted for 
“terrorist threats,” 5 years and 1 
day; they are acquitted for the 




Supreme Court Cassation rejected  
21 October 
2006 




                                                      
212
 The introduction of the crime “terrorist threat” has led to criticism as it is not clear whether it means to 
threaten someone with a terrorist offense, or whether the threat itself is terroristic. It is the first time that 









On 11 May 2001, eleven members of Mapuche community “José Millacheo Levio” from 
Chequenco, sub-region Ercilla, were arrested and charged with kidnapping, criminal 
organization, usurpation, theft, damages, and the illegal bearing and possession of arms. These 
offenses allegedly occurred in the context of the “recuperation” of a piece of land during the 
summer of 2001 (January–March). Six of the defendants were kept in pre-trial detention. 
During the course of the investigation the severe charges were dropped, and what was left 
when the case came to trial was the accusation of the theft of wheat. The prosecutor requested 
sentences of between 700 and 900 days in prison. The private accuser also demanded financial 
compensation for material and emotional damages. The trial took place on 13 and 14 January 
2003 at the Penal Tribunal in Angol. Among the evidence were the testimonies of anonymous 
witnesses. The defendants were convicted to 541 days in prison and the payment of 2 million 
Chilean pesos.  
 
2004 CAM 
In December 2002, the police arrested many members of the organization Coordinadora 
Arauco-Malleco (CAM). They were charged with “membership in a terrorist organization.” In 
total, 18 alleged CAM members were indicted. Not all stood trial as some decided to go fugitive. 
The trial started on 8 October 2004 and lasted four and a half weeks. In November 2004, the 







the Supreme Court and asked for a nullification. The Supreme Court granted the nullification 
and decided that the case had to be re-tried and that the judicial decision should be different 
next time. On 27 July 2005, another court again acquitted the CAM members of the charges.  
 
2004 Poluco Pidenco 
In trial transcripts, the court described that in the morning of 19 December 2001 forestry 
brigadiers were “combating” the arson when they were attacked by about forty persons. Then 
the carabineros also came to the fundo and were attacked by stones thrown with slingshots. 
The arson lasted two days and destroyed about 108 hectares of pine and eucalyptus plantations 
with a value of 600,000 dollars. The entire Poluco Pidenco fundos are 328 and 1,378.8 hectares, 
property of Forestal Mininco. This case involved 10 defendants, who were initially charged with 
“terrorist arson.” Several defendants decided to escape the trials and were therefore tried in 
later trials. The judges in 2006 and 2007 came to a different conclusion regarding the 
qualification of the arson. They rejected the notion that the arson was “terroristic.” There is still 
one person fugitive in this case.  
 
First trial August 2004  5 persons  Convicted of terrorist arson (10 years and 1 day) 
Second trial April 2005 1 person  Convicted of terrorist arson (10 years and 1 day) 
Third trial March 2006 2 persons  Acquitted, no participation and no terrorism  
Fourth trial February 2007 1 person Convicted of common arson, but no terrorism  








2005 Case Czech tourist in Torres del Paine 
On 17 February 2005, a Czech tourist caused an arson that destroyed about 5,500 hectares of 
the National Park Torres del Paine. He had been cooking in an area that was not designated for 
camping. He was indicted by the Public Ministry based on a law (Ley de Bosques [Forestry Law]) 
that also penalizes arson when it is the result of negligent behavior. However, in the end he was 
sanctioned with a fine of 121,000 Chilean pesos (the maximum fine for this offense, but 
depending on the exchange rate not more than 250 USD) and set free (by the Tribunal de 
Garantía [Warranty Court] of Puerto Natales).  
 
2007 Calfunao 
Between 21 and 23 December 2005, the Mapuche community “Juan Paillalef” protested against 
construction work by the Chilean Department of Public Works, which was building a road 
through the lands of the community. On 5 january 2006, the lonko of the Mapuche community, 
Juana Calfunao, and her sister were indicted for disorder on the public road. Juana Calfunao 
was additionally charged with threatening a police officer. During their arrest Juana Calfunao 
and her sister were hurt, and the presiding judge ordered for an investigation of the causes of 
their injuries. The trial for public disorder took place on 13 February 2006 at the Warranty Court 
of Temuco, and on 22 February 2006 they were sentenced to 61 days for public disorder. Juana 
Calfunao was sentenced to another 61 days for threatening a police officer. The allegations of 







criminal proceedings, the Department of Public Works promised that the machinery would not 
enter the community. On appeal, on 15 November 2006 at the Penal Tribunal in Temuco the 
judge confirmed the charges against Juana Calfunao. The members of the Mapuche community 
“Juan Paillalef” were upset about this verdict, and tumult ensued in the courtroom. What 
exactly happened is contested, but there were aggressive shouts and Calfunao’s sister hit the 
prosecutors. Twelve community members were arrested and indicted for assault against court 
authorities (Art. 264, Criminal Code), damages, minor injuries, and theft of the investigation 
dossier. In addition, Juana Calfunao was charged with threatening the prosecutor. On 31 
October 2007 she was sentenced to three years imprisonment for assaulting a court authority. 
One of the legal issues in this case was the question whether a prosecutor could be a “court 
authority” as prescribed in Art. 264 of the Chilean Criminal Code.  On 27 December 2007 a law 
was enacted (No. 20,236) in order to explicitly include prosecutors as authorities for the 
purposes of Art. 264.  
  
2009 Cayupe  
Carlos Cayupe was charged with attempted homicide as well as arson on a truck on the highway 
on 26 December 2007. Cayupe was accused of leading the group that staged this attack.  
In April 2009 he was tried after a year of pre-trial detention. Evidence against him included 
testimony of anonymous witnesses. He was convicted for arson and sentenced to five years 








2009 Chamichaco  
In January 2008, Erick von Jentschyk, Juan Medina, and Alex Bahamondes were arrested and 
accused of the arson of two trucks on the highway in the 9th region near Chamichaco. The 
arsons took place after the death of activist Catrileo and were generally understood to be 
committed in revenge for his death by the Chilean police. The prosecutor qualified the arsons 
as “common” arsons (i.e. not terrorist). In May 2009, the court in Angol convicted the three 
defendants for participation in just one of the arsons. They were acquitted of participation in 
the other arson. I attended this trial, and in my perception it is incomprehensible that the court 
could judge that there was sufficient evidence for their participation in one of the arsons and 
not the other. It seemed a typically “ambivalent” move of the judicial authorities. The reason 
for their ambivalent decision might be that a conviction for the two arsons would have led to a 
mandatory sentence of seven years in prison which would then have to be served by doing 
time. With the conviction of only one arson, the accused were sentenced to only three years 
and one day, which meant that they could serve this sentence without entering prison, but by 
reporting regularly at the police station. Thus, the ambivalent finding of guilt enabled the courts 
to communicate a guilty verdict without having a severe impact on the Mapuche activists. Early 
2010 one of the defendants, Erick von Jentschyk, died in the major earthquake that shook the 
country.  
 







On 3 January 2008 various members of the CAM entered the property of a private landowner, 
Fundo Santa Margarita, in order to occupy it because it was claimed by a Mapuche community. 
The police came at six in the morning, and while the CAM members were running away the 
police fired some shots, which lethally hit Matías. The lack of confidence in fair proceedings led 
the activists to keep Matías’ body hidden for the government during the first few days after his 
death. The CAM members wanted to protect the body against tampering with the evidence 
that the police bullet had come from behind. The activists deeply distrusted the state’s forensic 
employees. For a long time, the police argued that Matías was killed when the police defended 
themselves against an attack as the activists were burning hay stacks on the land of the private 
landowner. In June 2009, the trial took place against the police officer whose bullet was 
responsible for the death of Matias Catrileo. As the evidence confirmed that the bullet had hit 
Matías in the back, the prosecutors charged the police officer with “unnecessary violence 
resulting in death” and asked for ten years imprisonment. The judges of the military court in 
Valdivia convicted the carabinero responsible for the death of Matías Catrileo to two years, a 
sentence he could serve in liberty while reporting regularly to the police. On 19 May 2010 the 
Catrileo family appealed the sentence at the Martial Courts in Santiago, where the judges 
raised the sentence to three years and one day, still to be served in liberty by reporting 
regularly to the authorities for 48 months. In 2011, the case was still pending before the 
Supreme Court where the Catrileo family is demanding a sentence of fifteen years. In 2010, 








2011 Case Cañete 
In 2011 a major case came before the court in Cañete in the 8th region. 14 defendants were 
accused of various crimes, several of which, however, led to acquittals. They were all acquitted 
of the charges “terrorist organization” and “criminal organization for the theft of wood.” They 
were also acquitted of the charge “terrorist arson” and while the court agreed with the 
prosecutors that the arson could be indeed qualified as “terroristic,” it did not find sufficient 
evidence for a conviction. Only four of the defendants – all with leading positions within the 
CAM – were convicted. The court convicted them for an “attack on an authority” and 
“homicidio frustrado” [attempted homicide] for having attacked a prosecutor. However, 
regarding this charge the court rejected the prosecutorial narrative that the crime was 
“terroristic.” These four defendants were further convicted for “robo con intimidación” [theft 
with intimidation]. The main leader of the CAM, Hector Llaitul, received 25 years for his 









3. Selection of criminal cases in the United States eco-conflict 
 
The information for the overview of the cases below is based on a variety of sources, most 
importantly indictments, press releases, online news sources, trial transcripts, and the 
information provided on the websites in support for individual defendants. I have tried to cross-







A short description of the following cases can be found below: 
1989 Arizona Four  
1993 Rik Scarce  
1995 Rod Coronado  
1998 Ted Kazcynski   
1998 Douglas Joshua Ellerman  
2001 Jeffrey Luers  
2005 Peter Young  







2006 Ryan Lewis  
2006 SHAC7  
2007 Operation Backfire or the “Family”  
2007 Rod Coronado  
2007 Eric McDavid  
2008 Tre Arrow  
2008 Briana Waters  
2009 Marie Mason  
2010 AETA2  
2010 AETA4  
2010 Kevin Olliff  
2010 Scott DeMuth  
2010 Carrie Feldman  
2010 Steve Murphy  
2010 Gina “Tiga” Wertz and Hugh Farrell 
2011 Walter Bond  
2011 Tim DeChristopher  
 
1989 Arizona Four  
In 1989, four Earth First! activists from Prescott, Arizona, were arrested and charged with 







creating the plot is disputed. Scarce wrote that Earth First! activists understood the resulting 
prosecution of Earth First! founder Dave Foreman and four others as the FBI’s intention to 
“send a message” to Earth First! (2006:278). 
 
1993 Rik Scarce  
As a PhD student in 1993, Scarce was asked to testify before a federal Grand Jury about an 
arson attack at the University of Washington, Seattle. He refused to answer some questions 
about his interviews with animal rights activists. He was therefore held in civil contempt and 
spent five months in prison.  
 
1995 Rod Coronado  
Rod Coronado was a public advocate of the Animal Liberation Front. In 1995 he was tried for an 
arson attack at Michigan State University in 1992. This attack was allegedly committed in the 
campaign Operation Biteback, a series of attacks on animal testing and fur facilities across the 
United States. He was sentenced to 57 months in prison. The case was prosecuted by the 
Western District of Michigan.  
 
1998 Ted Kaczynski   
Kaczynski was indicted in 1996 for a bombing campaign including multiple separate bombings 







in prison without the possibility of parole. The case was prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office in Sacramento.  
 
1998 Douglas Joshua Ellerman  
Ellerman was accused of setting fire to the Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative mink farm in 
Sandy, Utah, in March 1997, causing nearly one million dollars in damage. He was accused of 16 
counts including malicious destruction of a building engaged in interstate commerce, using a 
destructive device (pipe bombs) during a crime of violence, illegally making bombs, and aiding 
and abetting (Title 18, Sections 844(i) and 924(c), Title 26, Section 5861(f)). The Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) was involved in the investigation and although no 
terrorism charges were involved, the media labeled it a case of animal rights terrorism 
(Costanzo 1998). Ellerman pled guilty, and in 1998 he was sentenced to seven years 
imprisonment. He was additionally ordered to pay $750,000 in restitution. Costanzo wrote that 
the prosecutors hoped that their recent “successes” would help stop “a string of animal-rights 
terrorist attacks” that affected Utah mink farmers and other businesses over the past five years 
(1998). The U.S. Attorney (David Schwendiman) claimed that this sentence was the harshest 
ever given in a case involving an animal activist crime. Threatened with a 35-year sentence, 
Ellerman implicated three other animal rights activists in the event. A federal jury, however, 
acquitted the three as additional physical evidence of their participation was lacking.   
 







In 2001, Jeffrey Luers was sentenced to 22 years and 8 months in prison for burning three sport 
utility vehicles (SUVs) at a car dealership in Eugene, Oregon. He appealed his sentence, and in 
2007 the Appeals Court remanded back to the Circuit Court for resentencing. In 2008, the Lane 
County Circuit Court reduced the sentence to ten years.  
 
2005 Peter Young  
Young released mink on six mink farms in the Midwest in 1997. He spent seven years as a 
fugitive before being arrested in 2005. His co-defendant Justin Samuels cooperated with the 
government. Young was charged under the AEPA and RICO. The RICO charges were later 
dropped. He pled guilty and was sentenced to two years in prison.  
 
2005 Robert Brooks and Hargit Singh Gill  
Brooks and Singh Gill were indicted for violation of 18 U.S.C . 5 1623 – False Declarations Before 
Grand Jury (two counts) and 18 U.S.C, 3 1001 – False Statements (four counts). The subject of 
the grand jury investigation was an “act of vandalism” of an Old Navy store in Chico, California, 
in March 2003. The FBI described this incident in its report on terrorism incidents between 
2002 and 2005 (FBI 2005b:8). The target in this description was a McDonald’s restaurant, and 
the act of vandalism consisted of graffiti statements such as “Animal Liberation Front,” “Meat is 
Murder,” and “Species Equality.” During the grand jury hearing, the defendants Brooks and 
Singh Gill were asked to identify two of the perpetrators. The defendants had testified that they 







the prosecutor argued that the defendants were well acquainted with the female participants, 
and that therefore the statements before the Grand Jury were false. According to the 
prosecutors, the defendants were involved in driving the two women to the Old Navy store. 
They were convicted and in June 2005 received a $500 fine and 36 months probation.  
 
2006 Ryan Lewis  
Lewis was arrested in 2005 in relation to two attempted arsons and one count of arson of 
commercial buildings in California. The actions were claimed by the ELF. He was sentenced to 
six years in prison. After completing his sentence he will have a three-year term of supervised 
release and be ordered to pay $243,000 restitution. The prosecution was done by the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office of Sacramento.  
 
2006 SHAC7  
Defendants: 
Kevin Kjonaas, Sentence: 6 years 
Lauren Gazzola, Sentence: 4 years, 4 months 
Jacob Conroy, Sentence: 4 years 
Joshua Harper, Sentence: 3 years 
Andrew Stepanian, Sentence: 3 years 








The SHAC defendants were convicted on 2 March 2006. The convictions were confirmed by the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals on 14 October 2009. All of the defendants were convicted of 
conspiracy to violate the Animal Enterprise Protection Act. Kjonaas, Gazzola, Conroy, and 
Harper were also convicted of conspiracy to harass using a telecommunications device (sending 
black faxes). Kjonaas, Gazzola, Conroy, and SHAC USA were convicted of conspiracy to commit 
interstate stalking and three counts of interstate stalking via the Internet. 
  
2007 Operation Backfire or the “Family”  
The defendants in this case were part of what the prosecutors called a “cell”, which was 
allegedly known by the defendants as the “Family.”  
 
Defendants: 
Chelsea Dawn Gerlach (cooperating defendant) – 9 years  
Sarah Kendall Tankersley (cooperating defendant) – 3 years, 10 months  
Stanislas Meyerhoff (cooperating defendant) – 13 years 
Josephine Overaker (not arrested, believed to be abroad) 
Suzanne Savoie (cooperating defendant) – 4 years, 3 months  
Darren Thurston (cooperating defendant) – 3 years, 1 month 
Kevin Tubbs (cooperating defendant) – 12 years, 7 months  
Joyanna Zacher (non-cooperating defendant) – 7 years, 8 months 







Daniel McGowan (non-cooperating defendant) – 7 years  
Jonathan Paul (non-cooperating defendant) – 4 years, 3 months  
Briana Waters (stood trial in 2008, her conviction was later reversed by an Appeals Court and 
remanded a new trial; while she was a non-cooperating defendant, she accepted a cooperating 
plea deal in 2011) 
Justin Solondz (arrested in 2009 in China)  
Rebecca Rubin (not arrested, believed to be abroad) 
Joseph Dibee (not arrested, believed to be abroad) 
Jennifer Kolar (cooperating defendant) – 6 years 
Lacey Phillabaum (cooperating defendant) – 3 years in prison and 3 years probation  
 
William Rodgers had been arrested in this same operation but committed suicide in prison 
shortly after his arrest.  
  
On 19 January 2006 a Grand Jury in Eugene, Oregon, issued indictments against 11 people. 
Later, several more defendants were indicted. The defendants were implicated in 17 attacks, 
including the $12 million arson of the Vail Ski Resort in Vail, Colorado, in 1998 and the sabotage 
of a high-tension power line near Bend, Oregon, in 1999. The defendants were accused of 
attacks on federal land and animal management sites, private meat packing plants, lumber 
facilities, and a car dealership, with damages reaching $80 million. The FBI offered $50,000 each 







application of the terrorism enhancement. The general hearing about this enhancement was on 
15 May 2007. After that there were separate sentencing hearings for each of the defendants.   
 
2007 Rod Coronado  
On 15 February 2006 Coronado was indicted for describing the device that he had used during 
the arson at Michigan State University in 1992 during a speaking engagement. The charges: the 
Distribution of Information Relating to Explosives, Destructive Devices, and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2)(A). The prosecutor alleged that Coronado’s 
intent was that the device be used to commit arson. His trial in September 2007 resulted in a 
hung jury. He later entered a guilty plea and received a one-year prison sentence.  
 
2007 Eric McDavid  
Eric McDavid stood trial in September 2007, charged with conspiracy to commit arson (18 
U.S.C. 371). His co-defendants Lauren Weiner and Zachary Jenson pled guilty for a maximum of 
five years. They cooperated with the government, testifying against McDavid. He was convicted 
by a jury and sentenced in 2008 to 19 years and 7 months imprisonment after the prosecutor 
had sought to apply the terrorism enhancement. In 2010 his request for an appeal was denied.  
 
2008 Tre Arrow  
In 2002, Tre Arrow was charged with involvement in two arson attacks in 2001 in the name of 







Arrow unsuccessfully asked for political asylum in Canada. In 2008, Arrow was sentenced to 78 
months in prison.  
 
2008 Briana Waters  
Briana Waters was one of the defendants in the case Operation Backfire. She was accused of 
participating in an arson attack at the University of Washington in 2001. She decided to face 
trial. In 2008 she was convicted and sentenced to six years imprisonment. In 2010, the  
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Briana's conviction and remanded for a new trial. In 
2011 Waters pled guilty and promised to testify against co-defendants in the case.  
 
2008 Kevin Olliff  
Olliff was arrested for the theft of a thumb drive in February 2008. On 23 October 2008 his bail 
was raised from $10,000 to $500,000.  
 
2009 Marie Mason  
In March 2008, Marie Mason, Frank Ambrose, Aren Burthwick, and Stephanie Lynne Fultz were 
arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit arson; Mason and Ambrose faced additional 
charges related to acts of property destruction that occurred in 1999 and 2000. It came out that 
Ambrose, Mason’s ex-husband, had been assisting the FBI extensively in investigating 
environmental organizing since 2007; despite his cooperation, his plea bargain resulted in a 







admitted involvement in 12 other acts totalling more than $2.5 million in property damage. 
Mason was sentenced on 5 February 2009 at a federal court in Lansing, Michigan. She received 
almost 22 years.  
 
2009 Carrie Feldman  
In October 2009 Carrie Feldman was subpoenaed before the Grand Jury of Davenport in 
relation to the raid on the University of Iowa attributed to the ALF. She refused to testify before 
the Grand Jury and was imprisoned for four months in November 2009 for civil contempt.  
 
2010 Scott DeMuth  
In November 2009, DeMuth was subpoenaed before the Grand Jury of Davenport in relation to 
the 2004 raid on the University of Iowa attributed to the ALF. Together with Carrie Feldman, he 
refused to testify and was taken in custody for civil contempt. On 18 November 2009 he was 
indicted for conspiracy under the AETA for the raid on the University of Iowa. When Scott was 
re-indicted in April 2010, the indictment contained a new allegation of involvement in a 
separate ALF action that occurred in Minnesota in the spring of 2006. In September of 2010, he 
pleaded guilty to a single misdemeanor, conspiracy to commit animal enterprise terrorism in 
violation of the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA), for his involvement in a ferret release 
at a farm in Minnesota in 2006.  
 







Alex Hall and Wiliam Viehl were arrested in March 2009 for a mink release in Utah and another 
attempted mink release in August 2008. They were charged with violation of the AETA. Wiliam 
Viehl entered a non-cooperating guilty plea and was sentenced in February 2010 to 24 months. 
Alex Hall was sentenced in June 2010 to 21 months.   
 
2010 AETA4  
Joseph Buddenberg, Maryam Khajavi, Nathan Pope, and Adriana Stumpo were indicted on 19 
and 20 February 2008 and charged under the AETA with criminal trespass, harassment, and 
intimidation at a bio-medical researcher’s residence in the East Bay. The indictment was 
dismissed on 12 July 2010.  
 
2010 Kevin Olliff  
Unlike most of the previous cases, this case is not a federal case but the State of California v. 
Kevin Olliff. It is also a different case from his 2008 arrest. Olliff was arrested in April 2009 on 
state charges for protest-related activity against UCLA vivisectors three years earlier. He faced 
10 felony charges, including multiple counts of stalking, conspiracy, conspiracy to stalk, and 
threatening of a public servant. The indictment also sought a gang enhancement penalty, 
alleging that the ALF was a criminal street gang and Olliff a member. However, the judge ruled 
that ALF does not meet the definition of a “gang.” Olliff did not make bail and stayed in jail for 







felony counts against him in March 2010. On November 9, 2010, Kevin was sentenced to three 
years in prison after pleading "no contest" to stalking and conspiracy charges.  
 
2010 Steve Murphy  
In April 2010, Steve Murphy was sentenced to five years in prison after pleading guilty to 
charges relating to an attempted arson at a luxury housing development construction site in 
2006 in Pasadena, California.  
 
2010 Gina “Tiga” Wertz and Hugh Farrell 
Hugh Farrell and Gina "Tiga" Wertz were arrested on 24 April 2009 and charged for organizing 
protests on 9 July 2007 against the construction of the highway I-69, specifically for staging an 
“office invasion.” Different activities were constructed as “racketeering” activity under RICO. 
The RICO charges were, however, dropped in March 2010. In July 2010 both pled to 
misdemeanor charges and received 15 months probation.  
 
2011 Walter Bond  
In February 2011, Walter Bond was sentenced to five years in prison in connection with an April 
2010 fire at the Sheepskin Factory in Glendale, Colorado, that caused $500,000 in damages. 
Walter also pled guilty to arson charges related to fires at the Tandy leather store and Tiburon 
restaurant in Salt Lake City in June and July 2010. On 13 October 2011 he was sentenced to 87 








2011 Tim DeChristopher  
DeChristoper was charged with one count of violating the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing 
Reform Act and one count of False Statement. In 2011 he was convicted to two years in prison, 
three years probation, and a $10,000 fine.  
 
